I'd like to post excerpts of an article I think raises some interesting general points. Although it revolves around the Australian forces, the discussion is equally relevant for China. I have tried to carve out the main arguments. What are your views? Especially, which course should China take?
With kind regards
Andrew
Sea Control - Submarines or Air Power?
Air power has been the decisive factor in nearly every major naval engagement since the beginning of the Second World War. Whether used by the Allies or the Axis Powers, air power when systematically applied to naval warfare annihilated naval surface forces and transport convoys not defended by friendly aircraft.
...
Some important examples bear examination. The battle of the Atlantic initially favoured Germany, and the Luftwaffe's Focke Wulf Condors wreaked havoc upon Allied shipping convoys on the high seas until countered by escort carriers and fighters. The infamous story of convoy PQ-17, largely sunk by the Ju-88s and He-111s of the Luftwaffe, has been told many times. (...)
Whether we examine Luftwaffe performance in the Artic, or USAAF performance off the Japanese coast, published statistics from many sources clearly indicate that land based aircraft sunk more shipping than either the U-boats or the US Navy's submarines did, at a fraction of the operating costs and loss rates of the latter. Whether shipping was destroyed by direct attack or mining, aircraft did so far more efficiently. (...)
More recently, RAF and RN Harriers and Sea Harriers played a decisive role in the retaking of the Falklands, and Argentina's only useful opposition was provided by the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (AAF), which sank four destroyers and frigates, and an important heavy container ship using by modern standards a marginal capability (a handful of Exocets and WW2 vintage USAAF dumb bombs). Were Argentine bombs fused properly, the losses would have been at least twice as great (4).
What is the Primary Role of a Navy ?
The primary role of a navy is to control the seas (5). This is accomplished by engaging shipping by direct attack and by mining, or the threat of doing so. The ascendancy of the submarine and aircraft carrier during WW2, and the preeminent role performed by these classes of vessel continue to this very day. The battleship, and conventional surface combatants in general, have declined in importance since 1939. The primary role of the surface combatant today is to provide a measure of air defence, defend other vessels from submarines, and support amphibious landings with gunfire.
The evolution of the modern anti-shipping missile has led to a situation where shipping must be defended from hostile missile firing aircraft at significant ranges, pushing up the size and weight of carrier based fighters to the point where they can only be effectively deployed on large carriers such as those used by the USN. The composition of a CVBG today is largely defensive, with a single carrier needing to deploy many fighters, multiple AEW aircraft, and be escorted by up to a dozen air defence cruisers (AAW), ASW destroyers and light escorts such as frigates, as well as one or two attack submarines. Such is the value of a carrier to opponent and user alike, that its deployment in contested waters requires significant ASW and AAW support. The lightweight carrier is simply not a viable proposition in contested waters (6).
In the context of a navy's primary role of sea control, unless the navy is able to deploy one or more fully capable CVBGs, its primary tool for sea control will be the submarine. The submarine will attack shipping with torpedoes and tube launched anti-shipping missiles, and lay mines. It can also be deployed defensively to engage hostile submarines.
Mines are a particularly valuable weapon as they are simple, cheap, reliable and persistent. Clever use of minefields can deny an opponent the use of ports, shipping channels and lanes, as well as force shipping into kill zones patrolled by submarines and aircraft. Modern mines are very difficult to find and remove, and can be easily delivered by naval vessels and aircraft.
In a strategic war, sea control is usually employed offensively as a means of blockading an opponent's shipping lanes or ports, or to enable amphibious forces to make a beachhead on a contested coastline. Blockade can often starve an opponent of resources and war material to the point where they are unable to sustain their war effort and collapse as a result - Japan in 1945 is a good example.
The ability of any contemporary navy other than the USN to achieve even a degree of sea control in the face of a well equipped modern air force is questionable. Whilst top of the line submarines stand a reasonable chance of evading ASW aircraft, their ability to sustain operations effectively whilst under constant aerial harassment must be questioned. Every engagement with the enemy localises their position and increases their vulnerability to attack.
Surface Action Groups (SAG) comprising cruisers, destroyers and frigates will not resist sustained attack by state of the art air forces, which can saturate their SAM and AAA defences with anti-shipping missiles and anti-radiation missiles. Once the SAG loses its area defences (when the AAW cruisers are taken down with ARMs and ASMs), then they will be picked off piecemeal with laser guided bombs and ASMs. The SAG is not survivable under sustained and concentrated air attack, moreover attacking jets can usually stand-off from outside area defence SAM range and keep lobbing ASMs at the SAG until its air defences collapse.
The ability of a SAG to provide useful defence of convoys is also open to questioning. A repeat of the PQ-17 fiasco, or the Bismarck Sea battle would be the most likely outcome. Only the US CG-47 Aegis class cruiser has any chance of usefully defending a convoy. If the air attack is sustained and concentrated, once the cruiser has exhausted its magazines the battle is lost. (...)
Sea Control and the ADF
The Royal Australian Navy is clearly aware of these circumstances, the building of six Collins class submarines and recent lobbying for an additional two reflect a focus on using the submarine, armed with Harpoons, torpedoes and mines, as its primary tool for sea control (...)
The question which we must then ask is whether a force of six to eight submarines can do a better job of performing the vital sea control mission, than could be performed by the RAAF using its AP-3C, F-111 and F/A-18 wings. (...)
Flexibility favours air power, as aircraft can deploy at hundreds of knots while submarines deploy at tens of knots. Submarines must return to base to refuel and rearm, or rendezvous with submarine tenders, in either instance having to do so from outside the coverage of hostile maritime aircraft. Aircraft can be reloaded much faster than submarines, and can engage ships, submarines and other aircraft. Whilst a submarine can dominate only the surface and subsurface medium under favourable circumstances, aircraft can dominate the air, surface and subsurface media. (...)
Weight of fire favours air power, as six or less aircraft can carry an equal load of Harpoons or mines to what a submarine can. A squadron of twelve F-111s or F/A-18s can deliver the weight of fire of two submarines on a single sortie, and several times the weight of fire if we allow the aircraft to fly home, reload and re-engage, which the aircraft can do in much less time than it takes a submarine to break contact, meet with a tender, and redeploy to regain contact with the enemy. (...)
Survivability favours air power, as modern tactical jets can deal with hostile fighters, maritime aircraft and surface vessels very effectively. Whereas a submarine must evade hostile ASW aircraft and vessels, and submarines, in order to perform its mission, all of these threats are typically easy targets for aircraft to successfully engage. The maritime patrol aircraft which is a deadly threat to the submarine, is easy meat for an F-111 or F/A-18. The same is true of surface vessels. Whilst a submarine can in theory engage an ASW aircraft with an encapsulated SAM, the submarine is still the hunted party in the engagement.
Coverage favours air power, as an aircraft using its ESM and radar can sweep a much larger area much faster than a submarine using a towed sonar. In the sea control scenario, where surface vessels are the target, aircraft offers substantially better coverage than submarines, moreso if we can deploy several aircraft for each submarine.
Costs have and continue to favour air power across all three categories. A Collins class submarine at $500M plus apiece is worth almost the cost of a squadron of state of the art tactical jets, new. Losing a single submarine is a similar loss to that of a whole squadron of tactical fighters, with a greater loss of life. In terms of bang for buck, aircraft are therefore much better value as a sea control asset.
Persistance and operating radius favour the submarine, where air power lacks proper inflight refuelling support. Where air power has proper inflight refuelling support, it can match the operating radius of the submarine with no difficulty. The RAF's Nimrod operations during the Falklands campaign are a good example.
Considering the previous analysis, we can argue a very strong case for the joint force commander to be RAAF rather than RAN, and for the RAN to be the service provider to the RAAF in sea control operations. The RAN would provide intelligence support and use its submarines to assist the RAAF in its conduct of operations. RAN submarines could drive hostile shipping into kill zones, mop up stragglers after air strikes, provide post strike Bomb Damage Assessment, as well as provide Combat Search And Rescue if needed. This arrangement reflects the weight of respective capabilities far better than the Navy-lead-service-in-sea-control-operations model. The latter is an anachronism.
With kind regards
Andrew
Sea Control - Submarines or Air Power?
Air power has been the decisive factor in nearly every major naval engagement since the beginning of the Second World War. Whether used by the Allies or the Axis Powers, air power when systematically applied to naval warfare annihilated naval surface forces and transport convoys not defended by friendly aircraft.
...
Some important examples bear examination. The battle of the Atlantic initially favoured Germany, and the Luftwaffe's Focke Wulf Condors wreaked havoc upon Allied shipping convoys on the high seas until countered by escort carriers and fighters. The infamous story of convoy PQ-17, largely sunk by the Ju-88s and He-111s of the Luftwaffe, has been told many times. (...)
Whether we examine Luftwaffe performance in the Artic, or USAAF performance off the Japanese coast, published statistics from many sources clearly indicate that land based aircraft sunk more shipping than either the U-boats or the US Navy's submarines did, at a fraction of the operating costs and loss rates of the latter. Whether shipping was destroyed by direct attack or mining, aircraft did so far more efficiently. (...)
More recently, RAF and RN Harriers and Sea Harriers played a decisive role in the retaking of the Falklands, and Argentina's only useful opposition was provided by the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (AAF), which sank four destroyers and frigates, and an important heavy container ship using by modern standards a marginal capability (a handful of Exocets and WW2 vintage USAAF dumb bombs). Were Argentine bombs fused properly, the losses would have been at least twice as great (4).
What is the Primary Role of a Navy ?
The primary role of a navy is to control the seas (5). This is accomplished by engaging shipping by direct attack and by mining, or the threat of doing so. The ascendancy of the submarine and aircraft carrier during WW2, and the preeminent role performed by these classes of vessel continue to this very day. The battleship, and conventional surface combatants in general, have declined in importance since 1939. The primary role of the surface combatant today is to provide a measure of air defence, defend other vessels from submarines, and support amphibious landings with gunfire.
The evolution of the modern anti-shipping missile has led to a situation where shipping must be defended from hostile missile firing aircraft at significant ranges, pushing up the size and weight of carrier based fighters to the point where they can only be effectively deployed on large carriers such as those used by the USN. The composition of a CVBG today is largely defensive, with a single carrier needing to deploy many fighters, multiple AEW aircraft, and be escorted by up to a dozen air defence cruisers (AAW), ASW destroyers and light escorts such as frigates, as well as one or two attack submarines. Such is the value of a carrier to opponent and user alike, that its deployment in contested waters requires significant ASW and AAW support. The lightweight carrier is simply not a viable proposition in contested waters (6).
In the context of a navy's primary role of sea control, unless the navy is able to deploy one or more fully capable CVBGs, its primary tool for sea control will be the submarine. The submarine will attack shipping with torpedoes and tube launched anti-shipping missiles, and lay mines. It can also be deployed defensively to engage hostile submarines.
Mines are a particularly valuable weapon as they are simple, cheap, reliable and persistent. Clever use of minefields can deny an opponent the use of ports, shipping channels and lanes, as well as force shipping into kill zones patrolled by submarines and aircraft. Modern mines are very difficult to find and remove, and can be easily delivered by naval vessels and aircraft.
In a strategic war, sea control is usually employed offensively as a means of blockading an opponent's shipping lanes or ports, or to enable amphibious forces to make a beachhead on a contested coastline. Blockade can often starve an opponent of resources and war material to the point where they are unable to sustain their war effort and collapse as a result - Japan in 1945 is a good example.
The ability of any contemporary navy other than the USN to achieve even a degree of sea control in the face of a well equipped modern air force is questionable. Whilst top of the line submarines stand a reasonable chance of evading ASW aircraft, their ability to sustain operations effectively whilst under constant aerial harassment must be questioned. Every engagement with the enemy localises their position and increases their vulnerability to attack.
Surface Action Groups (SAG) comprising cruisers, destroyers and frigates will not resist sustained attack by state of the art air forces, which can saturate their SAM and AAA defences with anti-shipping missiles and anti-radiation missiles. Once the SAG loses its area defences (when the AAW cruisers are taken down with ARMs and ASMs), then they will be picked off piecemeal with laser guided bombs and ASMs. The SAG is not survivable under sustained and concentrated air attack, moreover attacking jets can usually stand-off from outside area defence SAM range and keep lobbing ASMs at the SAG until its air defences collapse.
The ability of a SAG to provide useful defence of convoys is also open to questioning. A repeat of the PQ-17 fiasco, or the Bismarck Sea battle would be the most likely outcome. Only the US CG-47 Aegis class cruiser has any chance of usefully defending a convoy. If the air attack is sustained and concentrated, once the cruiser has exhausted its magazines the battle is lost. (...)
Sea Control and the ADF
The Royal Australian Navy is clearly aware of these circumstances, the building of six Collins class submarines and recent lobbying for an additional two reflect a focus on using the submarine, armed with Harpoons, torpedoes and mines, as its primary tool for sea control (...)
The question which we must then ask is whether a force of six to eight submarines can do a better job of performing the vital sea control mission, than could be performed by the RAAF using its AP-3C, F-111 and F/A-18 wings. (...)
Flexibility favours air power, as aircraft can deploy at hundreds of knots while submarines deploy at tens of knots. Submarines must return to base to refuel and rearm, or rendezvous with submarine tenders, in either instance having to do so from outside the coverage of hostile maritime aircraft. Aircraft can be reloaded much faster than submarines, and can engage ships, submarines and other aircraft. Whilst a submarine can dominate only the surface and subsurface medium under favourable circumstances, aircraft can dominate the air, surface and subsurface media. (...)
Weight of fire favours air power, as six or less aircraft can carry an equal load of Harpoons or mines to what a submarine can. A squadron of twelve F-111s or F/A-18s can deliver the weight of fire of two submarines on a single sortie, and several times the weight of fire if we allow the aircraft to fly home, reload and re-engage, which the aircraft can do in much less time than it takes a submarine to break contact, meet with a tender, and redeploy to regain contact with the enemy. (...)
Survivability favours air power, as modern tactical jets can deal with hostile fighters, maritime aircraft and surface vessels very effectively. Whereas a submarine must evade hostile ASW aircraft and vessels, and submarines, in order to perform its mission, all of these threats are typically easy targets for aircraft to successfully engage. The maritime patrol aircraft which is a deadly threat to the submarine, is easy meat for an F-111 or F/A-18. The same is true of surface vessels. Whilst a submarine can in theory engage an ASW aircraft with an encapsulated SAM, the submarine is still the hunted party in the engagement.
Coverage favours air power, as an aircraft using its ESM and radar can sweep a much larger area much faster than a submarine using a towed sonar. In the sea control scenario, where surface vessels are the target, aircraft offers substantially better coverage than submarines, moreso if we can deploy several aircraft for each submarine.
Costs have and continue to favour air power across all three categories. A Collins class submarine at $500M plus apiece is worth almost the cost of a squadron of state of the art tactical jets, new. Losing a single submarine is a similar loss to that of a whole squadron of tactical fighters, with a greater loss of life. In terms of bang for buck, aircraft are therefore much better value as a sea control asset.
Persistance and operating radius favour the submarine, where air power lacks proper inflight refuelling support. Where air power has proper inflight refuelling support, it can match the operating radius of the submarine with no difficulty. The RAF's Nimrod operations during the Falklands campaign are a good example.
Considering the previous analysis, we can argue a very strong case for the joint force commander to be RAAF rather than RAN, and for the RAN to be the service provider to the RAAF in sea control operations. The RAN would provide intelligence support and use its submarines to assist the RAAF in its conduct of operations. RAN submarines could drive hostile shipping into kill zones, mop up stragglers after air strikes, provide post strike Bomb Damage Assessment, as well as provide Combat Search And Rescue if needed. This arrangement reflects the weight of respective capabilities far better than the Navy-lead-service-in-sea-control-operations model. The latter is an anachronism.
:coffee: