shen
Senior Member
Let's continue the OT discussion from the Type 055 thread here.
I propose that China doesn't need to worry about a distant blockade of its SLOCs.
Let's look at a recent proposal of blockade of Chinese SLOC.
The context of the Offshore Control concept is that it is an alternative to the AirSea Battle concept. Offshore Control proponents consider AirSea battle a dangerous plan because it includes attacks of Chinese mainland targets. Offshore Control propose a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs to slowly strangle China economically. It must also be considered AirSea Battle will be much expensive for US military to implement. Many new and undeveloped weapon systems are needed to penetrate Chinese airspace and attack mainland target. Without an overall increase of US defense budget, which is highly unlikely, significant budgets would have to be shifted from the US Army and Marine Corp to USN and USAF. Unsuprisely, the author of Offshore Control is a Marine officers.
Distant blockade is the most difficult form of blockade to implement historically. Even when it works, it works very slowly.
note the proposal calls from the interception, boarding and diversion of Chinese container ships. not mining of choke points such as Malacca Strait, because that's unworkable as it would affect friendly and neutral shipping as well. not against China bound tankers, presumably because tankers are more difficult to track or because China is not really vulnerable in terms of energy.
Interception, boarding, inspecting every suspect container ships would take considerable naval resource. every warship on the distant blockade is one warship unavailable at the center of dispute, presumably around Taiwan or ECS or SCS.
China doesn't need to divert many warships to counter the blockade. At most, a couple of SSNs to pick off vulnerable warships on blockade duty. and some civilian container ships with converted to Q-ships with hidden weapons to sink as many opposition warships as possible, tie down any much opposition strength as possible for as long as possible and to cause the rest of the blockaders to to more wary of every innocent looking container ships.
In the mean time, PLAN should concentrate to all major combat assets to achieve the objective close to home. Whether it is reunification of Taiwan, landing in Diaoyutao or SCS islands.
Distant blockade takes long time to work. Given the importance of Chinese economy regionally as well as internationally, how many countries are dependent on trade with China for their economic well-being. A prolong economic blockade of China would be painful for almost every countries in the world and difficult to hold together for long over Taiwan or some tiny islands in ECS or SCS which means little to most countries in the world. In the mean time, China should make the blockade as painful for everybody as possible. First, declare the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean region a war zone and every merchant ship bound for a belligerent countries liable to be sunk without warning. That would raise the shipping insurance rate dramatically and disrupt global trade even without a single ship attacked. PLAN should mine choke points such as Malacca Strait, and all approaches to East Asia, defend minefields within land based air-cover with 022 boats, disrupt trade as much as possible. Once the immediate Chinese objectives are achieve, China should unilaterally declare conflict over and call for international peace conference and return of normal international trade as soon as possible. Face with a fait accomplis, and the alternative of a long war or a return to peace and normal trade, how many countries in the world would back a prolong blockade? How sustainable would a distant blockade be if many countries economically dependent on trade with China doesn't back it anymore?
I think it is telling that AirSea Battle seems to be ascendent. That alone should tell you how viable a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs is.
I propose that China doesn't need to worry about a distant blockade of its SLOCs.
Let's look at a recent proposal of blockade of Chinese SLOC.
The context of the Offshore Control concept is that it is an alternative to the AirSea Battle concept. Offshore Control proponents consider AirSea battle a dangerous plan because it includes attacks of Chinese mainland targets. Offshore Control propose a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs to slowly strangle China economically. It must also be considered AirSea Battle will be much expensive for US military to implement. Many new and undeveloped weapon systems are needed to penetrate Chinese airspace and attack mainland target. Without an overall increase of US defense budget, which is highly unlikely, significant budgets would have to be shifted from the US Army and Marine Corp to USN and USAF. Unsuprisely, the author of Offshore Control is a Marine officers.
Distant blockade is the most difficult form of blockade to implement historically. Even when it works, it works very slowly.
note the proposal calls from the interception, boarding and diversion of Chinese container ships. not mining of choke points such as Malacca Strait, because that's unworkable as it would affect friendly and neutral shipping as well. not against China bound tankers, presumably because tankers are more difficult to track or because China is not really vulnerable in terms of energy.
Interception, boarding, inspecting every suspect container ships would take considerable naval resource. every warship on the distant blockade is one warship unavailable at the center of dispute, presumably around Taiwan or ECS or SCS.
China doesn't need to divert many warships to counter the blockade. At most, a couple of SSNs to pick off vulnerable warships on blockade duty. and some civilian container ships with converted to Q-ships with hidden weapons to sink as many opposition warships as possible, tie down any much opposition strength as possible for as long as possible and to cause the rest of the blockaders to to more wary of every innocent looking container ships.
In the mean time, PLAN should concentrate to all major combat assets to achieve the objective close to home. Whether it is reunification of Taiwan, landing in Diaoyutao or SCS islands.
Distant blockade takes long time to work. Given the importance of Chinese economy regionally as well as internationally, how many countries are dependent on trade with China for their economic well-being. A prolong economic blockade of China would be painful for almost every countries in the world and difficult to hold together for long over Taiwan or some tiny islands in ECS or SCS which means little to most countries in the world. In the mean time, China should make the blockade as painful for everybody as possible. First, declare the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean region a war zone and every merchant ship bound for a belligerent countries liable to be sunk without warning. That would raise the shipping insurance rate dramatically and disrupt global trade even without a single ship attacked. PLAN should mine choke points such as Malacca Strait, and all approaches to East Asia, defend minefields within land based air-cover with 022 boats, disrupt trade as much as possible. Once the immediate Chinese objectives are achieve, China should unilaterally declare conflict over and call for international peace conference and return of normal international trade as soon as possible. Face with a fait accomplis, and the alternative of a long war or a return to peace and normal trade, how many countries in the world would back a prolong blockade? How sustainable would a distant blockade be if many countries economically dependent on trade with China doesn't back it anymore?
I think it is telling that AirSea Battle seems to be ascendent. That alone should tell you how viable a distant blockade of Chinese SLOCs is.
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