Gone are the days where you will actually see 90 aircrafts on board a carrier. There is a saying "Train like you fight, and fight like you train". If realistic training doesn't involve operating at peak capacity, don't expect to surge well during emergencies. That will be a recipe for operational disaster.
A carrier's operational agility and maneuver space is influenced by three factors. These are the distance to the objective, the distance from critical resupply nodes and the overall volume of air and sea over which the CSG can exercise defensive dominance. (page 5, Enabling the Carrier Strike Group by Dr. Daniel Goure Lexington Institute). IMO. there is presently conflicting behaviour in the USN leadership between its strategic asset acquisition and the operational deployment of diminishing embarked aviation wing. Sortie generation rate (SGR) is primarily correlated to the size of an embarked aviation wing, the lower the aviation assets the lower is the SGR.
The Ford class is designed with features intended to enhance its ability to launch, recover, and service aircraft, such as a slightly larger flight deck, dedicated weapons handling areas, and increased aircraft refueling stations. The Navy set the SGR requirement for CVN-78 to increase the sortie generation capability of embarked aircraft to 160 sorties per day (12-hour fly day) and to surge to 270 sorties per day (24-hour fly day) as compared to the CVN-68
Nimitz class SGR demonstration of 120 sorties per day/240 sorties for 24-hour surge.
During the 2013 operational assessment, DOT&E conducted an analysis of past aircraft carrier operations in major conflicts. The analysis concludes that the CVN 78 SGR requirement is well above historical levels and that CVN 78 is unlikely to achieve that requirement. This analysis on SGR is further supported by a 2017 RAND study “Future aircraft carrier options” where the historical SGR from Operation Desert Storm averages are far below 120 per day.
