Pointblank
Senior Member
Re: Ideal chinese carrier thread
Most of the losses of WWII era battleships were also due to the same causes (poor damage control, design defect / datedness, build quality). HMS Barham, a British Queen Elizabeth battleship, was lost to torpedoes because her torpedo protection scheme was obsolete. HMS Royal Oak had a defective torpedo protection scheme; the Revenge class battleships received external blisters containing “water excluding materials” in the form of closed metal tubes 8 and 9 inches in diameter, and wood pulp. In practise, this protection scheme was ineffective from the onset. The King George V battleships had a protection defect; the deck armour did not meet up with the side protection (which was shallow anyways), which was a cause in the loss of Prince of Wales.
The Italian battleship Roma loss was due to poor protection around the magazines, while the other Italian battleships sunk at the Battle of Taranto raid were due to a poor torpedo protection scheme; the Italian battleship's protection scheme was that the volume of the torpedo belt was filled with a large cylinder, which was in turn filled with closed tubes. Following the path of least resistance, the blast from a torpedo traveled around the cylinder and concentrated itself against the weakest point of the complex structure supporting the cylinder: the concave holding bulkhead. This bulkhead acted much like a dam mistakenly built bowing downstream, rather than upstream against the current. This concave surface was structurally the weakest possible arrangement for containing the force of an explosion, and to make matters worse, the workmanship was also defective.
The loss of the Japanese Kongō-class battleships were due to poor protection; the class was originally designed as a battlecruiser, but was modernized into battleships. As such, the armour protection was much thinner than other battleships of the war. The loss of the Fuso class battleships were also due to a very similar cause; thin armour protection (especially around the magazines). The Yamato class battleships also had a defect in the protection system; Yamato's system suffered from ineffective joins between the lower and upper armour belt, which was vulnerable to torpedoes.
The loss of the American battleships during the attack on Pearl Harbor is linked to the readiness state; the American battleships were not in fighting condition, and poor damage control on some ships contributed to the loss. After Pearl Harbor, no American battleship was ever lost during the war.
Today's weapons may be more accurate, but they are not as potent as you may think; the warhead on the Harpoon missile is only equivalent to a 500lb bomb (the same across many other anti-ship missiles), and many of today's warships are not armoured. Furthermore, large ships are often notoriously difficult to sink; for example, the SS Ohio is an example of how difficult it is to sink a large ship.
Most of the losses of WWII era battleships were also due to the same causes (poor damage control, design defect / datedness, build quality). HMS Barham, a British Queen Elizabeth battleship, was lost to torpedoes because her torpedo protection scheme was obsolete. HMS Royal Oak had a defective torpedo protection scheme; the Revenge class battleships received external blisters containing “water excluding materials” in the form of closed metal tubes 8 and 9 inches in diameter, and wood pulp. In practise, this protection scheme was ineffective from the onset. The King George V battleships had a protection defect; the deck armour did not meet up with the side protection (which was shallow anyways), which was a cause in the loss of Prince of Wales.
The Italian battleship Roma loss was due to poor protection around the magazines, while the other Italian battleships sunk at the Battle of Taranto raid were due to a poor torpedo protection scheme; the Italian battleship's protection scheme was that the volume of the torpedo belt was filled with a large cylinder, which was in turn filled with closed tubes. Following the path of least resistance, the blast from a torpedo traveled around the cylinder and concentrated itself against the weakest point of the complex structure supporting the cylinder: the concave holding bulkhead. This bulkhead acted much like a dam mistakenly built bowing downstream, rather than upstream against the current. This concave surface was structurally the weakest possible arrangement for containing the force of an explosion, and to make matters worse, the workmanship was also defective.
The loss of the Japanese Kongō-class battleships were due to poor protection; the class was originally designed as a battlecruiser, but was modernized into battleships. As such, the armour protection was much thinner than other battleships of the war. The loss of the Fuso class battleships were also due to a very similar cause; thin armour protection (especially around the magazines). The Yamato class battleships also had a defect in the protection system; Yamato's system suffered from ineffective joins between the lower and upper armour belt, which was vulnerable to torpedoes.
The loss of the American battleships during the attack on Pearl Harbor is linked to the readiness state; the American battleships were not in fighting condition, and poor damage control on some ships contributed to the loss. After Pearl Harbor, no American battleship was ever lost during the war.
Today's weapons may be more accurate, but they are not as potent as you may think; the warhead on the Harpoon missile is only equivalent to a 500lb bomb (the same across many other anti-ship missiles), and many of today's warships are not armoured. Furthermore, large ships are often notoriously difficult to sink; for example, the SS Ohio is an example of how difficult it is to sink a large ship.
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