PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

tphuang

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First, I think we need to establish why it makes sense for plan fleet to be there and what are the likely steps it would take to stay there. And also question of how they can establish a fleet there.

Over the next few years, china is likely to ramp up it's naval activity so that it's normal for them to be having several destroyers around Ryuku, Japan's main islands and generally east of Taiwan. So in order to maintain normalcy, they probably won't try to deviate from their regular deployment by having pre gather a fleet there. It will likely assemble there when they are about to start attacking. Presumably, they will initially launch a lot of missiles and follow that up by strike aircraft and bombers coming in for further destruction. At this stage, they will want to move large portion of their fleet to area of choke points. That might take a couple of days to accomplish. The opening couple of days with push plaaf to it's limit in terms of expected number of sorties in both strike and escort roles. At this point, assuming they have destroyed many capital surface ships and military command center and infrastructure, they are likely to have a couple of days where they can move into their position in east of Taiwan. I think at this point, they would opt to have as large of a fleet as possible. They would also need to make sure that Taiwan and Okinawa are completely offline in term high altitude air defense and over the horizon anti ship threat. That would require continued ucav and strike aircraft sorties.

At this point, they will hopefully have done enough to attempt landing of penghu and orchid island. It would be for different purpose. Penghu island and kinmen would allow them to keep up with their destruction with artillery and rockets. Penghu is also a harder island to take. Kinmen on the other hand is quite small and should be very easy to take. It would require deploying a 075 on the east of Taiwan. Assuming they can take both, they will now be able to build air strip on two airport off the mainland even if they don't take Taiwan proper.

Penghu is 875 km from Okinawa, 2850 km from Guam and probably 1000 km away from where they would want to station their fleet. That is about another 1600 to 2000 km from Guam. I don't think I need to explain why that's a good distance away.

Orchid island is 765 km from Okinawa, 2600 km from Guam and 750 km away from where they would want to station their fleet.

I took a look at orchid island and the lanyu airport is on the west side. It actually isn't very easy to attack from north or east due to terrain. So I think it would be a lot easier to defend that air strip from cruise missiles than a flat island terrain. They will probably look to get as many construction workers, equipments and air defense units established as soon as they can.

Let's say they have a month and half until facing a 3 csg usn fleet, they do have time to setup air bases in both lanyu and penghu. Both airport should support most military aircraft including possibly MPAs and refuelling tankers. That would actually significantly improve their ability to sustain a large fleet 1800 km west of Guam since they will can sustain more land based aircraft in the event of a conflict. They can sustain hale isr drones better if they can take off from lanyu instead of somewhere on the main land.

All of this assumes they do not try a beach landing on Taiwan proper. If they try a landing, they could conceivably put an airport into usage long before they take over Taiwan. So my premise here is that in any conflict where they have a month and half before an arriving usn, it's likely they will be able to extend the reach of their land based air wing. Therefore, they may start off operating closer to mainland but then move further out as they have more land base aviation support.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
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Not entirely sure if this is the right place to put this, so if not, mods feel free to let me know.

At the behest of a thoroughly overworked @Patchwork_Chimera, if anybody here has interest in helping put together an initial ORBAT for both PLA and US/TW/JP/SK/PH/AU/UK (Of course, not all of which are considered likely belligerents), as well as putting together an open source database of these units and military installations (Patchwork already has most of it, but I'm sort of burning him out in search of publicly available source material for it all, which is necessary for putting together unclass intelligence product when one of the team members has access to not so unclass intelligence material hah) for these nations - primarily PLA, US, TW, JP, SK - feel free to shoot either of us a DM. As part of that big project he keeps teasing, one of the main components will be an interactive map, SQL database (complete with API for nerds!), and overview of all military formations and facilities in the region, hence why so much effort is going into compiling and sourcing it.

Thanks y'all.
jeez way to call me out like that!

But yes, if anybody wants to hop on board, DM away.
When are the YT videos dropping?
 

AndrewS

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Let's say they have a month and half until facing a 3 csg usn fleet, they do have time to setup air bases in both lanyu and penghu. Both airport should support most military aircraft including possibly MPAs and refuelling tankers. That would actually significantly improve their ability to sustain a large fleet 1800 km west of Guam since they will can sustain more land based aircraft in the event of a conflict. They can sustain hale isr drones better if they can take off from lanyu instead of somewhere on the main land.

If you're talking about Week 6, then a PLA amphibious invasion on Taiwan would likely already have occurred.

Also remember that after Week 2, Taiwan would already be suffering from shortages of food, fuel, electricity, etc etc
 
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tphuang

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If you're talking about Week 6, then a PLA amphibious invasion on Taiwan would likely already have occurred.

Also remember that after Week 2, Taiwan would already be suffering from shortages of food, fuel, electricity, etc etc

Yes, it's unclear how long Taiwan would hold on without gas, electricity and facing food shortage. They may give up quickly depending on the situation. That would give pla plenty of time to repair and build up air defense around Taiwan. Does change dynamics quite a bit.

So I guess there is two parts to this. The initial Chinese effort to establish a fleet there while facing the remnant of us and Japanese military assets in the region. I would imagine submarines would be far and away the most threatening component.

And the other part is a large usn fleet that will get assembled and come after plan positions after 6 to 8 weeks.

It would seem like the first part is more critical. If they can establish air bases in Taiwan proper and possibly taking over Okinawa(for duration of the conflict), that would give them enough air control in that second phase.

So to establish foothold, I think it would be pretty logical for them to take over orchid island at the same time they establish a fleet about 500 to 800 km east of Taiwan. Having that island base, would allow them to station a few MPAs and j16s very close to the action. They would need to quickly figure out the logistics, but you would get so much longer patrol time when you only have to fly 500 km instead of 1000 km to get to the center of action. And as we discussed, they are heavily dependent on aerial assets for asw. Even if this just allow them to sustain 2 or 3 more kq200s in the air consistently, it could be worth it.
 

Tempest

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I can help with SQL stuff, optimizing joins/queries etc. if u guys need. If your DB is gonna have a public API, I'm definitely gonna be hooking into it with python and throwing it into my SQL server anyway lolz.
Sounds awesome, I'd love a hand with the DB stuff once we start building it out. Gameplan is to work with PostGreSQL since I like it hah. Feel free to shoot me an email at [email protected] and I'll plug you in to our working folder.

When are the YT videos dropping?
They're delayed for the time being. Patchwork got into a pretty gnarly motorcycle accident and is in hospital at this time, so that takes precedence in my opinion.

This sounds way too exciting to miss out, are you guys still in need of extra hands?

I am fairly well-read on both of your writings at this forum and hence have some basic understanding of what you are trying to accomplish. I take the subject-matter with immense interest and have profound appreciation of all your efforts on it.
Even if I am not an domain expert in any sense, what I do have currently is plenty of time (in middle of long vacation), so would happily contribute however small I can.

P.S. With apologies to Mods, it would have been more appropriate for me to DM you about this... but it appears an account needs to be at a certain level first to start conversations. Perhaps I can be on the receiving end of one?
Cheers, feel free to shoot me an email at the address listed above - I just found out I can't send DMs either hah.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Lyle is mostly a policy bro. He's a great dude, and a prudent thinker when it comes to addressing challenges, but he's not really an operational planner by any stretch - this (to my understanding) was meant to be more demonstrative of the kind of naval forces the PLA is able to project beyond the 1IC in the near future. I wouldn't consider this to be especially representative of real, notional Taiwan flashpoint naval operations. After all, what is the goal of them being there? All CONEMP exists to generate effects. If there's no effect generated, and it only serves to expose an asset, there is no reason to employ a weapon system, formation, unit, etc. in that manner.

If the US and China aren't in a shooting war, then Chinese carriers in such a location would be part of a screening/blockade force and also act as a political deterrent against US intervention.

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If the US and China are already in a shooting war, then yes, I expect Chinese carriers would be operating fighters and AWACs at long range against opposing US carriers.

If Chinese carriers are operating 900 km from the Chinese coastline and US carriers are operating 1800km (1000 nm), it means a gap of 900km. That is a short enough distance for fighters from both carrier groups to operate against each other. Also consider how Chinese carriers would have land-based tanker and ISR support, whereas US carriers wouldn't.

I also don't see how US carriers could sprint 400km (200nm) closer without definitely getting tracked. Furthermore, the launch points for F/A-18 JASSMs targeting mainland China or the Taiwan Straits would literally be above the Chinese CSGs.

So US carriers would be forced to conduct antiship missions against Chinese CSGs before they could devote attention to the Taiwan Straits. And this could be at a critical time during an invasion.
 

AndrewS

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So to establish foothold, I think it would be pretty logical for them to take over orchid island at the same time they establish a fleet about 500 to 800 km east of Taiwan. Having that island base, would allow them to station a few MPAs and j16s very close to the action. They would need to quickly figure out the logistics, but you would get so much longer patrol time when you only have to fly 500 km instead of 1000 km to get to the center of action. And as we discussed, they are heavily dependent on aerial assets for asw. Even if this just allow them to sustain 2 or 3 more kq200s in the air consistently, it could be worth it.

For Orchid Island, fighter jets make sense as they have such short operating distances and pilot endurance is a big deal. Plus it is possible to scramble fighter jets quickly if there is an incoming attack and save the aircraft.

But if you have MPAs like a KQ-200, it has 10 hours of endurance and a range of 5000km. Basing on Orchid Island saves about 1000km and 2 hours over a base on mainland China.

Given the increased vulnerability of larger aircraft on Orchid Island, I think it's better for them to continue operating from airbases on mainland China. The additional distance is manageable.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
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Regarding this one, I hold fairly firmly that US intervention is a de-facto guaranteed. I don't personally foresee any scenario in the near future in which the PLA affords the US reaction time by not initiating hostilities off the bat. I've explained my reasoning for this in past, so I'll spare you the writeup.

I understand your position.

But I also see the US acknowledging that China's expanding nuclear arsenal will be at parity with the US within the next 8 years. And the dynamics of nuclear escalation means the US wouldn't dare to get into an actual shooting war with China. Look at how careful the US is with Ukraine.

Well, I absolutely agree that forward deployment of PLAN formations is a very big plus - but I don't see the need to concentrate such a large formation in such a confined region with such questionable positioning. That is a *lot* of AAW that could be screening other portions of the coastline, or conducting disaggregated operations to support other objectives. Until OASuW increment 2, the USN doesn't have a viable large scale (non SSN) anti-shipping complex capable of threatening PLAN "heavy" formations (1+ DDG and 1+ FFG), making such a large concentration of assets redundant. Furthermore, by aggregating such a large formation, rearward ships are less able to provide ASW screening support, and forward assets are more vulnerable for little reason. The same sortie volume could reasonably be generated from more ASW-permissive regions, and ample screening could be provided by far fewer units, spread over a much larger area. Additionally, the employment of "picket" SAGs acting as ASW tripwires, as well as other benefits, would likely be spread over a much larger, wider frontage - rather than being concentrated so heavily around the CV/CVNs. Further, I would imagine PLAN CV employment would be much better suited to SCS/Malacca regions, in which PLAN airpower would genuinely face challenges in contesting important chokepoints - rather than *further* denying access to an already denied 7FLT. It's not so much that this CONEMP wouldn't have benefits, but that there are a myriad of larger, more impactful benefits from the alternatives.

Politically, I see Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam as definitely being neutral. None of these countries will support a US Navy presence dedicated to blockading China, which would make the Malacca Straits and South China Seas an active warzone. Indeed, their economic interests would be better served by aligning with the Chinese Navy and the Chinese SCS bases to keep any and all trade flowing through the Malacca Straits and South China Seas.

Remember that Indonesia is an archipelago nation and the two halves of Malaysia are separated by the SCS. Singapore's entire existence depends on being a maritime trading entrepot for the region. Vietnam is basically a long strip of coastline facing the SCS and shares a land border with China

In addition, China does sit in the middle of all the trade flows in Asia, and arguably globally.

So I see the Malacca Straits and South China Seas as being relatively secure. And deploying Chinese carriers further afield would definitely be of secondary importance compared to events in the Western Pacific.

5 years ago, I would have agreed with you that deploying a single carrier in the SCS would have been the best option for the Chinese Navy. But Chinese power has grown so much that it is now credible to deploy 2 Chinese carriers into the Western Pacific facing towards Guam.
 
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