China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[escobar]

I certainly don't expect that to happen either. My take is simply that actual deterrence derives from the capability to respond effectively to any possible attack. This quote from the Wikipedia entry on the New Start Treaty, to me, says it all:

"The Pentagon's "Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012" found that...​

You should also read "The Science of Military Strategy".

even if Russia did cheat and achieved a total surprise attack with a breakout force, it would have "little to no effect" on U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities" (my emphasis). Now, that's deterrence!

If that happens, US cities are already burning and deterrence has failed.

 

[SpicySichuan]

Could is not a term of art in war; will is.
Did "minimum deterrence" prevent that parade in the Taiwan Straits in 1996?
But, we haven't seen any US aircraft carriers in the Black Sea (treaties notwithstanding), now have we?

As far as the European "deterrence forces", I simply cannot believe that you don't recognize those as fig leaves covering the once might imperial egos. What does any NATO country need with nuclear weapons when the US has sufficient mega-tonnage to deter any nation? C'mom man? England and France? Those are China's model?

Back in 1996, China had probably less than 15 DF-5s (probably not even DF-5A). Also, the Chinese conventional forces remained in the 1960s level, so any conflict over the Taiwan Straight would have been a clear-cut victory for U.S. forces. Keep in mind that DF-5s need 2 hours of refueling before launching. These 2 hours give USAF's B-1B (China did not have radars capable of detecting these bombers in 1996) enough time to search and destroy the DF-5 silos. In another word, in 1996, China had "limited deterrence" when dealing with the U.S. Keep in mind that while the DF-3s and DF-4s could be launched from mobile launch pads (against Russia), DF-5s are too big. With the mobile DF-31A entering service in 2006, China now has a more survivable 2nd strike "minimum deterrence" in dealing with the U.S. Britain and France cannot be China's model because Chinese SSBNs are too loud, so PLAN SSBNs could only supplement land-based mobile ICBMs. I doubted the type 096s would achieve the same level of quietness the Ohio or Borei classes. Nevertheless SSBNs allow China's minimum deterrence to be more spread out, so more missiles would survive after absorbing an initial enemy strike. However, I did argue earlier that DF-5s are dumb and unnecessary because their silos will be the first ones to get knock out in nuclear exchange, so given China's mountainous geography, DF-31, DF-31As and DF-41s would ideally remain the core of China's nuclear deterrence. They are the most survivable when kept deep underground, so as long as 30-40 DF-31As and DF-41s survive, that would be a credible deterrence. In fact, even 10 American cities (including DC, NYC, Chicago, Boston and LA) getting smoked would be enough to reduce America's status from a superpower to a Third World nation. Think about all the economic impacts and subsequent chaos/lawlessness after at least 10 American cities getting smoked, not to mention 30-40 cities. This is why the U.S. cannot tolerate North Korea or Iran from having a credible nuclear deterrence. Several ICBMs (if launched) capable of dodging the U.S. and Allied ABM systems would mean an end to the post-1945 international society. In this sense, American have far more to lose than anyone in a nuclear war. Ultimately, Mao got it right. We Americans are ABSOLUTELY afraid of nukes, even if it is a minimum, but credible, deterrence.

 

[janjak desalin]

You should also read "The Science of Military Strategy".

Why?

If that happens, US cities are already burning and deterrence has failed.

If...? Precisely!

So, as your scenario is predicated upon a perceived causal relationship, i. e., [attack = no deterrence], then is the absence of your predicted outcome based upon the same causal relationship?
If, as in your scenario, [attack = no deterrence], then, as in actuality, does [no attack = deterrence], or does some other logic then apply, and some other causal relationship obtain?

The salient point of the quote is implied, not stated explicitly, i. e., the fact that a counter-value first-strike is insufficient to prevent a counter-value retaliatory-strike is the deterring factor. The reporter is technically correct to begin his clause with "even if", and not, simply "if". There are different meanings to those two!

 

[janjak desalin]

[...]With the mobile DF-31A entering service in 2006, China now has a more survivable 2nd strike "minimum deterrence" in dealing with the U.S. [...]

As I've observed, our understandings of "minimum deterrence" are divergent. It is clear that this is not the only subject on which they do so. It is also clear that there is little or no basis for further debate/discussion.

As I observed earlier, also, you are committed, to your interpretation, and that's fine. However, you've revealed, now, that your commitment is fear-based

[...] We Americans are ABSOLUTELY afraid of nukes, even if it is a minimum, but credible, deterrence.

I'm a US citizen, by birth, but not an American, so, I guess the fact that I'm not afraid doesn't count. The use of the construct "we", is, in my opinion, a fundamental fallacy of human societies. Nevertheless, there's no way I can engage a fear-based perspective as it will always revolve around and devolve into fear.

My hope is that no nation uses nuclear weapons. Yours seems to be that no nation uses nuclear weapons against the US. Those are drastically divergent hopes.
With that, I'll leave this discussion!

 

[janjak desalin]

I missed this:

The salient point of the quote is implied, not stated explicitly, i. e., the fact that a counter-force first-strike is insufficient to prevent a counter-value retaliatory-strike is the deterring factor.

 

[escobar]

Why?

If you want to understand why china think 200-300 warheads is sufficient for deterrence, you must start by reading that kind of thing.

 

[janjak desalin]

If you want to understand why china think 200-300 warheads is sufficient for deterrence, you must start by reading that kind of thing.

I don't believe that the Chinese strategists think that. It seems, though, that you, and others, do. So, reading a source that supports a belief I consider erroneous would be pointless. I do think that, at one time, they may have thought that. Strategies evolve within contexts.

 

[escobar]

If...? Precisely!
So, as your scenario is predicated upon a perceived causal relationship, i. e., [attack = no deterrence], then is the absence of your predicted outcome based upon the same causal relationship?
If, as in your scenario, [attack = no deterrence], then, as in actuality, does [no attack = deterrence], or does some other logic then apply, and some other causal relationship obtain?

What other logic?

The salient point of the quote is implied, not stated explicitly, i. e., the fact that a counter-force first-strike is insufficient to prevent a counter-value retaliatory-strike is the deterring factor.

I am a bit lost. Isn't the quote implying: the fact that a counter-force first-strike is insufficient to prevent a counter-force retaliatory-strike is the deterring factor.

The reporter is technically correct to begin his clause with "even if", and not, simply "if". There are different meanings to those two!

In a situation where missile are already flying, i don't think there is a difference

 

[escobar]

I don't believe that the Chinese strategists think that.

For a long time chinese leader thought that possession (rather than use) of nuclear weapon is the most important for deterrence. It was not until the 1990s that the second artillery began to develop operational concepts.

It seems, though, that you, and others, do. So, reading a source that supports a belief I consider erroneous would be pointless.

I am not trying to convince you. I said:"If you want to understand why..." and I have said nothing about what I personally think about that.

I do think that, at one time, they may have thought that. Strategies evolve within contexts.

True

 

[janjak desalin]

What other logic?

Then, we agree that [no attack = deterrence]?

I am a bit lost. Isn't the quote implying: the fact that a counter-force first-strike is insufficient to prevent a counter-force retaliatory-strike is the deterring factor.

That's a subjective, perspectival, consideration. If your strategy is to retaliate against the remainder of the attacking force, then so-be-it. The general consensus has been that a retaliatory nuclear strike would be counter-value as it is assumed that the counter-force first-strike would have largely expend the attacking force, thus diminishing its value as a target. Thus, the deterrent factor is 'you attack our forces, first, we attack your population/economic centers, second, nobody wins'.

In a situation where missile are already flying, i don't think there is a difference

But, before they do, it makes a significant difference in strategic contextualization .