That is a very interesting statement. If there anything that can be shared publicly?
Can't think of too much, other than what's already reasonably accessible. I'd just recommend reading those, since datalinks and connectivity are sort of touchy subjects and I try not to speak on them without a specific purpose or scope just to cover myself lol. I know
@Tempest though has a portion of his library available for people to read if they want -
Well, in a short duration operation that is true.
But remember that in a long campaign, the US can bring in additional assets and missiles from CONUS.
I am well aware of this position. However, doing so isn't quite as simple as most seem to believe lol.
The current OFRS (Optimized Fleet Response Plan) calls for 6 CVNs total to be (theoretically) deployable within 30 days, and one more within 90 days, including those already underway. This does not include CGs or DDGs, only the Carriers themselves. Deployed also doesn't always mean what you may think it does - currently there are 4 CVNs deployed, but only two of them are operating in CSGs. The other two are conducting their COMPUTEX ahead of a scheduled
operational deployment later in the year. Thus, in those 30 days (barring the PLA deciding "yeah screw it let's turn up the difficulty slider" and initiating hostilities just as new CSGs are about to deploy in earnest), the 2-3 CSGs operating typically would only require 3-4 additional CVNs, which would require additional time to conduct a wartime workup before heading to the fight (it is
not a good idea to put inexperienced sailors into an immeasurably complex weapons system like a CSG and throw them at an enemy who has been training for this exact moment for months, and who has already been fighting and learning for a minimum of 30 days prior). The transit time for those CSGs is another factor to consider - they would likely try to incorporate some of their training into the transit, but getting to Pearl takes ~5 days at 15-20kts and the transit from Pearl to an area they could get into the fight from from would take 8-9 days at ~20kts. All together, it's likely that the first FRP quick deployment carriers would begin hitting the "front line" anywhere from 1.5-2 months after the beginning of the conflict. This is, of course, pretending that the CVNs are all from the West Coast. The East Coast carriers have an even longer trip ahead of them, and comprise 3 of the 6 "rapid deployment requirement" carriers. This is also assuming that CVN-76 isn't one of the CVNs able to deploy within 30 days. If that were the case, you may as well drop the FRP requirement by 1 CVN, because CVN-76 in port is a complete writeoff.
PACAF's response could certainly be a little bit quicker. F-35 and F-22 Sqns from Alaska would likely redeploy to Anderson, Pearl, or to Australia, along with a myriad of 4/4.5gen TACAIR, AAR, AEW, ELINT, etc. aircraft. However, this just... well, it's not enough quite honestly. With East Asian basing out of the fight (Japan, South Korea - being unlikely to join the fight in the first place, but if they did, they would also be grounded rather sharpishly, Philippines - again, highly unlikely to join the fight, but the same caveat of "if they did they'd get put on the backfoot rather quickly", and of course Taiwan would all possess airbases that are either crippled - even if temporarily, too far into the PLA's skies to actually operate, or which do not permit the US to fight out of), it essentially leaves those bases as the only ones able to generate sorties for the time being. Furthermore, not only would it be the bases, but it would be the broader airpower system of those spots that would be attacked - meaning even with a runway and a few barrels of jet fuel, aircraft attempting to operate out of those bases would have a
very difficult time being armed, being maintained, being coordinated, and not being killed (both on the ground and while airborne). By flying out of these bases, the real sortie generation capability of PACAF is simply not large enough to meaningfully contest the PLAAF in their own backyard. Some civilian airports may be employed by the US to base aircraft, but they lack munitions storage, don't store large quantities of JP-8 in anything resembling hardened tanks (civilian aircraft use Jet-A, which is still okay but lacks some of the additives that JP-8 does and may cause modest performance changes), and have plenty of other miscellaneous drawbacks. They'll work for basing support airframes, but would need to be brought up to military standards as soon as possible to efficiently generate combat aircraft sorties. The Marianas would also be subject to cruise and ballistic missile attacks, which may taper off slightly after the initial salvo, but which would still be a significant impedance to air ops.
The surface force shares many of these same issues as well. The amount of vessels we operate in 7FLT's AOR are too few in number to survive the initial clash, but the warships in other parts of the world, or those which will be deployed as reinforcements would be arriving late into an already lost game.
These problems wouldn't just go away either. Even if all 3 Pacific rapidly-available CVNs were to be available after those 1.5 months, and were complemented by 2 CGs and 5 DDGs a piece, and PACAF were able to operate out of Guam without any further missile attacks, the amount of combat power that force could project into the PRC's near vicinity - while eye watering by the rest of the world's standards - would be insufficient to defeat the PLA on their home turf,
after they had completely crippled Taiwan and Japan already, and subjected them to a complete blockade for likely upwards of a month. Frankly, after a month and a half, I'd expect Taiwan to have already been considered sufficiently attrited for the PLAGF/PLANMC to initiate the land component of the campaign - and I would expect it to have succeeded. At that point, the war is already over. Even if the US
could then give the PLA a bloody nose bad enough for the history books to admire, what would the point be? We aren't going to invade the Eastern (worst-for-invasion) coast of Taiwan and push out the PRC.
As such, while yes, the US could certainly bring reinforcements to the fight - they'd simply be too little too late. A rewording, rather than a rewrite of how history records the conflict.
