It's the FFR99 a unmanned recon fighter from a sci-fi anime. I was getting tired of the TOG II tank.
the byproduct of a search I've done in relation to another post in this thread:
at page 13 of 26 in
Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that the JSF’s joint approach “avoids the three parallel development programs for service-unique aircraft
that would have otherwise been necessary, saving at least $15 billion.” [superscript 29]
unquote; [superscript 29] is
"Letter from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to Rep. Jerry Lewis, June 22, 2000.
Transcript made available by Inside the Airforce. June 23, 2000"
Replacing the aircraft before it with greater capabilities. The Harrier replacement alone works out as a 'success.'not sure of that;
bu the way how do you measure the success of the F-35 program?
As you noted, $2B was spent between 1995 to 2000 on the CALF/JAST/JSF. In two years, the NGAD has spent ~$900M (~$600M Y2K dollars). The F-35 started as a /DARPA/ Program that had to be transitioned into the rest of the Pentagon. Even then, there was resistance: the USAF wanted the MRF program, not the JAST and the USN wanted the AFX. The USMC realized tying them altogether was the only way /they/ would get a Harrier replacement.
OKre: F-35 successful or not:
Replacing the aircraft before it with greater capabilities. The Harrier replacement alone works out as a 'success.'
if you know what I mean...
kinda abstract economics rule says one should look at what would've been achieved by alternative project(s) in comparison to the one actually procured ... for example if you had invested one mil into something, you should then compare your gain, of for example 100 Grand, to what you would've earned if you had invested into something else, and evaluate the actual investment based on this: had it been realistically possible to gain 200 Grand by investing that one mil differently, your 100 Grand surplus would be a failure LOL!
could be I was wrong about "comically low" Yesterday at 9:15 AMAs you noted, $2B was spent between 1995 to 2000 on the CALF/JAST/JSF. In two years, the NGAD has spent ~$900M (~$600M Y2K dollars). The F-35 started as a /DARPA/ Program that had to be transitioned into the rest of the Pentagon. Even then, there was resistance: the USAF wanted the MRF program, not the JAST and the USN wanted the AFX. The USMC realized tying them altogether was the only way /they/ would get a Harrier replacement.
Even adjusting for inflation, the NGAD will have spent the equivalent of what the F-35 did by FY21 in 4 years instead of 5 and it is attempting to do a far more focused aircraft development than the F-35 was. A better comparison would be the ATF program, which case, we'll be at the same amount of money spent (adjusted for inflation) as the ATF was in 1988 in FY20.
oh I wouldn't know as its funding is classifiedIf I may ask, do you think the LRSB/B-21 is underfunded?
hmmm. Can't be that classified:
inside the document you posted I can see
And if you assume $2.5B to$3B for FY24 and FY25, you roughly get the number FG posted.inside the document you posted I can see
interestingly, "The development programme alone is estimated to cost $23.5 billion." according to 2015 FlightGlobal link
just thinking aloud
took it there A moment agoAnd if you assume $2.5B to$3B for FY24 and FY25, you roughly get the number FG posted.
However, if we're going down /this/rathole, may I suggest we move it to the LRSB thread?
I posted here asking if you thought it was underfunded vs expectations as a comparison to the NGAD.
andSunday at 8:57 AMnow BreakingDefense pulled V-2 and Newton inside
We explore the possibilities, from cutting-edge hypersonics and 1,000-mile cannon to repackaged Tomahawk cruise missiles and updated Pershing ballstic missiles.
Russia wants to sit down with Pentagon officials for “open and specific” talks on
The U.S. claims Russia is violating the INF treaty, and on Dec. 4 issued an ultimatum that Moscow come into compliance with the accord in 60 days,
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu sent his counterpart, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis, a proposal for launching a dialogue three days ago, according to a statement Saturday.
But Russia says it hasn't received any official reply from the Pentagon, which spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said proves that the U.S. is unwilling to maintain professional dialogue with Moscow on security issues.
On Friday, the Russian mission to the U.N. submitted a draft resolution calling for the international community to support the INF treaty against Washington's threat of withdrawal, warning that a collapse of the treaty could undermine nuclear arms control across the board.
Washington began sounding off on a potential Russian violation of the INF treaty under President Barack Obama.
Under President Donald Trump, those allegations have been specified and coupled with threats of unilateral withdrawal from the landmark 1987 arms agreement, which banned an entire class of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 kilometers (310-3,100 miles).
The U.S. claims that
These claims have, at times, focused on U.S. deployment of anti-missile systems in Romania and Poland. Moscow takes specific issue with the U.S. Mk-41 vertical launching system used by these missile defense installations.
The Mk-41, derived from the U.S. Navy's Aegis missile system, can launch a variety of American missiles — including the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, a weapon that would be banned by INF were it deployed on a ground-based launcher.
INF not only bans ground-based intermediate-range missiles, but their launchers too. And Moscow has seized on this point to claim the U.S. is responsible for destabilizing the INF treaty.
Army Bradley Brigade Will Get Israeli Anti-Missile System: Iron Fist
- ACQUISITION, LAND
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on December 14, 2018 at 4:00 AM
WASHINGTON: Seeking to
The decision comes after weeks of confusing statements by Army officials and
Whatever terms you use, the decision by the Army Requirements Oversight Council to buy a brigade of Iron Fist is not contingent on any particular level of performance in this new round of testing/qualification. (Presumably, though, some unexpected disaster could cause the service to reconsider).
That’s been a point of confusion after Army officials publicly contradicted each other at a recent conference in Detroit — one at which reporters were barred — but well-informed sources I’m unfortunately unable to identify made it unequivocally clear. The AROC has decided the threat is urgent, so the Army is not waiting on the test results: The only reason it’s not buying a brigade of Iron Fist immediately is that it’s $120 million short.
Nor is the Army currently considering an alternative to Iron Fist for Bradley, despite a “market survey”
Specifically, the survey asks for information on “current market manufacturing capability to produce a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 Active Protection System (APS)” —
The only potential challenger is the Trophy APS, also Israeli, which is the only active protection system in the Western world that’s actually been mass-produced and used in combat — qualifying it as
The Army is already buying Trophy for four brigades of
In January, the Army will also evaluate Trophy for the eight-wheel drive Stryker troop carrier, having earlier
The Army has no current plans to try out Trophy on a Bradley, at all. However, Trophy’s manufacturer,
Since the US Army didn’t run that test, it almost certainly doesn’t meet the Army’s definition of “proven and characterized.” Rafael and its American partner
All bets are off after that brigade, however. While it’s currently looking at off-the-shelf “non-developmental” options like Iron Fist and Trophy, the
The Army also wants to
Those are worthy ambitions, but technically tricky to realize, and they’ll take time — with a non-negligible chance of turning into one of the Army’s periodic acquisition disasters. Meanwhile, the Army is buying what it can get right now.
The Army’s full statement to me on the Iron Fist decision is below, courtesy of Ashley John, public affairs director for Program Executive Officer – Ground Combat Systems (PEO-GCS). It’s somewhat opaque, so read it with the explanations above in mind:
“At the end of November, the Army Requirements Oversight Council met to assess the performance of the Bradley Expedited Active Protection System non-developmental solution (Iron Fist) and to determine if the system was suitable for urgent qualification and deployment. After reviewing the results of the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s testing, the AROC determined that the Iron Fist system improved the survivability of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle without meaningful impact to the vehicle’s performance or increased risk to dismounted Soldiers. The AROC directed that Bradley ExAPS move into the next phase of urgent qualification testing and in parallel plan for fielding of at least a brigade’s worth of capability on an urgent basis in accordance with existing approved requirements.”