History of South American nation inter-rivalry and arms buildup

[Miragedriver]

The Naval War in the Falkland/Malvinas- Part 15

Land Operations
In spite of the heavy losses inflicted by Argentine airpower on the 25th of May, the British were able to land the main body of two brigades at San Carlos Water, and by the 26th, these forces began their offensive to eject the Argentines from the islands. During this ground campaign, the Navy’s role would be to ensure the steady flow of supplies ashore, and to provide Close Air Support as needed from the carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible.

Bad weather and the heavy losses suffered opposing the landings meant the Argentine Air Force mounted relatively few sorties and achieved even less. On the 30th, the Argentines fired their last Exocet at HMS Invincible. It was shot down. A follow up attack by Skyhawks did no damage. While the Argentinians still insist they struck Invincible, most likely the Skyhawks bombed the burnt out hulk of SS Atlantic Conveyor.

While a valiant effort was made, the Argentine Air Force could not realistically hope to turn the tide of war, they remained an aggressive force, and were quick to pounce on any British errors.

On June 8th, a secondary landing was made near the main Argentine positions at Port Stanley as an attempt to outflank the main defenses. Landings were made near Fitzroy. Due to a disagreement between the naval commanders and the landing force commander as to where the landings should actually take place, the landings took longer than anticipated. The Argentines quickly capitalized on this.

Landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were conducting the landing, escorted by HMS Plymouth. The frigate HMS Plymouth was first to suffer. Daggers from the FAA strafed and bombed her. She was struck by multiple bombs, but they failed to explode. Nevertheless, the damage from the kinetic energy was enough to take her out of the fight. Skyhawks in the same raid bombed both landing ships. Both ships were badly damaged and caught fire, with losing 48 men, mostly from the landing party of the Welsh Guards. Sir Tristam lost 2 men. Sir Galahad was a total constructive loss, and would later be scuttled. Sir Tristam was out of the fight, but well after the conclusion of hostilities, she was returned to Britain and rebuilt, serving until 2005. Later that afternoon, a large Landing Craft Utility, LCU F4 was caught in the open and sunk with the loss of troops aboard.

This battle on June 8 shows again the value of using the sea to maneuver ground forces. It was able to place a significant force in a position to unhinge Argentine defenses, and reduce the need for a British frontal assault on prepared defenses. But it also highlighted the vulnerability of amphibious shipping in the littorals, and emphasized the need for speed of execution in amphibious operations. The Welsh Guards commander’s desire to save a 6 hour road march cost him 40 troops and the Navy two valuable ships. It also showed that detailed planning for amphibious operations was needed, and that landings could not be extemporized without great risk.

One final action foreshadowed challenges that navies operating inshore would face. Lacking air launched Exocets, and with its fleet penned up in its home ports, the Argentines quickly devised a method of using ship launched Exocets from jury-rigged shore based launchers, and deployed them to the Falklands. On June 12, one of these shore based Exocets damaged HMS Glamorgan, The possible use of shore based anti-ship missiles was of great concern to the US Navy during the Tanker War of 1987-88, and during Desert Storm. And in the 2006 Lebanon War, an Israeli corvette would be badly damaged by a Chinese built anti-ship missile launched from ashore by Hezbollah. The proliferation of shore based anti-ship missiles will only get worse. Navies will need to learn to counter this threat, or cede the littorals to the enemy.

By 14th of June, the British had forced the capitulation of Argentine forces on the islands. The Union Jack once again flew over the small isolated possession. Patriotism in Britain blossomed. The war was a disaster for the General Galtieri lead junta in Argentina, which soon collapsed. And naval strategists, tacticians, and enthusiasts the world over began to pore over the details of the action, looking for lessons learned, and clues as to how the next war at sea would be fought.

We’ll examine a few of these lessons in our next, final post.



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

 

[Miragedriver]

We are all missing the bigger picture and the truth is the world has moved on since 1982, which was a time when Britain had rejected expeditionary politics and military intervention. The navy was funded for just one purpose, its part in NATO, it had only retained an expeditionary function because the Smart people in charge of the Royal Navy were clever about sneaking a dual role into its procurement policy. Argentina’s military was at a high point in the 1980’s. Now, fast forward 30 years and Britain has found a post imperial, post-Cold War role. The Royal Navy is an expeditionary force on the verge of regaining a capacity in this field second only to the US. If anyone out there thinks That Briton is not an aggressive expeditionary nation has been asleep for a few decades. Argentina in the meantime has slipped into an economic and military decline that has effectively removed it as a strategic threat for decades.

The real game here people is not the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina, it Britain and a small enclave of nations playing a games against the rest of the world for the new “New World”, or Antarctica and the southern ocean. When England started snugging all close to France and Australia it was not just about Africa or Chinese aggression in the pacific, it about England being part of the Antarctica club.

Good reads to start are:
The Falkland Islands as a strategic gateway RUSI

Britain and the British Antarctic territory in the wider geopolitics of the Antarctic and the southern Ocean by Klaus Dodds and Alan Hemmings.

I think the best bit is the US stance, considering the whole continent is claimed by strategic allies. You could see the special relationship going south…… If you excuse the pun.



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

 

[shen]

It seems to me from what Mirage has wrote about the scenario, the real military threat Argentina should worry about is Chile not Britain. Vs Britain, would an Icelandic Cod War type confrontation be the cheaper way to wear out Britain?

 

[Miragedriver]

It seems to me from what Mirage has wrote about the scenario, the real military threat Argentina should worry about is Chile not Britain. Vs Britain, would an Icelandic Cod War type confrontation be the cheaper way to wear out Britain?

You hit the nail on the head!


I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

 

[Miragedriver]

**OFF TOPIC**

i do not think so, The Malvinas are basically swamps, 8 jets are not enough if you have fighters like Su-24 or Su-34 because the Islands are small and the air strips easy to target, with X-59s or other anti-ship or ASM you basically deny the air base, even an aircraft carrier is a target, for England the main deterrence is the nuclear submarines and a good fighter with long range AAMs, but a Su-24 is a real game changer, it will not be a great asset, but it will be a real threat.
The Su-34 is different aircraft it can fight back as a fighter but the Su-24 it needs escort fighters

Considering that the UK regularly stations a quartet of Eurofighters plus a Voyager refueling aircraft, there is plenty of ramp space for additional aircraft. The Eurofighters are kept in hardened shelters, and such is the size of the airfield that runway-denial weapons would be unable to inhibit operations to any appreciable extent. The Eurofighter is a very capable aerial combat aircraft that's extremely well armed with AMRAAM and eventually, Meteor. And in a pinch, F-35B's can also joint the party as well.

Also, the RAF has practiced and homed their skills in long range missions, as demonstrated in Libya.

Furthermore, the UK is capable of rapidly reinforcing the Falklands; a complete infantry battlegroup can be immediately flown into the Falklands within 3 days and a full brigade with their equipment in a few more days to supplement the 1,200 troops already there. Argentina is facing roughly 30 years of the UK planning, training and hardening the defences of the islands, beyond the fact that the British military as an establishment is more professional, capable, and skilled than Argentina's military is.

Argentina's too broke to afford any of the options available, and maintaining any high end capabilities will stretch their budget to the breaking point. They will be lucky to afford trainer jets at this rate. Even a simple barter won't get Argentina very far; you need money to pay for spare parts, weapons, fuel and salaries to maintain any decent level of skill for the pilots, otherwise they will blasted out of the sky no matter what they fly. And that's beyond the fact that the UK has the ability to launch cruise missiles at Argentina from both submarines and fighters at long range.

Last night I was on my tablet and it was late (I have a difficult time on the tablet and can only use two fingers). I will try to break down the pros of British defense together with the cons.

Port Stanley Airfield pre 1982

Port Stanley Airfield present day

AS I mentioned earlier, the British as no fools, and their very professional military has contingence plans over contingency plans to avoid any embarrassments as in 1982. The British government had repeatedly shown itself to be irresolute over the defense of the Islands. Having fought a war to re-take the Falklands/Malvinas, Westminster's political commitment to the self-determination of the Islanders is now total. No British government would survive their loss and any Prime Minister for at least another generation will be hyper-sensitive to any indications of a military threat in the South Atlantic.

Not least, the government in Buenos Aires bears no comparison to the witless military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. It now has the witless government of Cristina de Kirchner, However, she is very anti-military. Argentina has been democratic since 1983 and has a $1.4 billion trade relationship with Britain that produces a surplus for Buenos Aires.

The military balance around the Falklands has been transformed by the construction since 1982 of the Mount Pleasant airbase 30 miles outside Stanley, which replaced the small airstrip that existed at that time. Mount Pleasant is a major military facility with two runways of over 4,000 meters between them. It is a simple military fact: whoever controls Mount Pleasant controls the Islands. As long as Britain occupies the base competently, Argentina could never mount a successful invasion; if Britain ever lost Mount Pleasant to a competent occupier, its forces would never get back onto the Islands, even with twice the military assets now available. The military balance in this relationship is far more disadvantageous to Argentina than it was in 1982.


Pros of the British defenses:
1) The major difference is the construction of RAF Mount Pleasant, a modern air base housing four Eurofighter Typhoon strike fighters, a Hercules transport plane and VC-10 tanker plane. There are also Rapier missile batteries in several locations. The British garrison numbers 1,200, including 100 infantrymen, with 200 reservists in the Falkland Islands Defence Force.

The Royal Navy has a patrol vessel, an auxiliary support ship, and frigate or state-of-the-art destroyer. It's reported that a British nuclear-powered submarine is in the South Atlantic, but the Ministry of Defence will not discuss operational matters. "It's quite a considerable deterrent force," says Peter Felstead, editor of Jane's Defence Weekly.


2) Nowadays the UK has access to satellites that would show a massing of Argentine forces. Islanders have the internet, which would make it easier to get word back that the islands are under attack. "There was incredulity in the early 1980s that Argentina would invade," says Prof Freedman. "That's not present now, they're more alert."

3) Military experts believe the islands are now virtually impregnable. The new air base has completely altered the balance of power. Any sign of Argentine invasion and the islands could be quickly reinforced by air. "There's no way Argentine forces could ever take Mt Pleasant air base," says Prof Clarke. They would need to land a large number of troops to capture it. And with more than 300 miles of sea to cross from the mainland, and Typhoon fighters and HMS Dauntless in the way, it is not going to happen, he says.

4) The Falklands War was 30 years ago. "But in military terms it is 100 years ago," says Clarke. British forces have advanced about 60 years in sophistication, but Argentine forces have barely improved, still using military hardware from the 1970s and 80s. Southby-Tailyour says they no longer have the landing craft to make an amphibious landing possible. However their special forces are highly respected. Most military thinkers agree they offer the only credible threat through a surprise attack on Mt Pleasant. One scenario might be a civilian airliner packed with special forces to divert to Mt Pleasant, says Colonel Southby-Tailyour. "It would take a very brave politician to shoot down a civilian airliner in cold blood. The Argentine forces are good. They could jump out and shoot everything up."

5) Today Argentina is a democracy (and I use that term very loosely). President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has requested talks on the islands' future and accused the UK of "arrogance" for refusing to negotiate. But it is a diplomatic war of words. Experts say there is no enthusiasm in Argentine government or military circles for another war with Britain. The rhetoric from Britain is tougher, and the military hardware on the islands far more of a deterrent. And the Argentine government understands the islanders want to remain British. Oil may be what the current dispute is about - according to some sources, a compromise whereby Britain allows the profits to be split 50-50 is likely to be considered.


Cons of the British defense:
1) The main difference now is that the two British carriers can only support helicopters, and it's likely only one would be available at any one time. There are three Type 45 destroyers - far more advanced than their predecessors - three Type 42 destroyers and 13 frigates. There are still two amphibious landing craft, but they are far more modern and effective, says Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who advised the task force in 1982. There are three landing auxiliary ships, a modern Astute class submarine and six of the older Trafalgar nuclear-powered submarines.

2) There are no aircraft to protect a task force. RAF Wideawake, the air base on Ascension, in the middle of the Atlantic, is 4,000 miles away. So any fighter planes deployed from there would require mid-air refuelling. Even if a carrier comes into service in 2020, there is no guarantee there will be strike jets to go on them, says Felstead. If the Falklands were invaded again, there would be no way for Britain to take them back. With no genuine aircraft carrier, it would be impossible to protect a task force. To send a flotilla without air cover would be "suicidal", he says.

3) Very few merchant ships carry British flags now - many fly a flag of convenience. "It would be much harder today," The British utilized over 150 merchant vessels in the 1982 campaign.

4) Much has changed in strategic terms. Nowadays, it could be won back through long-range air power, says Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute. The lack of carrier aircraft is an impediment. Many, including former head of the military General Sir Mike Jackson, have said it would now be impossible to recapture the islands. Clarke disagrees. Bombers from Ascension - backed by refuelling planes - could destroy Mt Pleasant air base if it fell into Argentine hands. Once Argentine defences had been nullified, special forces could be dropped onto the islands. So it is possible - but politically, there is probably no heart for such a campaign, Clarke says.

In conclusion:
All of these considerations emphasize the fact that although the dispute over the islands seems set to continue indefinitely, it can only be pursued by Buenos Aires in the political sphere for the foreseeable future. This is, in any case, the strongest card Argentina can play. Britain's claims on the Islands are confirmed in international law and in the UN's commitment to self-determination.

The British government is correct when it maintains that there is nothing to discuss in terms of the sovereignty of the islands. But Argentina benefits from a certain level of inchoate sympathy for its demands on islands that are closer to them than anyone else, and in opposition to a former imperial power that casts itself as a natural partner of the US throughout the world. President Kirchner may calculate that the political wind is blowing increasingly in Argentina's direction. If so, a disastrous military adventure that casts her, or any future democratic leader, in the same mold as the junta's General Galtieri, would be the surest way to undermine the progress Argentina seeks to make on the issue.



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec


**BACK TO TOPIC**

 

[Miragedriver]

The Naval War in the Falklands/Malvinas -Conclusion

This has been only the briefest overview of the Falkland/Malvinas War. Large aspects of the war, especially the fighting on the ground, have only been mentioned in passing. Additionally we have also glossed over large parts of the air war, especially the air-to-air combat between the British Harriers and the Skyhawks & Daggers of the Argentine Air Force. We’ve also only touched on the large mobilization of the British fleet, both support ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, such as the fleet oilers that allowed the task force to stay at see for weeks at a time, and the large number of British merchant ships that served, including the use of passenger liners as improvised troopships.

These aspects of the war, and indeed, the entire war itself, are interesting and worthy of study. If you’ve been at all intrigued by these posts, I encourage you to dig further. I thought I had a fair understanding of the actions of the war before I started this series. I did, as it turned out, but the research revealed the topic to be much like an onion. There was always another layer to be uncovered. The challenge to me was to quit reading and start writing!

There are few new lessons to be learned from the war. While the Royal Navy of the Napoleonic Wars didn’t have to deal with attacking jets, they would have had a clear understanding of the basics of moving a fleet long distances, blockading an objective, and landing a force to take control from an enemy.

Some tactical items that navies around the world were starkly reminded of included the danger of fire. With the exception of HMS Coventry, all the British ships lost succumbed to fire. Had they been able to suppress on board fires, most of the ships would have been salvageable, if not promptly able to return to battle. The Royal Navy had thought itself well prepared and well drilled in shipboard firefighting. Indeed, each ship of the task force had been stripped as far as possible of flammable materials, and each crewman wore flame retardant flash hoods and gloves to protect him at battle stations. But the heat, toxicity and persistence of shipboard fires came as a surprise to the fleet. Lessons relearned in the Falklands/Malvinas War would go a long way to saving the USS Stark 5 years later in the Persian Gulf. In the Marines, it’s “Every man a rifleman.” Likewise, in the Navy, it’s “Every man a firefighter.” Whether the US Navy has kept up the intense preparation to fight fires aboard ship (and follow through with other critical damage control missions such as maintaining power and internal communications, shoring and dewatering) and relentlessly drilling crews to the point that reaction is automatic.

Likewise, the vulnerability of sophisticated systems such as radars and missile systems to exposure to the harsh elements at sea led to several instances where critical defense systems failed when most needed. Maintenance, both in terms of funding for spare parts, plenty of well trained sailors to perform the maintenance, and in depth knowledge not just of the operation, but the fundamentals of their operation and maintenance, is absolutely critical. The current US doctrine for “optimal manning” will leave US ships vulnerable to the same failures at critical moments. This is unfortunate since it means that sailors will die needlessly in order to save money.

The lack of effective point defense against air and missile threats was something of a surprise to the Royal Navy. The fleet had been tailored for an open ocean “blue water” mission. It’s primary area air defense missile, the Sea Dart, was quite effective against medium altitude, long range targets. But the involved steps to identify, localize, track, and engage targets took time, and made it less than effective against low altitude threats and those threats that appeared at very close range. The most common short range air defense missile in the fleet, the ancient Sea Cat missile, was virtually useless. Last ditch weapons such as optically aimed 40mm and 20mm cannon were recognized as obsolete by the end of World War II, and yet they were still the only close in weapons for many RN ships in the islands nearly 40 years later. Not surprisingly, almost immediately after the Falklands/Malvinas War, money was found to install the Phalanx Close in Weapon System on most ships. Shortly after, the RN worked to develop its own gun based CIWS, the 30mm Goalkeeper. The Seawolf point defense missile, on the other hand, was quite effective. Engagement times were still too long to maximize its effectiveness. Changes were later made to methods to speed up the engagement, and later variants of the system were even faster to react. With even minimal warning, a Seawolf equipped ship has an excellent chance of defeating a close in attacker, whether missile or jet.

Strategically and operationally, the war shows the critical importance of having clear political and military goals. The Argentine invasion was conceived and executed almost without any strategic though of the implications. The Military junta saw it more as a political move than a military one. The Argentine forces had long played a central role in domestic politics, and had never fought a modern external enemy. This blinded the junta to the likelihood that Britain, led by a Thatcher government that could not be seen as “appeasing” an opponent, would not only fight, but make every possible exertion to regain the islands. Further, the junta was stunned that the Reagan administration sided with Britain. South America was a hotbed of Communist activity in those days, and the Reagan White House had made a concerted effort to assist South and Central American governments and strengthen diplomatic and military ties throughout the region. How the junta managed to convince itself this would outweigh 70 years of the “special relationship” and an alliance through two world wars as well as the ties of NATO is an open question. The junta thought they were going to negotiate a solution to the standoff, and just possibly had to fight. The British, on the other hand, assumed they would have to fight, and if there was a diplomatic breakthrough, so be it. This mindset clearly gave the British the upper hand in preparation for the coming battle.

Having looked at the seizure of the islands as a political ploy, the Argentinian junta therefore failed to approach the matter from a sound operational basis. While seizing the islands defended by 80 or so Royal Marines was one thing, holding them was another. Like the dog that chased a car, Argentina was not quite sure what to do when they caught it. A properly planned operation would have mobilized not just the Argentine Navy (ironically, the driving political force behind the seizure), but all elements of Argentine maritime power. Had plans been in place to move large amounts of equipment by sea, the islands might well have been made impenetrable to any task force the British might have raised. The Argentine fleet was hardly large enough to go toe to toe with the Royal Navy, but it had plenty of time to escort merchant shipping to the islands without any possible opposition. Further, even after Royal Navy submarines arrived on station, the modern Type 42 destroyers, and the anti-submarine assets of the ARA could have given respectable defense to convoys dashing back and forth. It would have been high risk, but no more high risk than having three World War II era ships blindly sailing around to the South Atlantic with virtually no defense against modern submarines.

The Argentine decision to occupy the islands with large numbers of infantry, at the expense of a smaller, balanced combined arms force showed a fundamental lack of understanding of modern warfare by the Argentine leadership. Had the Argentine government studied MacArthur’s campaign in the Pacific at all, they would have realized that MacArthur only landed infantry, not to destroy Japanese forces, but instead to seize airfields. The failure of the junta to improve Stanley Airfield to take strike aircraft is stunning, especially given the aggressiveness and skill of the aviators. Basing the strike elements of the FAA there may not have prevented the British from retaking the islands, but failure to do so virtually guaranteed that the British eventually would.

Seapower gives mobility. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of a fleet in being was clearly demonstrated to still hold true. Having a fleet may not have exercised the deterrent effect desired, but it did give Britain the ability to promptly set about regaining control of the islands. While the Royal Navy was a mere shadow of its former self, it was still a much larger force than any the Argentines could field. The Royal Navy also used its mobility to build up a forward operating base at Ascension Island that would shuttle tankers and other replenishment ships to the task force, allowing it to stay at sea around the islands. This persistence allowed the Royal Navy to “shape the battlefield” in the Falkland/Malvinas and set the conditions of the coming battle in favor of their forces. By using the inherent mobility of seapower, the Royal Navy was able to engage in battle when it chose, and deny the Argentines targets when they attempted to strike back. Further, this operational mobility allowed the British to make their landings at a time and place of their own choosing. This prevented the Argentine forces from massing against a force that was vulnerable while landing, and eventually allowed the British to engage Argentine ground forces.
The flip side is, once a fleet has landed its landing force, it is tied to its objective. It has to remain on station to defend the logistical lifeline for those forces. This negates the operational mobility, and in effect leaves them tactically immobile.

Argentina seized upon this to launch its heaviest strikes, sending up to 75 sorties to smash the invasion. While the aviators were stunningly aggressive, they paid an awful price, with losses of up to 15% in one day. No air force can long withstand that. And their attacks on the supporting warships meant that they failed to destroy the real threat- the amphibious ships that were actually landing the landing force. Still, the Royal Navy was not operating in a political vacuum. Had enough Royal Navy ships been sunk, political and popular support from the home front might have evaporated. The failure of the Argentines to realize their bombs were not exploding meant they didn’t correct their tactics until the very end of the war. Had they changed tactics even slightly early on, they might have sunk as many as twice as many British ships. The ability of Britain to sustain those losses must be questioned.

Ultimately, seapower’s value lies in its ability to influence events ashore. Eventually, even blue water fleets must enter the littorals, that band where sea meets shore. The littorals have historically been, and likely will remain, the most dangerous waters around. Mines, sea and shore based airpower, missiles, gunboats and land based sensors and defenses all conspire to make ships vulnerable. Navies must be equipped, trained, and prepared to operate in this cluttered, often confusing environment, and understand that losses will be taken. The current US Navy doctrinal push to be the dominant power in any littoral environment makes sense. Whether the equipment and training to support this does is another matter entirely. I have my doubts.

The End

 

[Miragedriver]

STRICTLY FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES ONLY:

The Falklands/Malvinas War started on Friday, 2 April 1982 with the Argentine invasion and occupation of the Islands and South Georgia, and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982. The war lasted 74 days, and resulted in the deaths of 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and three civilian Falklanders. It is the most recent conflict to be fought by the UK without any allied states and the only external Argentine war since the 1880s.

The conflict was the result of a protracted diplomatic confrontation regarding the sovereignty of the islands. Neither state officially declared war and the fighting was largely limited to the territories under dispute and the South Atlantic. The initial invasion was characterised by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by the UK as an invasion of a British dependent territory.

Britain launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Argentine Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. The British eventually prevailed and at the end of combat operations on 14 June the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2010 and as it has since the 19th century, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim. The claim remained in the Argentine constitution after its reformation in 1994.

The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the ruling military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the 1983 general election, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.

Part 1:
[video=youtube;nDbbwmJ-EPI]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDbbwmJ-EPI[/video]


Part 2:
[video=youtube;AOnVgJbYQ-s]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOnVgJbYQ-s[/video]



Back to bottling my Grenache

 

[Miragedriver]

Part 3:
[video=youtube;gEMmH22prAU]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEMmH22prAU[/video]


Part 4:
[video=youtube;0HoWENrG1LI]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HoWENrG1LI[/video]



Back to bottling my Grenache

 

[Miragedriver]

Part 5 (final Part):
[video=youtube;K8xs3kt24cI]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8xs3kt24cI[/video]



Back to bottling my Grenache

 

[b787]

The Naval War in the Falklands/Malvinas -Conclusion


Ultimately, seapower’s value lies in its ability to influence events ashore. Eventually, even blue water fleets must enter the littorals, that band where sea meets shore. The littorals have historically been, and likely will remain, the most dangerous waters around. Mines, sea and shore based airpower, missiles, gunboats and land based sensors and defenses all conspire to make ships vulnerable. Navies must be equipped, trained, and prepared to operate in this cluttered, often confusing environment, and understand that losses will be taken. The current US Navy doctrinal push to be the dominant power in any littoral environment makes sense. Whether the equipment and training to support this does is another matter entirely. I have my doubts.

The End

I think Argentina lost because as Melendez said, the Governor in 1982, because the Junta thought it was going to be no real war, Argentina could have won only if the FAA would have gotten more exocets, and perhaps gotten ASW helicopters and aircraft, but there was always the risk of a British strike on continental Argentina and that could only have been avoided as long as Argentina was protected by the US or it had became a nuclear power, both possibilities never happened.
[video=youtube;pM0V1q-AeFY]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pM0V1q-AeFY[/video]