The experiences of Imperial Germany in WW1 and Fascist Japan in WW2 hold particular significance for China today, and I think insufficient thought has been given to this topic so here is a little missive.
In 1914, the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austro-Hungary faced the Triple Entente of Russia, France and the UK.
That Dual Alliance was at a significant disadvantage in terms of population and also industrial heft, so at first glance, it doesn't make sense for them to deliberately push for a war in the aftermath of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, yet that is what happened.
But when I look at the situation, I see some key elements that led to the decision for Germany to push for a war.
1. Germany didn't believe that the UK would actually go to war on behalf of France and Russia.
2. Germany believed that their Army was strong enough to deliver knockout blows against France/Russia, and therefore the war would be over by Christmas. Germany was actually able to hold its own, but then the entry of the USA changed things..
3. But most crucially, I see very little appreciation that in the run-up to 1914, Germany had swiftly ramped up military spending whilst the Triple Entente had lagged behind. That meant Germany knew that it had to strike *now*, before the window of opportunity for a military victory disappeared as the Triple Entente built up their military as a counter.
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In 1941, Fascist Japan also went to war with the USA, knowing that they faced an opponent which was far larger from an economic, industrial and population perspective.
1. Again, Japan planned for a short victorious war and didn't believe that it would be a drawn out contest of wills.
2. Japan had nothing to lose by going to war as it was on the verge of economic, industrial and financial collapse in 1941. The primary reasons for this being a military quagmire when Japan was trying to conquer a much larger China AND the effects of the USA placing sanctions on the Japanese economy. But the roots of this go back to Japan trying to emulate the European colonial empires, which meant a hugely outsized military given the size of their economy.
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So what military lessons does this hold for China?
1. Do not underestimate the will of outside powers (eg. UK/USA) to go to war to prevent a new regional hegemon from being created.
2. Don't expect a war to be anything other than a bloody and drawn-out affair. Especially since China and the USA are both continental sized powers whose homelands are separated by the vast distances of the Pacific.
3. Don't undertake a military challenge against a larger alliance opponent and certainly don't go on an unsustainable military arms buildup. Particularly given the many domestic development needs inside China.
But the most interesting point is how Germany is now the defacto regional hegemon inside the European Union, and that this has achieved this purely through *economic* means and the voluntary exit of the UK from the EU. (France may actually need a bailout itself)
China also has a very long tradition of using its economic heft to subdue its periphery, and indeed, actually abolished the military on occasion because relations with its neighbours were that good.
The German example is certainly something to ponder, given how China is going to be way more important to Asia than Germany is to Europe.
And we've also seen how politics in the USA (and indeed in the rest of the world) has turned against globalisation and how the Republican party will likely move to representing older, less educated and angrier white males with a racial overtone.
The studies show that this could actually be a winning political formula in terms of electoral college votes in the next 10 years, which was a surprise to me, but it makes sense how the white rural states are over-represented.
But in the long-run, this is a losing proposition as America becomes a younger nation which is majority non-white. And the non-whites have a very different experience of American power and privilege.
Plus TPP may actually never be ratified by Congress and would therefore signal a voluntary end to US economic engagement with Asia, along with the Pivot to Asia.
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Comments are welcome
In 1914, the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austro-Hungary faced the Triple Entente of Russia, France and the UK.
That Dual Alliance was at a significant disadvantage in terms of population and also industrial heft, so at first glance, it doesn't make sense for them to deliberately push for a war in the aftermath of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, yet that is what happened.
But when I look at the situation, I see some key elements that led to the decision for Germany to push for a war.
1. Germany didn't believe that the UK would actually go to war on behalf of France and Russia.
2. Germany believed that their Army was strong enough to deliver knockout blows against France/Russia, and therefore the war would be over by Christmas. Germany was actually able to hold its own, but then the entry of the USA changed things..
3. But most crucially, I see very little appreciation that in the run-up to 1914, Germany had swiftly ramped up military spending whilst the Triple Entente had lagged behind. That meant Germany knew that it had to strike *now*, before the window of opportunity for a military victory disappeared as the Triple Entente built up their military as a counter.
===
In 1941, Fascist Japan also went to war with the USA, knowing that they faced an opponent which was far larger from an economic, industrial and population perspective.
1. Again, Japan planned for a short victorious war and didn't believe that it would be a drawn out contest of wills.
2. Japan had nothing to lose by going to war as it was on the verge of economic, industrial and financial collapse in 1941. The primary reasons for this being a military quagmire when Japan was trying to conquer a much larger China AND the effects of the USA placing sanctions on the Japanese economy. But the roots of this go back to Japan trying to emulate the European colonial empires, which meant a hugely outsized military given the size of their economy.
===
So what military lessons does this hold for China?
1. Do not underestimate the will of outside powers (eg. UK/USA) to go to war to prevent a new regional hegemon from being created.
2. Don't expect a war to be anything other than a bloody and drawn-out affair. Especially since China and the USA are both continental sized powers whose homelands are separated by the vast distances of the Pacific.
3. Don't undertake a military challenge against a larger alliance opponent and certainly don't go on an unsustainable military arms buildup. Particularly given the many domestic development needs inside China.
But the most interesting point is how Germany is now the defacto regional hegemon inside the European Union, and that this has achieved this purely through *economic* means and the voluntary exit of the UK from the EU. (France may actually need a bailout itself)
China also has a very long tradition of using its economic heft to subdue its periphery, and indeed, actually abolished the military on occasion because relations with its neighbours were that good.
The German example is certainly something to ponder, given how China is going to be way more important to Asia than Germany is to Europe.
And we've also seen how politics in the USA (and indeed in the rest of the world) has turned against globalisation and how the Republican party will likely move to representing older, less educated and angrier white males with a racial overtone.
The studies show that this could actually be a winning political formula in terms of electoral college votes in the next 10 years, which was a surprise to me, but it makes sense how the white rural states are over-represented.
But in the long-run, this is a losing proposition as America becomes a younger nation which is majority non-white. And the non-whites have a very different experience of American power and privilege.
Plus TPP may actually never be ratified by Congress and would therefore signal a voluntary end to US economic engagement with Asia, along with the Pivot to Asia.
===
Comments are welcome
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