China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
My understanding is that it is very difficult (if not impossible) to jam a frequency agile X-Band AESA radar.

I presume THAAD has one of these.
 

RickHunter

New Member
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I posted it in "sam"
abosolutely HQ-19
 

Broccoli

Senior Member
Free book: The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age
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In the second nuclear age, no less than the first, there are no realistic prospects for banning multiple-warhead missiles. China has started to deploy such missiles, and India and Pakistan are likely to cross this threshold as well. The motivations behind these steps will determine how extensively nuclear arsenals will grow and how pernicious the effects of stockpile growth will become.

Success in dampening the negative repercussions of multiple-warhead missiles will rest on two foundations. The first is improved bilateral relations among the contestants. The second foundation for dampening the negative consequences of multiple-warhead missiles in Asia is to resist a progression from countervalue to counterforce targeting strategies of nuclear deterrence. This metric, as with the willingness to improve bilateral relations, is measurable in several ways, including: the retention of no first use doctrines by China and India; proceeding slowly with limited numbers of multiple-warhead missiles; and being more transparent about strategic modernization plans and programs.

If the growth of warhead totals and missile accuracy presages moves by Beijing and New Delhi toward warfighting strategies of deterrence, then the second nuclear age will become far more dangerous, and prospects for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons on international affairs will be undermined. If decisionmakers in China, India, and Pakistan wish to avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age, they will limit the extent to which multiple warheads are placed atop missiles, they will proceed at a slow pace, and, most important, they will reject the lure and pitfalls of counterforce targeting strategies.


Writers speak about their book.



It will be interesting to see if China and India end up in full blown MIRV race unwillingly.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Free book: The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age
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Writers speak about their book.



It will be interesting to see if China and India end up in full blown MIRV race unwillingly.

India is in no position technologically or financially to get into an arms race with China.

China spends more on defence now than India could realistically muster and sustain in arms race mode.

India's near total reliance on imported weapons and technology will not only further erode their defence spending power (can really enjoy PPP gains) and weaken their economy (money China spends on defence stays in the Chinese economy, creating jobs and growth, whereas money India spend on imported arms leaves their economy).

Not to mention the fact that all nuclear weapons technologies and long range ballistic missiles are categorically banned for sale to India, so it cannot rely on its normal means of importing to bridge the technological gap between their indigenous technology levels Chinese technology levels.

The impact and role of India on China's strategic decision making is minimal at best.

'How the Indians might react' is unlikely to be a question Chinese leaders would ask, expect maybe as an afterthought.

India might be obsessed with China,by the reverse is most certain not true.
 

Ultra

Junior Member
India is in no position technologically or financially to get into an arms race with China.

China spends more on defence now than India could realistically muster and sustain in arms race mode.

India's near total reliance on imported weapons and technology will not only further erode their defence spending power (can really enjoy PPP gains) and weaken their economy (money China spends on defence stays in the Chinese economy, creating jobs and growth, whereas money India spend on imported arms leaves their economy).

Not to mention the fact that all nuclear weapons technologies and long range ballistic missiles are categorically banned for sale to India, so it cannot rely on its normal means of importing to bridge the technological gap between their indigenous technology levels Chinese technology levels.

The impact and role of India on China's strategic decision making is minimal at best.

'How the Indians might react' is unlikely to be a question Chinese leaders would ask, expect maybe as an afterthought.

India might be obsessed with China,by the reverse is most certain not true.



10 or 15 years down the track India will be. India is basically following the China formulae right now - Modi is spending on more infrastructure, at the same time making deals with western countries to have their factories move to India, tear down and cutting through the red tapes. The western countries particularly US led alliance (and also Russia) are all giving India a helping hand right now. In 10 or 15 years time India will be like what China was in 2000. In another 10 years after that India will most likely be close that gap further.

I think in 25 years time India will be able compete with China militarily, and that "second nuclear age" mentioned by the author will be fully realized. It is not about if it will happen, but WHEN it will happen.


Not to mention the fact that all nuclear weapons technologies and long range ballistic missiles are categorically banned for sale to India, so it cannot rely on its normal means of importing to bridge the technological gap between their indigenous technology levels Chinese technology levels.


There are many ways to get around import bans. One glaring loophole is CO-DEVELOPMENT.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) forbid transfer of missiles capable of carrying above 500 kg payload for more than 300 km, but Russian-Indian BrahMos II will be a hypersonic cruise missile capable of more than that. And India has already indicated they have every intention to tip the BrahMos with nukes.

As we have seen in the past, when it suits the western alliance, they can find loopholes and twist to their own advantage. India and Pakistan was under strict sanctions over their nuclear tests, but not long after because of the enlarged "China threat" Washington and its alliance lift the ban. They (led by US, and signed by Australia and many of its allies) even sign nuclear supply accord and nuclear technology tranfter with India when India is not even a signatory of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time they twist that fact still banning North Korea and Iran over the NPT, but India when they signed the nuclear supply agreement they didn't need to be inspected - opening door for them to use nuclear supply to fuel their military nuclear supplies.

You will be delusional to believe that western alliance will abide by the same rules that they
themselves set out. If it needs to be, they will supply India with nuclear weapon technologies and weapons. Then they will sit back and watch the fireworks. There is nothing better to them than to kill two birds with one stone.
 
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