Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

Brumby said:

The idea of sea and air control in my view do not exist during peacetime because the seas outside of territorial waters is global commons. Therefore a conversation about sea and air control without referencing to specific scenario is meaningless. For example, China has all the intentions to exercise air and sea control over the SCS but the other nations notably the US just ignores any attempt of such nature principally through FONOPs.

I simply cannot associate the idea of air and sea control up to and beyond the 2nd island chain without referencing to any objectives absent of any conflict scenario. For example, in order to exercise air and sea control, China has to deal with the Guam issue. Either you invade Guam or nullify completely its offensive capabilities. In my view, it is the same issue Imperial Japan had with Midway island. .

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Um, I thought it would go without saying that the goal of seeking air and sea control would be during conflict.
That is to say, the conops I'm proposing would of course only be used during a conflict of some kind.
No one goes around seeking to achieve "sea and air control" during peace time, and my entire previous post #8 it literally described the goal of the conops is to seek air and sea control by seeking to wage conflict with the opfor which is obviously not something you do during peacetime.


When I say "I'm not drawing up a conflict scenario" what I mean is that I'm not talking about a specific hypothetical conflict involving a specific set of hypothetical political or strategic objectives.
It is instead meant to be a conops that is applicable to a variety of potential likely conflict scenarios in the region with their own unique sets of political and strategic objectives.



The conops are a set of capabilities and strategies that enable the military to achieve a variety of potential political and strategic objectives during a conflict.

Bltizo said:

Um, I thought it would go without saying that the goal of seeking air and sea control would be during conflict.
That is to say, the conops I'm proposing would of course only be used during a conflict of some kind.
No one goes around seeking to achieve "sea and air control" during peace time, and my entire previous post #8 it literally described the goal of the conops is to seek air and sea control by seeking to wage conflict with the opfor which is obviously not something you do during peacetime.


When I say "I'm not drawing up a conflict scenario" what I mean is that I'm not talking about a specific hypothetical conflict involving a specific set of hypothetical political or strategic objectives.
It is instead meant to be a conops that is applicable to a variety of potential likely conflict scenarios in the region with their own unique sets of political and strategic objectives.



The conops are a set of capabilities and strategies that enable the military to achieve a variety of potential political and strategic objectives during a conflict.

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The part I am simply not getting is how do you define sea and air control as an objective without referencing to what air and sea control means objectively. As it is often said, the opposition also gets to vote in any conflict. Conops is a means to an end and not an end onto itself. The resourcing required has to take into consideration the set objectives, what tasks need to be fulfilled to deliver the set objectives and the constitution of your force package necessary to complete the tasks. It is not some arbitrary objective-less exercise.

Brumby said:

The part I am simply not getting is how do you define sea and air control as an objective without referencing to what air and sea control means objectively. As it is often said, the opposition also gets to vote in any conflict. Conops is a means to an end and not an end onto itself. The resourcing required has to take into consideration the set objectives, what tasks need to be fulfilled to deliver the set objectives and the constitution of your force package necessary to complete the tasks. It is not some arbitrary objective-less exercise.

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I've now taken a look at the new posts here (this page)

and my impression is what Bltizo described would be a modern version of what Mahan called "the command of the sea",

in short keeping an Opfor out by trying to, well, sink it quickly,

and I add there're other naval strategies how to keep an Opfor out;

disclaimer: I'm not saying Bltizo took anything from Alfred Thayer Mahan

Jura said:

I've now taken a look at the new posts here (this page)

and my impression is what Bltizo described would be a modern version of what Mahan called "the command of the sea",

in short keeping an Opfor out by trying to, well, sink it quickly,

and I add there're other naval strategies how to keep an Opfor out;

disclaimer: I'm not saying Bltizo took anything from Alfred Thayer Mahan

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I am not familiar with Mahan and so I can't really comment on it

I think what might be more relevant without getting into specific scenarios is to frame the question as to what kind of conops would be applicable in any sea and air control operation associated with far seas operation as opposed to near seas operation. The distinguishing feature being the availability of land support. The difference in language is to avoid specificity such as first and second island chain.

Brumby said:

I am not familiar with Mahan and so I can't really comment on it

I think what might be more relevant without getting into specific scenarios is to frame the question as to what kind of conops would be applicable in any sea and air control operation associated with far seas operation as opposed to near seas operation. The distinguishing feature being the availability of land support. The difference in language is to avoid specificity such as first and second island chain.

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to cut several-thousand years story short,

the question is how to win war at sea, and plan accordingly for example the USN as of now ():


as I said, I liked what Bltizo described in posts #8 and #16 since it might achieve that objective (= winning war at sea)

LOL personally I'm pro-US, but it doesn't matter here

@Bltizo

I'm just refining my thoughts on core PLAN objectives.

Sea (and Air) Control
This would only cover the offshore land masses that China deems critical.
To my mind, this encompasses the SCS islands, Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands on the 1st Island Chain.

But in order to obtain air and sea superiority over these land features - they must be isolated from outside support.
That only requires the surrounding sea and air to be denied to the opponent - which is an easier task.

So for the next 15+ years this will be the key objective that the blue-water navy will support - because it is still a relatively small navy, albeit growing fast.

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So looking at the CSBA 2040 vision - US carriers are operating ISR&T CAPs at 800-1000nm (1500-1800km)

That implies that the Chinese Air Force would capable of operating its own ISR&T CAPs at 1500-1800km from the Chinese mainland. That is smack over the middle of the projected operating area for US Navy carriers in the CSBA diagram.

It looks to me like a war of attrition would occur in such a scenario.
And that becomes a competition between a limited number of lower-performance US carrier aircraft versus a much larger force of Chinese land-based aircraft.

And come to think of it, it's only 3000km from Guam to mainland China.
If we're talking about ISR&T CAP operating at 1500-1800km, then it looks attritional again.
But this time, it is 1 airbase on Guam with some carriers versus all the mainland China airbases.

So how would the Chinese navy fit into such a vision?

Say CSGs operate at a distance of 1200km from the Chinese mainland.
That is enough to isolate Taiwan/Okinawa/Senkaku/Diaoyu.
But still leaves the CSG comfortably under the defensive cover of land-based ISR&T CAP which has a range of 1500-1800km.

Also note that those CSGs are only 1800km from Guam.
That's a feasible distance for a CSG to dash in - to launch a cruise missile strike or for aircraft to launch their own airstrikes.

But I reckon the CSGs would spend most of their time hunting for US carriers.
And the mere presence of a Chinese CSG operating some 1200km from the Chinese mainland - would push the US navy to operate much further away.

AndrewS said:

... away.

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Andy I'm curious if you still uphold your prediction from two years ago of like one-hundred Chinese destroyers in service?

Brumby said:

The part I am simply not getting is how do you define sea and air control as an objective without referencing to what air and sea control means objectively.

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I describe the objective necessary for achieving air and sea control up in post #8 multiple times, here's one of those times:

Essentially, the future PLAN CSG will be a mobile "fire, maneuver and recon" complex that will provide support and information for the rest of the PLA's sensor kill chain, to enable the use of "long range artillery" (AShBM/HGV and long range bombers with HGVs) to destroy the enemy in support of the PLAN CSG's own combat against the opfor CSG.

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my post #16 describes it as well

I believe China's multi domain warfare would have to involve a carrier force that is at least qualitatively and quantitatively equal in that theatre of conflict, while supported by more extensive land based long range strike capabilities and regional ISR and kill chain assets.
The combination of those forces will be to create a situation where the PLA has overall fire power superiority and ISR/situational awareness superiority in the region when looking at it from a multi domain point of view.

But to reliably do so, it would require China to send its own large carrier strike groups into the second island chain to try to locate and skirmish with US carrier groups and create situations whereby they can provide robust targeting solutions for long range strike systems and the Chinese CSG's own anti surface capabilities to destroy the opposing carrier group.

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As I wrote multiple times, such a battle would be fought around the second island chain, meaning there would be various other assumptions made about other preceding operations to enable this to happen, namely that the PLA would have secured air and sea control in and around its immediate periphery in the first island chain and greatly degraded the first island chain's ability to operate as an "A2AD chain" whether it's via a combination of geopoliticking or selective use of military force or both.

As it is often said, the opposition also gets to vote in any conflict. Conops is a means to an end and not an end onto itself. The resourcing required has to take into consideration the set objectives, what tasks need to be fulfilled to deliver the set objectives and the constitution of your force package necessary to complete the tasks. It is not some arbitrary objective-less exercise.

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I don't see how this contradicts any of what I said.

Nowhere in my write up did I suggest that a "conops" is an end unto itself.
The conops is meant to provide a set of capabilities and strategies to provide the best chance of achieving sea and air control.[/QUOTE]

Iron Man said:

The PLAN has or will have the money and the requisite technology for a 100kt nuclear carrier; of this there is little doubt. OTOH, this in no way makes such a carrier inevitable or even highly likely.

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[Just saw this part that wasn't quoted in my original reply for some reason]

If you do believe the PLAN has the money and requisite technology for 100k ton nuclear carriers, then I would be interested as to why you believe a smaller 80k ton conventional carrier would be their final design that they settle on instead.

AndrewS said:

@Bltizo

I'm just refining my thoughts on core PLAN objectives.

Sea (and Air) Control
This would only cover the offshore land masses that China deems critical.
To my mind, this encompasses the SCS islands, Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands on the 1st Island Chain.

But in order to obtain air and sea superiority over these land features - they must be isolated from outside support.
That only requires the surrounding sea and air to be denied to the opponent - which is an easier task.

So for the next 15+ years this will be the key objective that the blue-water navy will support - because it is still a relatively small navy, albeit growing fast.

Click to expand...

So, in my post #8 I specifically talk about how my conops would be for around the second island chain.

That is to say, when I write about "sea and air control" in post #8, I am talking about sea and air control around the second island chain, encompassing up to and beyond Guam.

Bltizo said:

To achieve the above mission, I believe the PLAN's future carrier strike group should seek to have a number of capabilities:

1. the ability to independently conduct air superiority missions and air defense missions, the ability to independently conduct surface strike missions, the ability to independently conduct EW missions, the ability to independently conduct AEW&C and ISR missions, the ability to independently conduct ASW missions.
2. the ability to also conduct the above missions in a joint manner to support, enable and/or increase the effectiveness of other friendly services (such as PLAAF, and PLARF). In particular, focus should be placed on having carriers have aircraft that can conduct widespread dynamic and redundant ISR, to provide targeting information for land based long range AShBMs as well as land based long range bombers who will provide long range strike support against opfor carrier and surface forces to greatly supplement the PLAN's CSG's own anti surface forces (in the form of carrier based strike fighters and strike UCAVs as well as AShMs from escorting destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines).
3. the range of the above missions should seek to have large footprints -- aka the aircraft conducting those missions should have long range so as to maximize the area of effect that they can have and thus to better reduce the risk the carrier itself faces from opfor threats, by virtue of having longer distance. This range should be no less than 500 nmi and should optimally aim to achieve 1000 nmi or above to match future potential US aircraft operating footprints.
4. to achieve the above missions, a combination of manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft will make up the airwing, and must be sufficiently large to provide adequate range/endurance (or to have tanker aircraft that can allow an aircraft to achieve the above range.
5. to achieve adequate sortie rate, each carrier itself should be capable of sustaining a competitively sized airwing.
6. the future CSG should be capable of operating at distances of up to and slightly beyond the second island chain for an extended period in terms of endurance (namely, fuel and consumable stores).

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---

So looking at the CSBA 2040 vision - US carriers are operating ISR&T CAPs at 800-1000nm (1500-1800km)

That implies that the Chinese Air Force would capable of operating its own ISR&T CAPs at 1500-1800km from the Chinese mainland. That is smack over the middle of the projected operating area for US Navy carriers in the CSBA diagram.

It looks to me like a war of attrition would occur in such a scenario.
And that becomes a competition between a limited number of lower-performance US carrier aircraft versus a much larger force of Chinese land-based aircraft.

And come to think of it, it's only 3000km from Guam to mainland China.
If we're talking about ISR&T CAP operating at 1500-1800km, then it looks attritional again.
But this time, it is 1 airbase on Guam with some carriers versus all the mainland China airbases.

So how would the Chinese navy fit into such a vision?

Say CSGs operate at a distance of 1200km from the Chinese mainland.
That is enough to isolate Taiwan/Okinawa/Senkaku/Diaoyu.
But still leaves the CSG comfortably under the defensive cover of land-based ISR&T CAP which has a range of 1500-1800km.

Also note that those CSGs are only 1800km from Guam.
That's a feasible distance for a CSG to dash in - to launch a cruise missile strike or for aircraft to launch their own airstrikes.

But I reckon the CSGs would spend most of their time hunting for US carriers.
And the mere presence of a Chinese CSG operating some 1200km from the Chinese mainland - would push the US navy to operate much further away.

Click to expand...

My conops is one where I see the PLAN as seeking to operate some 2000-3000km from the Chinese mainland instead. The goal would be to primarily seek and destroy US naval forces in that area -- or to push them much further away.