China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread

[Kalec]

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Some food for thought from Decker and Jane's reporter on DF-17 and DF-26.

They said DF-17 is replacing old DF-11/15/16 near Taiwan based on satellite image, which I believed to be true but AFAIK there is currently no public image a.k.a Google Earth or Apple Map showing a DF-17 in their garrison. The only DF-17 caught by Google Earth are launchers from 655 Brigade facing North Korea.

And still old cliche on how "DF-26 is so destabilizing that US could accidentally hitting nuclear asset even if they don't intend to." How about not attempting a strike on the mainland of a nuclear country in the first place, also I would like to hear their assessment on how de-stabilizing nuclear-sharing is in the Europe.

Most importantly, Decker's report still over-estimates the nuclear role of DF-26, but you know it is a talking point of arm control nerds, meanwhile probably also over-estimating the launcher per brigade.

He claimed that each DF-26 brigade has 36 launchers, which I doubt it is true, I mean they could have 36 missiles but I haven't seen that many launcher on satellite image. It could be 18 launchers + 18 re-loading missiles. On the other hand, he under-estimated the number of SRBM in each brigade.

I mean seriously, SRBM brigade operates less missile than their IRBM counterpart, does it even make sense by common sense? In the real world, some of SRBM brigades are getting an additional launching battalion under their command, therefore naturally each brigades should operate either 18, 36, 54 or even 72 missiles by their own. I have no idea where the number of 27 is coming from.

The last minor mistake, I think the so-called eighth DF-26 brigade could be the first DF-27 brigade instead.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

And still old cliche on how "DF-26 is so destabilizing that US could accidentally hitting nuclear asset even if they don't intend to." How about not attempting a strike on the mainland of a nuclear country in the first place, also I would like to hear their assessment on how de-stabilizing nuclear-sharing is in the Europe.

Most importantly, Decker's report still over-estimates the nuclear role of DF-26, but you know it is a talking point of arm control nerds, meanwhile probably also over-estimating the launcher per brigade.

Whoever wrote that piece was probably salivating on the prospect of B-21s launching JASSM-ERs and TELs stationed in Japan and the Philippines launching LRHWs towards the DF-26 bases located in China's interior with impunity - Before suddenly realizing that those DF-26s are somehow already mated with nuclear warheads, and that doing so could result in a nuclear exchange with China, blah blah blah.

To be honest, I find it to be quite rare to see people on the Chinese internet space and Chinese social media talking about how China's MRBMs and IRBMs will be nuclear-capable. All the talks about DF-17s, DF-26s and DF-27s I see mainly revolve around how to sink US carriers, other warships and strike at US bases in the Pacific, with little to nada mention about arming those missiles with nukes.

In the meantime, the only times I see nukes being mentioned a lot are when the discussion/reporting are mainly about China's ICBMs, i.e. DF-5, DF-31AG, DF-41, JL-2 and JL-3.

So, I have no idea why these defense-watching people in the West always like to hype up the nuke threat from China, as if China's about to use nukes once the war breaks out in the WestPac.

Self-projection and 做贼心虚 are hard-to-die habits, I suppose.

 

[vincent]

Whoever wrote that piece was probably salivating on the prospect of B-21s launching JASSM-ERs and TELs stationed in Japan and the Philippines launching LRHWs towards the DF-26 bases located in China's interior with impunity - Before suddenly realizing that those DF-26s are somehow already mated with nuclear warheads, and that doing so could result in a nuclear exchange with China, blah blah blah.

To be honest, I find it to be quite rare to see people on the Chinese internet space and Chinese social media talking about how China's MRBMs and IRBMs will be nuclear-capable. All the talks about DF-17s, DF-26s and DF-27s I see mainly revolve around how to sink US carriers, other warships and strike at US bases in the Pacific, with little to nada mention about arming those missiles with nukes.

In the meantime, the only times I see nukes being mentioned a lot are when the discussion/reporting are mainly about China's ICBMs, i.e. DF-5, DF-31AG, DF-41, JL-2 and JL-3.

So, I have no idea why these defense-watching people in the West always like to hype up the nuke threat from China, as if China's about to use nukes once the war breaks out in the WestPac.

Self-projection and 做贼心虚 are hard-to-die habits, I suppose.

Just an excuse to deploy nuclear-tip IRBM in West Pac.

 

[plawolf]

Just an excuse to deploy nuclear-tip IRBM in West Pac.

Maybe, but that’s ultimately a loosing game for them. Seems far more plausible they are being intentionally obtuse and clumsily trying to lead the PLARF down the same dead-end road as the USSR of getting so scared of the US deploying nuclear tip IRBMs near its boarders that it agrees to give up its own, far bigger, more capable and useful IRBM force in some arms control bad trade.

China is not remotely so stupid or insecure, and most importantly, it has never allowed the US to dictate the terms of engagement. China wisely never mass fielded tactical nukes, so basically its entire arsenal are city-killers, so it’s all or nothing when it comes to nuclear war with China. That means nuclear tipped IRBMs in SK or Japan changes precisely nothing in the grand scheme of things.

 

[Kalec]

So, I have no idea why these defense-watching people in the West always like to hype up the nuke threat from China, as if China's about to use nukes once the war breaks out in the WestPac.

I don't often talk about Chinese nuclear posture, tbh I am not even 100% sure whether China currently has a nuclear posture or not. But everyone knows that Chinese nukes are meant to be counter-value instead of counter-force.

I have read a journal from SSBN academy about the potential first strike capability of China, concluding that China may need up to 12,000 RVs to significantly dis-arm US's nuclear asset. Therefore the journal concludes that first strike is not a plausible option for China, and it is the most serious publication that I have ever seen about Chinese first strike published by Chinese itself.

In my understanding, the nuclear DF-26, like its predecessor DF-21A, are designed to deter minor nuclear coercion and obtain a hedge against a tactical nuclear strike. In some extreme case, China would nuke Guam or Okinawa IF US ever uses nuke on Chinese military assets. Otherwise I see no real intention of Chinese first-use and tbh I don't see any interests from US to use tactical nuke first in bid for any potential gain.

That is the most interesting part, because the DF-26 are designed to give China a nuclear bargain in the Westpac Theater against US tactical superiority. So I am really confused that why western experts and even some of Chinese experts questioned the necessity of nuclear DF-26.

1. DF-21A has been around for at least 30 years and "expert" acting like nuclear MRBM is a new creation.

2. DF-26 or DF-27 are built to deter against US, both conventional and nuclear.

China won't use DF-26 unless the deterrence fails, namly US attacked Chinese mainland or other strategic assets directly making CMC no other way but to retaliate in kind. And China has little to gain from using tactical nuclear weapon first, so it should be US concern to not launch bolt-out-of-the-blue strike against a nuclear delivery system.

 

[BoraTas]

Maybe, but that’s ultimately a loosing game for them. Seems far more plausible they are being intentionally obtuse and clumsily trying to lead the PLARF down the same dead-end road as the USSR of getting so scared of the US deploying nuclear tip IRBMs near its boarders that it agrees to give up its own, far bigger, more capable and useful IRBM force in some arms control bad trade.

China is not remotely so stupid or insecure, and most importantly, it has never allowed the US to dictate the terms of engagement. China wisely never mass fielded tactical nukes, so basically its entire arsenal are city-killers, so it’s all or nothing when it comes to nuclear war with China. That means nuclear tipped IRBMs in SK or Japan changes precisely nothing in the grand scheme of things.

To be fair to the Soviet Union, cold war era tech was a bit different. Ballistic missiles were not very useful for conventional warfare. Long targeting times, low accuracy, low mobility, very high costs, etc... In 2023 you can get 4 IRBMs that are rapidly targetable, accurate within meters and can be taken off-road for a cost of a single tank. This is a massive paradigm change. Another cold war reality was the delicacy of command networks and the unreliability of early warning. A sudden strike taking out most nukes and means to launch nukes was a real concern. This has changed too.

I agree that the US deployment of nuclear IRBMs would be irrelevant. As long as China is capable of launching its own nukes they are irrelevant.

 

[Kalec]

Just an excuse to deploy nuclear-tip IRBM in West Pac.

Not likely, and won't make much difference either.

The Ohio SSBN, visited South Korea last week, carries more nuke than 3 brigades worth of DF-26, well, not yield count but warhead count.

If US want to deploy more tactical nuke in Asia, ok please waste more money on these useless weapon anyway. One shouldn't pretend that SSBN doesn't exist or they can't launch from Guam instead of Hawaii, so there is very little value gained to deploy nuclear tipped IRBM.

Seriously, is there any difference between 90 nukes and 180 nukes flying from Guam and btw Guam and Okinawa are both small islands, making any missile deployment so concentrated that they have to build many shelters to hide their TELs. I doubt whether they could achieve that even if they are trying the hardest to disperse the launchers.

Chinese and Russia have to take care of 30ish launchers with 6,000 personnel. I wish US good luck with thousands of additional troops in Guam to take care of their nuclear IRBMs which is only worth the throw-weight of 4 Trident D5s.

Btw I haven't heard quite a lot from arm control guys on "why Ohio SSBN in Busan is so de-stabilizing in nature that US should abandon it."

Global Time also doesn't come up with "China could accidentally hit Ohio SSBN in a crisis even if it doesn't intend to do so." meanwhile no one ever questioned why China is going to bomb South Korea by accident.

 

[gelgoog]

To be fair to the Soviet Union, cold war era tech was a bit different. Ballistic missiles were not very useful for conventional warfare. Long targeting times, low accuracy, low mobility, very high costs, etc... In 2023 you can get 4 IRBMs that are rapidly targetable, accurate within meters and can be taken off-road for a cost of a single tank. This is a massive paradigm change. Another cold war reality was the delicacy of command networks and the unreliability of early warning. A sudden strike taking out most nukes and means to launch nukes was a real concern. This has changed too.

Most people think that the Soviets made a raw deal with the INF Treaty. Back then the Soviets had to get rid of quite many RSD-10 systems. This was a highly survivable road mobile system. They also had to remove the refueling capability of the Tu-22M3.

 

[Kalec]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1687020458250526720

There are at least 45 of DF-26s in the factory right now and more to come under the shelter.

Also there are some canister or missile like stuffs on the ground but I didn't count them because it is too hard to say what they really are.

 

[antiterror13]

wowww 45 is a lot , I didn't realise that DF-26 is manufactured near Beijing