Can you win a war with only light infantry in the 21st century?

vesicles

vesicles

Colonel
i.e. said:
First part of it was.
Click to expand...

I am aware of that! But having artillery was absolutely critical in the final outcome of the war. Apparently, PVA also thought this way as they purchased many artillery weapons from the Soviets during the war amid the very limited budget they had in their possession. If they thought light infantry was enough to beat the UN, they would not have spent the money on artillery. The PVA generals realized their weakness early on even when they were winning battles in 51'. They knew that they could not sustain the fight with their light infantry. This actually proves my point. Even the professionals knew that a light infantry cannot win a war and they did everything they could to upgrade their troops.
 
Last edited:
solarz

solarz

Brigadier
vesicles said:
One cannot isolate one period of the entire war and emphasize the usefulness of the strategies used in that period. Many strategies have tactical advantages, but lack strategic depth. Your initial question was whether a light infantry could win a WAR, not one or two battles. So win a few battles? yes! but winning the entire war with light infantry only? Absolutely NO!
...
I am aware of that! But having artillery was absolutely critical in the final outcome of the war. Apparently, PVA also thought this way as they purchased many artillery weapons from the Soviets during the war amid the very limited budget they had in their possession. If they thought light infantry was enough to beat the UN, they would not have spent the money on artillery.
Click to expand...

Ask yourself this question: if Mao did not decide to "strike the iron while it's hot" and push on to Seoul, would there have been the 2 years of stalemate? Personally, I don't think so.

Anyway, let's get back on topic.
 
vesicles

vesicles

Colonel
solarz said:
Ask yourself this question: if Mao did not decide to "strike the iron while it's hot" and push on to Seoul, would there have been the 2 years of stalemate? Personally, I don't think so.

Anyway, let's get back on topic.
Click to expand...

even if Mao decided to stay at the 38th, would MacArthur simply stop at that point? Let's not forget. The UN lost the fight in a very humiliating way in 51'. His personality would not allow him to stop after such embarrassing loss. He would want revenge. As a matter of fact, would anyone stop at that point? Would you stop if you led the UN forces? I know I wouldn't. I would feel totally humiliated if I simply stop there.

Actually, now I think about it, I think Mao made a wise decision by pushing further into SK. With a much deeper penetration, the final stopping point was still at the 38th after much back and forth between the PVA and the UN. As the final stopping point was much north to Seoul, we can imagine the new potential stopping point would be much north into the NK territory IF Mao decided to stop at the 38th in '51.
 
Last edited:
vesicles

vesicles

Colonel
solarz said:
Actually no, I was thinking of the Korean War. As I.E. pointed out, the PVA achieved their successes based almost exclusively on light infantry maneuvers. It was only during the stalemated later years that Chinese artillery came into play. However, had Mao decided to stop at the 38th parallel, the Korean War would have ended right then. Therefore, I feel that the Korean War is a good example of light infantry overcoming a technologically superior combined-arms army.
Click to expand...

Although the PVA was able to win battles in early '51 using primarily light infantry, the UN forces didn't suffer heavy casualties because of the ineffectiveness of the weapon systems used by the PVA. And because most of the PVA soldiers were on foot, they couldn't even catch up to the escaping UN troops. So it would be illogical to expect the war would end there even if Mao unilaterally decided to stop. Since the UN had preserved its strength, it would only be logical to expect them to come back with a vengeance, which they did. The PVA generals understood this and did everything they could to quickly arm their troops with heavy weaponry, which played a critical role in the final outcome of the war.

In fact, this example shows precisely the weakness of using light infantry. They may win a battle or two through surprise attacks and quick maneuvers. However, they cannot inflict heavy casualties on their enemy. Eventually, their enemy will be able to regroup and come back with even more powerful weapons and technology. When that happens, the light infantry will be in an even worst situation. remember the light infantry has to depend on their surprise and number. Because of the ineffectiveness of their weapons, they have to sacrifice their soldiers in any attack. The longer they stay on a war, the more depleted they would become the less effective they would be. It won't take long until they would completely lose all their advantages.

Another critical point is the supply. with the light infantry, one would not expect them to have any advanced means to maintain a supply line. They have to keep moving to avoid being detected. So their supply line will be almost non-existent. How would they keep their soldiers fed, keep them warm and make sure they have enough ammunition? The more they maneuver, the farther they will be from any possible supply route and the more likely they will starve. And the more they move around, the quicker they will starve and lose their morale.
 
Last edited:
bladerunner

bladerunner

Banned Idiot
vesicles said:
In fact, this example shows precisely the weakness of using light infantry. They may win a battle or two through surprise attacks and quick maneuvers. However, they cannot inflict heavy casualties on their enemy. Eventually, their enemy will be able to regroup and come back with even more powerful weapons and technology. When that happens, the light infantry will be in an even worst situation. remember the light infantry has to depend on their surprise and number. Because of the ineffectiveness of their weapons, they have to sacrifice their soldiers in any attack. The longer they stay on a war, the more depleted they would become the less effective they would be. It won't take long until they would completely lose all their advantages.

Another critical point is the supply. with the light infantry, one would not expect them to have any advanced means to maintain a supply line. They have to keep moving to avoid being detected. So their supply line will be almost non-existent. How would they keep their soldiers fed, keep them warm and make sure they have enough ammunition? The more they maneuver, the farther they will be from any possible supply route and the more likely they will starve. And the more they move around, the quicker they will starve and lose their morale.
Click to expand...

Absolutely. Its a fact thats been proven time and time again in a few wars and battles.
 
A

airsuperiority

Captain
solarz said:
Really? What about the Korean War?



Come on.

Take the Taliban or Iraq insurgents for example. Every time they engage US forces, even regular patrols, they inevitably suffer huge casualties with the US side taking little to no casualties. Are you telling me you can't come up with an infantry army who can perform better than that?

The main advantages of a combined-arms army is: surveillance/recon, communication, and logistics/reinforcements. These are definitely huge advantages, so the question is, are there ways for an infantry army to minimize the impact of those advantages?
Click to expand...

I'd say the reason is really being that technology is so advanced that technology today isn't merely just about advance in one element, but an advance on almost all trades. Superior weapons without logistics or maneuverability is pretty much sitting duck, but today not only technology provides the means for each of these, but enhances and brings up the overall standards of the fighting force by a far margin.
2. I'd also think the second reason why better tech doesn't necessarily dictate victory is also upon the gap between both sides. If the gap is far and wide, technology will make a huge difference because the superior force will have access to more options, information, and capabilities that render the inferior force, handicapped and lacking. In other sense, to possess the capabilities make the inferior force "handicapped" by raising the bars. (iphone 4 vs first generation iphone) In contrast, if both sides have access to all the same functions, but just a matter of slightly better quality, then the gaps will not mean much, if anything at all, if levels are close enough. Here, the advantage the superior force enjoys will merely be considered as "luxuries" (iphone 4 vs iphone 4s)
 
A

airsuperiority

Captain
solarz said:
Keep in mind that I'm talking about the initial stages of the war, when the PVA pushed the US-SK forces back to the 38th parallel. During that time, the PVA may have had a few pieces of artillery here and there, but they were certainly not enough to have an impact in most engagements.

***

Back on topic: what if the infantry army had access to state-of-the-art mobile SAM platforms? How well would they fare then?
Click to expand...

If state-of-the art refers to MANPADs with a very limited attitude detection, then I'd still say no. If SAM by the latest generations, I'd see things are only much better now, but still a heavy question. Stealth, electronic jamming, EW, ballistic missile attacks, rocket artillery, smart munitions, cruise missiles can equally pound out/nullify your anti-air. Having no air power nor heavy armor is equivalent of the absence of second strike capabilities of these.
 
A

airsuperiority

Captain
vesicles said:
Although the PVA was able to win battles in early '51 using primarily light infantry, the UN forces didn't suffer heavy casualties because of the ineffectiveness of the weapon systems used by the PVA. And because most of the PVA soldiers were on foot, they couldn't even catch up to the escaping UN troops. So it would be illogical to expect the war would end there even if Mao unilaterally decided to stop. Since the UN had preserved its strength, it would only be logical to expect them to come back with a vengeance, which they did. The PVA generals understood this and did everything they could to quickly arm their troops with heavy weaponry, which played a critical role in the final outcome of the war.

In fact, this example shows precisely the weakness of using light infantry. They may win a battle or two through surprise attacks and quick maneuvers. However, they cannot inflict heavy casualties on their enemy. Eventually, their enemy will be able to regroup and come back with even more powerful weapons and technology. When that happens, the light infantry will be in an even worst situation. remember the light infantry has to depend on their surprise and number. Because of the ineffectiveness of their weapons, they have to sacrifice their soldiers in any attack. The longer they stay on a war, the more depleted they would become the less effective they would be. It won't take long until they would completely lose all their advantages.

Another critical point is the supply. with the light infantry, one would not expect them to have any advanced means to maintain a supply line. They have to keep moving to avoid being detected. So their supply line will be almost non-existent. How would they keep their soldiers fed, keep them warm and make sure they have enough ammunition? The more they maneuver, the farther they will be from any possible supply route and the more likely they will starve. And the more they move around, the quicker they will starve and lose their morale.
Click to expand...

I totally agree with you. It's quite in line with one of my earlier posts in this thread. I'll also add 2 remarks to yours:

1. Unless light infantry attacks sprout up simultaneously at all enemy strongpoints with massive numbers and complete overwhelm, capture, dominate the positions and exterminate the opposing force, it is very hard to catch the enemy by surprise and decapitate their strike abilities once and for all. (consider if one night the aztecs snuck into Cortes camp and all outposts and their boats while the Spaniards were sleeping, then simultaneously killed them all and destroying all camps and boats, sparing no one. That way, probably no news will ever go back to Spain or whatever in that regard.)

2. Condition 1 only applies provided there are no backups or a carrier battle group or other further means of reinforcements. If they do, the opfor has the option of choosing to retaliate or pull out of the theater. (consider Tet Offensive)
 
A

airsuperiority

Captain
vesicles said:
even if Mao decided to stay at the 38th, would MacArthur simply stop at that point? Let's not forget. The UN lost the fight in a very humiliating way in 51'. His personality would not allow him to stop after such embarrassing loss. He would want revenge. As a matter of fact, would anyone stop at that point? Would you stop if you led the UN forces? I know I wouldn't. I would feel totally humiliated if I simply stop there.

Actually, now I think about it, I think Mao made a wise decision by pushing further into SK. With a much deeper penetration, the final stopping point was still at the 38th after much back and forth between the PVA and the UN. As the final stopping point was much north to Seoul, we can imagine the new potential stopping point would be much north into the NK territory IF Mao decided to stop at the 38th in '51.
Click to expand...

Also if UN was only stopped at the parallel, they will have the ability to garner momentum and push upwards again.(one way to see my argument is through logistic perspective of traveling to pyongyang from seoul vs the tip of the korean peninsula) In contrast, to recapture the entire land again will have diminishing returns on the efficiencies of the momentum and results yielded as they continued to travel back upwards.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Top