Just because Chinas keeps its strategy quiet doesn’t mean we can’t discuss possible developments.
A limit suits everyone, imo, because:
If you are the USA your analysts are already telling you that China will have 1k nukes by 2030, so it suits them to make that a limit, it seems they have accepted it. On the other hand you are under time pressure because your arsenal is deteriorating and you can’t afford to replace it fully. You want to reduce.
If you are Russia you have already accepted the multipolar world so an equal amount or nukes among the superpowers is fair and reasonable from that point of view.
If you are China you want a proper and sensible amount which might be the 1000 oft mentioned. You also want to build up this in a cost effective manner so keeping steady production up to 2030 then moving to refurbishing is perfect.
For China - and to some extent Russia as well - the quality of the deterrence matters more than the quantity alone, assuming the quantity is beyond certain threshold. China seems to realize that it was not a good idea to place too many RVs on TELs and have opted to diversify their deterrence by adding those few hundreds of silos, which is a significant investment, the ramification of which is not well perceived outside of ICs.
Why didn't they just add those RVs to DF-41 (or whatever came after) instead of going by the silo approach? was it because 41's capabilities in throw-weight or something else, like survivability?
Why did they place single-tipped DF-31BJ in the silos instead of a silo version of the DF-41?
Why did they produce a single-tipped DF-5C a few years after revealing the MIRV-ed 5B?
Behind closed doors there has to be careful deliberation within China's various bodies governing nuclear doctrines & strategic postures on these matters. Many things would affect the answers to these questions, including but not limited to the following:
- package of RVs currently available to produce besides the good old type 535, and whether the much smaller 575 is a real thing or not;
- technology/facilities available for LOW, which by now is most likely positive given the silos are being filled;
- willingness to participate arms control talks at some stage, and if so which models are likely to be used as chips on the table.
- what are the most threatening launchers the US can deploy against China, and what chips China is willing to offer in exchange to remove that threat. Some believe it is likely some sort of nuclear-tipped MRBM/IRBMs in those island chains, but we'll see.
