Future PLAN orbat discussion

[Tam]

Ok there is a lot going on in these posts so I want to try to clarify where we agree and disagree. You seem to agree that a reprioritisation of funds is both inevitable and desirable (e.g. shifting resources away from littoral combatants in favour of blue water combatants, from smaller aircraft like J-10 to larger aircraft like J-20, etc.). However, you believe that surface combatants, as a category, will continue to enjoy significant increases in funding over the coming decades even as other developing categories such as aircraft carriers and their air wings come to demand much higher levels of resources than they do today.

Yes, because these larger surface combatants are going to be more expensive as they are capable.

I don't presume that China will ever be making a lot of aircraft carriers. There is still a question of their fundamental vulnerability to new technologies in the future along with the future of the manned air wing. The number of ports in China that can hold aircraft carriers are limited, limited to say, only two. There is also the question of the aircraft carrier as a measured response in peacetime, as it can be viewed as ostentatious, if not threatening, bullying expressions of power. It seems more likely to me, that PLAN will build more LHDs or hybrid LHD with drones, even to LHAs in the future, and this stems from the positive experience of using the Type 071, which has proven, like in the Gulf of Aden missions, capable of leading a task force. Those who champion the carrier within the PLAN will have to convince the higher ups about the cost, reliability, the mission viability of the next carrier and future J-35 based airwings. There is a lot riding on the 003, and if that does not succeed, it would be hard to convince the higher ups of making the next one and the next. The military is full of people with contradicting ideas and visions, some would want more Dong Fengs, others would want more planes, others would want more submarines. If 003 and J-35 both prove to be a hit, you can bet they are going to make more carriers and J-35s and it may be at the expense of less performing segments of the PLA military. If it fails, they might even end the Chinese carrier experiment right there and invest those same resources on something more promising.

The same goes with the submarines, which despite the PLAN's growth, has taken a backseat. That's probably because they are not fully satisfied with what they have to fully invest on it, other than say the Yuans. Perhaps if the PLAN finds a hit design with the Type 95 and 96, then by all means, go for it and mass produce swarms of them. But if the new models only generate a meh feeling with the leadership, they will only produce a minimal quantity if only to sustain a submarine force in operation and training until they have a better, and definitive 'hit' model. Another problem is that submarines are not exactly the best way to express and defend your water claim, escort your civilian fleets, and conduct rescues and support missions for your expat population, because these missions require visibility, when submarines, are invisible.

The growth of the PLAN blue water fleet is a result of a branch breeding results which thereof breeds and justifies further investment with its own momentum. Its all like a company. Losers gets less and the winners get more. Obviously the CCP likes what they are seeing with the blue water fleet for its investment, production is speedy, the ships came within budget, little to no delays, few troubles, and they are able to deploy these forces in hot spots, and getting results. The blue water fleet has become the new flag wavers for the Chinese military. The crux of it were those wolf warrior moments in Libya, Tunisia and the Gulf of Aden. The ships have become the vanguard for enforcing claims in the East and South China Seas. One has to view the blue water fleet as an experiment that in the last fifteen years or so, has proven to be successful.

I'm not quite sure where you see the endpoint of PLAN combat strength. Obviously a large, blue water fleet is important for the reasons you have outlined. I believe, even with relatively flat funding for surface combatants going forwards (say, <30% increase over the next 15 years), that PLAN can come to field a blue water combatant inventory comparable to USN's. You believe that the current proportional allocation of resources to surface combatants will and should be sustained. Is this because you do not believe that relatively flat funding will allow for a force comparable to USN's, or is it because you believe that PLAN will or should aim for a surface combatant inventory that is outright superior to USN's?

For my part, I would not rule out that a future PLAN may come to enjoy significant advantages over USN in certain areas, and surface combatants are one of the more likely categories in which that may occur, but at the present I think the prospect is too distant to be a useful subject for discussion.

Having a predetermined end point does not suggest flexibility. The PLAN operates on results. Like for example, I am not surprised the 054B is going forward and they may relaunch the 054A in new batches. That ship has proven itself in the job and is worth building more around the same parameters but with more up to date technologies. The 055 is still in the proving stage which is why the already proven 052D is still around. If the 055 proves to be a clunker you're going to see more 052D and frigate around But if the 055 has proven itself to be a hit, they will turn on the production faucet on that one.

If you have a proven record and a hit, you can bring that to the bean counters to justify the expense for these new programs. If it looks to you that this kind of defies some master plan the PLAN has, yes it seems that way. There is a long term master plan but itself can be bent and can be made flexible in circumstances because some parts of the master plan turned out to be working better than others. This plan isn't fixed in stone, nor pre-determinate or destined. It would all depends if all these 'experiments', these new stuff, things like the new stealth bomber H-20, or the J-35, Carrier 003, Type 095 and 096, Type 054B/057, the Type 055 and so on will prove to be hits, then work around the hits and failures.

I don't see an end point because I don't think an end point exists. Its a matter of all these experiments succeeding, and the political and threat environment China is facing. Its difficult to quantify how much you are going to need if your back is facing the wall and about what it takes to win. I also don't think the PLAN feels they have certain advantages or superiorities over the USN to warrant dropping the ball, and in fact this feeling of being in the inferior position is what drives them to push even harder.

 

[SimaQian]

America bases carriers all over the world and seems to get away with it. Why couldn't China do the same? And your original assertion is funky to say the least... the world's largest trading nation couldn't find more than a couple of ports on its vast shoreline to base carriers? Is that a joke?

And you're talking about the expansion of Djibouti today; I'm talking about what the base will look like when China is on its eighth carrier. If the facility is too little, then embiggen it. Simple.

Because the Chinese policy is developmental peace. Aircraft carriers are offensive weapons. In runs counter to this policy if you send warplanes that can bomb those poor countries just like what US have been doing in the middle east in the last 20 years. Those Chinese bases outside China are obviously to be used for protecting the trade routes particularly in the Indian ocean.

Putting destroyers and attack submarines in the indian ocean makes more sense than carriers. This is aside from obvious limitation that currently the Chinese carriers are conventional not nuclear. So limited range with available fuel. This further suggests that these carriers are to be used near at home.

 

[Bhurki]

We are grossly off-topic..



Might be wrong on this, but when a new class is brought into production, the first hulls generally tend to take more time to build, fit out and come to service. As production practices get refined and first time issues get worked out, it is customary to see things happen faster in subsequent ships. The whole process tends to become more polished and efficient.

Normally the phase that takes the most amount of time in new class of ships is shake down and sea trials.
The stage of equipping ( between launch and sea trials) more or less takes the same amount of time regardless of what place of order the ship is in.
1 year is common for equipping 052d as far as i have followed, and the fact that the larger and more sophisticated 055 took less than that is suprising at the very least.

 

[jimmyjames30x30]

I would ignore him. His posts are usually rubbish.

I am not in principle against his sentiments, but sentiments are just sentiments. Decision making are not based upon sentiments.

Global Maritime power struggle has been going on since 1500s. China has been late to the game of industrialization. Industrialized naval powers has been fighting for more than 2 centuries now. Those ports in weak and small nations that has the best condition to become a navy bases has already been taken by the previous superpowers and old colonial powers.

If China is set on a peaceful rise, she would not opt for taking over naval bases by force. So the options is to find and development new ports to become naval bases. Such is difficult because they are bound by geography. The better ones has already been taken. This is why you don't see Chinese navy stationing overseas, because there aren't any readily available port to call a base.

 

[asif iqbal]

this is what you call a carrier strike group

and formation sailing within the battle group is practiced and practiced and is very important

this is good image

 

[Lethe]

I don't presume that China will ever be making a lot of aircraft carriers. There is still a question of their fundamental vulnerability to new technologies in the future along with the future of the manned air wing. The number of ports in China that can hold aircraft carriers are limited, limited to say, only two. There is also the question of the aircraft carrier as a measured response in peacetime, as it can be viewed as ostentatious, if not threatening, bullying expressions of power. It seems more likely to me, that PLAN will build more LHDs or hybrid LHD with drones, even to LHAs in the future, and this stems from the positive experience of using the Type 071, which has proven, like in the Gulf of Aden missions, capable of leading a task force. Those who champion the carrier within the PLAN will have to convince the higher ups about the cost, reliability, the mission viability of the next carrier and future J-35 based airwings. There is a lot riding on the 003, and if that does not succeed, it would be hard to convince the higher ups of making the next one and the next. The military is full of people with contradicting ideas and visions, some would want more Dong Fengs, others would want more planes, others would want more submarines. If 003 and J-35 both prove to be a hit, you can bet they are going to make more carriers and J-35s and it may be at the expense of less performing segments of the PLA military. If it fails, they might even end the Chinese carrier experiment right there and invest those same resources on something more promising.

The same goes with the submarines, which despite the PLAN's growth, has taken a backseat. That's probably because they are not fully satisfied with what they have to fully invest on it, other than say the Yuans. Perhaps if the PLAN finds a hit design with the Type 95 and 96, then by all means, go for it and mass produce swarms of them. But if the new models only generate a meh feeling with the leadership, they will only produce a minimal quantity if only to sustain a submarine force in operation and training until they have a better, and definitive 'hit' model. Another problem is that submarines are not exactly the best way to express and defend your water claim, escort your civilian fleets, and conduct rescues and support missions for your expat population, because these missions require visibility, when submarines, are invisible.

Aviation-capable LHDs absolutely cannot serve as an alternative to aircraft carriers. PLAN needs nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers for the same reason it needs a large blue water fleet in general: to defend both local and regional interests and, critically, trade, especially imports of oil. But China can't effectively do this by running convoys and setting up bases on a few islands. Rather, PLAN requires the ability to engage and defeat enemy forces at sea. PLAN needs SSNs to monitor, deter, and sink enemy high value units, and it requires carriers to defend naval and civilian assets against adversary land- and sea-based airpower. Don't get distracted by the history of how USN has used its carriers since WW2, i.e. as a bludgeon against third-world nations, the role of carriers in PLAN is sea control, and it is irreplaceable.

The strategic goal is to secure trade against threat of coercion. Operationally this means the ability to neutralise the American carrier battle groups and other ancillary forces (both land and sea-based) operated by other other potentially involved nations, in those locations where they are likely to attempt a blockade, which will assuredly NOT be within the "killzone" afforded by mainland tac air superiority, DF-21D, etc. The PLA cannot fulfil this strategically essential task without robust aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, backed by strategic airpower, etc. Conventional submarines and aviation-capable LHAs will not suffice.

 

[AndrewS]

The strategic goal is to secure trade against threat of coercion. Operationally this means the ability to neutralise the American carrier battle groups and other ancillary forces (both land and sea-based) operated by other other potentially involved nations, in those locations where they are likely to attempt a blockade, which will assuredly NOT be within the "killzone" afforded by mainland tac air superiority, DF-21D, etc. The PLA cannot fulfil this strategically essential task without robust aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, backed by strategic airpower, etc. Conventional submarines and aviation-capable LHAs will not suffice.

That is one goal.

But more important is the ability of the Chinese military to impose its own blockade on the First Island Chain and seal it off from outside support.

Realistically, the US Navy cannot abandon the First Island Chain, and then has no choice but to venture into the "killzone" near the Chinese coast.

The range of tactical air and DF-21Ds stretches to say 1500km, which covers all of the First Island Chain.

 

[Tam]

Aviation-capable LHDs absolutely cannot serve as an alternative to aircraft carriers. PLAN needs nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers for the same reason it needs a large blue water fleet in general: to defend both local and regional interests and, critically, trade, especially imports of oil. But China can't effectively do this by running convoys and setting up bases on a few islands. Rather, PLAN requires the ability to engage and defeat enemy forces at sea. PLAN needs SSNs to monitor, deter, and sink enemy high value units, and it requires carriers to defend naval and civilian assets against adversary land- and sea-based airpower. Don't get distracted by the history of how USN has used its carriers since WW2, i.e. as a bludgeon against third-world nations, the role of carriers in PLAN is sea control, and it is irreplaceable.

The strategic goal is to secure trade against threat of coercion. Operationally this means the ability to neutralise the American carrier battle groups and other ancillary forces (both land and sea-based) operated by other other potentially involved nations, in those locations where they are likely to attempt a blockade, which will assuredly NOT be within the "killzone" afforded by mainland tac air superiority, DF-21D, etc. The PLA cannot fulfil this strategically essential task without robust aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, backed by strategic airpower, etc. Conventional submarines and aviation-capable LHAs will not suffice.

More accurate to replace 'SSN' in your text with 'DDG'. The fact that PLAN is making more 055 and not 093 tells you they got their strategic goals and plans figured out. And DDGs, as well as FFGs are need to cover your carriers. Carriers do not work in isolation. you need a corresponding increase in escorts to cover them.

This does not mean you won't have future SSNs with the PLAN, PLAN will go with a distributed lethality concept into and across a wide range of platforms.

SSNs do not secure trade against coercion. That's not their job, and that's never their job. Its more of the opposite. The Soviet Navy secured a large fleet of SSNs and that's not meant to protect their own trade routes, but to disrupt the supply routes for NATO across the Atlantic. In fact, its the role of the disruptive, asymetric navy to be heavily sub reliant, you know, like Germany in both wars. But U-boats didn't and could not protect Germany's own trade routes from the Royal Navy put their own squeeze on that, given that the German surface navy lacked the strength to fully challenge the RN at sea.

Historically, the job of securing trade routes, and you can go back to two world wars for that, has been the escort expressed in terms of light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts ala frigates and corvettes. And yes with escort carriers. Not large aircraft carriers, but small ones that were converted from merchant ships. Like this. These escort carriers specialized in ASW against U-boats.



You may probably say that LHD, LHA and drone carriers are closer to this light carrier concept.

Needless to say, the Allied escort fleet did a lot of dying, or the most dying because they took the brunt of both Germany's combined submarine and aircraft attacks on supply routes in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Across the world, the IJN's lack of proper focus on destroyers and escorts for AAW and ASW was a factor that helped them get sunk in the war, and by the time they finally got AAW focused destroyers like the Akizuki class and ASW escorts, namely Kaibokan, it was too late. The IJN's impressive destroyer fleet had a flaw, and that was they acted as glorified torpedo boats, a job that they did very well when the situation happened. But they were not the best ships for supply route escort and protection in design, and that became a problem when they were forced to defend supply routes to say Guadacanal which the Japanese lost.

The experience of two World Wars established the primacy of the escort ship in its various forms, corvette, frigate, destroyer, light AAW cruiser, escort carriers, as the defender of supply routes and in turn, naval power. That is why the post war experience remains heavily reliant on surface ships, namely the twin of the destroyer and the frigate.

 

[Lethe]

More accurate to replace 'SSN' in your text with 'DDG'. The fact that PLAN is making more 055 and not 093 tells you they got their strategic goals and plans figured out. And DDGs, as well as FFGs are need to cover your carriers. Carriers do not work in isolation. you need a corresponding increase in escorts to cover them.

This does not mean you won't have future SSNs with the PLAN, PLAN will go with a distributed lethality concept into and across a wide range of platforms.

SSNs do not secure trade against coercion. That's not their job, and that's never their job. Its more of the opposite. The Soviet Navy secured a large fleet of SSNs and that's not meant to protect their own trade routes, but to disrupt the supply routes for NATO across the Atlantic. In fact, its the role of the disruptive, asymetric navy to be heavily sub reliant, you know, like Germany in both wars. But U-boats didn't and could not protect Germany's own trade routes from the Royal Navy put their own squeeze on that, given that the German surface navy lacked the strength to fully challenge the RN at sea.

Historically, the job of securing trade routes, and you can go back to two world wars for that, has been the escort expressed in terms of light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts ala frigates and corvettes. And yes with escort carriers. Not large aircraft carriers, but small ones that were converted from merchant ships. Like this. These escort carriers specialized in ASW against U-boats.

I don't dispute your characterisation of the role of various types and how they are useful to PLAN, my objection can be summed up in the phrase: you cannot defend your way to victory. Defense of convoys against air, sea and undersea threats is necessary and important, but it is not something that will ultimately deliver victory. At most it can prevent defeat. What is required is the ability to deter, monitor, and if necessary destroy the threat capabilities that are seeking to interfere with China's strategically sensitive trade in the first place. Operationally, this means the ability to confront and defeat the American carrier battle groups. SSNs are the single best tool for that job. As you suggested earlier yourself, SSN production is limited because PLAN is not satisfied with 093, not because there is a lack of recognition of their value.

The operational role of the carrier air wing is first and foremost to eliminate air-based threats and also to provide ISR support for the elimination of sea-based threats primarily by other assets. There are both offensive and defensive elements to these roles, but most importantly what the carrier and its air wing provides is the ability to take the initiative and reshape the battlespace in a way that destroyer/frigate escorts, airpower operating from islands of known and fixed location, and aviation-capable LHDs cannot. Averting defat is one thing, securing victory is quite another, and it is the latter that requires robust carrier and SSN forces.

 

[Tam]

I don't dispute your characterisation of the role of various types and how they are useful to PLAN, my objection can be summed up in the phrase: you cannot defend your way to victory. Defense of convoys against air, sea and undersea threats is necessary and important, but it is not something that will ultimately deliver victory. At most it can prevent defeat. What is required is the ability to deter, monitor, and if necessary destroy the threat capabilities that are seeking to interfere with China's strategically sensitive trade in the first place. Operationally, this means the ability to confront and defeat the American carrier battle groups. SSNs are the single best tool for that job. As you suggested earlier yourself, SSN production is limited because PLAN is not satisfied with 093, not because there is a lack of recognition of their value.

The operational role of the carrier air wing is first and foremost to eliminate air-based threats and also to provide ISR support for the elimination of sea-based threats primarily by other assets. There are both offensive and defensive elements to these roles, but most importantly what the carrier and its air wing provides is the ability to take the initiative and reshape the battlespace in a way that destroyer/frigate escorts, airpower from islands of known and fixed location, and aviation-capable LHDs cannot.

I don't think China has any offensive capability outside of the first island chain, and investment to defeat the USN in the open ocean on a hot war would be tremendous. China is so way behind in submarine numbers, compared to the USN in terms of nuclear submarines, and that's even assuming you have a submarine equally as quiet as a Virginia. China does not have realistically the resources and the time to confront the USN symmetrically (carrier vs. carrier) in the open ocean, and its not clear that a even a modern quiet SSN can get through a carrier screen (successful carrier group penetrations documented were in fact by SSKs). So the best way to play this game is not to play.

By the way, quiet does not help you when an ASW ship is actively pinging because quiet or not, your sub is still reflecting echoes. How much does an SSN cost versus a Type 055? Do you need to penetrate an escort screen and sink the carrier with torpedoes? Why not just an SSGN in a standoff mode and rain a horde of antiship missiles at the carrier group? But if you're talking about this, would it just be better to have guided missile destroyers and cruisers, or even arsenal ships to do the job?

Just remember what happened in the Russian-Japanese war. The IJN does not have the resources to defeat the Russian Navy at the home waters of the Russian Navy. It only needs to defeat the Russians near its home waters and that's what they did.

If you are going to defend trade routes, you need a visible and persistent presence and that's what a surface ship provides. Subs are invisible and they are not persistent.

If you are going to have carriers you need to protect them from submarines too, so that means a corresponding investment in AAW role ships and ASW role ships.

Let me add that historically surface ships are also used to escort submarines. German torpedoboats, which are really corvettes and frigates, often escort U-boats going in and out of the Bay of Biscay. The Soviet Bastion strategy called for a large number of ASW forces, including ships to protect their own SSNs and SSBNs in certain zones. The use of the Type 056 is similar to this strategy, being used to screen for the 093s and 094s at the South China Seas.