China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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styx

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what about hypersonic glide vehicle like df-17 one? Is it a better carrier killer weapon than a marv?
 

Hyperwarp

Captain
what about hypersonic glide vehicle like df-17 one? Is it a better carrier killer weapon than a marv?

Most certainly.

The DF-21D MaRV does not maneuver during mid-course. This makes it vulnerable to new generation missiles like SM-3. And remember, the USN would be firing multiple rounds of interceptors from the destroyers and cruisers in the carrier-battlegroup at a single missile. Not just DF-21, but normal DF-31, DF-41 warheads are vulnerable during mid-course if you include GBI. The only countermeasures used by the DF-21/31/41 would be pen-aids. But modern interceptors are designed to distinguish the actual warheads from the countermeasures.

So, the HGVs are a very important development for China in general. Intercepting normal ballistic warheads is very hard but intercepting warheads that maneuver during mid-course makes it much, much harder and would increase the survivability of China's warheads.
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
Most certainly.

The DF-21D MaRV does not maneuver during mid-course. This makes it vulnerable to new generation missiles like SM-3. And remember, the USN would be firing multiple rounds of interceptors from the destroyers and cruisers in the carrier-battlegroup at a single missile. Not just DF-21, but normal DF-31, DF-41 warheads are vulnerable during mid-course if you include GBI. The only countermeasures used by the DF-21/31/41 would be pen-aids. But modern interceptors are designed to distinguish the actual warheads from the countermeasures.

So, the HGVs are a very important development for China in general. Intercepting normal ballistic warheads is very hard but intercepting warheads that maneuver during mid-course makes it much, much harder and would increase the survivability of China's warheads.

Then the destroyer has to be between the target and the launch position.

That makes the destroyer as a prime target, and if that rest in the bottom of ocean the next target should be the carrier, example.

And the interception of ballistic missiles in the final course by an aegis destroyer would be quite difficult, if the missile target the named destroyer.

Even a Burke cost like 2 billion, kill it with a 10 million missile is a bargain.


And the price difference makes it possible to launch onto each destroyer say 3-4 missile.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Most certainly.

The DF-21D MaRV does not maneuver during mid-course. This makes it vulnerable to new generation missiles like SM-3. And remember, the USN would be firing multiple rounds of interceptors from the destroyers and cruisers in the carrier-battlegroup at a single missile. Not just DF-21, but normal DF-31, DF-41 warheads are vulnerable during mid-course if you include GBI. The only countermeasures used by the DF-21/31/41 would be pen-aids. But modern interceptors are designed to distinguish the actual warheads from the countermeasures.

So, the HGVs are a very important development for China in general. Intercepting normal ballistic warheads is very hard but intercepting warheads that maneuver during mid-course makes it much, much harder and would increase the survivability of China's warheads.

No there is no such thing as" able to distinguished actual war hear from dummy or aid penetration" So aid penetration definitely will help and current stock of missile is not that vulnerable
There is effort to built multi kill vehicle but sofar nothing come out of it
I am not even sure that the midcourse interception is always reliable Sofar the test is rigged
 

styx

Junior Member
Registered Member
i think that China is deploying mirved missiles, but not all of the RV in Every missile will be Nuclear tipped so it will be absolutely impossible for US abm to defend the nation against a Chinese retaliatory nuclear strike.
 

Brumby

Major
Much has also been said of the kinematic difficulty in hitting a moving carrier with a hypersonic projectile, however I do wonder about that.
The relative speed of a 30+ knot surface ship vs a mach 7 MaRV in the terminal stage with its own onboard terminal guidance and presumably an ability to conduct terminal end game maneuvers of its own, makes me question how effective evasive maneuvers of a surface ship at that speed would be.

Your question is premised on an assumption that the carrier is caught in a terminal targeting phase within the kill change. How realistically are you able to box in a carrier into such a narrow window is the big question. You will need a real time maritime reconnaissance strike sensor net. In peace time it will be challenging to execute one if you run through the decision cycle process chain. In a conflict scenario you will in all likely hood have none because you will not have any reliable sensors to work with. The best bet is a "Pearl Harbour" type strike but even if you take out one, there is still 10 more to go.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Your question is premised on an assumption that the carrier is caught in a terminal targeting phase within the kill change. How realistically are you able to box in a carrier into such a narrow window is the big question. You will need a real time maritime reconnaissance strike sensor net. In peace time it will be challenging to execute one if you run through the decision cycle process chain. In a conflict scenario you will in all likely hood have none because you will not have any reliable sensors to work with. The best bet is a "Pearl Harbour" type strike but even if you take out one, there is still 10 more to go.

Well this is 2019 and not 1942 China has total of 300 satellite in the space and most of them are dual function civilian and military. I don't know some one did some calculation that all you need is 30 to 40 specialized satellite to have 30 minute revisit time on the same object Add to that relay satellite then you can have persistent observation once the carrier is detected. Shijian and Yaogan series are NOSS satellites and they numbered 40 or more now Themore you have the shorter the revisit time

Now how is the carrier is detected ? Well China has 2 or 3 over the horizon radar that can survey up to 3000 km radius It will almost certain cover all the western pacific including Guam
And has been proven to track aircraft carrier Since they have distinct tell tale of the need to launch CAP every once and a while
Once it is detected the coordinate can be send to optical,SAR or SIGINT satellite to confirm the existence of the Carrier. Using A1 it can find and detect carrier differentiating it from other ship China now has civilian surveillance system that can track individual face fro huge database So what she can't detest carrier using thw same technology After all carrier outline is distinguished from other ship
Long range UAV with side radar can be send to further confirm it

China aspires to use Over-the-Horizon (OTH) sky-wave radar systems to target aircraft carriers. These systems could be used in an early warning capacity. China has also deployed surface-wave radars. Sky wave over the radar has a range of 1000 to 4000 km. The range of ground-wave over-the-horizon radar is short, but it can monitor the area that can not be covered by sky-wave over-the-horizon radar. China's sky-wave system radar system can detect U.S. aircraft and ships at a long distance from the coastline of the country.

In 1982, Bao Yang and Jiao Peinan presided over the successful development of China's first "pulse system sky wave over-the-horizon test radar" (112-1 radar), successfully detected aircraft targets in strong clutter at ranges of 900~1500km, which made China the third country to independently master this technology. The radar won the second prize of the National Science and Technology Progress Award in 1985. In 1998, China's first "frequency-modulated continuous wave system sky-wave over-the-horizon test radar system" successfully detected aircraft targets at ranges of nearly 2000km and independently tracked multiple targets. The key technology of the radar had reached the advanced technology level of today's international radar systems of its kind. In January 1999, the test radar system passed the national appraisal.

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Sky wave radar and ground wave radar collectively referred to as OTHR. OTHR has two basic types: the use of ionospheric shortwave reflection effect so that radio waves to the distant radar, known as sky-wave over-the-horizon radar; the use of longwave, medium and shortwave diffraction effect in the Earth's surface so that radio waves Radar spread along the curve, known as the ground wave over-the-horizon radar. OTHR is one of the technologies that Western countries have imposed on China's major blockades and embargoes. The former Soviet Union had only given some guidance to China theoretically, and China's own world of radar has truly reached its combat readiness level based entirely on China itself.

In November 2008, Sean O'Connor posted a great analysis of the OTH radar system and its role in an ASBM program on his IMINT & Analysis website. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang (Naval War College and RAND), Mark Stokes (Project 2049 Institute), Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin (China Security), and Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg) also have addressed the OTH radar cueing issue.

Interferometry does increase the total signal collected, but its primary purpose is to vastly increase the resolution through a process called Aperture synthesis. This technique works by superposing (interfering) the signal waves from the different telescopes on the principle that waves that coincide with the same phase will add to each other while two waves that have opposite phases will cancel each other out. This creates a combined telescope that is equivalent in resolution (though not in sensitivity) to a single antenna whose diameter is equal to the spacing of the antennas furthest apart in the array. With the Chinese NOSS satellite trio flying in fixed formation, radar interferometry can be used to increase the resolution of the Chinese NOSS satellite receivers. The HF emitters are on the ground, but the receivers can be either on the ground or in space.
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China may plan to deployed an Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar [OTH-B] to provide surveillance of the South China Sea. The precise location of this facility remained unclear.



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Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
In 2015 Indian institute of Advance study in Bangalore did some simulation study on the effectiveness of Chinese surveillance system and here is the conclusion
Since then China has launched more of Yaogan series satellites

Assuming that any three of the ELINT clusters are operational at any given point in time the ELINT satellites typically make 18 contacts in a day with the moving target. The maximum period for which the target remains outside the reach of the ELINT satellites is about 90 minutes in a day. The SAR and the optical imaging satellites together typically provide 24 satellite passes over the target. About 16 targeting opportunities, during which the uncertainty in the target’s location is less than 10 km, are available in a day. The analysis and the simulation results suggest that China has in place an operational ASBM system that can identify, locate, track and destroy an Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific Ocean. This seems to be an important component of a larger Chinese Access and Area Denial Strategy focused around a conflict over Taiwan.

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LONG MARCH 2C SET TO LAUNCH YAOGAN-30 TRIO INTO ORBIT
TOMASZ NOWAKOWSKI
JANUARY 24TH, 2018
  • Long-March-2C-Xinhua-image.jpg
Archive Photo Credit: Xinhua

China is preparing to conduct its fifth orbital mission this month by launching a Long March 2C rocket with three Yaogan-30 satellites.

The booster is scheduled to liftoff on Thursday, January 25, from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC). The launch is currently scheduled to take place at around 5:40 GMT (0:40 a.m. EST).

Very little is known about the preparations that have led up to the flight, or about the mission’s payload. The spacecraft will most likely be inserted into a low-Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of about 373 miles (600 kilometers).

Chinese media has described Yaogan-30 as remote sensing satellites dedicated for civilian purposes. Beijing insists that these spacecraft are designed to conduct scientific experiments, land surveys, crop yield estimates and disaster relief. According to Xhinhua state-run press agency, the latest Yaogan-30 trio, was launched on December 26, 2017 and was sent into space to carry out electromagnetic environmental probes and other experiments.

Western experts believe that the Yaogan-30 spacecraft will be employed for military purposes. Some of these have suggested that the Yaogan name is a cover for China’s spy satellite program.

Developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (
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), the Yaogan-30 04 trio consists of three identical satellites, designated Yaogan-30 J, K and L, each are equipped with two deployable solar arrays. Detailed technical parameters of this group as well as previous spacecraft in the series were not disclosed by China. However, Western analysts suspect that each Yaogan satellite employs either optical or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors.

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by the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India, suggests that the Yaogan satellites enable China to routinely identify, locate and track an aircraft carrier group on the high seas. The Yaogan network could therefore be an important component of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) system that Beijing is developing and fielding.

“The Chinese have in place a robust space based system that performs the location and tracking functions for the ASBM system,”
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The first Yaogan satellite was launched in April of 2006, while the first Yaogan-30 trio was delivered into space on September 29 of last year (2017). The newest trio, slated to be sent to orbit on Thursday, should expand the network of Yaogan-30 spacecraft in space to 12.

The Long March 2C booster used for this flight is a two-stage launch vehicle developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (
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). It is mainly used to launch satellites into LEO and Sun-synchronous orbits (SSO). The 138 feet (42 meters) tall launch vehicle is capable of lofting payloads of up to 3.85 metric tons to LEO and has an SSO capability of up to 1.4 metric tons. For some launches, the rocket could fly with an optional third stage.

The Long March 2C rocket carried out its first flight on September 9, 1982, from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, orbiting the Fanhui Shei Weixing recoverable satellite.

Thursday’s launch should be the 265th flight of the Long March launch vehicle seriesand the second mission conducted from XSLC this year.
 
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Blitzo

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Your question is premised on an assumption that the carrier is caught in a terminal targeting phase within the kill change. How realistically are you able to box in a carrier into such a narrow window is the big question. You will need a real time maritime reconnaissance strike sensor net. In peace time it will be challenging to execute one if you run through the decision cycle process chain. In a conflict scenario you will in all likely hood have none because you will not have any reliable sensors to work with. The best bet is a "Pearl Harbour" type strike but even if you take out one, there is still 10 more to go.

The midcourse guidance and overall maritime surveillance kill chain is a question that has of course been well documented and one I am well aware of.
However given the conversation that had already occurred and what I was replying to, it is fairly obvious that the midcourse guidance/maritime surveillance topic was not relevant for that particular subsection of the topic.
 
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