Korean War 70 years later Win Lose and A draw

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
Continued
Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north China.
The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast areas—populated by Chinese—the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union.
I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of non-dogmatism, but I should like to suggest at any rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.
What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill—conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so, and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken—that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the great rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.
I suggest that the second rule is very like the first. That is to keep our own purposes perfectly straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly aboveboard and do not get them mixed—up with legal quibbles or the attempt to do one thing and really achieve another....
What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?
In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American—and there are Australia—troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is not intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.
The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to

hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped military means.
The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very serious economic problems....In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been speaking....
So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations, and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.
 

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
On January 17th 1950 there was a meeting between Representatives of North Korea, the PRC and the USSR. The best source I have fund as to that meeting is a telegraph from Terenti Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinsky dated January 19 1950.
Strictly secret.

I report about the frame of mind expressed by Kim Il Sung during a luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. On January 17 the minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK Pak Heon-yeong [Pak Hon Yong] held a lunch attended by a small circle of persons, on the occasion of the departure of the Korean ambassador Ri Ju-yeon to the Chinese Peoples Republic. At the luncheon from the Korean side were Kim Du-bong [Kim Tu Phong], Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong, deputy minister of foreign affairs Pak Jeong-jo [Pak Jung Jo], Ri Ju-yeon [Ri Ju Yon]. The trade representative of the PRC Wen Shizhen attended the luncheon. On our side in attendance were myself and the advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko. The luncheon took place in a friendly, warm atmosphere. Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong and also the Chinese trade representative in their toasts expressed a feeling of love and gratitude toward the Soviet Union and personally toward Comrade Stalin for the liberation [of Korea from Japanese rule] and for the selfless assistance to both the Korean and Chinese people.

Kim Du-bong shared his impressions of his trip to the USSR for the 70th birthday of Comrade Stalin. In his account he repeatedly underscored the great interest of the Soviet people in Korea and the numerous wishes for quick unification of the country.

During the luncheon Kim Il Sung and the Chinese trade representative, who was sitting next to him, many times enthusiastically conversed with each other in Chinese. From individual phrases it was possible to understand that they were speaking about the victory in China and about the situation in Korea. After the luncheon, in the reception room Kim Il Sung gave advice and orders to his ambassador to China Ri Ju-yeon about his work in China, and moreover, while speaking in Korean, Kim several times said phrases in Russian about how Ri would act boldly in China, since Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.

Then, after Ri Ju-yeon left, Kim, addressing the advisers Ignatiev and Pelishenko in an excited manner, began to speak about how now, when China is completing its liberation, the liberation of the Korean people in the south of the country is next in line. In connection with this he said:

“The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed might. Partisans will not decide the question. The people of the south know that we have a good army. Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I can lose the trust of the people of Korea.”

Further Kim stated that when he was in Moscow, Comrade Stalin said to him that it was not necessary to attack the south, in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Rhee Syngmann, then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. But since Rhee Syngmann is still not instigating an attack, it means that the liberation of the people of the southern part of the country and the unification of the country are being drawn out, that he (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action by the Peoples' Army for the purpose of the liberation of the people of Southern Korea. Further Kim said that he himself cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law. Then he stated that if it is now possible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he will try to meet with Mao Zedong, after his return from Moscow. Kim underscored that Mao Zedong promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China. (Apparently Kim Il Sung has in mind the conversation of his representative Kim Il with Mao Zedong in June 1949, about which I reported by ciphered telegram.) Kim said that he also has other questions for Mao Zedong, in particular the question of the possibility of the creation of an eastern bureau of the Cominform. He further stated that on all these questions he will try to meet with Comrade Shtykov and to secure through him a meeting with Comrade Stalin.

The advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko, avoiding discussing these questions, tried to switch the discussion to a general theme, then Kim Il Sung came toward me, took me aside and began the following conversation: can he meet with Comrade Stalin and discuss the question of the position in the south and the question of aggressive actions against the army of Rhee Syngmann, that their people's army now is significantly stronger than the army of Rhee Syngmann. Here he stated that if it is impossible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he wants to meet with Mao Zedong, since Mao after his visit to Moscow will have orders on all questions. Then Kim Il Sung placed before me the question, why don't I allow him to attack the Ongjin peninsula, which the People's Army could take in three days, and with a general attack the People's Army could be in Seoul in several days. I answered Kim that he has not raised the question of a meeting with Comrade Stalin and if he raises such a question, then it is possible that Comrade Stalin will receive him. On the question of an attack on the Ongjin peninsula I answered him that it is impossible to do this. Then I tried to conclude the conversation on these questions and, alluding to a later time, proposed to go home. With that the conversation was concluded. After the luncheon Kim Il Sung was in a mood of some intoxication. It was obvious that he began this conversation not accidentally, but had thought it out earlier, with the goal of laying out his frame of mind and elucidating our attitude to these questions.

In the process of this conversation Kim Il Sung repeatedly underscored his wish to get the advice of Comrade Stalin on the question of the situation in the south of Korea, since [Kim Il Sung] is constantly nurturing his idea about an attack.
 

Gatekeeper

Brigadier
Registered Member
Look this is about the Korean War in history I am not going to debate the events of Hong Kong but to say we disagree.
Now then on topic. The is the still debated Parameter speech given January 12 1950. It has long been pointed to as a green light for the invasion of the ROK by omission.

Agreed, but don't forget it was your attempt at re-writing history on the negotiation of Hong Kong that got this de-railed.

Now, I think everyone here so far have make their opinions known (we might be wrong, or we might be right, but nevertheless is an opinion), as requested by your opening thread. "Win, Draw or Loose."

So what is your opinion (and we value your opinion), to which we are all waiting and dying to hear!

As for me, I would like to change my opinion on the short-term for Japan after reading Solarz post. I would agreed that its a win for Japan in the short term. But I maintain, its a big lost in the long term, when you considered, they have lost their main colony and any influence over it! look at the relationship that exist between them. Its not healthy.
 

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
Win lose or draw is a reference to how the parties of the war could be viewed in outcomes. Win in that the ROK and DPRK could have easily been absorbed by the other. Win in that it would shift China into the UN Security Council and shift the US from a Nation that discarded it’s military post world war 2 into a global power.
Lose all sides paid a great price in the conflict. The PLA because of it’s capabilities at the time threw large amounts of blood and treasure at the UN forces and lost debated numbers to this day. Official Chinese numbers claim 180,000+ but other estimates are as high as 400,000. the North and South both took massive casualties in both military and Civilian populations. Draw refers to the results. The DPRK and ROK both basically ended up back at about the starting point. Nothing was resolved. The DPRK in the near term did better in reconstruction than the ROK but in the long run the ROK became a tiger economy well the DPRK degenerated.

And No I was not rewriting history.
 

Just4Fun

Junior Member
Registered Member
2020 marks the 70th year since the start of the Korean War. This conflict marks a critical turning point of 20th century history.
As such I felt a thread dedicated to it should be opened not to hash out a possible future conflict but for the historical events.
This war could be viewed as a Win a Loss or a Draw depending on your perspective.
For The PRC it’s events would shift them to the seat in the UN Security Council.
For the US it would shift them from nascent Superpower to standing one.
For the Russians it was there first push to similarly shift from a regional power to a super power. For Both Korea’s it would carve a deep long lasting scar as both sides unleashed bloody retribution upon the populations and leave the two nations divided at almost the same line they started with.

The conflict started based on the end of the Second World War. When after The defeat of Japan the US and USSR occupied the Korean Peninsula in accordance with war time agreements divided at the 38th Parallel. The US to the South the North for the USSR.

This war could be viewed as a Win a Loss or a Draw depending on your perspective.

Korean War: The First Knell Ringing the Death of 500 Years' Western Dominance

The objective interpretation of Korean war results is always clear and indisputable. China won. The US lost. China won the war not just militarily, but most importantly, It won the war politically and financially. China's victory in Korea ushers in a new era of ending Western dominance in the world.

All the troubles the US faces today can be traced back to the root of its Korean war losses. And most of China's status in the world started from its win of the Korean war. China's win in Korea has tremendously transformed the world. It is not overstated that Korean war is the cornerstone of China's rise and the beginning of ending five-hundred years' Western dominance in the world since Christopher Columbus's discovery of the New World in 1492.

The Western dominance has long been characterized by using advanced weaponry to subdue, militarily and violently, peoples of different races, colors, religions, ethnicity, then enslaving them ruthlessly. China is the first agricultural, non-Western, non-Christian country since 1492 that used backward weaponry to overcome, militarily, an industrialized, dominant Western power, which is also the incumbent King The World with the best weaponry and the most logistics available. The significance of China's victory in Korean War can never be overestimated. It is in fact the first knell that rings the death of five-hundred years Western dominance in the world. As indicated by Marshal Peng De-huai, the General Commander of PLA forces in Korea, "It (the victory of the Korean War) has testified eloquently, that the era of several hundreds years, during which Western invaders could take over a nation and rule its people by just mounting a few pieces of big canons at the shore of the Oriental, has gone forever." (“它雄辩证明:西方侵略者几百年来只要在东方的一个海岸上架起几尊大炮就可以霸占一个国家的时代是一去不复返了。” --- 彭德怀, 《关于中国人民志愿军抗美援朝工作的报告》)


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Marshal Peng De-huai was signing the Korean War Armistice Agreement on July 27th, 1953.


After winning the Korea War, China helped Vietnam, another agricultural, non-Western, backward country, defeated the US militarily twenty years later. The truth that China won the Korean War and this victory has profound, lasting, historic significance is crystal clear. It is one's political preference, one's own political conviction, and one's personal attitude toward PR China that may influence his opinion about the Korean War, but his personal feeling can never alter truth.

Without the victory in Korea, the Sino-US trade war would be fighting in a completely different way. The US might simply sail a few nuclear aircraft carriers to China's shores, forcing China to sign an unfair trade deal under military threat, demanding China appreciate the value of its currency, extorting a big ransom from China for job loss in the US, or for anything it could fabricate, coercing China to change its economic policies,...etc. All the dirty imperialist gunboat tricks that British Empire had played to China and the US had played to Japan during the 19th century could have been repeated. They did these dirty tricks one hundreds years ago to China. And they are doing them now in Iraq, Libya, Syria,... Look how ugly the US behaves when stealing Syria oil right now. Isn't that any difference from what the British did in China one hundred years ago? Absolutely not. Because of the loss of the Korean War, the US has lost the credential to dictate the issues related to China's sovereignty. It has to negotiate with China, rather than threaten, intimidate or blackmail China with using force.

Financially,.China's victory in Korea undermines the credibility of the US dollar, endangering the survival of the dollar as world reserve currency.

The first crack of the dollar hegemony came from the US loss of the Korean war. The US started the Koran war with a gold reserve about 22,000 tons, more than 80% of world gold reserve at the time. Because the US didn't win the Korean war, people knew the so-called US military dominance was so trashy that it couldn't beat even a bunch of Chinese peasants, so they lost their confidence to America's ability to rule the world. People also worried about US ability to pay off its war bills. They suspected the US would print money secretly to cover its war bills. This set off the first wave of selling the dollar for gold right just after the Korean war. In most of time from the end of Korean war to early 1960s, European countries did it clandestinely in small scales at the fixed price of $35 / ounce gold set by the Breton Woods Agreement.

Later, when more and more ominous signs emerged, indicating the US military could lose to another bunch Asian peasants backed by China in Vietnam, more people joined the army of selling the dollar for gold. This set off the second wave, but a much powerful wave of gold run. It quickly depleted the US gold reserve to about 8,000 tons. Eventually the US had no choice but to default its currency, abandoning its obligation of dollar's gold standard in 1971 by Nixon. So, you can state that it was China that made the US lose two thirds of its gold reserve, even though China itself didn't get even one single ounce of the gold during the process. Or, you can state that it was the trashy US military that made the US lose two thirds of its gold reserve. With so much edge in military hardware in hand, had the US military had even the lowest military moral, even the lowest fighting ability in battle fields, it couldn't have lost twice in the same place to the same enemy, which, of course, is China's PLA.

The following graph depicts changes of US gold reserve between 1900 and 2008. Note how fast the US gold reserve has been depleted from its loss of the Korean War to its default of the dollar gold standard in 1971. About two thirds of American gold reserve, for which the Yankees had toiled in selling arms and war materials to warring parties for more than half century, was water-washed out by Chinese victories in Korea and Vietnam.

The US has to pay its war bills with its own "true money", either in the form of its gold reserve, or in the form of giving up the dollar's status of world's reserve currency. One way or another. It simply can't live forever on printing the greenbacks to fool other countries to pay its war bills. If the US couldn't find someone willingly to pay the war bills for it quickly, the dollar as world reserve currency will be a thing of the past in just a few years. Without the dollar, what is waiting ahead for the US? Bankruptcy and nation disintegration
.


Us_gold_reserves.png

Source:
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Gatekeeper

Brigadier
Registered Member
And No I was not rewriting history.


Britain was at the time having financial issues that were a major reason for the treaty hand over. There had been debate on hand over by the UK of Hong Kong and the Falklands. The Argentines of course invaded where the PRC sat down at the table. The PLA put on a pageant during the turnover but that hardly was a major factor.

Come on Terran, come clean, unfortunately for you, I'm old enough to have lived through the 80s and 90s, and remembered clearly what Britain's economic condition was like. Also, economics was what I earned my first degree on in the 80/90s.

So please do not try and paint Britain was in financial difficulties at the time of negotiationis, any attempt at re-painting that is clearly an attempt at re-writing history!
 

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
Oh please the UK had just skidded out of the 1982 mass unemployment and recession it was just 2 years since the Falklands. Thatcher was looking to prevent a conflict and trim the UK budget.

@Just4Fun The US hit it’s highest growth rates post conflict it would be decades before China emerged as a economic powerhouse.
 

Just4Fun

Junior Member
Registered Member
@Just4Fun The US hit it’s highest growth rates post conflict it would be decades before China emerged as a economic powerhouse.

@TerraN_EmpirE

1) China's real economy is already the largest in the world, and will continue grow faster than the US for a quite long period of time.

In 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that China was officially the largest economy of the world. In 2018, the electricity China produced and consumed was nearly 8,000 TWh, while the US did about 4,000 TWh in the same year. And the gap is still widening quickly. You can't claim you have the largest economy in the world while you can produce and consume only half of the electricity that another country can do, unless, of course, if your economy is based on printing money, rather than producing goods. This truth is plain and simple. Electricity is the most important element of modern economy. An adequate analog is like this: you can't claim you are the most valuable NBA player while you stand only 5 feet tall, weigh only 100 pounds, run like a duck, unless, of course, you can have the help from a bunch fraudulent appraisers. You get to have some basic physics to back your claim.

2) The US economic growth has been dependent on two factors in the past decades. One, population growth, immigrant growth contributes most as domestic birth rate staggers at low level. Two, money supply growth, i.e. printing money. Both factors are positively tied to the dollar's status as world currency.

From the 1950s to the 2010s, the US population increased from about 150 millions to 310 millions, immigrant number increased from 10 millions to 40 millions. Note that the share of immigrants in total population jumped from 4.7% in the 1970s when the US birth rate dropped to the lowest level, to 12.9% in the 2010s, indicating immigrants are the driving force of US population growth in recent decades. If US immigration is dried up, US economy will perform no better than the Japan's economy after the 1990s, staggering, if not contracting.

3) Dollar's status as world currency is the most important factor attracting immigrants to the US. It also gives the US the advantage of printing money freely, thus pops up US economic growth. When the prospect of dollar's status as world currency is dim, the three things will change, and hurt US economic growth negatively.

4) Even if the prospect of dollar's status were bright, US domestic politics would complicate its immigration polices. That is, US current economic growth rate is unsustainable from population growth prospect. If you factor in US war involvements in the ME and Africa, and its global security obligations, you know the dollar's current status will be ended very soon. Therefore, from the prospect of money supply growth, the US economic growth is also unsustainable.

5) Quantity is quality, a special quality on its own terms. China wins on its sheer population size. The US needs to import another 1 billion people to cancel China's population edge to fight and win an economic warfare. Even if the US could take in another 1 billion immigrants before the dollar is dead, were the US able to manage a population of 1.3 billions?




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US Total Population Growth from 1790 to 2010 (Steady increase)

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US Birth Rate
(Falling from the 1960s, then staying at low level of 60 / 1000 women.)
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US Immigrants Trends From 1900 t0 2017
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money-supply-us.jpg
 

Gatekeeper

Brigadier
Registered Member
Oh please the UK had just skidded out of the 1982 mass unemployment and recession it was just 2 years since the Falklands. Thatcher was looking to prevent a conflict and trim the UK budget.

@Just4Fun The US hit it’s highest growth rates post conflict it would be decades before China emerged as a economic powerhouse.

Oh please! You're definately re-writing history. You are an expert in firearms, but economic and social historian you are not! You should read more on this.

You wasn't even born at that time! Where as I was an economic student at the time! Thatcher trying to budget, and balance the book. Unemployment high, etc. These are just excuses.

Thatcher can find the money (with higher unemployment in the early 80s) to fight a war to keep a tiny island with population of few thousands over Sovereignty issues! Yet, she couldn't do the same for Hong Kong with population in millions because she is a "peace loving person", and trying to balance the household budget! Hear yourself, Gee!

She wouldn't fight for Hong Kong because she know she would loose, not because Britain is weak in finance or military, far from it, Great Britain was 5th largest economy in the world, and its economic size is twice that of China (and with a much smaller populace) with military more advanced than China's!

So it's not because of finance and peace, that you are trying to mske out! It's because of geography and logistics. China can reinforced Hong Kong much much easier than the Argentians because it had a land route.

And as for sovereignty, you obviously didn't bother to read what I wrote earlier. She was trying to keep Hong Kong intact if possible, if not, she was all for keeping Hong Kong Island because of the infamous Treaty signed back in 1842! That clearly stated Great Britain had sole sovereignty of Hong Kong island. No dispute. Period!

Unlike the island in the south Atlantic which is disputed vigorously by Argentina, yet she don't care about peace, and sees fit to spend money she don't have, and with high unemployment to boot, to fight a war to keep a colonial outpost British!
 
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