China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[janjak desalin]

For a long time chinese leader thought that possession (rather than use) of nuclear weapon is the most important for deterrence. It was not until the 1990s that the second artillery began to develop operational concepts.[...]

And, I'm certain that since the 1990s those concepts have evolved in response to the historical context.

[...]I am not trying to convince you. I said:"If you want to understand why..." and I have said nothing about what I personally think about that.

I believe I do understand why they did. I do not, for reasons stated above, believe that they still do! Thus, arguments supporting the belief that they still do, are erroneous to me. Simply my interpretation. I might as well go and read why folks used to think that the world was flat. I can see that with my own eyes.

I have no idea what strategies the PLAN leaders are considering. I am, however, confident that the strategy I propose is, at least, being considered.

 

[escobar]

Then, we agree that [no attack = deterrence]?

Yes.

That's a subjective, perspectival, consideration. If your strategy is to retaliate against the remainder of the attacking force, then so-be-it.

That is what a counter-force arsenal (US, Russia) is supposed to do.

The general consensus has been that a retaliatory nuclear strike would be counter-value as it is assumed that the counter-force first-strike would have largely expend the attacking force, thus diminishing its value as a target. Thus, the deterrent factor is 'you attack our forces, first, we attack your population/economic centers, second, nobody wins'.

If you agree with that, then why do you think a 200-300 warhead arsenal is not sufficient for china? Or you don't?

But, before they do, it makes a significant difference in strategic contextualization.

How exactly?

 

[escobar]

And, I'm certain that since the 1990s those concepts have evolved in response to the historical context.
I believe I do understand why they did. I do not, for reasons stated above, believe that they still do! Thus, arguments supporting the belief that they still do, are erroneous to me. Simply my interpretation. I might as well go and read why folks used to think that the world was flat. I can see that with my own eyes.

2nd Arti operationals concepts are evolving, but not the strategic concept. NFU policy is still there, and the arsenal is not expanding.

I have no idea what strategies the PLAN leaders are considering. I am, however, confident that the strategy I propose is, at least, being considered.

Are you proposing to expand the nuclear arsenal to reach US/Russia level?

 

[janjak desalin]

That is what a counter-force arsenal (US, Russia) is supposed to do.

Actually, as I've stated, a counter-force strike has been more associated with a first-strike strategy. Nevertheless, with the sizes of these arsenals, as you've mentioned, either counter-force or counter-value, or a combination of both, may be retaliatory options, particularly as significant numbers of warheads are deployed on SLBMs. Yet, consequently, these SLBM mounted warheads may also render counter-value the more effective retaliatory option as the possibility that the majority, or all, of the first-strike warheads were launched from fixed site ICBMs may leave no counter-force assets targetable by either ICBMs or SLBMs. I think the SLBM capacity actually offers the greatest retaliatory deterrent precisely because of their survivability. I think the and mobile ICBM capacity comes in a somewhat distant second. Obviously it can become complex.

If you agree with that, then why do you think a 200-300 warhead arsenal is not sufficient for china? Or you don't?

I don't think it's sufficient simply because in the hypothetical scenario in which either of the great nuclear powers were to launch a first-strike against China, it's erroneous to conceptualize that such a first-strike would be any one-off. The first-strike would be like any air campaign; it would occur in waves/pulses, and it would continue until those conducting it believed that the perceived threat had been degraded to acceptable levels. The assumption that there would be a first-strike and then a wait for a retaliation is simplistic, at best. As you've stated, and as I've concurred, the size of US and Russian forces is a significant factor, one that, should either be involved in a nuclear exchange with a nuclear non-superpower, would offer the option of multiple and successive counter-force and counter-value strikes. For a horrible example, I've stated the power of one Ohio class SSBN. Which nuclear non-superpower could possibly withstand a first-strike from one of those and then a series of subsequent pulsed strikes, occurring over several days, from even half of the remaining fleet?

How exactly?

You surprise me! In your scenario, if an attack occurs absolutely means that deterrence has failed. In the gov't report the fact that, even if a surprise, counter-force, first-strike were accomplished, it would fail to achieve it's objectives means that deterrent factor obtains as no advantage is gained. In other words, the even if negates any probability of the if, rendering it simply a possibility.
Didn't we go over this already?

 

[escobar]

Actually, as I've stated, a counter-force strike has been more associated with a first-strike strategy. Nevertheless, with the sizes of these arsenals, as you've mentioned, either counter-force or counter-value, or a combination of both, may be retaliatory options, particularly as significant numbers of warheads are deployed on SLBMs. Yet, consequently, these SLBM mounted warheads may also render counter-value the more effective retaliatory option as the possibility that the majority, or all, of the first-strike warheads were launched from fixed site ICBMs may leave no counter-force assets targetable by either ICBMs or SLBMs. I think the SLBM capacity actually offers the greatest retaliatory deterrent precisely because of their survivability. I think the and mobile ICBM capacity comes in a somewhat distant second. Obviously it can become complex.

I agree.

I don't think it's sufficient simply because in the hypothetical scenario in which either of the great nuclear powers were to launch a first-strike against China, it's erroneous to conceptualize that such a first-strike would be any one-off. The first-strike would be like any air campaign; it would occur in waves/pulses, and it would continue until those conducting it believed that the perceived threat had been degraded to acceptable levels. The assumption that there would be a first-strike and then a wait for a retaliation is simplistic, at best. As you've stated, and as I've concurred, the size of US and Russian forces is a significant factor, one that, should either be involved in a nuclear exchange with a nuclear non-superpower, would offer the option of multiple and successive counter-force and counter-value strikes. For a horrible example, I've stated the power of one Ohio class SSBN. Which nuclear non-superpower could possibly withstand a first-strike from one of those and then a series of subsequent pulsed strikes, occurring over several days, from even half of the remaining fleet?

As I have already said, in a hypothetical scenario in which either of the great nuclear powers were to launch a first-strike, the deterrence has already failed. For china, deterrence is not warfighting.

You surprise me! In your scenario, if an attack occurs absolutely means that deterrence has failed. In the gov't report the fact that, even if a surprise, counter-force, first-strike were accomplished, it would fail to achieve it's objectives means that deterrent factor obtains as no advantage is gained. In other words, the even if negates any probability of the if, rendering it simply a possibility. Didn't we go over this already?

True for the US where warfighting is inextricably linked to the deterrence strategy.

 

[janjak desalin]

As I have already said, in a hypothetical scenario in which either of the great nuclear powers were to launch a first-strike, the deterrence has already failed. For china, deterrence is not warfighting.

I absolutely understand both the impetus to, and logic of, "no-first-use" and "minimum-deterrence" policies. The problem, for me, is how to reconcile these policies within a context in which several others have first-use, first-strike policies. As Neanderthal as it might seem to say so, I'd have more confidence in a policy of MAD, or something very close. Maybe mutually assured reduction to pre-industrial economic and pre-unified-nation statuses.

As per my very first statement on this, I just couldn't see allowing national decision-makers that conceptualize nuclear was as winnable, as a viable option, to perceive a nuclear war against my nation as such, not if my nation had the means to prevent that. Those that conceptualize nuclear war so accept the idea of tens of millions of casualties as simply necessary casualties of war. That's not insane; it's psychotic. The only way I can think of to approach that kind of mindset is to create cause to give pause, to make it question whether it truly accepts those ideas, or if, perhaps, it might attempt alternative logic, at least as it regards my nation.

Additionally, the fact that the use of nuclear weapons has been considered, on numerous occasions, within conflicts over what were basically abstract economic philosophical differences, does not elicit much confidence in the mentalities of those that possess them.

 

[escobar]

I absolutely understand both the impetus to, and logic of, "no-first-use" and "minimum-deterrence" policies. The problem, for me, is how to reconcile these policies within a context in which several others have first-use, first-strike policies.

Well, with their nuclear warheads not even mated to the missiles, china has lived and is living in this situation without a problem.

As Neanderthal as it might seem to say so, I'd have more confidence in a policy of MAD, or something very close. Maybe mutually assured reduction to pre-industrial economic and pre-unified-nation statuses.

Why should china devote lot of money to build a MAD arsenal if, the goal is not to used them? US and Russia have reduced their arsenal.

Additionally, the fact that the use of nuclear weapons has been considered, on numerous occasions, within conflicts over what were basically abstract economic philosophical differences, does not elicit much confidence in the mentalities of those that possess them.

The likelihood of a nuclear war between has decreased since the end of cold war

 

[janjak desalin]

Well, with their nuclear warheads not even mated to the missiles, china has lived and is living in this situation without a problem.

And I wish them luck with that as they go about not warfighting in the South China Sea and western Pacific! But, then again, as Japan has a mutual-defense treaty with the US we can safely conclude that the Senkaku Islands will remain as they are for the foreseeable future as there is no deterrent to the US honoring that treaty.

Why should china devote lot of money to build a MAD arsenal if, the goal is not to used them? US and Russia have reduced their arsenal.

I never said that China should. The better question might be why should China devote a lot of money to building aircraft carriers that have no clear access to the open sea. But, hey, that imitative impulse is irresistible, huh?

The likelihood of a nuclear war between has decreased since the end of cold war

Between? Yeah, between!

 

[escobar]

And I wish them luck with that as they go about not warfighting in the South China Sea and western Pacific! But, then again, as Japan has a mutual-defense treaty with the US we can safely conclude that the Senkaku Islands will remain as they are for the foreseeable future as there is no deterrent to the US honoring that treaty.

China having thousand of warhead is not going to deter US from honoring that treaty. Personally I hope one day china will have better relation with japan than what we are seeing today.

I never said that China should. The better question might be why should China devote a lot of money to building aircraft carriers that have no clear access to the open sea. But, hey, that imitative impulse is irresistible, huh?

They are still more useful than a MAD arsenal.

Between? Yeah, between!

I mean "The likelihood of a nuclear war has decreased since the end of cold war". And I think it continues decreasing

 

[antiterror13]

The thing is, nobody knows (apart from Chinese elites) how many warheads (nuke) China has.
General perception is China "only" has ~400 nukes ... and the number stays the same since 1980s which is very surprising, just to put into a perspective, China' gdp in 1980s is roughly only ~$200B or 2% of current GDP

Honestly I don't believe the number, I tend to believe closer to ~1,000 (may not all in operational state).
China has achieved very advanced state in nuclear warhead technology, W87 or even W88 level or close to it. No resources or technical problems for China to increase the number of warheads, just a matter of political will

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