What military? The Filipino Air Force has 12x FA-50s and these will not be flying sorties against the PLA. The Navy has three whole frigates and these also won't be going up against China. The Army is more substantial but it's not going to be doing a whole lot unless they're good at swimming 100+ km.
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
I believe Marcos' decisions and strategies regarding China in the region are all meticulously crafted through what he considers clever designs. None of his actions—whether geopolitical “military strategies” or so-called “diplomatic statements”—are arbitrary. He is fully aware of the “sensitivity” of the issues he raises and the potential consequences they may trigger. Yet I equally believe this approach is unsustainable.
Some political analysts view Marcos as an “administrative agent” for the 52nd state of the United States. This perception stems partly from his family's complex and opaque “family wealth” in the U.S., which operates within the gray areas of American legal oversight. This reality compels him to strike a balance between the national interests of the Philippines and the regional interests of the United States. In other words, he effectively represents dual interests—those of the U.S. and the Philippines—even when they diverge.
Conversely, for the United States, Marcos' value lies in ruling the Philippines to counter China. If he cannot control the Philippines, he holds no value for America. Thus, Marcos must secure domestic support by safeguarding Philippine interests. Specifically, he must navigate family politics and strike balances among domestic supporters (voting blocs), stakeholders, and nationalists. China is the nation most capable of delivering prosperity and benefits to the Philippines. This necessitates an “unrealistic” balancing act between the two superpowers (as either side demands unconditional allegiance: support me or oppose me).
Thus, Marcos' primary diplomatic endeavor since taking office has been maintaining this schizophrenic stance while seeking benefits for his family.
Simply put, in practical terms, he leans more heavily toward U.S. support. Hence, he strengthens military alliances with America while adopting increasingly hardline stances on South China Sea issues. He also collaborates with U.S. corporate interests and propaganda machinery to craft and promote a narrative of mutual benefit between the United States and the Philippines. Yet America's true objective is for the Philippines to sacrifice itself like Ukraine did to trouble China—the two nations' interests are fundamentally opposed.
This effectively embeds the Philippines into the U.S. Asia-Pacific defense ecosystem. History shows that direct proxy warfare typically ends more tragically than for the “puppeteers” behind the scenes. Filipinos have not yet embraced challenging the ‘Leviathan’ as a “fate” akin to Ukraine's stance.
Yet he recognizes China's formidable economic and geopolitical clout. Fully aware of China's “strategic red lines,” he must exercise restraint to avoid provoking irreversible escalation. Here, he also needs to avoid provoking other domestic “political factions” and disrupting the existing “political ecosystem” between the two sides—such as fully aligning again with the U.S.-led West. Otherwise, his family would lose its value to America.
Marcos undoubtedly faces pressure from the U.S., yet he remains temporarily uninterested in crossing China's red lines. Still, he must engage with China to secure tangible benefits. Through what he perceives as clever maneuvering, he seeks to extract maximum benefits.
However, I believe such petty tactics are unsustainable. The Philippines lacks the capacity to maintain this delicate balance. When a more escalated incident occurs, he will inevitably have to choose sides—and his choice will undoubtedly be the United States. In a sense, the U.S. seeks to position the Philippines as another Ukraine. Marcos believes he can reap benefits from both sides (foreign investment and questionable U.S. security assurances) without being drawn into actual conflict. Yet the Philippines lacks the capacity to achieve this.
Marcos resembles a rider attempting to strap the Philippines—a bicycle—onto an American flying chariot, charging toward a cliff to seize its treasures. He believes he can brake the bicycle in time to snatch the rewards, but in reality, should genuine conflict erupt, the Philippines would be the first to plunge off the cliff. The United States could hover mid-air and return safely, but the Philippines could not (much like Ukraine). However, this outcome was not entirely unacceptable—the United States would provide his family with sufficient compensation.
they only need to do one thing: maintain the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the phillipines until its reclamation by the united states.
Do you know how much money the USAF wants to allocate towards base building in Philippines for FY2026? $0! Yeah, it's shocking, but it sort of makes sense if you think hard enough.
I suspect that only the Army and the Marines want to station a significant force in Philippines.