PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC (first wave, sustained, other)


Patchwork_Chimera

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This is exactly the kind of problem I want to give to a deep learning + reinforcement learning system and just have it play it out over and over and over again. It should be able to devise optimal strategies to employ IADS assets and identify the most vulnerable approach routes. I hope and expect that the PLA is doing this.
Lol. Lmao.

You should look up what a Generative Adversarial Model (also called GAN) is. We uh, well... we may or may not base course of action analysis on deep-learning-ifying a GAN model by giving it force postures, objectives, etc. etc. and having it run force employment models hundreds of thousands (if not millions LOL) of times, and using it to determine what the optimal employment schema for a given operational environment are. I also may or may not have used that approach when working on JAAWS (joint ai augmented weaponeering system), which takes force structures, ETFs (electronic target folders), munition distributions and current taskings, and can work out the most efficient munition allocation and conemp.

EVERYBODY is doing this kind of thing. I'd almost bet money that the PLA has this, but significantly better (afaik JAAWS only ended up getting used in Cruise Missile Support Activity - Atlantic as some auxiliary thing because it takes a while to run and can be finicky) in almost every way. Data is the future of combat (and everything else, really); and the side with access to the best data and the best tools to work with that data is the side that will perform best in war. After all, the PLA doesn't define it's 3 major theaters as "Air, Sea, and Information" for no reason.
 

Patchwork_Chimera

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That is a very interesting statement. If there anything that can be shared publicly?
Can't think of too much, other than what's already reasonably accessible. I'd just recommend reading those, since datalinks and connectivity are sort of touchy subjects and I try not to speak on them without a specific purpose or scope just to cover myself lol. I know @Tempest though has a portion of his library available for people to read if they want -
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Well, in a short duration operation that is true.
But remember that in a long campaign, the US can bring in additional assets and missiles from CONUS.
I am well aware of this position. However, doing so isn't quite as simple as most seem to believe lol.

The current OFRS (Optimized Fleet Response Plan) calls for 6 CVNs total to be (theoretically) deployable within 30 days, and one more within 90 days, including those already underway. This does not include CGs or DDGs, only the Carriers themselves. Deployed also doesn't always mean what you may think it does - currently there are 4 CVNs deployed, but only two of them are operating in CSGs. The other two are conducting their COMPUTEX ahead of a scheduled operational deployment later in the year. Thus, in those 30 days (barring the PLA deciding "yeah screw it let's turn up the difficulty slider" and initiating hostilities just as new CSGs are about to deploy in earnest), the 2-3 CSGs operating typically would only require 3-4 additional CVNs, which would require additional time to conduct a wartime workup before heading to the fight (it is not a good idea to put inexperienced sailors into an immeasurably complex weapons system like a CSG and throw them at an enemy who has been training for this exact moment for months, and who has already been fighting and learning for a minimum of 30 days prior). The transit time for those CSGs is another factor to consider - they would likely try to incorporate some of their training into the transit, but getting to Pearl takes ~5 days at 15-20kts and the transit from Pearl to an area they could get into the fight from from would take 8-9 days at ~20kts. All together, it's likely that the first FRP quick deployment carriers would begin hitting the "front line" anywhere from 1.5-2 months after the beginning of the conflict. This is, of course, pretending that the CVNs are all from the West Coast. The East Coast carriers have an even longer trip ahead of them, and comprise 3 of the 6 "rapid deployment requirement" carriers. This is also assuming that CVN-76 isn't one of the CVNs able to deploy within 30 days. If that were the case, you may as well drop the FRP requirement by 1 CVN, because CVN-76 in port is a complete writeoff.

PACAF's response could certainly be a little bit quicker. F-35 and F-22 Sqns from Alaska would likely redeploy to Anderson, Pearl, or to Australia, along with a myriad of 4/4.5gen TACAIR, AAR, AEW, ELINT, etc. aircraft. However, this just... well, it's not enough quite honestly. With East Asian basing out of the fight (Japan, South Korea - being unlikely to join the fight in the first place, but if they did, they would also be grounded rather sharpishly, Philippines - again, highly unlikely to join the fight, but the same caveat of "if they did they'd get put on the backfoot rather quickly", and of course Taiwan would all possess airbases that are either crippled - even if temporarily, too far into the PLA's skies to actually operate, or which do not permit the US to fight out of), it essentially leaves those bases as the only ones able to generate sorties for the time being. Furthermore, not only would it be the bases, but it would be the broader airpower system of those spots that would be attacked - meaning even with a runway and a few barrels of jet fuel, aircraft attempting to operate out of those bases would have a very difficult time being armed, being maintained, being coordinated, and not being killed (both on the ground and while airborne). By flying out of these bases, the real sortie generation capability of PACAF is simply not large enough to meaningfully contest the PLAAF in their own backyard. Some civilian airports may be employed by the US to base aircraft, but they lack munitions storage, don't store large quantities of JP-8 in anything resembling hardened tanks (civilian aircraft use Jet-A, which is still okay but lacks some of the additives that JP-8 does and may cause modest performance changes), and have plenty of other miscellaneous drawbacks. They'll work for basing support airframes, but would need to be brought up to military standards as soon as possible to efficiently generate combat aircraft sorties. The Marianas would also be subject to cruise and ballistic missile attacks, which may taper off slightly after the initial salvo, but which would still be a significant impedance to air ops.

The surface force shares many of these same issues as well. The amount of vessels we operate in 7FLT's AOR are too few in number to survive the initial clash, but the warships in other parts of the world, or those which will be deployed as reinforcements would be arriving late into an already lost game.

These problems wouldn't just go away either. Even if all 3 Pacific rapidly-available CVNs were to be available after those 1.5 months, and were complemented by 2 CGs and 5 DDGs a piece, and PACAF were able to operate out of Guam without any further missile attacks, the amount of combat power that force could project into the PRC's near vicinity - while eye watering by the rest of the world's standards - would be insufficient to defeat the PLA on their home turf, after they had completely crippled Taiwan and Japan already, and subjected them to a complete blockade for likely upwards of a month. Frankly, after a month and a half, I'd expect Taiwan to have already been considered sufficiently attrited for the PLAGF/PLANMC to initiate the land component of the campaign - and I would expect it to have succeeded. At that point, the war is already over. Even if the US could then give the PLA a bloody nose bad enough for the history books to admire, what would the point be? We aren't going to invade the Eastern (worst-for-invasion) coast of Taiwan and push out the PRC.

As such, while yes, the US could certainly bring reinforcements to the fight - they'd simply be too little too late. A rewording, rather than a rewrite of how history records the conflict.
 

Patchwork_Chimera

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Exactly! For some reason, this is a controversial idea here. Except for a few people like @Blitzo, many seem to think you can simply 'absorb' the enemy's 1st strike offensive fires and then casually retaliate.

Any IADS can be saturated, for much less the cost of the IADS. In fact, all evidence indicates IADS don't even work as advertised. And if you get enough CMs/BMs through, you can do a ton of catastrophic damage in the opening wave. Add to that the degradation of the kill chains which would be required for retaliation, it just makes more sense to focus on offense rather then relying on defense.

This general principle has always been true in strategy, but it is even more pronounced in the age of CMs.
Yea, people are kind of underestimating how huge the first strike advantage is these days. On land, initiative can be re-won after it is lost, even between equals; the same is not true of the air/sea domain. There was no coming back from Operation Focus. There was no coming back from the first day of Desert Storm. A concerted, competent, and extensive employment of air/naval operational fires while the target has not yet employed their own munitions (nor, potentially, is operating at maximum readiness and/or alertness) can be utterly devastating. Should Air Force Global Strike Command decide "buckle up" and generate a maximum bandwidth salvo, about 1000 JASSM-ERs could reasonably be salvo'd at targets in the PRC. TLAMs from, what I assume would be a "built-up" naval presence would be able to contribute another 600+ TLAMs. This would all occur as a synchronized, coordinated action; and would enjoy a significantly less "ready" PLA defending against it. Whereas wartime subsonic CM Pa figures are put anywhere from .1 to .3 against mainland targets (for coordinated strikes), the values could be well over .8, even close to .9 as part of a true "first strike." This can be the difference between successfully striking (if we assume the targets have an average of 5 aimpoints) 32 targets and striking 256 targets. That is big.
 

tphuang

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If I’m a PLA planner, i will sink a number of fully loaded container ships in both Suez Canal and Panama Canal (preferably in the locks) just before the start of hostilities.
Is USN CSG going to cross through the canals? That seems incredibly dangerous for the ships themselves. I'd imagine they would go around Argentina or South Africa.

The current OFRS (Optimized Fleet Response Plan) calls for 6 CVNs total to be (theoretically) deployable within 30 days, and one more within 90 days, including those already underway. This does not include CGs or DDGs, only the Carriers themselves. Deployed also doesn't always mean what you may think it does - currently there are 4 CVNs deployed, but only two of them are operating in CSGs. The other two are conducting their COMPUTEX ahead of a scheduled operational deployment later in the year. Thus, in those 30 days (barring the PLA deciding "yeah screw it let's turn up the difficulty slider" and initiating hostilities just as new CSGs are about to deploy in earnest), the 2-3 CSGs operating typically would only require 3-4 additional CVNs, which would require additional time to conduct a wartime workup before heading to the fight (it is not a good idea to put inexperienced sailors into an immeasurably complex weapons system like a CSG and throw them at an enemy who has been training for this exact moment for months, and who has already been fighting and learning for a minimum of 30 days prior). The transit time for those CSGs is another factor to consider - they would likely try to incorporate some of their training into the transit, but getting to Pearl takes ~5 days at 15-20kts and the transit from Pearl to an area they could get into the fight from from would take 8-9 days at ~20kts. All together, it's likely that the first FRP quick deployment carriers would begin hitting the "front line" anywhere from 1.5-2 months after the beginning of the conflict. This is, of course, pretending that the CVNs are all from the West Coast. The East Coast carriers have an even longer trip ahead of them, and comprise 3 of the 6 "rapid deployment requirement" carriers. This is also assuming that CVN-76 isn't one of the CVNs able to deploy within 30 days. If that were the case, you may as well drop the FRP requirement by 1 CVN, because CVN-76 in port is a complete writeoff.
Thanks for this breakdown. What do you make of the thought that USN could station all the CSGs in workup mode on the Pacific side (this was hypothesized earlier). And then quickly move 5 of them to the westpac theater. Based on what you are saying, there just isn't enough supplies to support this many CSGs between Japan, Guam and Pearl, right?

In the war games that you've seen, how much respect does USN pay toward something like ASBM or HGV AShM? Do they see it as a real problem? For example, given China's C4ISR in the area, would they be wiling to move surface combatants within 500 km of first island chain and risk getting targeted by many hypersonic anti-ship missiles?
PACAF's response could certainly be a little bit quicker. F-35 and F-22 Sqns from Alaska would likely redeploy to Anderson, Pearl, or to Australia, along with a myriad of 4/4.5gen TACAIR, AAR, AEW, ELINT, etc. aircraft. However, this just... well, it's not enough quite honestly. With East Asian basing out of the fight (Japan, South Korea - being unlikely to join the fight in the first place, but if they did, they would also be grounded rather sharpishly, Philippines - again, highly unlikely to join the fight, but the same caveat of "if they did they'd get put on the backfoot rather quickly", and of course Taiwan would all possess airbases that are either crippled - even if temporarily, too far into the PLA's skies to actually operate, or which do not permit the US to fight out of), it essentially leaves those bases as the only ones able to generate sorties for the time being. Furthermore, not only would it be the bases, but it would be the broader airpower system of those spots that would be attacked - meaning even with a runway and a few barrels of jet fuel, aircraft attempting to operate out of those bases would have a very difficult time being armed, being maintained, being coordinated, and not being killed (both on the ground and while airborne). By flying out of these bases, the real sortie generation capability of PACAF is simply not large enough to meaningfully contest the PLAAF in their own backyard. Some civilian airports may be employed by the US to base aircraft, but they lack munitions storage, don't store large quantities of JP-8 in anything resembling hardened tanks (civilian aircraft use Jet-A, which is still okay but lacks some of the additives that JP-8 does and may cause modest performance changes), and have plenty of other miscellaneous drawbacks. They'll work for basing support airframes, but would need to be brought up to military standards as soon as possible to efficiently generate combat aircraft sorties. The Marianas would also be subject to cruise and ballistic missile attacks, which may taper off slightly after the initial salvo, but which would still be a significant impedance to air ops.
I've read about General Wilsbach mentioning a lot about ACE, being agile, flexible and such in the Pacific. Let's say the bases around Ryuku island chain are off limits after the first few days. How many other bases could USAF conceivably use and how quickly could they actually put those into action? Just curious.

Yea, people are kind of underestimating how huge the first strike advantage is these days. On land, initiative can be re-won after it is lost, even between equals; the same is not true of the air/sea domain. There was no coming back from Operation Focus. There was no coming back from the first day of Desert Storm. A concerted, competent, and extensive employment of air/naval operational fires while the target has not yet employed their own munitions (nor, potentially, is operating at maximum readiness and/or alertness) can be utterly devastating. Should Air Force Global Strike Command decide "buckle up" and generate a maximum bandwidth salvo, about 1000 JASSM-ERs could reasonably be salvo'd at targets in the PRC. TLAMs from, what I assume would be a "built-up" naval presence would be able to contribute another 600+ TLAMs. This would all occur as a synchronized, coordinated action; and would enjoy a significantly less "ready" PLA defending against it. Whereas wartime subsonic CM Pa figures are put anywhere from .1 to .3 against mainland targets (for coordinated strikes), the values could be well over .8, even close to .9 as part of a true "first strike." This can be the difference between successfully striking (if we assume the targets have an average of 5 aimpoints) 32 targets and striking 256 targets. That is big.
Wouldn't a build up like this get caught on by Chinese Y-8/9 aircraft really quickly?
 

Patchwork_Chimera

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The other point is that if Korea, Japan or Taiwan can launch standoff naval mines and ground-launched VLO cruise missiles at those distances, what is to stop China from doing something similar? Korea, Japan and Taiwan are geographically small island(s) which are critically reliant on seaborne trade, whereas China is a continental-sized nation that can be largely self-sufficient and also has a lot of land borders for trade to flow.
Well, yes lol. They absolutely will do that. And more, in fact. The thing is though, they'll do that no matter what. It's not like the PLA is going to "hold back" in a war between the two just because Japan isn't striking the mainland. I'm not saying any of those nations would be able to defeat the PLA, or even significantly degrade it. What they would do, is retain the ability to cause enough damage - should things go right - that it changes the calculus from

"Hmmm should we attack Japan? It's not like they can really do anything to us, and we really want to make sure the US is denied that basing, but we also don't want to waste resources. Diplomacy would be nice, but since it only incurs opportunity cost, it may be safer to just bite the bullet and make them unable to offer their basing"

to

"Should we attack Japan? We'd be wasting resources, and they're actually able to hit back in a meaningful way. We'd close the airbases for sure, but diplomacy is worth considering as a potentially safer option."

That's all it is. The introduction of a risk factor. If you're not going to win a war, you're not going to win a war. It's as simple as that. The only way to prevent a war in that case is through deterrence - which Japan and Taiwan currently rely on the USA for, but which would also be benefited by an indigenous offensive fires threat.

Currently I don't see China having enough missiles and other long-range systems to keep Guam (and other distant bases) non-operational for a extended war, say lasting over 3 months. Afterwards, that would allow US forces the time and opportunity to concentrate long-range fires on specific targets. So conceivably the US could "win" in a years-long campaign.
I agree, absolutely. However, the campaign would not last more than 3 months. At least, it would not meaningfully last more than 3 months. The first 30-60 days will likely be the decisive period, with the first week alone being by far the most important portion of it. For that matter, the first day of that week, and the first hour of that day will also be the most decisive and important timeframes at their respective levels. Modern systems of combat power are overwhelmingly "front-loaded" in that they can deliver mind-boggling amounts of destruction on an incredibly short timescale. However, this can only be kept up for a relatively short period of time. The US is expected to burn through its JASSM+JASSM-ER+LRASM inventory in a little over a week, and I imagine the PRC would be running fairly thin on standoff 5-7 days of conflict.

Where I disagree is that the US could "win" in a years-long campaign. Firstly, what is the definition of "winning" here? If it's a Taiwan conflict, Taiwan will likely fall within the first 45-60 days following a crippling air campaign, a complete blockade and isolation from the global telecommunications system, a period of attrition and follow on strikes of tactical assets, and finally a relatively swift land component once Taiwan had been adequately weakened. The US will never be able to invade a PRC-controlled Taiwan. It simply wouldn't be possible. If the goal is simply to disable or to destroy the PLAN, the PLAN has a major advantage in that respect. There are currently nowhere near enough LRASMs to meet our needs, and once those are expended - we're back to Harpoons. At that point, the surface warfare fight is over for the US. An entire CVW conducting an ASuW strike would likely be unable to penetrate the PLA counter-air and CMD system. Even after that aforementioned 1.5-2 months of marshaling time needed to get back into the fight in earnest, JP and TW would be yelling uncle, wanting it to be over. If the US continued to let ostensibly ally nations starve (keep in mind, should the US successfully blockade Indian Ocean trade at, say, Malacca - which I am dubious of our ability to accomplish - it would also cut off trade to the rest of East Asia), it could indeed leverage Guam as an airbase once more. However, Guam and the 3-4 CSGs would generate nowhere near the airpower near the first island chain that the PLAAF can from their entire nation. Furthermore, once our JASSM inventory begins to dwindle, it will require us to operate closer and closer to the PRC for our Rhino squadrons to employ munitions against the mainland. CSGs are already at a perilous standoff when at their maximum range to still employ JASSM-ERs (~800nm); so if our longest range PGM became something like the JSOW at around 70nm, our CSGs would have to operate no more than ~400nm from the PRC's shores, which is utterly and abjectly untenable. Not only the Rhinos from those CSGs, but Air Force Global Strike Command (excepting B-2s I suppose) would lose their ability to survivably even deliver those munitions without JASSM-ER; and thus the fight would essentially be left to whatever TACAIR could be based at Guam. The problem? Even an F-35 would be hard pressed to penetrate to within 70nm of a mainland target - especially if it's not a coastal target.

At this point, with a shaken Taiwan under the PRC's flag, a de-fanged and gutted Japan simply trying to feed its citizens with not enough food, and an amputation of the US and China's economic intertwinement - the global supply chain would essentially have imploded. Stocks would be through the floor (more of an issue in the US than in the PRC to be honest), and worldwide economic activity would come to a rather undignified, screeching halt. Citizens on both sides would be subjected to the mother of all global recessions (with the acknowledgement that the PRC is likely in a better position to endure this than the US), and would likely want the war to end as swiftly as possible. With an inability to meaningfully prosecute targets in the PRC, no meaningful ability to strike PLAN vessels (other than SSNs, which are not a viable asset to control the sea with), and no real change to the wartime situation in sight - the USA would be in a position overwhelmingly best served by an appeal for Status Quo Post-Bellum. The PRC, likely in the midst of impending energy shortage issues, food rationing (even as a caloric surplus, the PRC does not at any given time possess the ability to immediately begin feeding its entire population without rationing), economic hardship, and no real ability to "win" any more than had already been done, would be in a position overwhelmingly best served by accepting such an appeal.

But then what? Afterwards you could end up with a situation similar to how Imperial Germany sought vengeance after WW1 and transformed Nazi Germany. In this case, the US had an economy many times larger than Nazi Germany. In comparison, China is already 30% larger than the US overall and conceivably could grow to 3x larger.
 

Blitzo

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These problems wouldn't just go away either. Even if all 3 Pacific rapidly-available CVNs were to be available after those 1.5 months, and were complemented by 2 CGs and 5 DDGs a piece, and PACAF were able to operate out of Guam without any further missile attacks, the amount of combat power that force could project into the PRC's near vicinity - while eye watering by the rest of the world's standards - would be insufficient to defeat the PLA on their home turf, after they had completely crippled Taiwan and Japan already, and subjected them to a complete blockade for likely upwards of a month. Frankly, after a month and a half, I'd expect Taiwan to have already been considered sufficiently attrited for the PLAGF/PLANMC to initiate the land component of the campaign - and I would expect it to have succeeded. At that point, the war is already over. Even if the US could then give the PLA a bloody nose bad enough for the history books to admire, what would the point be? We aren't going to invade the Eastern (worst-for-invasion) coast of Taiwan and push out the PRC.

As such, while yes, the US could certainly bring reinforcements to the fight - they'd simply be too little too late. A rewording, rather than a rewrite of how history records the conflict.

At this stage it becomes a political question more than a pure military question -- but the way I've tended to game it out is to naturally extend it out to a war of attrition whereby the US would seek to wage an extended "blockade/siege" against China over the course of months and years, whereby the US military's pre-existing geostrategic positioning in the region would enable the US to gradually wear away at PLA defenses and military capability through containment, blockade, and siege, with the aim of trying to build up their own offensive capabilities to achieve decisive operations to achieve an armistice or peace that was heavily on the US favour, ideally with as much destruction of PLA in service fighting capabilities and power projection capabilities as possible.

Of course by this period it is assumed that the US and much of the western world would have been roused into a state of something close to resembling total war (at least from the economic and military-industrial complex pov), as would China.



I suppose what I am saying is that I don't think the war would necessarily be "already over" after a month and a half, because the US will still field substantial warfighting capabilities that could enable them to carry out operations to achieve terms of peace that is more in America's favour.
 

vincent

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Is USN CSG going to cross through the canals? That seems incredibly dangerous for the ships themselves. I'd imagine they would go around Argentina or South Africa.

Carriers may not transit through the canals (I thought they do transit Suez canal all the time), but other warships from the US and its vassals will.

At this stage it becomes a political question more than a pure military question -- but the way I've tended to game it out is to naturally extend it out to a war of attrition whereby the US would seek to wage an extended "blockade/siege" against China over the course of months and years, whereby the US military's pre-existing geostrategic positioning in the region would enable the US to gradually wear away at PLA defenses and military capability through containment, blockade, and siege, with the aim of trying to build up their own offensive capabilities to achieve decisive operations to achieve an armistice or peace that was heavily on the US favour, ideally with as much destruction of PLA in service fighting capabilities and power projection capabilities as possible.

Of course by this period it is assumed that the US and much of the western world would have been roused into a state of something close to resembling total war (at least from the economic and military-industrial complex pov), as would China.



I suppose what I am saying is that I don't think the war would necessarily be "already over" after a month and a half, because the US will still field substantial warfighting capabilities that could enable them to carry out operations to achieve terms of peace that is more in America's favour.
China can hunker down and ration food and fuel to last out the siege. Chinese government has plenty of experience with rationing.
 

Blitzo

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China can hunker down and ration food and fuel to last out the siege. Chinese government has plenty of experience with rationing.

Then it becomes a question of political will on each side, rather than the extent of the fighting capability of the US military. That's fine, but that is essentially the end game which I described.
 

Mohsin77

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Lol hopefully you'll be able to by the end of the year,

Can't wait man, I've been looking for a good modern operational sim for a looooong time. Remember to announce the launch on this forum.

We'd need to expand our land-based SAM procurement in a big way (PATRIOT is a really REALLY awesome system, and the Bn (1-1 ADA) we have at Kadena for instance is fantastic, but it's still just not enough), and integrate those air defenses widely across our Western Pacific force posture

Are you sure? Earlier you said that it's better to invest in offense rather than defense (and that's a principle I agree with.) So why spend more billions on defensive systems, when the same $$$ can be spent on a greater volume of offensive fires to saturate defenses?


Yea, people are kind of underestimating how huge the first strike advantage is these days. On land, initiative can be re-won after it is lost, even between equals; the same is not true of the air/sea domain. There was no coming back from Operation Focus. There was no coming back from the first day of Desert Storm. A concerted, competent, and extensive employment of air/naval operational fires while the target has not yet employed their own munitions (nor, potentially, is operating at maximum readiness and/or alertness) can be utterly devastating. Should Air Force Global Strike Command decide "buckle up" and generate a maximum bandwidth salvo, about 1000 JASSM-ERs could reasonably be salvo'd at targets in the PRC. TLAMs from, what I assume would be a "built-up" naval presence would be able to contribute another 600+ TLAMs. This would all occur as a synchronized, coordinated action; and would enjoy a significantly less "ready" PLA defending against it. Whereas wartime subsonic CM Pa figures are put anywhere from .1 to .3 against mainland targets (for coordinated strikes), the values could be well over .8, even close to .9 as part of a true "first strike." This can be the difference between successfully striking (if we assume the targets have an average of 5 aimpoints) 32 targets and striking 256 targets. That is big.

This is the essence of the discussion that was taking place a few weeks ago on this thread. There is no recovery from an effective 1st strike, for whoever is on the receiving end of it. The key part which you confirmed, is that a well coordinated (and masked) 1st strike could have a subsonic CM hit rate of up to 90%... That's even higher than what I was thinking! Even if we assume "256 targets" struck in the 1st wave, that's still catastrophic damage, which then opens the way for more follow-on strikes... That's basically "gg" game over in the first few hours of the war.

We know that China has already committed to building up this capability. If the US truly commits to this route, they can also spool up a sizable count of CMs in theater (in all their many flavors.) But it doesn't look like the US is going for it. So advantage China.
 

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