PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) questioned Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee, Alexander Velez-Green about the repositioning of US assets away from the Pacific.

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At the Lower House Budget Committee on the 7th, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, when asked for concrete examples of a “survival-threatening situation” in which Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defense in the event of a Taiwan contingency that could also involve a U.S.–China clash, replied: “If it involved the use of warships and entailed the use of force, then by any measure I think it could constitute a survival-threatening situation.” Successive prime ministers had avoided stating a clear view; this is the first time one has explicitly said a Taiwan contingency could amount to such a situation. She was responding to questions from Katsuya Okada, a former foreign minister from the Constitutional Democratic Party.

Under the security legislation enacted in 2015, even if Japan is not directly under attack, the Self-Defense Forces can exercise the right of collective self-defense if the government determines that a country with which Japan has close relations is attacked and Japan’s survival is threatened—a “survival-threatening situation.” Takaichi’s remarks indicate that, depending on circumstances, the SDF could resort to the use of force together with U.S. forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

Asked by Mr. Okada about a comment she made during last year’s LDP leadership race—namely, that a Taiwan contingency caused by China could amount to a survival-threatening situation—and specifically, “In what cases do you think it would qualify?”, Prime Minister Takaichi replied that “a judgment must be made based on the specific, concrete circumstances of the situation as it actually occurs, taking all information into account.” She argued that if the Chinese military were to impose a naval blockade on Taiwan using warships and U.S. forces came to break it, “one could also envisage the use of force (by the Chinese military against U.S. forces) to prevent that.” She added, “Simply lining up civilian ships to make passage difficult would not, I think, constitute a survival-threatening situation. But if it were a naval blockade in the context of an actual war, with drones flying and various developments unfolding, it could be viewed differently,” concluding that “if an armed attack occurs, there is a high likelihood this would constitute a survival-threatening situation.”

At the same time, the prime minister said, “Our consistent position on issues concerning Taiwan is to hope for a peaceful resolution through dialogue,” and added, “We must anticipate worst-case scenarios, but that does not mean Japan would immediately designate it a survival-threatening situation and resort to the use of force.”

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I agree with this in principle. Strictly speaking, there is no existential threat to Japan as an entity by the PRC's ascension to regional hegemony. However, there is an existential threat posed to the Japanese State as it currently exists.

Frankly, beyond territorial claims to the Senkakus/Diaoyus, there isn't any inherent contention present in the JP/PRC diplomatic relationship (barring historical enmity for the rather treatment Chinese citizens faced at the hands of the IJA). I don't think there is any reality in which China goes Hearts of Iron IV mode and captures Tokyo in furtherance of some thoughtless expansionist agenda (though you would be surprised just how many people believe this to be not just possible, but likely should the PLA capture Taiwan).

The friction comes from Japan's presence in the US-led order. The government of Japan exists in its current form one level above being a US client state. Much of the political apparatus of Japan is built around relations with the US, much of the JSDF is organized and equipped to support US operations, and much of Japan's current foreign policy is tethered to the US's interests. Furthermore, the population generally supports this status quo. Support for the US is fairly widespread, with ~75% of Japanese citizens polled stating they "Trust" the US, in contrast with only 7% towards the PRC. The fabric of modern Japanese society is as much intertwined with American influence as it is with historical roots - and I don't believe the two will separate quite so easily.

Should the United States be "pushed out" of the Pacific (without some form of conflict taking place), Japan will be forced to contend with a geopolitical landscape entirely incongruent with the one it is developed for, and will either become a regional pariah that remains US aligned, or will be forced to tear themselves away from those Red-White-and-Blue foundations upon which the modern Japanese state, political system, and society have been built. This aspect is what I view to be existential.

Could Japan realign itself as a neutral player in the Western Pacific, cooperating with both the US and China on an equal basis, and reconciling differences with the PRC? Absolutely. There's no reason why a Japan willing to become a Chinese-aligned nation should be or feel threatened by the PRC. However, that's the issue. Doing this would mean a fundamental shift for Japan - one that they seem entirely unwilling to make.

As such, yes. I agree, there is place a-plenty for Japan at the table of nations even in a China-led Western Pacific. However, that Japan is so fundamentally different from the Japan of today that much of the political establishment, and a non-insignificant portion of the citizenry would be wiling to commit what amounts to economic suicide at the cost of many lives, enormous damage, and dim hope for a victorious end - rather than making the "pragmatic" decision and working towards their own best interests.

Ironic, really. The Japanese and principle-driven sacrifice (in many cases, outright suicide) sure do go hand in hand I guess.

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