China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[FriedRiceNSpice]

True but there are a lot of other considerations. After separation it's harder to intercept MIRV. Further MIRV are inherently a better usage of throw weight than 1 big warhead because of the general smaller warheads are more efficient thing. Also depending on where the separation takes place it can be pretty hard to intercept before it happens. Finally, given the low success rate in intercepting ICBM warheads in general right now and the fact that so few interceptors are available I don't think this is the major consideration on MIRV vs single warhead.

More recent Chinese delivery vehicles are equipped with multiple decoys in addition to the actual warhead. Technically a MIRV is used, just that the majority of re-entry vehicles are decoys rather than warheads. Perhaps I should've worded my original statement as, given the ratio of warheads to ICBMS/SLBMS, the PLA seems to not be a fan of using multiple real warheads per delivery vehicle.

 

[ENTED64]

More recent Chinese delivery vehicles are equipped with multiple decoys in addition to the actual warhead. Technically a MIRV is used, just that the majority of re-entry vehicles are decoys rather than warheads. Perhaps I should've worded my original statement as, given the ratio of warheads to ICBMS/SLBMS, the PLA seems to not be a fan of using multiple real warheads per delivery vehicle.

Yes this is a lot more plausible. My objection was to the statement that PLA didn't like MIRVs because they were more easy to shoot down than 1 single warhead. PLA preferring more decoys and only 1 real warhead is entirely reasonable and probably forms a big reason why they have things set up the way they do.

 

[nativechicken]

More recent Chinese delivery vehicles are equipped with multiple decoys in addition to the actual warhead. Technically a MIRV is used, just that the majority of re-entry vehicles are decoys rather than warheads. Perhaps I should've worded my original statement as, given the ratio of warheads to ICBMS/SLBMS, the PLA seems to not be a fan of using multiple real warheads per delivery vehicle.

Before drawing this conclusion, shouldn't we verify whether the judgment basis assumes China's actual warhead count remains as low as Western estimates?

If using HGVs (Hypersonic Glide Vehicles), their larger weight naturally limits the number of warheads a single missile can carry.

Regarding other delivery systems: Large-yield single warheads have significant weight and length (e.g., DF-31's 700kg warhead), making them inherently incompatible with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) designs for ICBMs. Additionally, delivery vehicles with high payload capacities (like DF-26) could theoretically deploy 1-2 low-yield warheads (150-250kg) over intercontinental ranges (~10,000km), while lightweight decoys weigh just a few kilograms. For systems like DF-31B, JL-2/3, DF-41, and DF-5B with payload capacities of 1-5 tons, developing such warheads seems redundant given their massive carrying capabilities. Thus, Western estimates of China's ICBM launchers and warhead numbers must have at least one critical error in their calculations.

China's nuclear warheads fall into three categories in terminal guidance:

Cluster warheads
MIRVs
Full-guided warheads (including HGVs as a subtype)
Notably, China has researched cold shroud technology for nearly two decades, with technical details frequently published in academic papers. This innovation involves wrapping warheads in a liquid nitrogen-convection outer cover to reduce their infrared signatures in space to near-background levels—a critical midcourse penetration enhancement. Implementation adds ~100kg to the warhead's mass (significant for smaller warheads).

Warhead dimensions can be inferred from cold shroud research literature, revealing two distinct categories:

Compact warheads (suitable for MIRV configurations)
Larger warheads (optimized for single high-yield strikes)
This technical reality directly challenges Western assumptions about China's warhead-to-delivery-system ratios.

 

[antiterror13]

True but there are a lot of other considerations. After separation it's harder to intercept MIRV. Further MIRV are inherently a better usage of throw weight than 1 big warhead because of the general smaller warheads are more efficient thing. Also depending on where the separation takes place it can be pretty hard to intercept before it happens. Finally, given the low success rate in intercepting ICBM warheads in general right now and the fact that so few interceptors are available I don't think this is the major consideration on MIRV vs single warhead.


I suppose it depends on the relative cost of these things and strategic doctrine. I don't think a warhead would cost more than the rocket to procure but it is possible PLA doctrine wants more control/less of them around given their no first use policy and general conservatism in this field.

There is no limiting factors (except #cost, which is not a big factor for China) for PLA to produce many ICBMs, however the availability of fissile material for warhead is limited.

So, "cost" may not be an important factor to choose between ICBM and warhead

 

[ENTED64]

There is no limiting factors (except #cost, which is not a big factor for China) for PLA to produce many ICBMs, however the availability of fissile material for warhead is limited.

So, "cost" may not be an important factor to choose between ICBM and warhead

China's military budget isn't infinite and large long range rockets are expensive so I don't think it's entirely a nonfactor. Even if we use your logic and assume it is, it's not like China cannot produce plenty of fissile material. It just takes money and time, the exact same thing making a bunch of large long range rockets does.

 

[antiterror13]

China's military budget isn't infinite and large long range rockets are expensive so I don't think it's entirely a nonfactor. Even if we use your logic and assume it is, it's not like China cannot produce plenty of fissile material. It just takes money and time, the exact same thing making a bunch of large long range rockets does.

if you read my posts carefully, I clearly didn't say that "cost" is a non-factor. I did say that "cost" is not important factor

ICBM is not cheap but is not super expensive either, definitely China has no capacity and cost problems producing 200-300 per year, however I doubt China would do that.

Cost of producing DF-31A is around $15M and DF-41 is around $25M (I googled it) ..... I doubt that China would think twice of cost consideration whether to produce 100 or 300 DF-41. So, "Cost" of ICBM is not important factor for China

 

[toast]

I'm not entirely sure if this has been discussed before, but over 90 suspected launch silos with configurations distinct from other known ICBM sites have been identified in the Jilantai area. Interestingly, about 15 additional silos matching the patterns of established sites were observed nearby, distributed along the eastern foothills following the mountain range's topography. I haven't seen this covered in any U.S. reports. Would appreciate everyone's insights.

 

[plawolf]

if you read my posts carefully, I clearly didn't say that "cost" is a non-factor. I did say that "cost" is not important factor

ICBM is not cheap but is not super expensive either, definitely China has no capacity and cost problems producing 200-300 per year, however I doubt China would do that.

Cost of producing DF-31A is around $15M and DF-41 is around $25M (I googled it) ..... I doubt that China would think twice of cost consideration whether to produce 100 or 300 DF-41. So, "Cost" of ICBM is not important factor for China

I agree that China likely does not favour MIRVs at present, but I think you two have gone a little off track with your focus for the reasoning.

Chinese nuclear doctrine is principally and overwhelmingly about deterrence. The whole point is to not fight a nuclear war rather than trying to win one, because Chinese strategists have long ago concluded that there is no winning an all out global nuclear war.

This is why arguing over penetration ratios is missing the point, because if you really have spammed thousands of missiles and warheads at each other, a few more or less mushroom clouds really doesn’t matter anymore in the grand scheme of things.

China favours more missiles because it views that as achieving maximum deterrence factor.

With a few hundred MIRV’d missiles, there is at least still the theoretical possibility of a successful surprise alpha strike being able to reduce Chinese missile numbers sufficiently that BMD can potentially limit the damage to non-existential for the U.S. Especially if a significant portion of these missiles are deployed on a few SSBNs.

But with thousands of missiles, that whole chain of thinking becomes obviously nonsensical even to a total wildcard like Trump or a half brain-dead walking vegetable like Biden.

Having thousands of missiles also gives China rapid ramp up potential of MIRV’ing them later. Indeed, from a Cold War 2.0 grand strategy POV, it makes perfect sense to goad the US into bankruptcy trying to build missile defences against thousands of PLARF ICBMs, only to then rug pull them by revealing those thousands of missiles are all MIRV capable, so it becomes potentially tens of thousands of warheads they now need to defend against. And the beauty of that is that China doesn’t actually need to MIRV every missile. It just needs to demonstrate that it can, and American paranoia will do the rest.

 

[toast]

View attachment 152883View attachment 152884I'm not entirely sure if this has been discussed before, but over 90 suspected launch silos with configurations distinct from other known ICBM sites have been identified in the Jilantai area. Interestingly, about 15 additional silos matching the patterns of established sites were observed nearby, distributed along the eastern foothills following the mountain range's topography. I haven't seen this covered in any U.S. reports. Would appreciate everyone's insights.

39°46'39.0"N 105°33'22.9"E

 

[ismellcopium]

View attachment 152883View attachment 152884I'm not entirely sure if this has been discussed before, but over 90 suspected launch silos with configurations distinct from other known ICBM sites have been identified in the Jilantai area. Interestingly, about 15 additional silos matching the patterns of established sites were observed nearby, distributed along the eastern foothills following the mountain range's topography. I haven't seen this covered in any U.S. reports. Would appreciate everyone's insights.

Can you elaborate? Is this your own finding, & what makes you think they're ICBM silos? I was under the impression that Jilantai had no other silos besides maybe a dozen training ones, the active (solid fuel) silos are all at the Hami, Yumen & Ordos fields.