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Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
I didn't say you shouldn't build or make use of overseas bases, only that you can't base your force structure and military strategy around having them. If you could then the US Navy could just about dispense with its aircraft carriers, which it very sensibly does not.

Good question. I don't have enough information to provide a definite answer, and nor does anyone else so far as I am aware. It would strike me as odd, however, if PLAN's first modern blue water frigate, designed in the very early stages of the 21st century when PLAN was still overwhelming focused on operations within the first island chain, in fact turned out to be ideally suited not only for operations in the second island chain and eastern IOR, but deployments even further afield.
Well it seems that contrary to your claims, the 054A is doing just fine way out past even the Second Island Chain, in the middle of the ME. It seems that dozens of them have been doing pretty well over the last several years. So while it may strike you as odd, you have provided no evidence at all that 054As are unsuited for long distance deployments.

My first post in this discussion was clear and unambiguous: "Distinct from my previous conception whereby a 6000-ton frigate replaced the 054-series in production, I think a 6000-ton frigate could have a role in a future PLAN..."

Obviously my previous conception has been rendered invalid, at least for the moment, by developments regarding 054B and 052E. The possibility space evolves. I am not here to issue dogmatic proclamations about what PLAN will look like in future, merely to illustrate that the range of what it could plausibly look like is broader than is assumed by the linear extrapolations from the present that many are so fond of.
I get it. You like to think outside the box and leave the linear-thinkers behind in the dust. Unfortunately I just don't think there is a place for your 6,000t super-frigate to squeeze in between a 4,500-5,000t 054B and a 7,500-8,000t 052E, not to mention you will have gone from a two-tier ORBAT straight into a four-tier(!) ORBAT, which would seem to be a dramatic reversal of your previous conception of the future PLAN ORBAT. In any case, I'm guessing the PLAN is going to be way too linear for your tastes for the next few decades.

Obviously tonnage is an index of capability and not itself the characteristic of interest. Nonetheless, it is a good guide. If you want to put more capability on the 056 hull without sacrificing other qualities, then it is going to get bigger. If you want to increase range and endurance on top of that, it will get bigger again. These are reliable relationships.
Who said anyone wanted to increase range and/or endurance for the PLAN's corvette series? Did the PLAN recently say this was to become a priority for its littoral patrol ships?
 
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Lethe

Captain
That is an interesting claim, since I fail to see which developments in Europe and the Soviet Union have overtaken the Seawolf, even at this present time, 29 years after the Seawolf was laid down.

The claim was about designs prior to the Seawolf, i.e. the 688 series. The pump-jet propulsor (UK) and anechoic tiles (Soviet Union) are two examples that spring to mind.

This also speaks nothing of the Virginia or its design team, or the current submarine leadership team. You are essentially using a book published 13 years ago to condemn not just the entirety of the USN's submarine leadership in power now but also those that will be, well into the 2040s, which I find to be a stunningly dramatic claim.

The book was published 13 years ago, yet the genesis of the Virginia class and its vaunted 40yr lifespan goes back rather further and is adequately captured by the text, including the non-competitive nature of the design process.

But you're right: I'm reading between the lines. I see a history of US conservatism in submarine design (one that led to some nasty surprises by the end of the Cold War) emerging from rigid institutional structures that dovetails both with the genesis of the Virginia-class program (basically as a retreat from Seawolf following the end of the Cold War), the explicit characteristics of the boat as a retreat to the prior Los Angeles-class (when the wisdom of those characteristics is a matter for debate in the first place), and the ludicrous claim of a 40yr production and development cycle for the class (i.e. "this design will basically suffice with minor alterations for the next 70 years") as the ultimate expression of hubris from an overwhelmingly complacent community that has disappeared up its own ass. Even the dynamic from the alarm about Soviet progress in the 1980s (result: Seawolf) to the complacency of the unipolar moment (Virginia) and its concurrency with other dumb ideas from the 1990s US Navy (LCS and Zumwalt) fits

Like all theories (or narratives), it's built from fragmentary data and connections with other narratives. How close is it to reality? Impossible to say. But I suspect it's closer than the fluff that comes out of USN's PR office.

Right now USN is just happy to have a program that just about works, but I would not be at all surprised to see a Seawolf II program initiated a decade from now to restore American underwater supremacy that has been eroded by Chinese and Russian advances.
 
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Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
The claim was about designs prior to the Seawolf, i.e. the 688 series. The pump-jet propulsor (UK) and anechoic tiles (Soviet Union) are two examples that spring to mind.
Uhh, no. Anechoic tiles were used not only by the 688 series, but also by the previous series, the Sturgeon class SSN. The first sub in this class to incorporate anechoic tiles was the second sub of the series, the USS Batfish, in 1980. The first Soviet sub to use anechoic tiles was the Akula class, the first of which was laid down in 1983. In other words, your math is off. Not only that, anechoic tiles weren't even invented by the Soviets. They were invented by Nazi Germany during WWII but not in wide use until the 1980s. As for the pumpjet propulsor, the Tralfgar class certainly did preempt the Seawolf in its use of the pumpjet propulsor. But that's your one, sole shining star, long since overtaken by the Seawolf and Virginia classes.

The book was published 13 years ago, yet the genesis of the Virginia class and its vaunted 40yr lifespan goes back rather further and is adequately captured by the text, including the non-competitive nature of the design process.

But you're right: I'm reading between the lines. I see a history of US conservatism in submarine design (one that led to some nasty surprises by the end of the Cold War) emerging from rigid institutional structures that dovetails both with the genesis of the Virginia-class program (basically as a retreat from Seawolf following the end of the Cold War), the explicit characteristics of the boat as a retreat to the prior Los Angeles-class (when the wisdom of those characteristics is a matter for debate in the first place), and the ludicrous claim of a 40yr production and development cycle for the class (i.e. "this design will basically suffice with minor alterations for the next 70 years") as the ultimate expression of hubris from an overwhelmingly complacent community that has disappeared up its own ass. Even the dynamic from the alarm about Soviet progress in the 1980s (result: Seawolf) to the complacency of the unipolar moment (Virginia) and its concurrency with other dumb ideas from the 1990s US Navy (LCS and Zumwalt) fits
I don't see any "nasty surprises". The one "surprise" the US sub community ever really experienced was the advent of the Akula class in the 1980s, which surprised the US sub community by its (relative) improvement compared to prior Soviet subs and its earlier-than-expected appearance, but certainly not because it overtook the US edge in sub acoustics. It didn't. This chart comes straight from your idol Norman Polmar:
Sub_Noise_Comparison_ENG.jpg

As far as the Virginia being a "retreat" from the Seawolf, this is meaningless to the context of the discussion if you can't show that it "retreated" to a level inferior to Russian or other Western sub tech levels. Can you? No, you can't, because the acoustics technology of the Virginia is considered to be IDENTICAL to the acoustics technology of the Seawolf, and even after all this discussion you are still unable to point to any Western or Russian sub that has superior capabilities compared to the "retreated" Virginia, to speak nothing of the Seawolf. If the US sub community has somehow "disappeared up its own ass", which ass has the sub communities of Europe, Russia and China disappeared up into? Each others'? LOL

Also, I'd like to again point out that after just 3 blocks of the 688 class, the 688i is widely considered to be effectively in a new separate class, just as improved Akulas and improved Victor IIIs are considered to be effectively in their own classes. After 7 blocks, though the basic design of the Virginia will still be there, I expect it will be at least one generation separated, perhaps even two, from its progenitor class. Where you see "hubris", I see forward thinking combined with future-proofing built into the base design.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Good question. I don't have enough information to provide a definite answer, and nor does anyone else so far as I am aware. It would strike me as odd, however, if PLAN's first modern blue water frigate, designed in the very early stages of the 21st century when PLAN was still overwhelming focused on operations within the first island chain, in fact turned out to be ideally suited not only for operations in the second island chain and eastern IOR, but deployments even further afield.

The 054 was patterned after the La Fayette class, which was probably the first true modern post Cold War stealth frigate. At this point, it was the French who started the Euro-Frigate concept trend, that envisioned a ship smaller than a destroyer but is blue water, which means it can operate independently away from its home port for a long time, and is highly multi role, and not just an ASW escort. This was a return to the classic concept of the frigate in the Age of Sail, but in a modern context --- a single gun deck ship that is capable of being ocean going; the single gun line separates the ship from multi gun decks lines (ships of the battle line) and sloops (analogous to a corvette) that are still tied to a home port. In the modern context, the smallest unit of warship that is capable of operating in blue water and independently from its home port for long periods of time.

After Taiwan bought La Fayettes (the procedure of which since has become a case of criminal corruption), the PLAN was quite impressed with the ships (or feared) across the straits that either a counter or their own version was required. The 054 was born there.

This isn't to say the previous Type 053 wasn't ocean worthy. The basic design is sound; what was questionable was the pre-2000 shipbuilding quality of Chinese shipyards then, along with the lack of safety measures. But when that was accomplished even the Type 053H3 and its export variants proved to be fine ocean going ships. The Type 053H3 did participate in Gulf of Aden operations, and the export F22P participated in rescue operations in Yemen.


Obviously tonnage is an index of capability and not itself the characteristic of interest. Nonetheless, it is a good guide. If you want to put more capability on the 056 hull without sacrificing other qualities, then it is going to get bigger. If you want to increase range and endurance on top of that, it will get bigger again. These are reliable relationships.

Not completely. The Admiral Gorshkov class and the Korean KDX-II class are both 4500 ton ships standard but are as equally heavily armed or more so than many 5000 to 6000+ frigates. The Gorshkov class has a 5" gun, 16 cells for UKSK VLS and 32 cells for Redut. The KDX-II started with 32 MK. 41 VLS cells, but then added another 32 VLS cells of Korean design with Korean missiles. The 32 Mk. 41 cels are all strike length (7.7m) meaning they can do Tomahawks, and the 32 K-VLS is capable of firing an antiship and cruise missile analogous to a Harpoon. Both these vessels are more heavily armed in offensive potential compared to European frigates not to mention destroyers.

Of course the typical snide reaction, especially among Western European defense watchers is to denigrate the Gorshkov as "cramped", and if that is the case, the 64 cell KDX-II should be absolutely claustrophobic.

As for the Type 056, going to a 1800 ton C-18 or P-18 design means adding 300 tons for a second hanger and space for four more antiship or Yu-10 missiles. That is a significant jump in capability. Adding an SR2410C phase array on top will greatly enhance its sensor abilities for no difference in weight.

The Korean Daegu class frigates, starts at 2500 empty to 3500 full roughly, already sports a 16 cell K-VLS and 4 ASMs. Naval Group's FTI frigate is going at 4,200 tons with 16 VLS cells, but with 8 ASMs. However, the FTI's cells can only house the Aster 15, which means only the 4.3m deep version of the Sylver, while the K-VLS cell could hold an ASM analogous to a Harpoon.

The increasing trend right now in modern warships is cost and efficiency. Requirements are now being set with a budget amount rather than a weight. Type 31e is given a 250 million Pound figure. Doesn't matter if you build a 3500 or a 4500 ton frigate, it needs to fall into that budget.
 
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by78

General
High-resolution photos of a recent replenishment at sea exercise...

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hkbc

Junior Member
Uhh, no. Anechoic tiles were used not only by the 688 series, but also by the previous series, the Sturgeon class SSN. The first sub in this class to incorporate anechoic tiles was the second sub of the series, the USS Batfish, in 1980. The first Soviet sub to use anechoic tiles was the Akula class, the first of which was laid down in 1983. In other words, your math is off. Not only that, anechoic tiles weren't even invented by the Soviets. They were invented by Nazi Germany during WWII but not in wide use until the 1980s. As for the pumpjet propulsor, the Tralfgar class certainly did preempt the Seawolf in its use of the pumpjet propulsor. But that's your one, sole shining star, long since overtaken by the Seawolf and Virginia classes.

Really nothing to do with the PLAN but the Soviets had anechoic tiles on their subs since the mid-sixties not with the Akula class here's an actual reference/citation
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to allow fact checking, not just some opinion being passed off as fact.
 
Feb 11, 2018
now noticed the tweet
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Le destroyer 173 Changsha de Type 052D qui avait "disparu" l'an dernier en océan Indien se trouve actuellement au même endroit, c'est à dire à l'Est de l'océan Indien. Certains parlent d'une opération pour dissuader toute tentative d'invasion indienne sur les Maldives...
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Translated from French by
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The 052D Destroyer 173 Changsha, which had "disappeared" last year in the Indian Ocean, is currently located in the same place, i.e. east of the Indian Ocean. Some talk about an operation to deter any Indian invasion attempt on the Maldives...

DVw23dSVQAAAbyq.jpg
now waiting to see if they'll meet With 16-Nation Naval War Games, India Looks To Secure Sea Lanes
Countries participating in the 'Milan' naval exercise led by Indian Navy include Australia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand and Oman, among others

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"India will host navies from 16 countries for an eight-day mega naval exercise from March 6 with an aim to expand regional cooperation and combat unlawful activities in critical sea lanes. ..."
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Really nothing to do with the PLAN but the Soviets had anechoic tiles on their subs since the mid-sixties not with the Akula class here's an actual reference/citation
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to allow fact checking, not just some opinion being passed off as fact.
I'm pretty sure I already said "not in wide use until the 1980s", when the level of anechoic tile technology had reached maturity for both the American and Soviets. The early Cluster Guard that you are referencing here were extremely prone to falling off and it wasn't until the Akulas that they were able to make tiles that were effective.
 

hkbc

Junior Member
I'm pretty sure I already said "not in wide use until the 1980s", when the level of anechoic tile technology had reached maturity for both the American and Soviets. The early Cluster Guard that you are referencing here were extremely prone to falling off and it wasn't until the Akulas that they were able to make tiles that were effective.

So if tile de-bonding makes the timeline of introduction irrelevant/void and maturity is measured by tiles that stick, how does that square with the fact that the Virginia class, produced for the US Navy from the early 2000s, are still losing their anechoic tiles? as referenced here
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and with pictures here
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Note: Contemporary articles from multiple sources including on the record statements from the US Navy, not a 13 year old book or Wikipedia

Pretty sure you can't have it both ways! Maybe you could, because hey it's just words they don't have to make sense

As for your statement "not in wide use till the 1980s" I suppose it depends on your definition of "wide use"

I would contend 40 commissioned Soviet subs to be wide use (Given the Royal Navy hasn't produced 40 nuclear subs in 50 years!).

Number of subs referenced from Anthony Tucker-Jones in his book Soviet Cold War Weaponry: Aircraft, Warships and Missiles (ISBN: 9781783032969)
The Soviets used clusterguard on all their fleet submarines after the November class and on all the SSGNs from the Charlie class. So prior to the 80s that would mean all the Victor I and IIs (23 subs) plus a Victor III and all 11 Charlie 1s and 5 of the 6 Charlie IIs so that's over 40 subs in total not counting any of the diesel electrics. Note: A reference with numbers not a sweeping generalisation or a vague assertion to be walked backwards and forwards as circumstance dictates.

Obviously, your definition of wide use can be what ever you choose it to be.
 
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