China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread

[antiterror13]

The DF-26 launchers and reload vehicles are extremely heavy and cumbersome. Their mobility requires extensive support from engineering units, along with accompanying CBRN troops and technical support detachments. If additional launchers were added to a single brigade, the brigade’s overall personnel would expand to an unacceptable level, creating a major burden on command, control, and administration.

Therefore, I believe the number of launchers will remain at 16 per brigade. If additional combat capability is required, new brigades would be formed instead.

In addition, “Nugget” has mentioned that the DF-21 has been rapidly retired over the past few years, with the original units re-equipped with the DF-26. The reason is that, after PLA assessments, the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile-3 Block IIB was expected to have a relatively high probability of intercepting the DF-21D.

I think SM-3 Block IIB has been cancelled due to complexity and huge cost. Likely would cost 2-3x or more of DF-21

How much expensive DF-26 to DF-21?

Do you know what happen to old DF-21 after been replaced with DF-26?

 

[AndrewS]

With the same number of personnel, mobile missile forces can support far fewer missiles than silo-based missile forces—the gap may be as large as an order of magnitude, or even more than tenfold.

But we're not comparing [mobile missiles] versus [silo-based missiles]

We are comparing [mobile missiles] versus [mobile missiles]

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1. We can see DF-15 Brigades are structured with 36-48 launchers. So there is precedent for such a command and control structure
2. Janes is reporting 36 launchers per DF-26 Brigade, as per the NDU
3. Janes is reporting [mobile ICBM Brigades] doubling from 6 to 12 DF-31 launchers.

Note that DF-15s use a 4 wheel TEL compared to 6 wheel TELs for the DF-26.
So I don't expect that much difference in operating personnel per TEL between a DF-15 and DF-26

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You end up with a lot more efficiency by making the DF-26 Brigades larger with more TELs.

 

[AndrewS]

any info or rumour of cost of DF-26 and DF-27 missiles only ?

The only "estimate" was from the CSBA many years ago, that an American DF-26 equivalent would cost $20 Million.

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But you could also extrapolate from the $2 Million cost of the DF-17.
That would give you a figure of ~$8 Million for DF-26 land attack, and ~$10 Million for DF-26 Antiship.

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I wouldn't imagine adding a HGV (to make the DF-27) as much more expensive, given what we've seen with the DF-17 cost compared to the DF-15/16.

 

[Kalec]

It looks like a terminal phase maneuvering MRBM/IRBM launch with anti-ship/aircraft test on 14 Nov.

View attachment 164431

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So it turns out to be anti-HAS test.

 

[AndrewS]

That’s impossible to know. How many basic loads are prepared for each unit is highly confidential, and even the numbers cited in doctrine don’t reflect the actual figures.

This is based on what the Pentagon and the US think tanks are reporting.

Presumably they have access to daily satellite imagery which shows the minimum number of observed launchers, reload vehicles and missiles

 

[pipaster]

Is there any benefit of selling surplus DF-21Ds to Venezuela or other allies to push back on Typhoon deployments in the Philippines?

 

[tokenanalyst]

This is based on what the Pentagon and the US think tanks are reporting.

Presumably they have access to daily satellite imagery which shows the minimum number of observed launchers, reload vehicles and missiles

How a satellite knows how many TELs and missiles are in storage close to the production site, it can't. Nobody knows. Also satellites are pretty limited in time and space. You cannot even guess with something that will give a margin of error of two, three or ten times what could be reality.

 

[AndrewS]

How a satellite knows how many TELs and missiles are in storage close to the production site, it can't. Nobody knows. Also satellites are pretty limited in time and space. You cannot even guess with something that will give a margin of error of two, three or ten times what could be reality.

I expect bases and production sites to be covered almost in real-time.

The Jilin network is already at 38 revisits per day, for example.

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I think would be very difficult for US estimates to be out by a factor of 10.

Consider how much base facilities would have to be expanded for example. Plus that implies 5000 DF-26s in existence, with annual production in excess of 800 missiles per year.

2-3x is more plausible.

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Given how conservative the US estimates are, I just use these as a minimum

 

[ismellcopium]

I expect bases and production sites to be covered almost in real-time.

The Jilin network is already at 38 revisits per day, for example.

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I think would be very difficult for US estimates to be out by a factor of 10.

Consider how much base facilities would have to be expanded for example. Plus that implies 5000 DF-26s in existence, with annual production in excess of 800 missiles per year.

2-3x is more plausible.

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Given how conservative the US estimates are, I just use these as a minimum

You know they don't publicize their actual, classified "estimates", right? Every single time there's been actual classified figures leaked the contrast with those comedy documents for public consumption like the annual CMPR is quite large.

 

[AndrewS]

You know they don't publicize their actual, classified "estimates", right? Every single time there's been actual classified figures leaked the contrast with those comedy documents for public consumption like the annual CMPR is quite large.

It's the best publicly available information available.

And as I said, I treat it as a minimum