China's Defense/Military Breaking News Thread

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ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
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Things have changed a bit, huh?
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
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Honestly, this does make me genuinely worried about the lower number of VLS cells (64) on the Chinese 052Ds compared to their American and Japanese counterparts (96). Because no matter how accurate, powerful and resilient your radar sets and fire control suites are, I think the volume of firepower that every ship can put out is also a key factor in reliably dictating a battle's outcome.

Remember that the Chinese military plans to primarily use long-range missiles launched from mainland China for targets in the 1st Island Chain. If you run the costs for targets here, it's significantly cheaper to use a truck and somewhat bigger land-based missiles, rather than use the VLS cells on a Destroyer.

In comparison, the US barely has any long-range missiles and has to transport those missiles all the way from Hawaii or the continental USA. So US destroyers have to have more VLS cells dedicated to land-attack and anti-ship.

In addition, Chinese ships can return to relatively close ports nearby in mainland China to reload any type of missile

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So on a tactical level, I don't think there should be too much difference in SAM loadouts between the Type-052D and the Burkes
In any case, you can afford to buy more Type-052Ds for the same money than a larger ship with more VLS cells like the Type-055.

Doing this increases the number of SAM platforms and therefore the duration of any SAM engagement, which increases the probability of success.

Plus at the campaign level, the SAMs/missiles will run out first, leaving you with a bunch of a destroyers without weapons
So it might be more effective to save money by buying smaller Type-052Ds instead of Type-055.
And then use those savings ($450? Million) to buy a whole lot more missiles instead
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
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2:13:20 Patch denies insitutional knowledge exists

The video has been taken offline now, so could you expand on this?

3:05:00 Patch asserts PLA can invade Okinawa even if US, Japan, Taiwan, (maybe even) SK as well get involved.

I've previously theorised on the forum that Okinawa would be possible in the future
But in any case, the Miyajima Islands do look very vulnerable, if Japan decides to join the US in a war against China

And the military balance looks like it will shift even further in the Western Pacific.

My base scenario (a Chinese increase in military spending from 1.7% to 2.5%) sees the 30year stock of advanced weapons in China double in the space of 7 years from 2022-2029. Then there would be another 50% increase in the 6 year period from the 2029-2035. There's a whole bunch of assumptions here, but you get the idea

So even if Japan doubles military spending and the US arms up somewhat to 4% of GDP, the military balance will continue to shift sharply in China's favour in the Western Pacific

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If I had been on the stream, I would have asked about Shaheed-136 loitering munitions essentially being flying JDAMs that can slowly fly 2000km to their targets. They look about the same cost and have similar weight/payloads (500lb) and guidance systems.
 

BMUFL

Junior Member
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The video has been taken offline now, so could you expand on this?
IIRC Patch asserts that success of an military operahion is a function of the capability of one's system, the amount one has, and how one uses it.

Me? I think he has a point. While "institutional knowledge" is a rather nebulous thing, it's real in the sense that it is knowledge that is passed down by word-of-mouth, stuff that is never written down because a lot of it comes down to TLAR (that looks about right). It is not a thing that will win wars, rather, it is the thing that will keep your machine running. I am sure people here have seen plenty of this, where some random old guy retires and suddenly the entire place falls apart because no one actually knows how the system works in real-life condition.

If I had been on the stream, I would have asked about Shaheed-136 loitering munitions essentially being flying JDAMs that can slowly fly 2000km to their targets. They look about the same cost and have similar weight/payloads (500lb) and guidance systems.
I don't think they want to talk about the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
 

antiterror13

Brigadier
If you look at the US naval force structure, it's still larger overall than the Chinese Navy
The issue is the operating tempo where the US Navy has to be forward deployed everywhere in the world

Either the US Navy increases in size to match the operating tempo or the number/duration of deployments needs to shrink
But the US now faces a classic example of Imperial overstretch
Many commitments were made during the easy days after the Cold War, but now these need a lot more military heft and presence
It's simply not sustainable
But the US retreating from its commitments anywhere means everyone in the world (allies/neutrals/competitors) sense weakness

As an example, look at how the US pivot from the Middle East to China is turning out.
China is now moving into the space vacated by the US in the Middle East, because China and the countries of the Middle East can see this



To be fair, Vietnam's military procurement has been sensible/effective, given the constraints they face

They have to consider the Chinese Army on their northern border, and the fact that statistically, Vietnam is equivalent to one of China's poorer provinces. Vietnam has 14x fewer people, an economy 23x smaller, military spending some 20x less for example
@AndrewS .. Vietnamese economy is 45x smaller than China ($409B vs 18.3T) ... and Vietnamese military spending is 53x smaller ($5.5B vs $293B according to SIPRI 2022)
 

Staedler

Junior Member
Registered Member
The video has been taken offline now, so could you expand on this?
Patch talks a little heatedly about how the US's institutional knowledge is of overstressing their CSGs just because of some OFRP cycle trying to get readiness rates up and having a bunch of sailors suicide because they're miserable and trapped for months aboard a prison. That the US's institutional knowledge is just fucking around in 5th Fleet and having SWOs (Surface Warfare Officers) become division heads. SWOs not learning to drive the ship, etc. just acting like admin staff aboard. Warfighting Flotilla in Center of International Maritime Security had a whole discussion about how SWO knowledge is eroded significantly. The US has started to try to address this the 2020-2021 reforms (command structure, etc. reorganization).

The US hasn't been doing much for the past 30 years institutionally as opposed to China which has been preparing for decades for a fight with the US. Complains about how they've spent all theirtime in 5th Fleet doing Counter-Terrorism nonsense instead. He notes that it's all about the training you do, the equipment you field, and systems you put together. Shooting at people doesn't make institutional knowledge.

A US-China war would be an Air-Naval war and the US hasn't had experience with that sort of thing. The best they've had is off of Yemen or North Africa were there were maybe a couple of munitions fired at them that had to potential to hit. The US (or anyone for that matter) has never had to fight in high intensity electronic warfare or engage in large scale Electro Magnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).

Toaster follows up with talking about the problems in the US Navy NCO culture. Senior NCOs (Chiefs) force people to work 6+ days a week until people suicide or the ship is in port for maintenance. They'll constantly threaten you, deny you sleep, pulling you on ship when you're supposed to be on leave, etc. The antagonism between junior enlisted/officers and the Chiefs is well known and the USN has a huge class/culture divide between the two - probably the widest of any of the services.

Later on Patch talks about the British/etc. pilots going to China to train. They do impart some institutional knowledge there about stuff that happens maybe once in a blue moon and would be hard to find out without loads of experience.


Basically institutional knowledge exists, but it's not a meaningful advantage the US enjoys over China.
Honestly the USN culture and problems I'm hearing sound similar to the sorts the IJN had in the lead up to WW2.
 
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Hyper

Junior Member
Registered Member
Patch talks a little heatedly about how the US's institutional knowledge is of overstressing their CSGs just because of some OFRP cycle trying to get readiness rates up and having a bunch of sailors suicide because they're miserable and trapped for months aboard a prison. That the US's institutional knowledge is just fucking around in 5th Fleet and having SWOs (Surface Warfare Officers) become division heads. SWOs not learning to drive the ship, etc. just acting like admin staff aboard. Warfighting Flotilla in Center of International Maritime Security had a whole discussion about how SWO knowledge is eroded significantly. The US has started to try to address this the 2020-2021 reforms (command structure, etc. reorganization).

The US hasn't been doing much for the past 30 years institutionally as opposed to China which has been preparing for decades for a fight with the US. Complains about how they've spent all theirtime in 5th Fleet doing Counter-Terrorism nonsense instead. He notes that it's all about the training you do, the equipment you field, and systems you put together. Shooting at people doesn't make institutional knowledge.

A US-China war would be an Air-Naval war and the US hasn't had experience with that sort of thing. The best they've had is off of Yemen or North Africa were there were maybe a couple of munitions fired at them that had to potential to hit. The US (or anyone for that matter) has never had to fight in high intensity electronic warfare or engage in large scale Electro Magnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).

Toaster follows up with talking about the problems in the US Navy NCO culture. Senior NCOs (Chiefs) force people to work 6+ days a week until people suicide or the ship is in port for maintenance. They'll constantly threaten you, deny you sleep, pulling you on ship when you're supposed to be on leave, etc. The antagonism between junior enlisted/officers and the Chiefs is well known and the USN has a huge class/culture divide between the two - probably the widest of any of the services.

Later on Patch talks about the British/etc. pilots going to China to train. They do impart some institutional knowledge there about stuff that happens maybe once in a blue moon and would be hard to find out without loads of experience.


Basically institutional knowledge exists, but it's not a meaningful advantage the US enjoys over China.
Honestly the USN culture and problems I'm hearing sound similar to the sorts the IJN had in the lead up to WW2.
The USN is one branch which has been out of battle since the Vietnam War. So they try out the remaining thing - they wage war against their own soldiers.
 

sinophilia

Junior Member
Registered Member
After what went down in the J-20 thread, this comment from him definitely feels like a sh*tpost, unless I misunderstood him in that he thinks F-22 (not in production) is still superior to the J-20.

In metrics that matter I still think f-35 is at least on par, if not ahead of J-20 in terms of avionics.

No it really didn't feel like a troll. He actually mentioned what went down in the J-20 thread right at the time when he was referring to it being significantly superior to all US combat aircraft in the podcast, and in a way that made it clear he isn't trolling.

He said that despite believing the J-20 is better than all combat aircraft, its ridiculous that him making an admission here that the F-22 is superior in TACAIR caused so many people to take personal offense.
 
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