China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

Status
Not open for further replies.

Chilled_k6

Junior Member
Registered Member
Not ICBM/SLBM. That contrail probably belongs to propelled HGV. Could be the coinciding with recent news of a Chinese hypersonic aircraft project being able to land the craft. So that would have been about a reusable vehicle.

Ballistic missile flight doesn't look like that. The booster rocket doesn't produce that kind of contrail pattern (zooming horizontally covering that sort of distance). Also unlikely to be a glide vehicle due to contrails produced but could potentially be a boost phase being captured but the colour and pattern of the contrail also doesn't seem like booster rocket. More likely some scramjet or more exotic form like sodramjet breakthroughs that have been disclosed years ago.

Very interesting video. That reminds me of something somewhat related. I have read that the DF-17 HGV can be "direct-boosted" at lower altitudes within the atmosphere. So rather than exiting the atmosphere and then re-entering in semi-parabolic fashion and performing the Qian Xuesen glide trajectory, the HGV starts gliding within the atmosphere without exiting it via the booster affecting its trajectory.

Not representative of DF-17 below, but kinda gives the idea. Seems like China has been working hard at different variations of propelled "depressed trajectory" HGVs and BMs for years including that newer vid posted with the depressed trajectory BM.

6-Figure12-1.png


From paper published 2017:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
Did the JL-3 missile test equipped with HGV in 2019? Does that check?

Excerpt from the book "Soaring Dragon Vol 3 and China Dream (China at the Cutting Edge) Vol 4".
 

Attachments

  • Soaring Dragon Vol 3 and China Dream (China at the Cutting Edge) Vol 4.JPG
    Soaring Dragon Vol 3 and China Dream (China at the Cutting Edge) Vol 4.JPG
    64.9 KB · Views: 52

clockwork

Junior Member
Registered Member
So rather than exiting the atmosphere and then re-entering in semi-parabolic fashion and performing the Qian Xuesen glide trajectory, the HGV starts gliding within the atmosphere without exiting it via the booster affecting its trajectory.
That sounds exactly like the video from Beijing posted in this thread 2 weeks ago. So was that a DF-17?
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
Very interesting video. That reminds me of something somewhat related. I have read that the DF-17 HGV can be "direct-boosted" at lower altitudes within the atmosphere. So rather than exiting the atmosphere and then re-entering in semi-parabolic fashion and performing the Qian Xuesen glide trajectory, the HGV starts gliding within the atmosphere without exiting it via the booster affecting its trajectory.

Not representative of DF-17 below, but kinda gives the idea. Seems like China has been working hard at different variations of propelled "depressed trajectory" HGVs and BMs for years including that newer vid posted with the depressed trajectory BM.
You must be talking about this trajectory (image 1).

b3763b5e943d4885b0625f521085043f.jpg
The principle of Qian Xuesen's trajectory is that the missile depends on fuel in the first half of its operation, and counts on the inertia of the missile itself in the second half of the operation.

Compared to Sanger ballistics, the trajectory was just three jumps to send the missile hitting the east coast of the United States. However, his eyesight had a problem. The missile was very rudimentary, lacked a control system, and the explanation of how to perform the jump was relatively vague. Is very difficult. The biggest difference between Qian Xuesen's trajectory and himself is the concept of glider maneuver flight, that is, the glider that returns to the atmosphere after the jump.

The problem with both trajectories, whether Qian Xuesen and Sanger is that as the missile depends on inertia to complete the trajectory to the target, the missile loses speed due to atmospheric drag. Although Sanger's idea is to pass through the critical point in the atmosphere many times (90 km to 100 km altitude), the resistance caused by the air is quite reduced, so the penetration speed is much faster than common missiles and can surpass Mach. 15, which is an amazing speed exceeding fifteen times the speed of sound. But its biggest shortcoming is that the flight altitude is too high. Most of the missile's altitude exceeds 40 kilometers. This altitude is within the height range that the anti-missile system is most likely to attack, the THAAD system starts operating at this altitude and has good maneuverability that can allow it to hit the HGV. Therefore, there are still trajectories that are calculated by the anti-missile system. Therefore, the possibility of being successfully intercepted and attacked is relatively achievable, although not entirely reliable.

Qian Xuesen's trajectory, having a more depressed flight profile than Sanger's, atmospheric drag has the rudimentary task of slowing the missile down, which could leave it vulnerable in the terminal phase, although the advantage lies in the altitude , because both endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptors would have no use in this flight profile, but the atmosphere has the thankless task of slowing the missile down.

A booster making a contribution to the missile not losing as much speed could reduce the relative deficiencies of this depressed flight profile and would increase the chances of the interceptor failing, even though it is in the terminal phase, precisely in this phase that the missile is more likely to be intercepted by not contain many high amplitude maneuvers, running the risk of missing the target for meters or even km of distance, as it would be at hypersonic speed.
 

Attachments

  • main-qimg-945231bca24e908cbc6610b2ab8f98e5-lq.jpg
    main-qimg-945231bca24e908cbc6610b2ab8f98e5-lq.jpg
    7.3 KB · Views: 44

10thman

Junior Member
Registered Member
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Alternative link:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Chinese scientists hail success of new hypersonic engine that military ‘did not think would work’​

  • Researchers say a new manufacturing method will allow them to produce high-quality, ultra-modern weapons at a low cost
  • The team adapted a process that has been used to make conventional military equipment for decades, but many doubted it would work for more complex technology

 

iantsai

Junior Member
Registered Member
五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明
2022-01-03 21:00

中华人民共和国、法兰西共和国、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国认为,避免核武器国家间爆发战争和减少战略风险是我们的首要责任。

我们申明核战争打不赢也打不得。鉴于核武器使用将造成影响深远的后果,我们也申明,只要核武器继续存在,就应该服务于防御目的、慑止侵略和防止战争。我们坚信必须防止核武器进一步扩散。

我们重申应对核威胁的重要性,并强调维护和遵守我们的双、多边不扩散、裁军和军控协议和承诺的重要性。我们将继续遵守《不扩散核武器条约》各项义务,包括我们对第六条的义务,“就及早停止核军备竞赛和核裁军方面的有效措施,以及就一项在严格和有效国际监督下的全面彻底裁军条约,真诚地进行谈判”。

我们愿保持并进一步增强各自国家措施,以防止核武器未经授权或意外使用。我们重申此前关于不瞄准的声明依然有效,重申我们不将核武器瞄准彼此或其他任何国家。

我们强调愿与各国一道努力,创造更有利于促进裁军的安全环境,最终目标是以各国安全不受减损的原则建立一个无核武器世界。我们将继续寻找双、多边外交方式,避免军事对抗,增强稳定性和可预见性,增进相互理解和信任,并防止一场毫无裨益且危及各方的军备竞赛。我们决心在相互尊重和承认彼此安全利益与关切的基础上开展建设性对话。

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races
JANUARY 03, 2022
STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.

We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.

We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.

We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other’s security interests and concerns.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

===================

Something happened?
 

Yodello

Junior Member
Registered Member
五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明
2022-01-03 21:00

中华人民共和国、法兰西共和国、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国认为,避免核武器国家间爆发战争和减少战略风险是我们的首要责任。

我们申明核战争打不赢也打不得。鉴于核武器使用将造成影响深远的后果,我们也申明,只要核武器继续存在,就应该服务于防御目的、慑止侵略和防止战争。我们坚信必须防止核武器进一步扩散。

我们重申应对核威胁的重要性,并强调维护和遵守我们的双、多边不扩散、裁军和军控协议和承诺的重要性。我们将继续遵守《不扩散核武器条约》各项义务,包括我们对第六条的义务,“就及早停止核军备竞赛和核裁军方面的有效措施,以及就一项在严格和有效国际监督下的全面彻底裁军条约,真诚地进行谈判”。

我们愿保持并进一步增强各自国家措施,以防止核武器未经授权或意外使用。我们重申此前关于不瞄准的声明依然有效,重申我们不将核武器瞄准彼此或其他任何国家。

我们强调愿与各国一道努力,创造更有利于促进裁军的安全环境,最终目标是以各国安全不受减损的原则建立一个无核武器世界。我们将继续寻找双、多边外交方式,避免军事对抗,增强稳定性和可预见性,增进相互理解和信任,并防止一场毫无裨益且危及各方的军备竞赛。我们决心在相互尊重和承认彼此安全利益与关切的基础上开展建设性对话。

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races
JANUARY 03, 2022
STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.

We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.

We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.

We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other’s security interests and concerns.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

===================

Something happened?
Never Trust the Anglosphere. China should keep modernizing and increasing her Nuclear Arsenal, that is the only way to mitigate any conventional conflict from the Anglosphere, while also making sure to let them know that any pre-emptive treachery will not go unanswered.

The US has already displayed its utter disrespect for any agreements or conventions it enters into, it has already given enough precedence not to be trusted even an iota.
It has displayed a street-thug mentality, in its recklessness in shredding any commitment or promise it makes.
 

bajingan

Senior Member
五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明
2022-01-03 21:00

中华人民共和国、法兰西共和国、俄罗斯联邦、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国认为,避免核武器国家间爆发战争和减少战略风险是我们的首要责任。

我们申明核战争打不赢也打不得。鉴于核武器使用将造成影响深远的后果,我们也申明,只要核武器继续存在,就应该服务于防御目的、慑止侵略和防止战争。我们坚信必须防止核武器进一步扩散。

我们重申应对核威胁的重要性,并强调维护和遵守我们的双、多边不扩散、裁军和军控协议和承诺的重要性。我们将继续遵守《不扩散核武器条约》各项义务,包括我们对第六条的义务,“就及早停止核军备竞赛和核裁军方面的有效措施,以及就一项在严格和有效国际监督下的全面彻底裁军条约,真诚地进行谈判”。

我们愿保持并进一步增强各自国家措施,以防止核武器未经授权或意外使用。我们重申此前关于不瞄准的声明依然有效,重申我们不将核武器瞄准彼此或其他任何国家。

我们强调愿与各国一道努力,创造更有利于促进裁军的安全环境,最终目标是以各国安全不受减损的原则建立一个无核武器世界。我们将继续寻找双、多边外交方式,避免军事对抗,增强稳定性和可预见性,增进相互理解和信任,并防止一场毫无裨益且危及各方的军备竞赛。我们决心在相互尊重和承认彼此安全利益与关切的基础上开展建设性对话。

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races
JANUARY 03, 2022
STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.

We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.

We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.

We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other’s security interests and concerns.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

===================

Something happened?
That agreement doesn't change anything, i expect China to stick to her principles, its either they go down to China numbers or China will achieve parity then we can enter any arms control agreement
China will not enter any unequal treaties
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top