PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

tphuang said:

I did not say anything like that. I said US military would try to degrade Chinese bases, missile launchers and possibly military production facility on the mainland in the event of a war. And depending on how much risk they are willing to take in the positioning of their carrier groups and how much risk Japan is willing to take in terms of the airports it would allow USAF to operate out of and a wide variety of other factors, China could potentially be dealing with a really large collection of missiles.

Keep in mind that China does have a geographical advantage, because it's operating out of its backyard, so everything in PLA would be at its disposal. It would also be able to repair bases and factories a lot quicker with all the available workers. But for the sake of the discussion, I can't pretend this is just a one sided exchange.

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If they tried it would be what would happen if Vietnam had a long range air force shooting down their troop transports. Vietnam shot down 3000+ US fixed wings.

To hit targets in China that work on things with turnaround time fast enough to matter, like missiles and planes, US would need to strike places in the middle of China like Sichuan and Xi'an. That rules out all tactical aviation. They'll also need overflight rights from other countries or just ignore them for bombers. If they ignore, they'll be limited to cruise missile and their B-2 fleet since B-52s aren't stealthy enough to just ignore foreign airspace.

That means the only real pathway to attack Chinese MIC facilities is load up in Diego Garcia, overfly a foreign country like India or Myanmar stealthily, then overfly Tibet (high risk of crashing due to environmental issues), avoid all Chinese air defenses for thousands of km, strike a heavily defended target without immediate consequence for the front and make it back out. Not likely to happen.

ZeEa5KPul said:

The point of this exercise is to deter the US from launching conventional strikes against soft Chinese mainland targets like shipyards by threatening tactical nuclear strikes against identical targets in the US. The reason for using tactical nukes as opposed to conventional weapons is because the volume of fire China will be able to generate against the mainland US is pitifully small, so each hit must be very strong and very accurate - that spells out "intercontinental range HGV with tactical nuclear warhead."

A roughly one kiloton tactical nuclear weapon is destructive enough that one hit is enough to delete Newport News Shipbuilding or USAF Plant 4, but not strong enough to obliterate or even severely damage the cities they're in. The aim is calibrated escalation of force and to put the onus of escalation onto the US: leave Chinese military-industrial facilities alone or suffer comparable destruction. The objective is symmetric deterrence - an eye for an eye - but the means are asymmetric. I don't think the physics of the weapons used is what matters, the scale of destruction is what matters.

Of course, reaching strategic parity is a prerequisite for this strategy to work so as to prevent the US from escalating to strategic use of nuclear weapons.

I agree. Even though the quoted comment was supportive, I urge that we keep discussion civil.

I differentiate between strikes on strictly military targets like bases, which can be considered fair game, and soft military-industrial targets like shipyards which I do not consider fair game.

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Using tactical nuclear weapons on the home soil of a nuclear nation is, and will remain, an action that will be considered rapidly escalatory on the path of general nuclear escalation.
In your description, the likely US response to China using a small number of tactical nuclear weapons against US military production centers on CONTUS is probably going to be the US carrying out large scale use of nuclear weapons against Chinese military production centers on the Chinese mainland, and then dare China to proceed to larger scale nuclear employment or even counter value targeting.

I understand the desire to seek a method to bridge the geographical disparity/advantage that the US holds currently in the western pacific where it is able to relatively easily target Chinese military production centers due to the proximity of their offensive capabilities to mainland China, while PLA offensive capabilities are relatively far from US military production centers in CONTUS.

However, the way to solve this problem is by achieving massive conventional superiority in the western pacific such that the US will not have sufficient time or organization to carry out meaningful strikes against Chinese military production centers in the first place, and to rapidly annihilate forward deployed fixed and mobile US forces in the region.

FairAndUnbiased said:

That means the only real pathway to attack Chinese MIC facilities is load up in Diego Garcia, overfly a foreign country like India or Myanmar stealthily, then overfly Tibet (high risk of crashing due to environmental issues), avoid all Chinese air defenses for thousands of km, strike a heavily defended target without immediate consequence for the front and make it back out. Not likely to happen.

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Since you don't expect the USAF to do this, this is very much what they can plan to do. Better have something in place to stop such an operation than to leave it to 'chance'.

Bltizo said:

In your description, the likely US response to China using a small number of tactical nuclear weapons against US military production centers on CONTUS is probably going to be the US carrying out large scale use of nuclear weapons against Chinese military production centers on the Chinese mainland, and then dare China to proceed to larger scale nuclear employment or even counter value targeting.

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As I told you before when I first brought up this idea, if that happens then we all go straight to Hell. Great Filter time. It's like Putin said when he was asked if Russia would use nuclear weapons, "Why do we need the world if Russia is not in it?" Why do we need the world if China is not in it? Why do we need the world if China can't get out from under the US's thumb?

Bltizo said:

However, the way to solve this problem is by achieving massive conventional superiority in the western pacific such that the US will not have sufficient time or organization to carry out meaningful strikes against Chinese military production centers in the first place, and to rapidly annihilate forward deployed fixed and mobile US forces in the region.

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That would be ideal, but no matter how strong China gets it won't be able to stomp every single cockroach simultaneously. If China destroys all but one of the US's submarines, it just takes that one submarine slipping through and launching cruise missiles at JNCX or a similar target.

They have to understand what doing that will get them. They have to have that sword hanging over their heads.

SampanViking said:

A Solomon Islands flashpoint has none of those advantages for China, so If I was a US Theater Commander tasked with producing a strategy, I think I know where I would want to make my play!

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The last thing you wanna do is to trigger this war by hitting an irrelevant target, imo.

You'd just be gifting China an excuse to launch salvos on US targets which actually matter.

This principle applies to both China and the US. Neither can trigger such a war by hitting trivial targets.

ZeEa5KPul said:

As I told you before when I first brought up this idea, if that happens then we all go straight to Hell. Great Filter time. It's like Putin said when he was asked if Russia would use nuclear weapons, "Why do we need the world if Russia is not in it?" Why do we need the world if China is not in it? Why do we need the world if China can't get out from under the US's thumb?

That would be ideal, but no matter how strong China gets it won't be able to stomp every single cockroach simultaneously. If China destroys all but one of the US's submarines, it just takes that one submarine slipping through and launching cruise missiles at JNCX or a similar target.

They have to understand what doing that will get them. They have to have that sword hanging over their heads.

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Strategic/counter value nuclear exchange is what I consider to be a lose-lose outcome for two warring sides.

I am not opposed to the logic of strategic/counter value non-nuclear retaliatory nuclear exchange (i.e.: first use), if it is due to one party (in this case, China) recognizing that it will lose in a conflict to a devastating degree, such that strategic nuclear exchange makes sense, to ensure that the opfor loses as well.

However, use of tactical nuclear weapons against home soil of a nuclear armed nation is half a step away from strategic nuclear exchange on the escalation ladder, and I do not see how China could justify risking strategic nuclear exchange without thinking that not using tactical nuclear weapons would result it in losing a conflict to a devastating degree.



Because adopting your policy, the best outcome is one where China use tac nukes, then the US uses tac nukes, and they undergo strategic nuclear exchange and everyone does.
The worst outcome is one where China uses tac nukes, then the US uses tac nukes (but due to US tac nuke stocks, delivery methods, and due to their geographical proximity/superiority) are able to tac nuke China's military production and warfighting capabilities and national command/control capabilities far more thoroughly, and China loses the guts or even the capacity to carry out the threat of armageddon.

Putting it another way -- there is no outcome in your proposal where the US does not reply with the use of tactical nukes, if China uses tactical nukes first.

Bltizo said:

Strategic/counter value nuclear exchange is what I consider to be a lose-lose outcome for two warring sides.

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I don't consider this the worst outcome. The worst outcome is the perpetuation of US hegemony, the second worst outcome is humanity's extinction. If it's between those two, I'll choose the latter.

Bltizo said:

However, use of tactical nuclear weapons against home soil of a nuclear armed nation is half a step away from strategic nuclear exchange on the escalation ladder, and I do not see how China could justify risking strategic nuclear exchange without thinking that not using tactical nuclear weapons would result it in losing a conflict to a devastating degree.

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Even if China "wins" the conflict in the sense that it destroys the US military deployed/surged to the Pacific and expels the US from the region but at the cost of its military industry, then it still loses. If the US does not suffer similar destruction, it can rearm much faster and launch another war.

It must suffer comparable devastation, period. If that means a terminal nuclear war then so be it. It cannot get away with striking Chinese industrial centers, it simply can't.

Bltizo said:

Because adopting your policy, the best outcome is one where China use tac nukes, then the US uses tac nukes, and they undergo strategic nuclear exchange and everyone does.

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The best outcome is where the US is deterred from striking the Chinese mainland with any kind of weapon. The absolute best outcome is where the US sees that war is hopeless for it and withdraws with its tail between its legs.

Bltizo said:

The worst outcome is one where China uses tac nukes, then the US uses tac nukes (but due to US tac nuke stocks, delivery methods, and due to their geographical proximity/superiority) are able to tac nuke China's military production and warfighting capabilities and national command/control capabilities far more thoroughly, and China loses the guts or even the capacity to carry out the threat of armageddon.

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That means China's escalation ladder is deficient. It must have sufficient stocks of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons at high levels of alert and launch preparation such that what you describe is impossible. That's just a problem of producing more warheads, delivery vehicles, and early warning systems.

ZeEa5KPul said:

I don't consider this the worst outcome. The worst outcome is the perpetuation of US hegemony, the second worst outcome is humanity's extinction. If it's between those two, I'll choose the latter.

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I never said that is the worst outcome. I said that is a "lose lose scenario". In my post I stated that the lose lose scenario is actually the best scenario for one where China uses tactical nuclear weapons.

ZeEa5KPul said:

Even if China "wins" the conflict in the sense that it destroys the US military deployed/surged to the Pacific and expels the US from the region but at the cost of its military industry, then it still loses. If the US does not suffer similar destruction, it can rearm much faster and launch another war.

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Not necessarily.
There's a difference between suffering minor damage to its military industry and having its entirely military industry devastated or crippled.

There's also a difference in the manner in which China can "win" the conflict.
There's a difference between a decisive victory where they are capable of decisively annihilating US forward deployed/surged forces in westpac (while retaining the vast majority of its own mobile air-naval surface-subsurface forces and suffering minimal damage to its own military industry) ------ versus experiencing a phyrric victory where it is able to defeat US forward deployed/surged forces but at great cost where it loses half or more of their own mobile air and naval forces and loses substantial military industry at home that cripples their ability to replace losses or conduct future operations.

ZeEa5KPul said:

It must suffer comparable devastation, period. If that means a terminal nuclear war then so be it. It cannot get away with striking Chinese industrial centers, it simply can't.

The best outcome is where the US is deterred from striking the Chinese mainland with any kind of weapon. The absolute best outcome is where the US sees that war is hopeless for it and withdraws with its tail between its legs.

That means China's escalation ladder is deficient. It must have sufficient stocks of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons at high levels of alert and launch preparation such that what you describe is impossible. That's just a problem of producing more warheads, delivery vehicles, and early warning systems.

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It is virtually impossible for China to have a sufficiently capable nuclear deterrence against the US in such a manner where they can threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons against US soil and not expect the US to use tactical nuclear weapons in response in a manner that exceeds what China can deliver.

It is simply a matter of geography and pre-conflict/peacetime geographical basing of offensive platforms and capabilities.
It is the same reason why the US is capable of striking Chinese military production facilities on Chinese soil and why China finds it much more difficult to strike US military production facilities on US soil, is the same reason why US tactical nuclear weapons delivery capacity towards Chinese soil will far exceed what China can deliver towards US soil.


Based on the above, it would be disastrous and stupid for China to think about using tactical nuclear blackmail to deter the US from striking Chinese soil using conventional weapons, because the outcome is that China will come off far worst when the US conducts inevitable massive scale tactical nuclear retaliation.

If some Chinese military production facilities get bombed, they can always be repaired. If China can build multiple hospitals in Wuhan in a few days, repairing factory floors won't be a problem. Even if China suffers a major defeat in a war, it can rebuild itself over 50 years. The Chinese history has full of cases where it suffered defeat to foreign countries and then rebuilt itself. America will not have perpetual hegemony just because it successfully bombs a few Chinese MIC factories. If China starts a nuclear exchange against US, the Chinese civilization is going to get wiped off the face of the world. There is no way to recover from that.

Bltizo said:

It is virtually impossible for China to have a sufficiently capable nuclear deterrence against the US in such a manner where they can threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons against US soil and not expect the US to use tactical nuclear weapons in response in a manner that exceeds what China can deliver.

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Bltizo said:

It is simply a matter of geography and pre-conflict/peacetime geographical basing of offensive platforms and capabilities.

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Your position is contradictory. You entertain the possibility that in the future the PLA will be able to resoundingly defeat the US Pacific force while suffering tolerable losses (75% of the PLA force intact with 100% of the US force wiped out) and to do it with such speed and ferocity that Chinese industry suffers minimal to no damage. From your lips to God's ears is all I can say to that. Amen.

But why wouldn't the PLA destroy forward deployed US nuclear weapons along with the rest of the US force? Either the US withdraws these weapons or they are captured/destroyed by the PLA in the ensuing rout. If they're on submarines, then the PLAN will pop those subs or they'll withdraw to US waters.

Bltizo said:

Based on the above, it would be disastrous and stupid for China to think about using tactical nuclear blackmail to deter the US from striking Chinese soil using conventional weapons, because the outcome is that China will come off far worst when the US conducts inevitable massive scale tactical nuclear retaliation.

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It would be so if this policy were a substitute for conventional overmatch rather than a supplement. China isn't North Korea (or the US for that matter) to rely on nuclear weapons to make up for conventional deficiencies. If China's conventional forces are strong enough and properly postured, then the US won't have the capacity to overmatch China with tactical nukes.

There's also another component to this that I don't discuss because it'll run afoul of the forum's rules (which is an indictment of the forum's rules that they constrain discussion of strategy). I've mentioned only China's response vis-à-vis the US homeland in response to strikes on Chinese industry; I think you can imagine what I advocate China do to countries like Japan who host US assets used to strike soft Chinese targets.

tphuang said:

Even if China suffers a major defeat in a war, it can rebuild itself over 50 years.

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I don't even know what to say to this. If China suffers a major defeat in war then it's the end of human life on Earth. It's not China's lot in life to rebuild itself every time some imperialist scum prey on it. If anybody's going to be rebuilding, it's them.