The Rifle Squad/Section - What should it do and how should it be organized?

Norfolk

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SampanViking:

As to your question whether the PLA Rifle Squad organization was applicable to all types of infantry (light, motorized, arnmoured, etc.) I'm afraid I erred. I found (sitting right beneath my nose, well, where else would it be but staring me straight in the face?) on our own site that the PLA mechanized infantry Rifle Squad consists of a Western-style 8 man Squad mounted in an APC or IFV with a 3 man crew. It seems that they caught our bug too.
 

zraver

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No problem your writing a very good read.

A couple more points, as former US Army I know a bit about why small unit use an up the middle approach. If you've ever seen a large scale offensive op plan you'll notice that there isn't a lot of room given to each maneuver element. This adds both weight to the attack (less frontage covered by more men), and reduces fratricide. The real weight/power of the attack is carried in the power kept in reserve at every level.

The standard Army plan calls for developing the enemies MLR and then pinning it in place while other units use maneuver, fire, and shock to defeat it. We called this the recon/ counter recon fight. US Army Frontal attacks are almost never the real attack.

I can not speak from the rifleman's perspective but as a tanker. But what I can say is the find-develop-reduce method has kept force on force losses in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Panama, Iraq 91 and other battles very very low compared to historical equivalents.
 

Norfolk

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No problem your writing a very good read.

A couple more points, as former US Army I know a bit about why small unit use an up the middle approach. If you've ever seen a large scale offensive op plan you'll notice that there isn't a lot of room given to each maneuver element. This adds both weight to the attack (less frontage covered by more men), and reduces fratricide. The real weight/power of the attack is carried in the power kept in reserve at every level.

The standard Army plan calls for developing the enemies MLR and then pinning it in place while other units use maneuver, fire, and shock to defeat it. We called this the recon/ counter recon fight. US Army Frontal attacks are almost never the real attack.

I can not speak from the rifleman's perspective but as a tanker. But what I can say is the find-develop-reduce method has kept force on force losses in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Panama, Iraq 91 and other battles very very low compared to historical equivalents.

To be honest zraver, there is often a tendency in the infantry to revert to a slow, methodical, by the numbers formula that emphasizes attrition appraoch to operations, both offensive and defensive. This is not universal, of course, and there are some very aggressive, and very bold infantry and infantry leaders out there, but they tend to be in the minority, especially in peacetime. This tilts the playing field in favour of the more cautious, less imaginative, frankly duller remainder resulting in mediocrity tending to prevail in peacetime doctine and training. Although this is a problem that crosses combat arms in most peacetime armies, its consequences are very swift and direct in wartime, particularly for infantry due to their direct exposure to the enemy.
 

zraver

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To be honest zraver, there is often a tendency in the infantry to revert to a slow, methodical, by the numbers formula that emphasizes attrition appraoch to operations, both offensive and defensive. This is not universal, of course, and there are some very aggressive, and very bold infantry and infantry leaders out there, but they tend to be in the minority, especially in peacetime. This tilts the playing field in favour of the more cautious, less imaginative, frankly duller remainder resulting in mediocrity tending to prevail in peacetime doctine and training. Although this is a problem that crosses combat arms in most peacetime armies, its consequences are very swift and direct in wartime, particularly for infantry due to their direct exposure to the enemy.

The inverse is true in mechanized formations where speed gets over emphasized.
 

Norfolk

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The PLA's Rifle Squads and how they compare to an "Ideal" Rifle Squad/Section:

At present, the PLA uses at least 3 or 4 standard types of Rifle Squad, each for a different part of the Infantry.

1. The regular Foot Infantry units use a 10 man Rifle Squad organized into 3 cells; the first cell, of 4 men consists of the Squad Leader (who, like all PLA and PLAN Infantry NCOs is a former enlisted man who, upon completing his intial two year contract and follwing his selection for NCO training, has 1 to 3 months training at either an NCO Academy or in a training unit) and 3 riflemen, one of whom carries a Rocket Launcher; the second cell consists of 3 men, on of whom also carries a Rocket Launcher; and the third cell similarly consists of 3 men, one of whom carries a Light Machine Gun. This 3-cell structure of the Rifle Squad is the traditional basic infantry structure of the PLA.

The 3-cell organization of the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry allows it to conduct frontal, flank, and double envelopment attacks in offensive operations; with the Light Machine Gun cell providing a base of suppressive fire, the other two cells (one with 4 men, the other with 3, and both carrying Rocket Launchers) can assault either together, or separately (or allow one cell to deal with a secondary threat), or to conduct a frontal attack with all three cells if necessary. In defensive operations, its single Light Machine Gun provides a basic, if modest, defensive fire capability against enemy attacks. The 10 man Rifle Squad has a limited capacity to sustain losses.

2. The Light Infantry units have reduced from a 12 man Rifle Squad organized into three 4 man cells to a 9 man Squad with three 3 man cells. Otherwise, the Light Infantry Rifle Squad may be similar to the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry with the two following differences: first, that the 9 man Rifle Squad of the Light Infantry can afford the loss of perhaps a single man at most before it loses its capacity for internal fire-and-movement, whereas the 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry can afford perhaps two men lost; and second, that the Light Infantry may find itself motorised, and thus possibly more likely to be committed to costly frontal attacks.

3. The Mechanized Infantry units have Western-style 8 man Rifle Squads. It would appear that they are too small to accomodate the traditional 3 man cell structure of the PLA. As such, they would require organization into two 4man fire teams, each equipped with a Light Machine Gun in order to possess any real internal fire-and-movement capability. The 8 man Rifle Squad, which may also be used by the PLAN Marines (or alternatively, the 9 man Rifle Squad of motorized units of the PLA Light Infantry - this is dependent upon the capacity of the amphibious IFV that the Marines finally settle on) has no ability to sustain losses; even the loss of a single man practically forces the squad to reorganize itself into a fire team capable of either fire or movement, but not both. This is particularly serious, as being Mechanized Infantry, with the concommitant likelihood of having to engage in frequent frontal assaults during offensive operations, the utter inability of the 8 man Rifle Squad to sustain losses is a critical flaw. However, if the 8 man Squad possess 2 Light Machine Guns, it is at least adequate for defensive operations (in the short term at least). It is capable of flanking, however, though if it carries two LMGs, then at most 5 men will be available for the assault - pretty marginal.

As has been shown, PLA Rifle Squads in general suffer from a lack of ability to sustain losses while maintaining any capacity for internal fire-and-movement. Ironically, those units' Rifle Squads (Mechanized [Light and Amphibious Mechanized as well] and perhaps PLAN Marines also) that are intended for offensive operations are those least suited to them, while those least suited to defensive operations (Light and Foot) have Rifle Squads that may be best suited for offensive operations (relatively speaking). The 10 man Rifle Squad of the Foot Infantry (with 1 LMG) is better suited for offensive operations than the 8 man Rifle Squad of the Mechanized Infantry (with 2 LMG), whereas the converse is true for defensive operations, with the reduced 9 man Rifle Squad of the Light Infantry situated uncomfortably in between.

Furthermore, the basic building block of the PLA Infantry, the 3 man Cell, has had to be abandoned for the 8 man Squads of the Mechanized Infantry (and perhaps the Marines as well). Curiously, the 3 man Cell, 3 Cell Rifle Squad of the PLA inspired two US Marine Corps officers to experiment with a similar structure, ultimately leading to the 13 man Rifle Squad organized into 3 4 man Fire Teams of the USMC in 1944, and used with success ever since. It is ironic that the PLA is tampering with something that it invented and that has worked so well for so long.


By comparison, the 13 man Rifle Section proposed as an ideal (alongside the USMC Rifle Squad) in the 1st and 10th Posts of this thread is capable of both the full of basic tactics in offensive operations and great staying power in defensive operations, all the while capable of sustaining the loss of up to 4 or 5 men while still retaining full capacity for internal fire-and-movement. The 13man Rifle Section, as described in earlier posts, is led by a Sergeant who commands two 6 man Rifle Squads, each commanded by a Corporal and comprising the following: the Corporal Squad Commander, armed with an assault rifle with an underslung light grenade launcher, both for taking out point and area targets at range as well as marking and designating targets, a Light Machine Gunner, and 4 Riflemen (with assault rifles, one of whom may have an underslung shotgun).

With two 6 man Rifle Squads, the 13 man Rifle Section is capable of frontal attacks as well as flank attacks. For double envelopments, the Section Commander may draw one or two men from each of the two Rifle Squads and lead them himself in an ad hoc Rifle Squad of 4 men. Alternatively, the Section Commander may take both of the Section's LMGs under his command along with the underslung LGL's to create an exceptional base of fire, and leave 8 riflemen to conduct the assault under the two Rifle Squad Commanders. Having 8 rifleman as opposed to only 6 in the USMC Rifle Squad gives the 13 man Rifle Section superior offensive power, while retaining quite sufficient defensive power afforded by the mutually supporting, interlocking fires of the Sections's 2 LMGs. And given the unsurpassed ability of such a Rifle Section to sustain battle losses, the 13 man Rifle Section of two 6 man Rifle Squads (each based upon an LMG and an LGL), such a Section is easy to control while possessing full capacity for both offensive and defensive operations. Compared to the 13 man Rifle Section, all of the PLA's Rifle Squads 8-,9-, and 10- man) are found wanting, for all the various reasons previously pointed out.
 
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Norfolk

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Notwithstanding much of what was written in the earlier post, the PLA rifle squads do possess some important advantages in some cases compared to many Armies that have adopted a Western-style "up-the-middle" almost automatic frontal attack mentality. First off; most PLA infantry squads (except mechanized) still resort to their traditional three cells each of 3 men (at times in the past that has been as many as 5), with one cell crewing a heavy automatic rifle (Type 95 5.8mm heavy automatic rifle firing "heavy" rounds for added range, accuracy, and striking power), and two cells (one of which includes the Squad Leader) each carrying a rocket launcher (Type 69 or PF 89).

With 9 or 10 men in each rifle squad, this compares favourably to the 8 man section of British and some Commonwealth Armies and even the 9 man squad of the US Army. Though still smaller than the 13 man squad of the USMC (admittedly, a rarety amongst the world's Armies), the PLA Rifle Squad possesses the great distinction of being both the forerunner and the inspiration of the USMC Rifle Squad (and the PLA as well as being the source of the battle cry of the USMC - "Gung Ho!").

The reason for this was that the PLA was observed by a USMC officer during the 1930's who, along with another officer, eventually adapted the PLA rifle squad for USMC purposes for use in the Raider Battalions of WWII. Both officers went on to become generals (Carlson and Edson). After the disbandment of the Raider Battalions, the regular infantry battalions of the USMC adopted the PLA Rifle Squad structure in 1944 as previously used by the Raiders and added a fourth man to each fire team to enable the USMC Rifle Squad to absorb losses; thus, with the Squad Leader, the 13 man USMC Rifle Squad was born and has been used ever since.

It seems a pity that the PLA has reduced to an 8 man rifle squad in mechanized units. With just one heavy automatic rifle (Type 95) for 8 men (with Type 95 assault rifles, and perhaps one 35mm or 40mm underslung grenade launchers to be introduced), the squad is incapable of internal fire-and-movement for Western-style frontal attacks in open country (often difficult to avoid in mechanized operations). Nevertheless, it is capable (where cover and terrain permit) and is best suited for, flank attacks, with the heavy automatic or LMG providing suppressive fires on the enemy position while 5 men conduct the assault. And it is easy to control, by no means a "small' consideration, and loss of control in battle is often disastrous.

The mechanized rifle squad has practically no ability to perform double envelopments (even if terrain permits) without stripping the heavy automatic rifle/machine gun team of virtually all security and source of ammo resupply. The mechanized rifle squad is organized to perform flanking attacks during offensive operations, which enable it to avoid (where cover permits) the heavy losses of Western frontal attacks. That said, terrain and cover may force the squad to perform frontal attacks, for which it is ill-organized and equipped. And with only one heavy automatic rifle or LMG, the squad is weak in defenisve staying power compared to Western squads/sections with 2 LMGs that allow for the mutual support of each other and interlocking fields of fire (as well as for the old German tactic of drawing the enemy in with the fire from one machine gun, and then as the enemy gets close to assault, only then allowing the second machine gun to open fire as well, catching the enemy by surprise and in the flank). The PLA mechanized rifle squad is a mixed bag, and perhaps ill-suited to mechanized warfare in open country.

But those 9 and 10 man squads of the Light and regular Foot Infantry still retaining the 3 cell organization are admirably suited to the demands of close combat in close, difficult country (as much of China itself is). For offensive operations, with the one cell equipped with a heavy automatic rifle to provide a base of suppressive fire on the objective, and the other two cells each with a rocket launcher may then perform either flank or a double envelopment attack (if cover permits). The rocket launchers provide vastly superior range and killing power against field fortifications and light armour than do grenade launchers.

By contrast, a British or (some) Commonwealth 8 man section might have to reorganize to perform a flank attack as their organization effectively permits it to perform only frontal attacks as organized with its two fire teams/assault groups; it is unlikely that it could perform a double envelopment attack at all, even if cirumstances otherwise allowed for it). The US Army 9 man rifle squad has a little more margin for error, and can reorganize to perform both flank attacks and even double envelopment attacks if 2 men are taken under personal command of the Squad Leader (one man poached from each 4 man fire team). Neither British, Commonwealth, or US sections/squads normally carry anything comparable to the Type 69 or PF 89 rocket launchers, let alone two of them (although they have at times carried a Garl Gustav or a Mk 153 SMAW in the past).

The problem for the US Army squad in the double envelopment attack by comparison to the PLA squad is the former's greater firepower. It seems ironic, but in order to execute a double envelopment attack the US squad must place both of its LMGs into one team, ideally led by the Squad Leader himself. The two reduced three man Fire Teams may then use cover and concealment to take up position on either flank of the enemy position. However, in doing so, the fire teams take with them much of the LMG's source of ammo resupply. Consequently, the Squad Leader may possess a heavy base of fire with 2 LMGs to fix and suppress the enemy position, but little way to keep the LMGs supplied with the necessary ammo.

The PLA rifle squad, by contrast, with its single heavy automatic rifle for a base of fire (admittedly less heavy than that provided by 2 LMGs) does not create such a supply conundrum. Presumably the PLA has tested the suppressive effects of the Type 95 heavy automatic rifle variant and found it to provide adequate suppressive fires for the squad. If not, then the Type 88 5.8mm GPMG in the light role should prove a more effective replacement, though possibly creating an ammo supply problem (though not as much as two would).

However, in defensive operations the PLA Rifle Squad would be at a disadvantage with only one heavy automatic rifle or light machine gun. Many other Armies have 2 LMGs per Squad or section, which gives them a capability to cover each other's LMG positions and to create interlocking fields of fire, which cannot be done with the single heavy automatic or LMG of the PLA squad. Ammo resupply is less of an issue in some ways in the defence (not as far to go, not having to move around as much, etc.) than in the offense.

That said, the PLA rifle squad has powerful reinforcement from platoon and company level. The Type 88 5.8mm GPMG is on hand (although this is inferior in range and hitting power to the 7.62mm FM MAG typically used by Western armies) as well as the QLZ 87 35mm automatic grenade launcher (weighing 26pounds plus ammo in the light role, and 45 pounds in the SF role) to which Western Armies have no equivalent (until battalion level, and here the PLA also is introducing 40mm automatic grenade launchers equal to the US Mk 19). The PF 98 120mm recoilless gun gives AT capability to 800m and HE out to 1800m. The Garl Gustav 84mm recoiless rifle that British and Commonwealth Armies (and US Army Rangers) use is inferior in both respects, effective to 700m and 1,000m respectively; the USMC and US Army Mk 153 SMAW 83mm rocket launcher is even more inferior, and does not even have straight HE rounds as a normal option. Similarly, the 60mm mortar of the PLA company is equal to or marginally superior to the US 60mm mortar; British and Commonwealth armies either use the vastly inferior 51mm or the still very inferior Mk 19 60mm (of Korean War vintage) mortars, or nothing at all until battalion level.

The PLA Rifle Squad, though reduced in size recently, is still more flexible, if potentially more difficult to control, than most Western Sections/Squads. It is easier to keep supplied during offensive operations and is more flexible in its range of attacks. It has less defensive staying power, however, due to its usual lone heavy automatic rifle or light machine gun. However, the platoon and company of which it is a part possesses the usual GPMGs and other heavy weapons, but most notably 35mm automatic grenade launchers in the weight class of 7.62mm GPMGs, in both light and SF roles, and this provides for a substantial increase in firepower at company and platoon level compared to Western equivalents.

Likewise, even at squad level, the 40mm underslung grenade launchers of Western sections and squads are mere peashooters compared to the Type 69 (a development of RGP-7V) or the PF 89 rocket launchers that the PLA squad uses against the same point and area targets that a Western section/squad would use 40mm grenade launchers on. US troops in Iraq are presently complaining that the worst weapon they have to face in firefights are the RPG-7's of the insurgents, and they have nothing comparable to fight back with (except captured RPG-7s). The PLA is clearly on to something here.

There are relative weaknesses in the PLA rifle squad, especially as they were pointed out and described in the last post. The inherent flexibility of the 3x3 organization of the squad may make it more difficult to control, particularly if there is only one NCO to command it, and it makes internal fire-and-movement in frontal attacks more comlicated (typically a necessity in open country), thus lending itself to possible loss of control compared to a two fire team/assault group squad/section. And the PLA squad, as it usually has only one heavy automatic rifle or LMG, is markedly inferior in automatic firepower to its Western counterparts, and it has little capacity for internal fire-and-movement.

However, in the often restricted terrain of most of China, such an organization makes sense for offensive operations. Though the lack of a second heavy automatic rifle or LMG weakens its capacity for frontal attacks and for defensive operations, the former may be avoided in close country, and the latter is remedied especially by the 35mm automatic grenade launchers available to company or even platoon level, in addition to the usual heavy weapons at those levels.

The Rifle Squad of the PLA, in its 8 man Mechanized, and especially in its 9 and 10 man Light and Foot Infantry versions, make for an interesting, even revealing, comparision with and contrast to Western Rifle Squads and Sections. The PLA Squad emphasizes flexibility and the use of terrain, cover, and concealment, and flanking or double envelopment attacks on the offense, and heavy weapons support in the defense, as well as a reduced need for ammo resupply. Its Western counterparts emphasize tight control, the need for ready access to heavy ammo resupply, and heavy firepower at Section/Squad level for internal fire-and-movement and less at higher level in both offensive and defensive operations, and frontal attacks are often preferred due to that emphasis on firepower and control, even when terrain and cover allow for other options.
 
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crobato

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Are you sure what the Americans observed in China was the PLA? By the way, the PLA doesn't officially exist until 1946. Prior to that, it was simply called the Red Army. If American officers were observing Chinese armies at the late thirties, World War II period, it's likely to be the ROCA or Republic of China Army under the Kuomingtang.
 

Norfolk

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Are you sure what the Americans observed in China was the PLA? By the way, the PLA doesn't officially exist until 1946. Prior to that, it was simply called the Red Army. If American officers were observing Chinese armies at the late thirties, World War II period, it's likely to be the ROCA or Republic of China Army under the Kuomingtang.

Yes, Carlson observed the Communist operations againt the Nationalist troops in the 1930's (one source said he was in northen China in 1937 when he observed these operations; confusingly yet another source implied that he had witnessed such operations a few years earlier than 1937). I apologize for using the term PLA, but I did so in order to establish continuity between the Communist guerilla forces of the time and the PLA that they became and that exist now.

Postscript:

I checked again, crobato, and Carlson observed the operations of the Communist 8th Route Army against the Japanese, not the Nationalists as I had written earlier. Sorry about that mistake.
 
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Norfolk

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Here's a Most Important Issue in the Organization and Tactics of the Infantry Squad / Section:

Major Brendan B. McBreen, USMC in the 2001 Marine Corps Gazette article "Suppression is the Critical Infantry Task" and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas P. Odom, US Army (Ret.) (who now works at CALL at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and co-authored the 2005 Military Review article "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units") argue for using the ratio of at least 2 Fire Elements to 1 Assault Element in the Infantry attack. Whereas McBreen already has a 13-man Marine Rifle Squad of three 4-man Fire Teams for this purpose, Odom proposes a similar 14-man Rifle Squad for the US Army (with an Additional NCO in the Squad HQ):

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas P. Odom et al.'s "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units":

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In order for the the Rifle Squad/Section to be able to achieve the level of suppression necessary to get an assault element close enough to destroy the enemy in his own positions without suffering disabling losses in the attempt, the Squad/Section must employ a ration of 2 suppressive (or fire) elements for each assault element to ensure (within reason) a successful attack, and without suffering excessive losses doing so. Looking at the figures that McBreen supplies (and found in Gorman's "The Secret of Future Victories"),

General Paul F. Gorman's "The Secret of Future Victories".

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one can see that the "typical" infantry attack formation using one element to provide covering fire while two other assault, results in a successful attack only 25% of the time. By contrast, the most successful attack formation was the simple reverse of this, with two elements providing covering fire to one assault element resulting in an astonishing success rate of 88% in the attack. None of the other organizations, even the one with an Anti-Tank Team in support, even came close to this.

As such, the Squad/Section that is organized upon a two-fire team basis is unbalanced and seriously inadequate for squad/section level attacks; in order to be reasonably "sure" of a successful attack, it must be composed of three fire teams, just as the USMC rifle squad is. The USMC rifle squad consists of 4 men for each of its 3 fire teams; it originally, like its Chinese ancestor, had 3 men per fire team, but vulnerability to battle losses in WWII caused the USMC to add a fourth man per fire team in late 1944. It has used this ever since. Together with the Squad Leader, the USMC rifle squad has 13 men; but its size is not what is important, that's just a side effect. Amongst all Western Infantry Squads/Sections, the USMC rifle squad is nearly alone in possessing the potential for achieving sufficient suppression of the enemy in the attack to more or less ensure a successful attack, and reducing the likelihood of losses while doing so.

Given this, the Rifle Squad/Section should be organized as follows:

1. The Fire Team (4 men, one of whom is an NCO) is an overly-complicated name for the Squad, which appeared in the late 19th century composed of the same 4 men, and commanded by the lowest-level NCO, a Corporal. The fire team/assault group should be recognized for, and named as, what it is, the Squad.

2. Doctrinally, the Section is commanded by a senior NCO (a Sergeant) and is composed of two or more Squads. Modern Armies have gotten themselves into the strange situation where they have one, or the other, but rarely both, due to past reorganizations (often because that is a favourite peacetime activity of apparently bored staff officers with too much time on their hands), and applying the latest fashionable term to rename small units to make it appear that something really important has occurred, when it really hasn't, just someone trying to make their mark. So then, for the purposes of the Infantry, the Rifle Section should be commanded by a Sergeant, and composed of 3 Rifle Squads (each of 4 men, commanded by the Corporal mentioned above).

This organization, (as well as simplification of organizational terminology by returning to traditional names,) allows for a simple, but very flexible and effective basic infantry formation that is reliably capable of successful attacks, and without suffering undue losses in those attacks, unlike current organizations and the attack formations they use, and is especially useful for attacks in open country with a minumum of cover. Incidently, the Rifle Section of Three 4-man Rifle Squads retains the otherwise almost unique ability of Chinese Army Rifle Squads for successful double-envelopment attacks in close terrain (where cover and terrain both interfere with suppressive fire, but simultaneously reduce the need for it), in which one suppression element provides covering fire upon the enemy position, while two assault elements exploit cover and concealment to manoeuvre to either flank of the enemy position, and then either assault and destroy him, or lure him out and then destroy him. Neither is practically possible with the standard two-fire team squad/section of most Western Armies.
 
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Norfolk

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This is an article by (now) Lt. Col. David Kilcullen that reinforces Rommel's and DePuy's findings on needing to maximize the number of suppression elements in the attack while minimizimg the number of assault elements. While attached to the British Army, Kilcullen (from the Australian Army), learned the basis of suppression-heavy infantry attacks, where a general rule of at least 3/4s of an infantry company would provide suppression, while the remainder assaulted. Prior to the attack proper, the enemy position was surrounded by small reconnaissance and surveillance detachments who provided continuous all-round surveillance of the enemy position and its surroundings.

The attack force itself advanced by infiltration to covered fire positions close to the the enemy position, receiving intelligence along the way from the reconnaissance troops maintaining surveillance of that position. Here's the link:

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Kilcullen himself applied this concept in East Timor in 1999 during fighting with Indonesian troops and local militias.
 
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