You guys put way too much emphasis on mouth cannon rhetoric. The Bhakts always say that they fear war with nobody and then their soldiers got treated by Chinese eye doctors and now they reject them as Nigerian actors.
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- Thread starter bd popeye
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You guys put way too much emphasis on mouth cannon rhetoric. The Bhakts always say that they fear war with nobody and then their soldiers got treated by Chinese eye doctors and now they reject them as Nigerian actors.
Nope. Not interested. Doing so would fundamentally change the dynamics, culture, and demographic make up of the country that's been able to withstand many millenia.
China must copy elements in other parts of the world that works and discard things that clearly don't or destructive if applied in China.
The U.S. Canada, Australia and other artificially created modern countries could experiment with mass immigration not entirely done from moral reasons but purely on capitalism and outward expansion when it comes to the U.S. absorbing mostly European immigrants to subdue/genocide the beast a.k.a. Native Americans from their own lands. The same applied to Canada, New Zealand, Australia.
The immigration issue has been the fulcrum of conflict in Europe and why leaders of Hungary, Poland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway etc...are increasingly becoming anti-immigration because the makeup and culture of their countries are being changed from within. The make up of those countries in 100 years time would not look any more differently than their North American counterparts with their culture essentially being colonized, cannibalized by liberal humanists who are nothing more than nihilistic hedonists which is pretty much the ultimate goals and project by the Liberals.
They essentially want a future with no borders, no discerning culture and where collectivism is all but extinguished replaced by INDIVIDUALISTS who are free to pursue every hedonistic desires.
As PM Justin Trudeau pointed out in the glowing profile penned by the NYT in 2015 stated:
Trudeau’s most radical argument is that Canada is becoming a new kind of state, defined not by its European history but by the multiplicity of its identities from all over the world. His embrace of a pan-cultural heritage makes him an avatar of his father’s vision. ‘‘There is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada,’’ he claimed. ‘‘There are shared values — openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice. Those qualities are what make us the first postnational state.’’
I don't mean to provide a long winded response to your point about China having an immigration policy that can attract peoples of different ethnic backgrounds that in my opinion laudable, humane, and noble but IMHO not suitable for China as of right now.
Didn't the U.S. government under Trump postpone calling the issues in Xinjiang a genocide until after they lost the election? Didn't the Democrat opposition also refrain from calling it genocide in the intervening period? Does that make everyone in the U.S. government genocide deniers until early last year?
This type of virtue signaling always serves political agenda. Look at this from the Chinese side as well -- how many Korean War movies and drama did China make between 1980 and the start of the Trade War?
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Of course not letting millions of refugees and migrants flood pass your borders like what happened in the EU. Though that could become a concern for China in the future as parts of South/South East Asia become too hot due to global warming.
Instead create an environment to attract the best and brightest. If the next Bill Gates or Elon Musk can successfully assimilate into Chinese society, does it matter if he/she is not ethnically Chinese.
The bill gates and Elon Musks of this world are chosen and created by states, you have the Hollywood origin story and then you have the nepotism real origin story.
The point is you don't get to cherry pick the billionaire who gets to come to your country, because how can you really?
Chamath Palihapitiya wasn't already a billionaire in his native Sri Lanka then all of a sudden decided to settle in the US. His family emigrated to Canada as refugees. Nobody thought or expected kid Chamath would grow up to be a billionaire.
Same goes for Bill Gates or Steve Jobs or Elon Musk. These guys didn't become uber rich over night. They were all nobodies in their native host countries (Gates and Jobs are/were natural born Americans, Musk is Canadian-South African). The environment they grew up in presented them the opportunity to become who they are now just like the environment in China, past and present, allowed the rise of Jack Ma, Pony Ma, Robin Li and a whole host of super rich. So the West is certainly not unique in that respect.
The question I believe Bellum is trying to raise is how many immigrants must the US, Canada, Europe or in this case, China, take in until there's a kid amongst them who might later grow up to become the next Elon Musk whom society seems to place so much value on, when China's already 'producing' more billionaires and graduating more talents from within her own native pool of Chinese than the US anyway?
Op-Ed: Russia’s got a point: The U.S. broke a NATO promise that's keep on breaking.
By JOSHUA R. ITZKOWITZ SHIFRINSON
Moscow solidified its hold on Crimea in April, outlawing the Tatar legislature that had opposed Russia’s annexation of the region since 2014. Together with Russian military provocations against NATO forces in and around the Baltic, this move seems to validate the observations of Western analysts who argue that under Vladimir Putin, an increasingly aggressive Russia is determined to dominate its neighbors and menace Europe.
Leaders in Moscow, however, tell a different story. For them, Russia is the aggrieved party. They claim the United States has failed to uphold a promise that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe, a deal made during the 1990 negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union over German unification. In this view, Russia is being forced to forestall NATO’s eastward march as a matter of self-defense.
The West has vigorously protested that no such deal was ever struck. However, hundreds of memos, meeting minutes and transcripts from U.S. archives indicate otherwise. Although what the documents reveal isn’t enough to make Putin a saint, it suggests that the diagnosis of Russian predation isn’t entirely fair. Europe’s stability may depend just as much on the West’s willingness to reassure Russia about NATO’s limits as on deterring Moscow’s adventurism.
After the Berlin Wall fell, Europe’s regional order hinged on the question of whether a reunified Germany would be aligned with the United States (and NATO), the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact) or neither. Policymakers in the George H.W. Bush administration decided in early 1990 that NATO should include the reconstituted German republic.
In early February 1990, U.S. leaders made the Soviets an offer. According to transcripts of meetings in Moscow on Feb. 9, then-Secretary of State James Baker suggested that in exchange for cooperation on Germany, U.S. could make “iron-clad guarantees” that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward.” Less than a week later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to begin reunification talks. No formal deal was struck, but from all the evidence, the quid pro quo was clear: Gorbachev acceded to Germany’s western alignment and the U.S. would limit NATO’s expansion.
Nevertheless, great powers rarely tie their own hands. In internal memorandums and notes, U.S. policymakers soon realized that ruling out NATO’s expansion might not be in the best interests of the United States. By late February, Bush and his advisers had decided to leave the door open.
After discussing the issue with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on February 24-25, the U.S. gave the former East Germany “special military status,” limiting what NATO forces could be stationed there in deference to the Soviet Union. Beyond that, however, talk of proscribing NATO’s reach dropped out of the diplomatic conversation. Indeed, by March 1990, State Department officials were advising Baker that NATO could help organize Eastern Europe in the U.S. orbit; by October, U.S. policymakers were contemplating whether and when (as a National Security Council memo put it) to “signal to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO’s readiness to contemplate their future membership.”
At the same time, however, it appears the Americans still were trying to convince the Russians that their concerns about NATO would be respected. Baker pledged in Moscow on May 18, 1990, that the United States would cooperate with the Soviet Union in the “development of a new Europe.” And in June, per talking points prepared by the NSC, Bush was telling Soviet leaders that the United States sought “a new, inclusive Europe.”
It’s therefore not surprising that Russia was incensed when Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states and others were ushered into NATO membership starting in the mid-1990s. Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Gorbachev himself protested through both public and private channels that U.S. leaders had violated the non-expansion arrangement. As NATO began looking even further eastward, to Ukraine and Georgia, protests turned to outright aggression and saber-rattling.
NATO’S widening umbrella doesn’t justify Putin’s bellicosity or his incursions in Ukraine or Georgia. Still, the evidence suggests that Russia’s protests have merit and that U.S. policy has contributed to current tensions in Europe.
In less than two months, Western heads of state will gather in Warsaw for a NATO summit. Discussions will undoubtedly focus on efforts to contain and deter Russian adventurism — including increasing NATO deployments in Eastern Europe and deepening NATO’s ties to Ukraine and Georgia. Such moves, however, will only reinforce the Russian narrative of U.S. duplicity. Instead, addressing a major source of Russian anxieties by taking future NATO expansion off the table could help dampen Russia-Western hostilities.
Just as a pledge not to expand NATO in 1990 helped end the Cold War, so too may a pledge today help resuscitate the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an international security fellow at Dartmouth College and assistant professor at the Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University. His article, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion” was published in the spring issue of International Security.
One can be forgiven to assume upon reading this op-ed that it was written this year. This op-ed was written almost 6 years ago on MAY 30, 2016 5 AM PT. Yet the situation and relations between Russia and U.S. led NATO has gotten worst not better. With an increasing amount of western European experts pretty much pushing on the idea and established facts that indeed the U.S. made a verbal promise to then Soviet Russia's leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
By JOSHUA R. ITZKOWITZ SHIFRINSON
Moscow solidified its hold on Crimea in April, outlawing the Tatar legislature that had opposed Russia’s annexation of the region since 2014. Together with Russian military provocations against NATO forces in and around the Baltic, this move seems to validate the observations of Western analysts who argue that under Vladimir Putin, an increasingly aggressive Russia is determined to dominate its neighbors and menace Europe.
Leaders in Moscow, however, tell a different story. For them, Russia is the aggrieved party. They claim the United States has failed to uphold a promise that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe, a deal made during the 1990 negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union over German unification. In this view, Russia is being forced to forestall NATO’s eastward march as a matter of self-defense.
The West has vigorously protested that no such deal was ever struck. However, hundreds of memos, meeting minutes and transcripts from U.S. archives indicate otherwise. Although what the documents reveal isn’t enough to make Putin a saint, it suggests that the diagnosis of Russian predation isn’t entirely fair. Europe’s stability may depend just as much on the West’s willingness to reassure Russia about NATO’s limits as on deterring Moscow’s adventurism.
After the Berlin Wall fell, Europe’s regional order hinged on the question of whether a reunified Germany would be aligned with the United States (and NATO), the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact) or neither. Policymakers in the George H.W. Bush administration decided in early 1990 that NATO should include the reconstituted German republic.
In early February 1990, U.S. leaders made the Soviets an offer. According to transcripts of meetings in Moscow on Feb. 9, then-Secretary of State James Baker suggested that in exchange for cooperation on Germany, U.S. could make “iron-clad guarantees” that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward.” Less than a week later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to begin reunification talks. No formal deal was struck, but from all the evidence, the quid pro quo was clear: Gorbachev acceded to Germany’s western alignment and the U.S. would limit NATO’s expansion.
Nevertheless, great powers rarely tie their own hands. In internal memorandums and notes, U.S. policymakers soon realized that ruling out NATO’s expansion might not be in the best interests of the United States. By late February, Bush and his advisers had decided to leave the door open.
After discussing the issue with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on February 24-25, the U.S. gave the former East Germany “special military status,” limiting what NATO forces could be stationed there in deference to the Soviet Union. Beyond that, however, talk of proscribing NATO’s reach dropped out of the diplomatic conversation. Indeed, by March 1990, State Department officials were advising Baker that NATO could help organize Eastern Europe in the U.S. orbit; by October, U.S. policymakers were contemplating whether and when (as a National Security Council memo put it) to “signal to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO’s readiness to contemplate their future membership.”
At the same time, however, it appears the Americans still were trying to convince the Russians that their concerns about NATO would be respected. Baker pledged in Moscow on May 18, 1990, that the United States would cooperate with the Soviet Union in the “development of a new Europe.” And in June, per talking points prepared by the NSC, Bush was telling Soviet leaders that the United States sought “a new, inclusive Europe.”
It’s therefore not surprising that Russia was incensed when Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states and others were ushered into NATO membership starting in the mid-1990s. Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Gorbachev himself protested through both public and private channels that U.S. leaders had violated the non-expansion arrangement. As NATO began looking even further eastward, to Ukraine and Georgia, protests turned to outright aggression and saber-rattling.
NATO’S widening umbrella doesn’t justify Putin’s bellicosity or his incursions in Ukraine or Georgia. Still, the evidence suggests that Russia’s protests have merit and that U.S. policy has contributed to current tensions in Europe.
In less than two months, Western heads of state will gather in Warsaw for a NATO summit. Discussions will undoubtedly focus on efforts to contain and deter Russian adventurism — including increasing NATO deployments in Eastern Europe and deepening NATO’s ties to Ukraine and Georgia. Such moves, however, will only reinforce the Russian narrative of U.S. duplicity. Instead, addressing a major source of Russian anxieties by taking future NATO expansion off the table could help dampen Russia-Western hostilities.
Just as a pledge not to expand NATO in 1990 helped end the Cold War, so too may a pledge today help resuscitate the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an international security fellow at Dartmouth College and assistant professor at the Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University. His article, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion” was published in the spring issue of International Security.
One can be forgiven to assume upon reading this op-ed that it was written this year. This op-ed was written almost 6 years ago on MAY 30, 2016 5 AM PT. Yet the situation and relations between Russia and U.S. led NATO has gotten worst not better. With an increasing amount of western European experts pretty much pushing on the idea and established facts that indeed the U.S. made a verbal promise to then Soviet Russia's leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
But China as it continues to grow economically, scientifically etc..will have the breathing space to add more people that can and will produce China's innovators/disruptors. China already have the most number of millionaires in the world, the most women in the billion dollar club etc...
With respect, I don't think you have managed to present a credible argument to support your push for the kind of immigration you're advocating for China to make.