Future PLA combat aircraft composition

caohailiang said:

I think the PLA need several CSG groups (4~6) but not necessarily matching those of USN, my logic is as follows.

The current "reliable range" of PLA's land based ISR and strike capability is maybe 1000~2000km. It is reasonable to believe that, with new technologies and additional support from PLAN CSG as mobile ISR platforms in the 2030s, 3000~4000km off Chinese coast can be safely covered, .

In that case, US trying to wage war within second island chain against China would be overly ambitious and extremely risky. When you fight against a peer competitor, there is simply no reason that you are able to push the fight all the way towards their front yard.

The viable strategy for the US then would be to pull back and remotely block China's SLOC in India ocean and east Pacific, where it would be difficult for PLA to leverage those land based assets to gain advantage. (If US follows that strategy, US allies in east Asia are effectively abandoned. Whether that is acceptable politically is a different matter)

Then what is the PLA's strategy to secure the SLOC? One option is to build 12 CSG and win a traditional sea battle in Indian Ocean. Another possibility is China tries to get more foot hold in south and west Asia (Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan) so PLA can deploy large quantity of survivable land based assets and strike from there, which seems to be much a safer and cheaper solution than the 12 CSG option.

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Even considering PLAN CSGs as mobile ISR platforms in the 2030s and beyond, 3000-4000km most certainly cannot be "safely" covered, because the USN would likely seek to withdraw its mobile CSGs and then concentrate them with as many as they can muster -- at least 4, potentially up to 6 depending on how far they surge -- to defeat mobile PLAN CSGs and deny PLA ISR the ISR they need to operate at ranges of 3000-4000km or beyond.
The US military knows, as does the PLA, that the further from the Chinese coast they go, the far more thinly spread and less reliable the PLA's ISR is able to reach, and the easier it is for USN CSGs to deny them.

E.g.: if the US positions itself between Hawaii and the second island chain, that is a distance where PLA ISR will not be able to reliably reach from the mainland even into the future, and the US would likely use small islands in that area as missile bases with mobile TELs to bombard the mainland as well as to use strategic bombers deployed from CONTUS and/or Hawaii to launch long range missiles at standoff ranges as well, while their CSGs continue to deny PLA ISR and provide CAP at ranges of 2000-3000km away from the Chinese coast.

This is to say, I believe the goal of any CSG that the PLAN pursues into the more distant future, would be primarily to wage high intensity large scale air-naval-missile conflict at ranges of over 2000km away from the Chinese coast in the western pacific, but more likely over 3000-4000km away from the Chinese coast in the western/central pacific, against opposing US carrier groups as well as US land based (island based) missile forces and long range bomber forces.

That will of course require the PLAN to be capable of putting forwards a CSG force that is at least equal (ideally quantitatively superior) CSG force as well as supporting and complementary naval forces (SAGs, UCAV carriers, submarines), as well as very long range missile forces and long range strategic bomber forces and long range land based UAV/UCAVs of their own.

This is to say, I do agree that I think the PLAN doesn't need to "match" the USN's number of CSGs -- I think given the likely regional disposition of forces post 2030 and especially post 2040, the PLAN will need to ideally at least marginally exceed the USN's number of CSGs.
They will be in a position where ekeing out victory or equivalent losses is not enough, but where being able to leverage quantitative superiority of equally capable mobile forces (CSGs) and home field advantages in ISR and strike, should be able to have a high likelihood of defeating a combined USN CSG force (4-6 CSGs) while losing relatively few forces of their own by virtue of exploiting said above advantages.


All of this of course presumes that the PLA has sufficient intra-regional strike capabilities to take out the first island chain and Guam as centers of US air-naval-missile capability and sufficient intra-regional ISR and strike capabilities to credibly deny and destroy any US attempts to use islands in the first island chain as anti shipping locations.

Bltizo said:

All of this of course presumes that the PLA has sufficient intra-regional strike capabilities to take out the first island chain and Guam as centers of US air-naval-missile capability and sufficient intra-regional ISR and strike capabilities to credibly deny and destroy any US attempts to use islands in the first island chain as anti shipping locations.

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That is the assumption. Not saying it will be achieved, more because if it cannot be, discussion beyond that is pointless.

Bltizo said:

E.g.: if the US positions itself between Hawaii and the second island chain, that is a distance where PLA ISR will not be able to reliably reach from the mainland even into the future, and the US would likely use small islands in that area as missile bases with mobile TELs to bombard the mainland as well as to use strategic bombers deployed from CONTUS and/or Hawaii to launch long range missiles at standoff ranges as well

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If PLA manage to keep US CSG at a distance beyond Guam, isnt that already a success? Like you said, US by then will use island based missile in mid pacific or strategic bomber from contus to strike, because tactical a/c on the csg cannot inflict much damage from that range already. If that is the case, the war will be more like a long range missile exchange, both sides can do that, and no decisive result can be achieved, which in a way is victory for China, because in that case US force is effectively banished from east asia.

I would say both navies may try to lure the opponent to a favorable battlefield in order to achieve annilation. For USN that place is eastward of second island chain, for PLA that is westward. But i think the US side would be more eager to be on the offensive thus prone to be ambushed, if their strategic goal is to retain sea control over the entire west pacific like they do today.

caohailiang said:

If PLA manage to keep US CSG at a distance beyond Guam, isnt that already a success?

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This is what I think most people don't understand. Too many jump to a total war scenario without thinking about other possible reasons for a strong Navy. I've had to explain repeatedly to coworkers that China doesn't want war, they just want guaranteed autonomy.

Bltizo said:

So, I'm saying 10-12 CSGs required because I imagine that during a conflict, the PLAN will aim to have a peacetime deployment model that allows them to be able to surge up to 2/3rds of their overall orbat in the region.

I.e.: with a fleet of 10-12 CSGs, they will aim to be able to sortie 6-8 CSGs at once.

I have nothing against procurement of more long range missiles, however the more of them you have and especially the longer their range is, the more robust of an ISR capability you need.
Procurement of a large fleet of carriers will be very much complementary to procurement of a large stock of long range strike missiles.

Remember, the goal is to achieve qualitative parity at minimum while being able to achieve quantitative superiority in theater -- in terms of not only land based long range strike missiles, land based fighters, etc, but also CSGs.

If the US is able to deploy 4 CSGs to a pacific theater at any one time, of course it would be preferable to be able to outnumber in terms of your own CSGs as well as exploit any home turf advantages you have (land based strike missiles, land based aircraft, land based ISR).





The US is already adjusting their own military strategy to emphasize strikes at greater distances, as well as using air and naval forces to impose blockades at distances further form the Chinese coast.

Going into the 2030s, I suspect PLA procurement and strategy will be defined by the requirement to be able to go out and defeat opposing, capable, air-naval formations at significant distances form China's coast, as far as 4000-5000km away at its maximum.

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What you're missing is how the US will respond, and what the likely diplomatic responses are to a PLAN that, at least on paper, is superior to the USN.

A Sino-American war is very much winnable when you're looking at currently 75-80% of the US GDP. But when you're considering a global field, it becomes closer to 2:1 in the West's favor once Europe is added in. A strong PLAN is a threat not only to the USN, but also navies globally.

A 10-12 CSG PLAN is not only going to be contested by the USN and possibly local allies, but also NATO as a whole. By aiming to keep the PLAN CSG force down and focusing more on the PLAAF and PLARF for regional conflicts, with the PLAN providing a supporting factor (or focusing on submarines or other naval ships that don't have the same inland strike potential as carriers), you avoid triggering an excessive counterresponse.

Carriers are and will remain useful for what they put on the table that other ships cannot, but naval supremacy assets that do not have the same bombardment / imperialism capability as carriers are more useful in that they don't trigger an excessive military build-up by other actors.

If you must go big on carriers, you're better off working light drone carriers (LHDs, etc) or non-nuclear carriers that have a limited range.

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As for the need to keep sea lines of control open, OBOR exists for a reason. China is better off using diplomacy when it can to negate threats, reserving military options when diplomacy cannot work or is unreliable. China replacing the US as the world's military hegemon is precisely the disaster scenario many on the outside fear; when it comes to the devil you know versus the devil you don't, the United States wins.

Team Blue said:

This is what I think most people don't understand. Too many jump to a total war scenario without thinking about other possible reasons for a strong Navy. I've had to explain repeatedly to coworkers that China doesn't want war, they just want guaranteed autonomy.

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This convo is getting offtopic but I will jump in.
It is not about "being left alone". It is about securing ALL sea and land trade lanes. China cannot afford to be cut off from crucial imports, such as raw materials, energy resources etc

So even if China secures the SCS it would still need to expand is naval presence around the world in order to control their development interests.

This is where they clash with the US. China wants to expand to the US backyard and the US wont allow that. So there will be more, not less, friction as time passes.

Now, for getting back on topic, this is important because it will shape how many carriers China will need. I am also expecting the eventual number to be 10+.

Of course depending on technology advancements I only feel comfortable making predictions until 2040. Who knows how things will be after that, maybe UUVs will swarm the seas and you will have underwater carriers.

Nobody knows, so to conclude, for now I am sticking with the carrier number of 10+ and there is no way China is going to want to be left alone only on the SCS, it will inevitably expand its presence worldwide

Inst said:

What you're missing is how the US will respond, and what the likely diplomatic responses are to a PLAN that, at least on paper, is superior to the USN.

A Sino-American war is very much winnable when you're looking at currently 75-80% of the US GDP. But when you're considering a global field, it becomes closer to 2:1 in the West's favor once Europe is added in. A strong PLAN is a threat not only to the USN, but also navies globally.

A 10-12 CSG PLAN is not only going to be contested by the USN and possibly local allies, but also NATO as a whole. By aiming to keep the PLAN CSG force down and focusing more on the PLAAF and PLARF for regional conflicts, with the PLAN providing a supporting factor (or focusing on submarines or other naval ships that don't have the same inland strike potential as carriers), you avoid triggering an excessive counterresponse.

Carriers are and will remain useful for what they put on the table that other ships cannot, but naval supremacy assets that do not have the same bombardment / imperialism capability as carriers are more useful in that they don't trigger an excessive military build-up by other actors.

If you must go big on carriers, you're better off working light drone carriers (LHDs, etc) or non-nuclear carriers that have a limited range.

===

As for the need to keep sea lines of control open, OBOR exists for a reason. China is better off using diplomacy when it can to negate threats, reserving military options when diplomacy cannot work or is unreliable. China replacing the US as the world's military hegemon is precisely the disaster scenario many on the outside fear; when it comes to the devil you know versus the devil you don't, the United States wins.

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Sorry but I don't agree with non-alarmism. Historically, middle powers usually rally behind the strongest empire. Also, the biggest trader needs the biggest navy. If China doesn't want to get left out and wants to snatch US allies out of the orbit of the US, building more carriers is exactly what it should be doing. The CPC knows better than me of course but if I were them, I would have all the carrier-capable shipyards working 7/24 to achieve 10 carriers and 35 big amphis by 2035. The Chinese economy will be bigger than the USA's in 2035 by nominal. In GDP PPP it will be twice as large as the USA's. It should have no problems with sustaining the said fleet.

BoraTas said:

Sorry but I don't agree with non-alarmism. Historically, middle powers usually rally behind the strongest empire. Also, the biggest trader needs the biggest navy. If China doesn't want to get left out and wants to snatch US allies out of the orbit of the US, building more carriers is exactly what it should be doing. The CPC knows better than me of course but if I were them, I would have all the carrier-capable shipyards working 7/24 to achieve 10 carriers and 35 big amphis by 2035. The Chinese economy will be bigger than the USA's in 2035 by nominal. In GDP PPP it will be twice as large as the USA's. It should have no problems with sustaining the said fleet.

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The middle powers that China should care about are the ones in East Asia. The ones in East Asia are more threatened by cruise and ballistic missiles, alongside short-range bombardment, than they would by carriers.

The alarming thing I get about the conversation of "China should build 10-12 carriers" is the "China should take over the world" subtext involved. The biggest weakness of the US is PRECISELY that it's taken over the world; i.e, it's the biggest target for everyone else, and it has an absurd military spending to maintain its hegemony. What you're asking for is for China to follow the same path of hegemonism, which Chinese states have always denied.

===

I can get behind China if the point is to create a regional sphere, as that's crucial for its security, but global hegemonies are expensive, stupid, and brutal. Every contender for global hegemony has collapsed in a gruesome fashion; the British went broke and were reduced back to their home islands (and they may lose Scotland within a decade). The French Empire is gone, the Spanish Empire is full of independent states, and the United States is in debt up to its eyeballs and unable to manage internal contradictions.

You have to remember, China just got out of a near-death experience. People say the Japanese could never have successfully conquered China, but look what happened with the Manchus, they were successful, until they were not. If China follows the path of hegemonism, as opposed to focusing on its own development and taking a quasi-isolationist approach to elements outside its own sphere, when the Chinese hegemony collapses, this could be the end of China.

Not trying to be an ahole here, but when we start to talk more generally on historic lessen of empires we definitely cross that fine line of being off topic. Why dont we stick closer to csg and stuff, before mods axe the discussion.

Inst said:

The middle powers that China should care about are the ones in East Asia. The ones in East Asia are more threatened by cruise and ballistic missiles, alongside short-range bombardment, than they would by carriers.

The alarming thing I get about the conversation of "China should build 10-12 carriers" is the "China should take over the world" subtext involved. The biggest weakness of the US is PRECISELY that it's taken over the world; i.e, it's the biggest target for everyone else, and it has an absurd military spending to maintain its hegemony. What you're asking for is for China to follow the same path of hegemonism, which Chinese states have always denied.

===

I can get behind China if the point is to create a regional sphere, as that's crucial for its security, but global hegemonies are expensive, stupid, and brutal. Every contender for global hegemony has collapsed in a gruesome fashion; the British went broke and were reduced back to their home islands (and they may lose Scotland within a decade). The French Empire is gone, the Spanish Empire is full of independent states, and the United States is in debt up to its eyeballs and unable to manage internal contradictions.

You have to remember, China just got out of a near-death experience. People say the Japanese could never have successfully conquered China, but look what happened with the Manchus, they were successful, until they were not. If China follows the path of hegemonism, as opposed to focusing on its own development and taking a quasi-isolationist approach to elements outside its own sphere, when the Chinese hegemony collapses, this could be the end of China.

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I agree with all of this except you understood me wrongly. I didn't say China should practice hegemonism. It shouldn't. What I said is China should be able to clash with the USA head-on. It should be strong enough to put the existence of the US military in danger. This requires a strength that is at least equal to the US. Otherwise, it risks encirclement and trade disruption. China shouldn't establish 800 bases around the globe. China shouldn't get itself into endless conflicts like the USA has been doing since 1991. China shouldn't send its navy to patrol (read cruise missile diplomacy) sealines. But China should definitely build 10-15 carriers and 150-300 stealth bombers.

caohailiang said:

That is the assumption. Not saying it will be achieved, more because if it cannot be, discussion beyond that is pointless.

If PLA manage to keep US CSG at a distance beyond Guam, isnt that already a success? Like you said, US by then will use island based missile in mid pacific or strategic bomber from contus to strike, because tactical a/c on the csg cannot inflict much damage from that range already. If that is the case, the war will be more like a long range missile exchange, both sides can do that, and no decisive result can be achieved, which in a way is victory for China, because in that case US force is effectively banished from east asia.

I would say both navies may try to lure the opponent to a favorable battlefield in order to achieve annilation. For USN that place is eastward of second island chain, for PLA that is westward. But i think the US side would be more eager to be on the offensive thus prone to be ambushed, if their strategic goal is to retain sea control over the entire west pacific like they do today.

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Regarding the bolded part -- I don't think that would necessarily be a successful outcome, because in that context the US will retain the strategic initiative by having the ability to continue to launch strikes against Chinese population, economic, industrial and military centers in the mainland, while also conducting a blockade.

Such a strategy would essentially be a slow war of attrition and siege whereby the PLA will have no means of denying the US the ability to siege the mainland, nor will they have the ability to break a blockade, without having the mobile forces to neutralize key US mobile air-naval groups essential to their ability to conduct that sort of siege/blockade in the first place.