The NH-90 has the problems you would find in any new helicopter program. Most of it is due to lack of support, parts, and maintenance. Most of the countries which bought them cheapened out on the support package, then they are surprised not enough parts are produced to keep them operational. The UK had the same problem with the Eurofighter. This was only solved after they made the builders responsible for maintenance and gave them adequate funding so there would be a spare parts supply.
Australia Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter lych470
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German ones work fine, as do the Spanish, French, Italian, Omani, New Zealand, Finnish, Belgian, Hellenic, Dutch and Qatari fleets. It has received praise from several operators for its reliability, including New Zealand. Only 3 operators had issues: Australia, Sweden with it's very unique custom variant and Norway. Not unsurprisingly all 3 rushed out to buy Lockheed Martin helicopters without competition, no doubt securing the worst deal of the century after the RAAFs latest C-130J order.
Lethe
Captain
I saw a local TV segment this evening about the challenges we have had maintaining and operating the Collins-class submarine fleet. It strikes me that most of what is discussed is fairly unremarkable in and of itself. It is only when those issues are juxtaposed against the timelines, costs and challenges of the AUKUS nuclear submarine enterprise that things begin to look alarming. There was much talk about the age of the Collins-class boats, which were commissioned 1996-2003. By way of comparison, two-thirds of America's nuclear submarines are as old or older than our submarines. The difference is that America is working up to building >2 submarines per year, while our plan for the next fifteen years is to hope that the Americans ultimately choose to give us three of their submarines as they have pinky promised. The strategic insouciance of this enterprise truly beggars belief.
For what little it's worth, here's my prediction as to how this is going to unfold as we enter the 2030s:
(1) Australia's acquisition of two second-hand Virginia-class submarines is pushed back or cancelled owing to a combination of lack of enthusiasm in Washington to transfer them and our lack of readiness to receive and operate them.
(2) The AUKUS nuclear submarine program is ultimately thrown in the bin and a new conventional program is pursued with local shipbuilding.
(3) A limited number of Virginia-class submarines (say, four) are eventually acquired from the American production line at ruinous expense and maintained at low readiness, partly to make the Americans happy and partly just to say that we did it.
Corporate boardrooms in Washington and London rejoice at their good fortune, politicians and consultants in Canberra retire comfortably. Everybody wins except for the Australian taxpayer and Australia's national security.
TL;DR: The problem isn't Collins, the problem is that we under-resourced those submarines for decades and are now asking them to serve for an additional 10-15 years longer than originally intended while simultaneously embarking on a project with exponentially greater challenges, risks and costs.
Eurofighter and NH-90 both illustrate the basic weaknesses of multinational European procurement programs. Multiple small nations each fighting for workshare while minimizing their own development contributions and acquisitions. You don't have to be in Washington's pocket to appreciate mature platforms with robust industrial support chains.
For what little it's worth, here's my prediction as to how this is going to unfold as we enter the 2030s:
(1) Australia's acquisition of two second-hand Virginia-class submarines is pushed back or cancelled owing to a combination of lack of enthusiasm in Washington to transfer them and our lack of readiness to receive and operate them.
(2) The AUKUS nuclear submarine program is ultimately thrown in the bin and a new conventional program is pursued with local shipbuilding.
(3) A limited number of Virginia-class submarines (say, four) are eventually acquired from the American production line at ruinous expense and maintained at low readiness, partly to make the Americans happy and partly just to say that we did it.
Corporate boardrooms in Washington and London rejoice at their good fortune, politicians and consultants in Canberra retire comfortably. Everybody wins except for the Australian taxpayer and Australia's national security.
TL;DR: The problem isn't Collins, the problem is that we under-resourced those submarines for decades and are now asking them to serve for an additional 10-15 years longer than originally intended while simultaneously embarking on a project with exponentially greater challenges, risks and costs.
Eurofighter and NH-90 both illustrate the basic weaknesses of multinational European procurement programs. Multiple small nations each fighting for workshare while minimizing their own development contributions and acquisitions. You don't have to be in Washington's pocket to appreciate mature platforms with robust industrial support chains.
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Yes...
For example there was recently a request from Saudi Arabia for more Eurofighters (Middle East countries are negociated with UK) and the sale was blocked by the German Parliament.
Lethe
Captain
Z-20 doesn't even count as a mature platform today, let alone back in 2004 when the first NH90s were ordered.
Mi-17 would've been an interesting left-field contender.
The AUKUS plan as released just seemed like some kind of absurd Australian subsidization of billions into American industry first and hope for some scraps later on.
Since the timeline, capacity, and inventory of American SSN doesn’t really allow for giving away any submarines, again it seems like the more realistic scenario is that the US will make Australia pay for existing US subs to be based in Australia, have some nominal Australian crew and call it a day. It will likely still be majority staffed and serviced by USN crew.
15b per year into the void
I think the idea is that the US will get access to Australian staffing, and Australia gets a capability they otherwise would not be able to afford.
Australia should have just bought the Japanese submarines back then. They fit all the requirements.
Another possible alternative today would be the latest South Korean KS-III submarines.
(4) Some years down the track, a nuclear incident happens onboard on of those Virginia-class because Australia doesn't have the nuclear industry to properly care for and run marine nuclear reactors.
And if it happens RAN should count itself lucky if it doesn't end up with loss of all hands on board.