battle for Changsa,1939

lightspeed

Junior Member
So you're saying that the KMT didn't do much to stamp out these CCP propaganda if they knew about it? It's called incompetent and no initiative on their part. The KMT had most of the major urban areas of China along with the newspapers and other media outlets as well and yet they still couldn't figure out how to deal with this intelligence information gathering and network of spies by the CCP?

And Democracy was formed in ancient Greece, what's your point?


the Soviets and the Chinese Communists were very smart skilled propagandists. even the USA leaders and people were deceived to a great degree by the Soviet propaganda machine in the 1940s. the Kuomintang’s propagandists and intelligence agents were incompetent, the KMT had no answer against the incredible efficient CCP intelligence and espionage network.

this is an example of a faceless unknown but important CCP agent inside of KMT government. CCP agent Ching Yu Chi was the Secretaries Secretary General. he dealt with confidential Chinese and English documents between the government and United States. he could have made known many important government's dealings with the United States from 1944-1949 to the CCP.

this is a quote from Zhou Enlai.
if Dai Li ( KMT intelligence director ) didn't die in 1946, the CCP would take over 10 years to complete the conquest of China after WW2…..

think the CCP first had a private founding in the Soviet Union then the official founding in China 1921.
 

delft

Brigadier
"The battle for Changsa,1939" is for me the beginning of understanding something of the Chinese civil war. Of course the political side is the most important but I want to understand the military side.
The expression "guerrilla war" had let me to the wrong picture, because I associated it especially with the Second Viet Nam War when the Vietnamese couldn't operate in large units because of the immense air power of their enemies. In China the Japanese had very much less air power so the guerrilla could operate in much larger units and the Japanese had to use much larger units too. The CCP had to coordinate its units to avoid contact with the Japanese army until there was an opportunity to attack a unit with overwhelming force and then make sure that force was applied. This means that the CCP staffs won plenty experience in winning and protecting liberated areas.
I understand that of the 4 million troops of Chiang Kai-chek in 1946 the large majority were soldiers of war lords who were decorated, according to some complaints, with much higher military ranks than corresponded with their military capabilities or those of their forces and besides the war lords had distinctly other interests than Chiang. The experienced staff of Chiang's WWII army was not able to gauge the usefulness of the employment of the many disparate sub-armies and especially its political aspects. In other words Chiang's army was a house of cards.
 

hardware

Banned Idiot
another battle was the battle in shangdong province.I remember saw a picture of capture japanese tankette destroyed by the KMT 37mm ATG.
do anyone has any article about the battle for shangdong province?
 

solarz

Brigadier
The competence of KMT during WWII was very obvious to see. All you have to do is to simply google battle of Changsha and battle of Wuhan. Look at the casualty list as well as the length of the battles. You will see how effective the KMT was against the Japanese. The Japanese got to central China in the Fall of 1937, but the KMT managed to fight them to a stalemate and hold the Japanese in the area for the next 7 years and inflicted close to 200,000 casualties to the Japanese.

I would call that "valor" but not competence. Changsha was a typical example of the way the Nationalists conducted war against the Japanese. Look at Shanghai and the Great Wall for other such examples.

The guiding strategy of the Nationalists was basically attrition. Though they often made victory very expensive for the Japanese, it was the Chinese people who paid the price of these battles of attrition, from the victims of flooding caused by the destruction of Yellow River dams ordered by Chiang, to the victims of the Nanjing Massacre, a direct consequence of the Nationalist strategy in the defense of Shanghai.

If we look at the overall record of Chiang's leadership during the War of Resistance, we can clearly see a pattern of callous disregard for the lives of the common Chinese people.

While it is most certainly true that the NRA had several brilliant generals, Chiang's political leadership tended to follow this pattern: keep the loyal generals behind to protect Chiang's personal assets, and send those generals with questionable loyalty to the front lines with poor supplies and let them be chewed up by the Japanese or Communists.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
I would call that "valor" but not competence. Changsha was a typical example of the way the Nationalists conducted war against the Japanese. Look at Shanghai and the Great Wall for other such examples.

The guiding strategy of the Nationalists was basically attrition. Though they often made victory very expensive for the Japanese, it was the Chinese people who paid the price of these battles of attrition, from the victims of flooding caused by the destruction of Yellow River dams ordered by Chiang, to the victims of the Nanjing Massacre, a direct consequence of the Nationalist strategy in the defense of Shanghai.

If we look at the overall record of Chiang's leadership during the War of Resistance, we can clearly see a pattern of callous disregard for the lives of the common Chinese people.

While it is most certainly true that the NRA had several brilliant generals, Chiang's political leadership tended to follow this pattern: keep the loyal generals behind to protect Chiang's personal assets, and send those generals with questionable loyalty to the front lines with poor supplies and let them be chewed up by the Japanese or Communists.

solarz, please try to read some books on the major battles and take the state of the Chinese technological/industrial level into consideration when you berate the effectiveness of the Chinese army at the time. Don't let your past education cloud your judgement. Thousands of officers (including generals) died with their troops. Many stood their ground knowing they have no hope of surviving if they do so. Please read up on the history books written by other than the CCP.

Chinese army had no airforce, no navy, no armour, very little heavy weapons/artilleries, very little training and limited rifiles/ammo for their troops. Jap planners said they will steamover China in 3 months based on the strength on both sides at the beginning of the war, yet we all know how badly the Chinese army hurt them after they got organized (after the Great Wall and Shanghai). Chiang was given opportunities to give up at every step, yet he fought on. Imagine if the Iraqi forces fought as well as the Chinese...

As for the Yellow River flood, if Chiang didn't do it, Japs would have roll straight down the middle, cut China in half and isolated the main body of the Chinese forces in the coastal regions which can be annihilated easily

What the Chinese forces accomplished was truly amazing. Never belittle what those brave men and women had done for their country.
 

solarz

Brigadier
solarz, please try to read some books on the major battles and take the state of the Chinese technological/industrial level into consideration when you berate the effectiveness of the Chinese army at the time. Don't let your past education cloud your judgement. Thousands of officers (including generals) died with their troops. Many stood their ground knowing they have no hope of surviving if they do so. Please read up on the history books written by other than the CCP.

Chinese army had no airforce, no navy, no armour, very little heavy weapons/artilleries, very little training and limited rifiles/ammo for their troops. Jap planners said they will steamover China in 3 months based on the strength on both sides at the beginning of the war, yet we all know how badly the Chinese army hurt them after they got organized (after the Great Wall and Shanghai). Chiang was given opportunities to give up at every step, yet he fought on. Imagine if the Iraqi forces fought as well as the Chinese...

As for the Yellow River flood, if Chiang didn't do it, Japs would have roll straight down the middle, cut China in half and isolated the main body of the Chinese forces in the coastal regions which can be annihilated easily

What the Chinese forces accomplished was truly amazing. Never belittle what those brave men and women had done for their country.

First, you should look up the definition of "valor" before claiming that I'm trying to belittle the soldiers of the NRA in the War of Resistance.

Second, the lack of equipment does not excuse the strategy of Chiang. Look at the Defense of the Great Wall: the 29th Army was forced to create sword-fighting units because they were so poorly supplied. Nevertheless, they still held the Great Wall for months and even defeated the Japanese at Xifeng Kou. Imagine how long they could have held with proper supplies and better trained troops!

Now take a look at the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang decided to throw in his most elite divisions against the Japanese, in a battlefield that allowed the Japanese to fully exert their overwhelming naval and aerial firepower. Shanghai just happens to be the seat of Chiang's power. Coincidence?

In fact, you are wrong about the "no airforce, no armour" part. If you look at the Battle of Shanghai, the KMT made use of airforce, tanks, and howitzers. Remember how the 29th Army had to use swords because they didn't have enough bullets for everyone? Hmmmm.....

Now fast-forward 13 years. The Chinese army, with no navy, no armour, and very little air force and heavy artillery, managed to rout an opponent that deployed Sherman Tanks and B-29 Superfortress bombers. *That* is competence.
 

pissybits

Junior Member
the Kuomintang armies were fighting with little United States military aid. the US imposed an arms embargo on the Republic of China for ten months since late 1946 to mid 1947 and the KMT did not receive any substantial military supplies from the US till Jan 1949. in that period, the Soviet gradually increased its military aid to the CCP. a few PLA Generals said in their memoirs that during the year 1948, they had more artillery pieces and shells ( Soviet produced ) than the KMT armies. the KMT depleted its military supplies. the CCP had more and more military equipments. the tide of war situation changed in favor of the Communists.

the CCP won the country by force of arms. the CCP propaganda was excessively skillful and the KMT propaganda was excessively stupid. the CCP occupied areas had massive conscription.

people like to talk about KMT's corruption but ignore the fact that Communist agents like Henry Dexter White, Chi Chao Ting and cohorts did irrevocable damage to the ROC's monetary system. inflation naturally leads to corruption. the Communists were responsible for the financial crisis suffered by the KMT which naturally lead to the people losing confidence in the KMT government and switching support to the CCP.

the CCP was formed in the Soviet Union.

Like hardware said the CCP was indeed created in Shanghai, albeit with help from Comintern. (Soviet Union)
However the first communist power base/state in China was in fact in Hunan: (湘赣苏维埃)-The Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet in the Jinggang Mountains. (井冈山). Although Comintern gave some support to the Hunan Jiangxi Soviet, it was Mao's Autumn Harvest Uprising in Changsha (1927) that first led to its creation. Its members were mainly poor peasants who were inspired by the prospect of equality and justice in China. (Hunan and Jiangxi were some of the poorest provinces in China)

Unlike the Shanghai Communists, they were less bourgeois intellectuals and truly proletarians. Comintern sent a representative to guide the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet, but it was the leadership failure of this same Comintern representative that forced the Communist forces at the Jinggang Mountains to begin the Long March. By the end of the Long March, Mao had evicted this Comintern representative precisely because he was so incompetent in leading the Chinese Communists.

Yes the CCP benefited from Soviet military aid, yes they beat the KMT militarily; but that does not detract from the amount of genuine support the CCP had from the Chinese people at the time, and neither is this something you should understate: because this popular support is by far the biggest reason why they were able to beat the KMT militarily. I've said this before and I'll say it again, but you only have to look at the economic demographics of China at the time to see why the CCP would elicit more support. You say the CCP used conscription in the areas they occupied, but they never had to 抓壮丁 like the KMT. (impressment) The CCP merely offered food as an incentive to join their army, which many starving peasants accepted, and this fact can be corroborated by many veterans of the Chinese Civil War.
 
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pissybits

Junior Member
"The battle for Changsa,1939" is for me the beginning of understanding something of the Chinese civil war. Of course the political side is the most important but I want to understand the military side.
The expression "guerrilla war" had let me to the wrong picture, because I associated it especially with the Second Viet Nam War when the Vietnamese couldn't operate in large units because of the immense air power of their enemies. In China the Japanese had very much less air power so the guerrilla could operate in much larger units and the Japanese had to use much larger units too. The CCP had to coordinate its units to avoid contact with the Japanese army until there was an opportunity to attack a unit with overwhelming force and then make sure that force was applied. This means that the CCP staffs won plenty experience in winning and protecting liberated areas.
I understand that of the 4 million troops of Chiang Kai-chek in 1946 the large majority were soldiers of war lords who were decorated, according to some complaints, with much higher military ranks than corresponded with their military capabilities or those of their forces and besides the war lords had distinctly other interests than Chiang. The experienced staff of Chiang's WWII army was not able to gauge the usefulness of the employment of the many disparate sub-armies and especially its political aspects. In other words Chiang's army was a house of cards.

You must remember that the CCP did not fight the battle of Changsha, the KMT did. I would say that the Chinese forces (CCP and KMT) for the most part did not have to rely on solely guerrilla tactics to fight the Japanese. (though guerrilla tactics were most definitely used in many instances)

Yes the Chinese forces were often under-equipped and had to improvise, but I think that lend-lease arms agreements with the Americans + U.S. air power operating from inland air bases brought at least some degree of parity to the table.

I believe that the main reason Chiang's army was ineffective post-1945 is that they lost the morale that soldiers have when they are defending their country against a foreign invader, and this is especially true as many KMT soldiers in fact ended up deserting or defecting to the CCP. Why would they help support a elitist military dictator (Generalissimo Chiang) that the majority of people despised? After all, they were poor people's sons too.

Mao was definitely the all time master of guerrilla war. In fact, he wrote a book on it called On Guerrilla Warfare (游击战) that the Vietcong studied, along with Che Guevara/Fidel Castro, and even the Americans.
 
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vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
Second, the lack of equipment does not excuse the strategy of Chiang. Look at the Defense of the Great Wall: the 29th Army was forced to create sword-fighting units because they were so poorly supplied. Nevertheless, they still held the Great Wall for months and even defeated the Japanese at Xifeng Kou. Imagine how long they could have held with proper supplies and better trained troops!

Supplied with what? Chinese forces had very little supplies to begin with. Chinese troops had no experience with industrialied warfare and the troops knows only how to fight WWI battles at the beginning.

Now take a look at the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang decided to throw in his most elite divisions against the Japanese, in a battlefield that allowed the Japanese to fully exert their overwhelming naval and aerial firepower. Shanghai just happens to be the seat of Chiang's power. Coincidence?

You do know why Chiang forced the battle at Shanghai, right? The reason is to force the Japs to go through China horizontally instead of vertically. If the Japs go down from the north plains, they can leverage their vastly more superior mobility and armour to sweep across China vertically like the German did in Europe. If the Japs had to go through China horizontally through Shanghai, they have to go through areas of China that are full of rivers and lakes, which greatly reduce their mobility and give China some breathing room to mobilize.

In fact, you are wrong about the "no airforce, no armour" part. If you look at the Battle of Shanghai, the KMT made use of airforce, tanks, and howitzers. Remember how the 29th Army had to use swords because they didn't have enough bullets for everyone? Hmmmm.....

He leverage the best of what he got because of the point I made above.
They don't have enough bullets because the transportation system was horrible. Chiang mobilize forces from all over China, but large portion of the forces had to get to Shanghai by foot and got wiped out right after they reach their positions because of their poor training (they don't know about preparing their positions for artillery bombardments

Now fast-forward 13 years. The Chinese army, with no navy, no armour, and very little air force and heavy artillery, managed to rout an opponent that deployed Sherman Tanks and B-29 Superfortress bombers. *That* is competence.

Those troops are battle harden troops that are much much better equiped than the Chinese forces during the Japanese invasion. What ever their competences, they couldn't push the American past the 38 parallel due to supply problems, something Chinese forces had to deal with the entire time during the war of resistance. At least they have a stable rear that can produce supplies/materials steadily
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
other factor was the soviet aid, according to the archieves,Liu Shio Chi (who later died in purge during the cultural revolution) admit the soviet aid play important factor in Communist victory,for example more than 300 plus capture japanese tank .two factory producing helmet not to mention million of ton of ex-japanese small arm and artillery pieces capture by the soviet armies were illegally hand over the CCP.before that more than half of Mao's red armies were armed with nothing more than some sword and spear, since arms were hard to come by.

This is nothing but BS ,myth and complete distortion of History .Stalin never trust Mao in fact he probably prefer Chiang than Mao because Mao won't listen to him. In fact he try to eliminate Mao by installing Oto Braun, Bo gu as the commander of the CCP army he proposed direct confrontation with Kuomintang which naturally result in CCP got beaten badly by the better equipped Kuomintang army. Close to annihilation they change course . In this conference finally Mao outmaneuver the incompetent and stupid Comintern Oto Braun. Mao reclaim the leadership of CCP and never looked back. Most of the equipment were taken from defeated Japanese kuantung army in the north and not gift from Soviet union. In fact when the Soviet return they took everything that is worth taking from Manchuria .They stripped every machinery from factory built by the Japanese. Soviet is the worst robber, rapist and thief
Another thing as a Child I read the exploit of Lin Biao in North East I thought he one of the best Chinese general right after Peng De Huai and Zhu De

Lin Biao (pinyin: Lín Biāo; IPA: [lǐn pjɑ́ʊ]; December 5, 1907 – September 13, 1971) was a major Chinese Communist military leader who was pivotal in the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeastern China. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen Campaign and Pingjin Campaign, co-led the Manchurian Field Army of the People's Liberation Army into Beijing, and crossed the Yangtze River in 1949. He ranked third among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked directly ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng.
The battle of Liaoshen
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Conference agenda and speeches
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The main agenda of this conference was to examine the Party's failure in the Jiangxi region and to look at the options now available to them. Bo Gu was the first to speak with a general report. He acknowledged that the strategy used in Jiangxi had failed, without taking any blame. He claimed the lack of success was not due to poor planning. Next Zhou gave a report on the military situation in an apologietic style. In contrast to Bo, he admitted mistakes had been made. Then Zhang Wentian in a long critical oration, condemned the leaders for the debacle in Jiangxi. This was supported by Mao and Wang. Mao's comparative distance from power over the past two years had left him blameless of the recent failures and in a strong position to attack the leadership.

Mao insisted that Bo Gu and Otto Braun had made fundamental military mistakes by using tactics of pure defense rather than initiating a more mobile war. Mao's supporters gained momentum during the meeting and Zhou Enlai eventually moved to back Mao. Under the principle of democracy for majority, the secretariat of the Central Committee and Central Revolution & Military Committee of CCP were reelected. Bo and Braun were demoted while Zhou maintained his position now sharing military command with Zhu De. Zhang Wentian took Bo's previous position while Mao once again joined the Central Committee.

The Zunyi Conference confirmed that the CCP should turn away from the 28 Bolsheviks and towards Mao. The Red Army regained its military power, survived in Yan'an and ultimately defeated the KMT with using a guerrilla strategy, and later through conventional warfare as it gained mass peasant support. It could be seen as a victory for those old CCP members who had their roots in China and, on the contrary, it was a great loss for those CCP members such as the 28 Bolsheviks who had studied in Moscow and had been trained by the Comintern and the Soviet Union and could be regarded as proteges or agents of Comintern accordingly. After the Zunyi Conference, the influence and involvement of the Comintern in CCP affairs was greatly reduced.
See also


Russian Robber

China

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union declared a war on Japan and launched an invasion of Japanese puppet state Manchukuo (Manchuria). Upon occupation of this territory, the Soviets laid claim to Japanese valuable materials and industrial equipment in the region.[85] A foreigner witnessed Soviet troops, formerly stationed in Berlin, who were allowed by the Soviet military to go at the city "for three days of rape and pillage." Most of Mukden was gone. Convict soldiers were then used to replace them; it was testified that they "stole everything in sight, broke up bathtubs and toilets with hammers, pulled electric-light wiring out of the plaster, built fires on the floor and either burned down the house or at least a big hole in the floor, and in general behaved completely like savages."[86]

According to some Western sources, the Soviets made it a policy to loot and rape civilians in Manchuria. The same Soviet troops from Germany had been sent to Manchuria and looted, killed and raped. In Harbin, the Chinese posted slogans such as "Down with Red Imperialism!" Soviet forces ignored protests from Chinese communist party leaders on their mass rape and loot policy.[87][88][89]

Russian historian Konstantin Asmolov argues that such Western accounts of Soviet violence against civilians in the Far East are exaggerations of isolated incidents and the documents of the time don't support the claims of mass crimes. Asmolov also points out that the Soviets, unlike the Germans and Japanese, prosecuted their soldiers and officers for such acts.[90]
 
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