Taiwan SAM discussion


Vlad Plasmius

Junior Member
Re: Taiwan SAM Artical (Sean O'Connor)

The more I read on Taiwan's defenses the more I see little chance for Taiwan to successfully defend itself with its current force. There are only 27 SAM batteries with just nine providing any long-range cover. The ROCN has very little chance of posing any serious threat given the resources in the East Sea Fleet alone.

I can't help but feel the author is being overly generous to Taiwan. Even a small incursion of just half a dozen strike aircraft could punch a gaping hole in Taiwan's air defense.
 

Mr T

Senior Member
Re: Taiwan SAM Artical (Sean O'Connor)

Don't forget they are upgrading their Sky Bow I and II to phase III which is deemed Taiwan's Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Project.
Not quite. Sky Bow I missiles are being taken out of service. Sky Bow II missiles will be kept in service - Sky Bow III is being introduced.

Probably the most important thing to note is that the HAWK launchers are due to be replaced by more Sky Bow II batteries (which may also have Sky Bow III missiles). That will be a significant change in long-range SAM capabilities.
 

Vlad Plasmius

Junior Member
Re: Taiwan SAM Artical (Sean O'Connor)

Don't forget they are upgrading their Sky Bow I and II to phase III which is deemed Taiwan's Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Project.
Despite all the fanfare ballistic missiles aren't their major concern.

New PAC IIIs come in handy. Of course Taiwan doesn't have alot the same amount of resources as the PRC does, but I think given the circumstances Taiwan is doing alright.
The introduction of new systems won't really change what would happen even with the small incursion I mentioned. However, I envision the initial blow in a Taiwan war scenario being like a modern variant of Operation Focus. China could use a relatively small number of aircraft in an opening salvo together with ground and sea-based weapon systems to decimate Taiwan's defenses.

I just can't see a possibility for Taiwan's defenses to last on any level for even a short period of time. Two days is usually the time limit for destruction of the ROCN and ROCAF, but I think twelve hours is pushing it.
 

Mr T

Senior Member
Vlad, if more Sky Bow II batteries can't make a difference, what can? Or are you taking the "if China invaded tomorrow" position?
 

Finn McCool

Captain
Registered Member
Re: Taiwan SAM Artical (Sean O'Connor)

Despite all the fanfare ballistic missiles aren't their major concern.

The introduction of new systems won't really change what would happen even with the small incursion I mentioned. However, I envision the initial blow in a Taiwan war scenario being like a modern variant of Operation Focus. China could use a relatively small number of aircraft in an opening salvo together with ground and sea-based weapon systems to decimate Taiwan's defenses.

I just can't see a possibility for Taiwan's defenses to last on any level for even a short period of time. Two days is usually the time limit for destruction of the ROCN and ROCAF, but I think twelve hours is pushing it.
I agree with you very much. For me, the biggest problem the ROCAF faces is the fact that it's bases will be hit with ballistic and cruise missles and in all likelihood they will have great difficulty taking off, while at almost the same time, they will have to face a truly huge incoming wave of aircraft to strike the bases (and other targets) with greater accuracy. If the Chinese have surprise, the ROCAF is in a desperate situation. They have so little time to get their aircraft in the air from when the opening missle salvo is launched to when the Chinese strike aircraft start hitting their targets, especially with runways and other base facilities damaged. This could be helped a bit by relocating the majority of their aircraft to the East side of the island. It would be helped even more if they could get the F-35 with VTOL. Even still, it's a very difficult situation.
 

Vlad Plasmius

Junior Member
Vlad, if more Sky Bow II batteries can't make a difference, what can? Or are you taking the "if China invaded tomorrow" position?
I'm saying it would take a lot more. Just a small group of strike aircraft can punch a big hole in Taiwan's air defenses. Within minutes a similar attack would widen that hole. In an hour the PLAAF could, with a few small incursions, effectively obliterate Taiwan's current and planned air defense network. A larger wave could bring it down within minutes.

I agree with you very much. For me, the biggest problem the ROCAF faces is the fact that it's bases will be hit with ballistic and cruise missles and in all likelihood they will have great difficulty taking off, while at almost the same time, they will have to face a truly huge incoming wave of aircraft to strike the bases (and other targets) with greater accuracy.
I agree that this is the most likely use of ballistic missiles. However SEAD attacks would precede this in so much as they are needed to eliminate ballistic missile defenses. A highly synchronized attack would have ballistic missiles hitting within minutes of successful SEAD strikes followed by more penetrative air strikes. Given the amount of resources at their disposal I doubt a "huge" wave of aircraft is needed. Operation Focus involved the use of Israel's entire air force but ultimately it was used against a force several times larger.

Modern advances allow a similar operation with even fewer aircraft. The key to such an attack is surprise and speed, which are not easy the larger your force gets.
 

FriedRiceNSpice

Senior Member
Even though the distance across the strait is very small, Taiwanese radar would nonetheless be able to give the ROCAF a few minutes notice preceding such a strike. ROCAF aircraft would be scrambled, and greatly complicate matters for Chinese strike aircraft performing their SEAD missions.

During Operation Focus, the IDF Air Force was able to achieve full surprise only because 1) the Egyptian Air Force had ordered all radar stations to be shut off 2) IDF aircraft flew out across the Mediterranean before heading towards Egyptian airspace, thus avoiding the main concentrations of Egyptian radar stations. Also, the Egyptian Air Force as a whole was in a low state of readiness. In the case of rising tensions across the strait, the ROCAF would no doubt be flying CAPs and have all radar and air defense sites on wartime alert.
 

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