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Lethe

Captain
Pretty certain that the Type 054B frigate is from a decided PLAN 4000 ton displacement requirement, same as the 054A. That decision for the 054B may have been made early in 2016, picking from various design proposals, the losing ones eventually became what CSSC displayed in the defense show at Abu Dhabi as export frigates, which are pegged at 4000 tons.

Well, rumours indicate that 054B displaces somewhat more than 054A -- 4500 tons, perhaps. I think it's fantastic that PLAN has vessels in this category: affordable blue water combatants with a full suite of peer-warfare capabilities. Most nations (including of course the US) no longer have this, and it hurts them. I have no doubt that such vessels have a valuable role to play for the foreseeable future. What I am suggesting is that a future PLAN could also, simultaneously, accommodate a larger frigate, with most of the same systems as the 054 series (save perhaps the main gun), optimised for long range, long endurance, independent general purpose operations: think western IOR, the Atlantic, west Africa and the Americas, the Med, etc. This vessel would be significantly cheaper than 052D/E (acquisition and personnel, through deleting the long-range AAW capabilities, crew <200) while exceeding it in range and endurance and offering superior aviation facilities and others to support SOF.
 
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Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Well, rumours indicate that 054B displaces somewhat more than 054A -- 4500 tons, perhaps. I think it's fantastic that PLAN has vessels in this category: affordable blue water combatants with a full suite of peer-warfare capabilities. Most nations (including of course the US) no longer have this, and it hurts them. I have no doubt that such vessels have a valuable role to play for the foreseeable future. What I am suggesting is that a future PLAN could also, simultaneously, accommodate a larger frigate, with most of the same systems as the 054 series (save perhaps the main gun), optimised for long range, long endurance, independent general purpose operations: think western IOR, the Atlantic, west Africa and the Americas, the Med, etc. This vessel would be significantly cheaper than 052D/E (acquisition and personnel, through deleting the long-range AAW capabilities, crew <200) while exceeding it in range and endurance and offering superior aviation facilities and others to support SOF.

I believe 4000 is just a rough figure used as a guide post, and it didn't say whether this is empty, standard or full displacement. If a ship is 4000 tons empty it can be over 4500 in full. Type 054A is quoted slightly over 4000 but its not clear if that figure is standard or full.

While some issued requirements center around a weight range like I suspect, the French FTI, other issued requirements like the USN's FFG(X) never specified any weight at all. What they gave you is a money figure --- $950 million --- plus a list of required equipment on the ship, with minimum requirements like 16 VLS cells and 4 ASM canisters (they didn't specify the make of the ASM). You fill in the rest. The result is the contested field are full of varied designs and weights, from the full destroyer like Navantia F100 and FREMM ships to upscaled LCS to militarized cutters, and a late entry that is a light and intermediate frigate.

So I don't know what the PLAN's procurement procedures are, if they use a tonnage as the guidepost for the requirements of a money figure. The navy makes clear what it wants to do with the ship, and gives specific requirements --- use at least a 32 cell VLS, must have TAS, must have radar that of this range, the speed and range requirement, the budget and so on. If they don't give the tonnage, the varying contesting proposals can have different tonnages but whats really important is whether the design meets the budget, the requirements and the missions. Then you debate whether this design does it better or this other design. Setting a design to revolve around a tonnage requirement can mean a straight jacket for the designers. You don't start with the design from a weight perspective, you start it from the mission perspective and work your way from that with the budget setting the fence that you don't climb over.

In a sense, the PLAN already have "larger" frigates than the 054A --- namely the refits of the Type 051B, the Project 956E and EMs, and maybe the Type 052B in the future. But do they perform any missions capably than a Type 054A for the additional cost of fuel and personnel?

Do note that a 6000 ton ship doing the same missions as a 4000 ton ship that can be purchased for much less is also a waste of money, or just simply too hard on the budget. That is why, all of a sudden, Europe has this blow back on the larger frigates by suddenly cutting back their contracts and building smaller frigates --- the French FTI, the Italian PPA and the British Type 31.

I am not saying whether a 4000, 5000, or 6000 ton frigate would be better. If space and weight is needed, then it is added purposely but we should not add them for the sake of making the ship bigger only to see them not efficiently utilized later. A bigger ship is also a heavier ship and would cost more fuel to operate.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
You can't build a force structure around the availability of overseas bases, as it then becomes a trivial exercise to cripple PLAN's ability to operate, no less than if USAF sized its bomber aircraft only to be able to reach China from Guam. You might as well be flashing a "strike boss here for massive damage" sign. Warship characteristics reflect intended mission profiles. Is it really so difficult to imagine that a design that had its origins in the early 2000s and the strategic requirements and ambitions of the nation at that time may not be perfectly matched to the nation's strategic requirements and ambitions in the 2030s and beyond?
Sure you can. The USN has done exactly that. BTW, did the possibility of the US striking Djibouti (as it surely could) dissuade the Chinese military from building a base right next to a US military base? Well we both know the answer to that question. Regardless, I don't see any kind of reports saying that even the 054A is having any kind of problems with endurance during its deployments to the ME, so what kind of problem is your 6,000t solution looking to fix, really?

No. The jumping off point for this discussion was the idea that PLAN is *not* going to slim down to a two or three-type navy. The vessel I am proposing would be in addition to ongoing 054 and 052 series development and is merely an illustration of the possibilities that exist for the future. We can have a discussion about the merits of the specific suggestion, but the broader point is this: superpowers find that they have all sorts of requirements, and they have the budgets and depth of force structure to invest not only in "swiss army knife" capabilities, but relatively niche ones as well.
That is a strange statement, given that in the past you have used this exact 6,000t figure to espouse your future two-tier PLAN ORBAT. Not to mention that I find it exceedingly difficult to justify a 6,000t ship operating in the midst of a 4,500-5,000t 054B, a 7,500-8,000t 052E, and a 12,000 to 13,000t 055/A.

The ridiculous thing about this discussion is that you seem to acknowledge that 056 is inadequate and calls for a more capable successor. That is to say, you acknowledge that a capability gulf exists between the 056 and 054 types that could and should be narrowed. The rest is quibbling over details, although a major point of departure seems to be the conceptual emphasis I place on littoral ASW, which is because in the long run I expect this to emerge as the primary challenge for Chinese naval supremacy in the region, as the US carrier groups retreat from this position in the face of broad array of capabilities that will increasingly threaten them.
There are some big differences in the "details" here, let's not equivocate here. All I have been advocating is a hangar, and 2 quad slant launchers instead of 2 dual slant launchers. That's it. That is exactly what a 1,800t P18 looks like BTW. You are asking for all kinds of fanciness to be added to a corvette whose primary job is littoral patrol and ASW, and turn it into some kind of super-corvette looks and acts like a frigate, that can single-handed annihilate legions of enemy SSNs. If the PLAN is too cheap to put a hangar on the 056, it certainly isn't going to go for some new super-corvette if and when it finally decides to upgrade its corvette series.
 
now noticed the tweet
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Une vue partielle de la base navale de Zhoushan

Translated from French by
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A partial view of the naval base of Zhoushan

DWkf7-UU8AEoopf.jpg
 

Lethe

Captain
Sure you can. The USN has done exactly that. BTW, did the possibility of the US striking Djibouti (as it surely could) dissuade the Chinese military from building a base right next to a US military base? Well we both know the answer to that question.

I didn't say you shouldn't build or make use of overseas bases, only that you can't base your force structure and military strategy around having them. If you could then the US Navy could just about dispense with its aircraft carriers, which it very sensibly does not.

Regardless, I don't see any kind of reports saying that even the 054A is having any kind of problems with endurance during its deployments to the ME, so what kind of problem is your 6,000t solution looking to fix, really?

Good question. I don't have enough information to provide a definite answer, and nor does anyone else so far as I am aware. It would strike me as odd, however, if PLAN's first modern blue water frigate, designed in the very early stages of the 21st century when PLAN was still overwhelming focused on operations within the first island chain, in fact turned out to be ideally suited not only for operations in the second island chain and eastern IOR, but deployments even further afield.

That is a strange statement, given that in the past you have used this exact 6,000t figure to espouse your future two-tier PLAN ORBAT.

My first post in this discussion was clear and unambiguous: "Distinct from my previous conception whereby a 6000-ton frigate replaced the 054-series in production, I think a 6000-ton frigate could have a role in a future PLAN..."

Obviously my previous conception has been rendered invalid, at least for the moment, by developments regarding 054B and 052E. The possibility space evolves. I am not here to issue dogmatic proclamations about what PLAN will look like in future, merely to illustrate that the range of what it could plausibly look like is broader than is assumed by the linear extrapolations from the present that many are so fond of.

So I don't know what the PLAN's procurement procedures are, if they use a tonnage as the guidepost for the requirements of a money figure. The navy makes clear what it wants to do with the ship, and gives specific requirements --- use at least a 32 cell VLS, must have TAS, must have radar that of this range, the speed and range requirement, the budget and so on. If they don't give the tonnage, the varying contesting proposals can have different tonnages but whats really important is whether the design meets the budget, the requirements and the missions. Then you debate whether this design does it better or this other design. Setting a design to revolve around a tonnage requirement can mean a straight jacket for the designers. You don't start with the design from a weight perspective, you start it from the mission perspective and work your way from that with the budget setting the fence that you don't climb over.

Obviously tonnage is an index of capability and not itself the characteristic of interest. Nonetheless, it is a good guide. If you want to put more capability on the 056 hull without sacrificing other qualities, then it is going to get bigger. If you want to increase range and endurance on top of that, it will get bigger again. These are reliable relationships.
 

Lethe

Captain
Your accusations are extremely vague, like "the structure of the program" and "how it came about" and "conservative, closed-minded nature" of US sub development. I don't know what you mean by any of these statements or how you intend to provide evidence for these claims.

The major source for my impressions of US submarine development as conservative and hostile to innovation is the book Cold War Submarines: the Design and Construction of US and Soviet Submarines by Norman Polmar, which I was inspired to read by the contributions of Vepr157 in discussions such as
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one. You can view some of the relevant pages regarding the Virginia-class on Google Books (pp. 314-316).

An excerpt from the foreword:

By the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet submarines were radically different in design and capabilities [....] it is useful to examine how and why this divergence occurred [....] significantly, for much of the Cold War, the US Navy had a highly centralised, authoritarian organisation. The head of Naval Nuclear Propulsion held de facto control of submarine development, with virtually unqualified power to veto -- if not enforce -- key design decisions. Indeed, the incumbent of this position, Admiral H.G. Rickover, by the early 1960s was able to deter any infusion of design ideas or concepts from outside the senior officers of the nuclear submarine community unless it corresponded with his views and goals

[....] In contrast, the Soviet Union had several design bureaus engaged in submarine development during the Cold War. Those bureaus were, to a large degree, in competition in submarine design, although ostensibly each specialised in different types of submarines. Further, the Soviet regime pursued to various stages of fruition innovative proposals from qualified (and at times unqualified) submarine designers and naval officers. This, in turn, led to the examination of innumerable submarine designs and concepts, which contributed to the highly innovative submarines produced by Soviet design bureaus and shipyards.

And here is a quote from Norman Friedman, who seems to be the other preeminent author in this field:

Certainly many of the US nuclear programme's characteristics [688 series and earlier] can be attributed to [Admiral Rickover's] person views: the primacy of the powerplant in submarine design, the absolute unwillingness to entertain trade-off analysis, what some would consider an obsession with safety and reliability leading to design conservatism [....]

In many ways its proposed design [Seawolf SSN-21] appears to reflect a view that American designers have been far too conservative, and have been overtaken by developments in Europe and in the Soviet Union. Some would go so far as to describe [Seawolf] as an Americanized (if grossly enlarged) Victor [the then-new Soviet SSN].

--- Submarine Design and Development, 184-5
 
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Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
The major source for my impressions of US submarine development as conservative and hostile to innovation is the book Cold War Submarines: the Design and Construction of US and Soviet Submarines by Norman Polmar, which I was inspired to read by the contributions of Vepr157 in discussions such as
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one. You can view some of the relevant pages regarding the Virginia-class on Google Books (pp. 314-316).

An excerpt from the foreword:



And here is a quote from Norman Friedman, who seems to be the other preeminent author in this field:
That is an interesting claim, since I fail to see which developments in Europe and the Soviet Union have overtaken the Seawolf, even at this present time, 29 years after the Seawolf was laid down. Perhaps you can point out these developments to me. This also speaks nothing of the Virginia or its design team, or the current submarine leadership team. You are essentially using a book published 13 years ago to condemn not just the entirety of the USN's submarine leadership in power now but also those that will be, well into the 2040s, which I find to be a stunningly dramatic claim.
 
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