The problem I see with concurrent 052D and 055 production runs is that the two do the same job.
The 055 may have newer sensors and systems than the first 052D, but don't you think the PLAN will also modify the 052D design (if they were committed to a large production run over a long time) as new sensors and systems become available? If they do build 052D and 055s concurrently, would it not make sense to update the later 052Ds with the same generation of sensors and key systems as is now available for the 055?
As such, I don't think there will be a big difference in the cost of sensors and systems. Even if there is, that would underscore the point that the 055s are the better choice, as you are getting newer, and presumably better sensors and systems.
If 052D does get a 24 ship production run, I do believe later ships may leverage certain technologies that 055 and later 055 variants will pioneer.
However, 055 is still a substantially larger vessel and thus capable of carrying much more capable sensors with a greater number, as well as more VLS cells... and the larger size of 055 also means it will likely be capable of adopting more advanced propulsion in future when it arrives (namely IEPS) and thus can potentially be equipped with more advanced (and more costly) weapons such as DEWs and railguns which the 052D will likely be unable to adopt due to its smaller size possibly leaving insufficient space for adopting more advanced propulsion.
All of those possibilities together makes me think 055 will be somewhat more expensive than 052D.
I also believe that having some overlapping capabilities between 052D and 055 is sensible, for the sake of redundancy if some ships in a task force are lost during combat actions, and overall flexibility. Of course the question is whether the cost is worth it...
As for VLS costs, well I actually look at it in a different way compared to total procurement cost. Instead, I think cost per VLS is more important and relevant in determining which ship to choose to focus on. That is the cost to add one unit of VLS to the fleet.
The 055 will cost more than the 052D, but it will also have potentially twice as many VLS cells. So long as the cost of ship divided by number of VLS cells carried by the 055 is higher than the 052D, that's better value in my book.
Regarding total ship cost (procurement cost and operational cost), VLS is only one factor to consider I think.
Even if we ignore cost and only look at capability, I think armament should only be one factor as well -- command capabilities, additional sensors, CeC, ELINT, etc are all things that need to be accounted for. And some of those capabilities cannot be "scaled" -- for instance it may be that only an 055 will have the size to host a true facilities for a flag officer and their staff, where a smaller 052D or 054B simply doesn't have the space for it and where hosting only a flag officer and a part of their staff does not produce the same fraction of effectiveness in the same mission.
The 052D is pretty much the ultimate evolution of the 052 hull design. It deserves great respect for how much capability they managed to squeeze in such a modest sized hull, and how far they have taken the original hull design. But the physical size and configuration limitations of that hull design means they cannot really hope to take it much further.
The 055 represents the next chapter of PLAN top end surface combat power.
-snip-
Co-operative engagement means you do not need expensive AESA radar and battle management systems on every escort ship. The PLAN could easily and happily load long range SAMs on the CCL equipped 054Bs and have them rely on nearby 055s, AWACS, UAVs and other assets for targeting information to function as picket ships.
Such ships can fulfill the role the 052D hopes to take within a PLAN task group at a fraction of the cost of an 052D.
I agree that 055 is indisputably going to be the most capable surface combatant of the Chinese Navy going into the next few decades.
I also do agree that "054B" will likely have certain capabilities and parameters that make it competitive with 052D in some ways.
However, I also believe that the Chinese Navy should retain a mid-heavy weight destroyer class like the 052D in significant numbers, and that its role cannot be replaced through recent developments of CeC, simply because I do not think offboard sensors have reached a state of maturity where the Chinese Navy (or indeed, any serious high tech Navy) can afford to
This isn't to say I'm advocating for every surface combatant to be equipped with expensive and powerful active sensors and a large number of VLS cells, but I do think there needs to be a balance in the foreseeable future where a significant number of such ships exist (in the large destroyer and destroyer classes) and are balanced by a lower tier of ships with less capable sensors and less capable armament (in frigate classes).
As such, if I was in charge, I would prefer to get more 055s at the expense of 052Ds while relying on 054Bs to make up the shortfall in overall numbers.
I would expect 052D construction to continue as the first 055 is being built and trialed. But once the PLAN is satisfied that the 055 project is a success and delivered as promised, I would expect 052D production to stop and switch over entirely to 055 production.
Your position does make sense given your premises, but I think my position is also fairly well laid out. I suppose we have slightly different views on the Chinese Navy's most optimal future orbat structure which is underpinned by different views on the viability, capabilities, and costs of certain technologies.
Personally I am fond of a 4 x 24 fleet organization, that can potentially emerge in the mid-late 2020s.
24 054As
24 054Bs
24 052D/Es
24 055/As
For such a surface combatant orbat, assuming 1/3 of such a fleet would be in port in refit or giving crew rest/leave at any one time, that leaves 16 of each type of ship available for operations at any one time.
For a
wartime situation against a high tech foe in the western pacific, I think the composition of various forces would be intended to have enough large destroyers:destroyers:frigates to have a ratio of 2:4:4 escorts available for a wartime CSG (2 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054A/Bs), with intention for three such CSGs, to operate mostly in westpac during wartime.
2 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054A/Bs may be overkill for the escort of a single carrier, but given the capability of the potential adversaries which the Chinese Navy faces, I think that such an escort during wartime should be quite necessary.
That leaves 10 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054Bs, 4 054As available for other missions, including escorting task groups of lower importance or in conjunction with a wartime CSG (such as an amphibious group which could attach itself to a CSG to become a combined task force); or conducting blue water SAG missions (especially for the 055/As available), or escorting replenishment ships travelling between bases to a CSG in westpac (which would require less of a surface combatant escort, possibly only 2 frigates or a destroyer), or convoy protection, or even conducting closer in naval base and port defence alongside 056 corvettes and land based airpower.
The "excess" of 055/As leftover which are not part of a CSG compared to other ships is deliberate, and reflects my belief that 055/As may operate somewhat independently or in small SAGs among each other to perform supplementary combat actions in conjunction with the rest of the CSGs (and of course land based air power and 2nd Arty) as part of an overall strategic goal. This may include offensive missions such as conducting LACM strikes, or defensive missions to help support a more forward deployed sensor and AAW net from China's coast to provide more safe space for maneuvre for auxiliary ships.
OTOH, in
peacetime (or against a low tech foe in blue water long distance missions), I think the 3 CSGs can afford to have a halved escort force of only 1 055/A, 2 052D/Es, and 2 054A/Bs. That leaves a far larger number of ships available for other missions, including 13 055/As, 10 052D/Es and 10 054A/Bs, and such a fleet would conduct a variety of peacetime missions including supporting a few forward deployed amphibious ready groups, conducting showing the flag missions, and general patrol missions near China's coast and in blue water... of course more free ships also means more ships and more crew could be afforded to have downtime on shore at any one time, which during peacetime can probably be afforded.
PS: the "3 CSGs" of course only reflect active carriers that are capable of performing action... I envision a total carrier fleet of 5-6 carriers of which at least 3 are either at sea or capable of being put immediately to sea.
PPS: I may have gotten carried away with my overall fleet vision, but I am firmly of the belief that a wartime CSG against a high tech opponent should optimally have an escort force of 2 055/As, 4 052D/Es and 4 054A/Bs, which I think would provide a balance of sufficientASW capabilities, AAW capabilities, command capabilities... and would also provide sufficient mutual redundancy support in those capabilities if any friendly escort ships are damaged or destroyed during combat actions.
However, we are still a few years away from that point, and in the meantime, they could easily still pump out enough 054Ds to hit the 12 unit rumoured planned production run that was floated a while back.
I expect 12 052Ds to definitely be built, the question for me is whether they will hit the rumoured 24 unit count..