09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

SEAD

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I just showed you KLT-40S comes from the same parent that also "fathered" OB-650V. If you have the technology for one, you can build the other also. The dimension of ACPR50S also makes sense for a nuclear sub. It's actually more likely China is further along on their military one.

But since you are trying to annoy me. Why don't you tell us then? Do you think they need a new reactor for 095? If they do and it's not a 200 MWt reactor, what will it be? If it's not, then what would they use?
I said in the first response the 200MWt may be just a coincidence. Maybe it’s NOT, but what I really want to show you is that your reasoning is not solid, even leaving alone analyzing generation of military reactors by civilian reactors generations(I said it’s nothing but X-32 vs. B-737). You can prove your idea by showing more evidence just like what @taxiya did rather than always quoting a single old Soviet case.
 
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SEAD

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but I’m sure the development among ‘generations’ of civilian reactors is more about safety, less about economy and None about volume/power/noise. So it’s a little bit weird for me, just like analyzing LO capability of X-32 but your argument is the range of B-737…
I must quote my response as a reminder.
People around the world did a lot of work to transfer HEU reactors to civilian LEU civilian versions, so we do know it’s not easy.
So I agree with @taxiya’s idea: Chinese may transfer a military reactor to a civilian one but it must take a lot of time so we cannot estimate their submarine development basing on that.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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We don’t know but ELF is enough to transmit a targeting location in <1min. Its bandwidth is around 1bps.

SSBNs have the ability to retarget underwater by command.
Yes, but none of that is applicable to SSN which will require real time data for complex missions.
 

AndrewS

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Registered Member
The first batch of ships built in the new facility may be the last batch before the impending war. They have no time to build them one by one if the 2027 rumor is true.

on the other hand, China have spent enough time on subsystems so we may assume they have been carefully tested. In 2000, both PLAN DDGs and submarines were at 1970s level, however now their DDGs are advanced while submarines are still at 1980s level. Considering China spent similar resources to those fields, it’s unreasonable. IMO we will see a big jump just like what happened from 051B to 052D, or even 055.

The 2027 timeline is when China wants to have the ability to successfully invade Taiwan.

But if we look to a 2040 timescale, China could have the ability to successfully contest blue-water control in the second island chain AND also have a much larger domestic economy which would suffer less from sanctions than its opponents.
 

SEAD

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Yes, but none of that is applicable to SSN which will require real time data for complex missions.
If you’re targeting Guam sites, fixed targets don’t need rt data. If you’re targeting ships, missiles have seekers so rough location is ok. But yes SSN cannot hunt for TEL/SAM etc.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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If you’re targeting Guam sites, fixed targets don’t need rt data. If you’re targeting ships, missiles have seekers so rough location is ok. But yes SSN cannot hunt for TEL/SAM etc.
Rough location of ships is no good for subsonics, within a 20 min flight time from say 200 km away, the ship could've moved 20 km.
 

tphuang

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I said in the first response the 200MWt may be just a coincidence. Maybe it’s NOT, but what I really want to show you is that your reasoning is not solid, even leaving alone analyzing generation of military reactors by civilian reactors generations(I said it’s nothing but X-32 vs. B-737). You can prove your idea by showing more evidence just like what @taxiya did rather than always quoting a single old Soviet case.

Read carefully what I said. This was my question

""Does this indicate they are now capable of building a 200 MW reactor for submarine?"

And I went on to show from Russian case that there is exactly such a precedence. Which indicates that if you have the technology to build a MWt reactor for civilian use on barges, then you can do one in military utilizing similar technology.

In fact, of that 70 reactors you listed, the only other comparable sized PWR reactor for marine use were KLT-40S/RITM-200M. If we include all the reactors in that list from China, the rest of them are simply too large to fit in a submarine. It should also tip you off that Bohai shipbuilding is building this ACPR50S. What could it possibly mean when the shipyard that's building all the nuclear submarines is also the one in charge of building civilian nuclear reactor that would fit really well inside a nuclear submarine?

I'm not the only one that sees a link here.
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In September 2010, China and Russia agreed to expand their cooperation in the development of
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. Russia had finished the design for
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, which would have two 150 megawatt
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—reactors that are closely related to OK-650 reactors on Russian third-generation submarines built in the mid-1980s through the 1990s.
Initially, China was reportedly considering
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from Russia but later decided to use an indigenously produced
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, the
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, designed by
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. This reactor started its development in 2012 and bears a striking resemblance to the Russian KLT-40S with its unique primary coolant arrangement that employs a pipe within a pipe, which is associated with Russian naval nuclear power reactors.

Remember, nuclear energy is expensive and not so competitive with coal or wind/solar. Even the large nuclear reactors are really not competitive right now in terms of cost of construction and operation. These mini reactors are even less competitive in cost. There is not a great market out there for these small marine reactors. One of the few places suggested were to power China's islands in SCS or offshore oil fields.. There isn't a huge market for this type of reactor. For that usage scenario, ACP100S might be better. It generates more power and does not have similar size constraints. And it's not built by Bohai shipyard. Funnily enough, ACP100S generates 125 MWe of electricity, which according to wiki is the same as what A1B reactor on Ford class generates.
 
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AndrewS

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It isn't only about a multi-axis attack.

It is about being able to conduct a multi-axis attack with reduced warning time.
The 24/7 presence is about enabling that reduced warning time.


The ability to conduct a successful defense is contingent on a few factors -- one of those factors is time, or to be more precise, early warning.

The nature of geography means that missiles launched from China towards the second island chain will have early warning radars located in East Asia (i.e.: first island chain) as well as naval based radars (Aegis BMD ships) on top of air and missile defense systems on or stationed near Guam itself. Those radars and sensors in the first island chain, will be able to provide early warning, support continuous tracking of targets, greatly improving the ability of Guam's defenses to successfully discriminate and thus target the incoming missiles.
Heck, depending on the system, some of the first island chain radars may have accompanying BMD capabilities to shoot down some of the missiles China shoots.

The same issue applies for VLO bombers -- because to get within range of Guam to launch their payloads, the VLO bombers would have to fly from Chinese airspace to within range of Guam (depending on the weapon, that may be anywhere from 2000km or more). That is 2000km of flying in international airspace over ocean, past the first island chain and against US and their allies' fighters and surveillance aircraft operating from bases and/or carriers, where they will again not only provide early warning to Guam, but they can also actively seek to intercept and shoot down Chinese VLO bombers on the way to and on the way back from their launch point.


Now one may ask -- as part of an overall westpac air-naval-missile conflict, wouldn't the PLA seek to destroy/degrade US radars, air bases and carriers in and around the first island chain, thus greatly reducing the ability for early warning to be provided to Guam?
Well yes, the PLA would absolutely seek to do that.
However, that sort of operation would also take time, time which Guam would have to better organize their defenses. More importantly, as part of that operation, it is likely that PLA land bases will also suffer attacks from the US, and the PLA's own long range bombers and/or even some missile bases may be adversely affected and degraded, in turn reducing the PLA's ability to conduct long range strikes against Guam.


So where does that leave the 24/7 presence of SSNs? Well, during this whole process, they are able to remain on station, undetected, able to launch some 480 missiles at the opfor's base in the 2IC with far shorter warning time and thus with a higher likelihood of successful penetration, than PLA long range missiles and VLO bombers operating from China, because they do not have to run a 3000km+ gauntlet of US radars, air bases, and naval forces that have to be thinned out first.


During peacetime, the 24/7 presence of SSNs in the 2IC will pose a clear and present threat to Guam that the US would be forced to dedicate immense resources to pursuing and tracking, or they will have to accept that during a time of tension or conflict that there may be many missiles launched from submarines that have a much higher likelihood of penetrating their defenses due to being launched from a much closer distance.



Also, we are not comparing spending money on "SSNs" with "additional MRBMs and/or bombers".
We are comparing spending money on "additional VLS tubes" with "additional and/or bombers".

Because the PLAN will need 60 competitive SSNs going into future decades anyway, and they will be deployed extensively in the deep waters of the second island chain and pacific anyway. The entire "standard SSN" and its mission profile would already paid for.
All I am proposing is a lengthened hull plug additional VLS tubes, for 3/4 of the overall fleet of SSNs.

For Guam, I previously did a rough model for the [H-20] versus [SSN with 40 VLS tubes]

If we're talking about a first-strike, then yes, the 12 SSNs with 40 VLS tubes closeby would be useful.
So 480 JASSM type missiles launched from submarines at Guam would cost a minimum of of $0.8 Million each.

But a campaign would require multiple strikes over weeks and months, so an H-20 would have an advantage in being able to launch many more SDB-2 or JDAM at a much lower cost.

My guestimate was that you could have 3 H-20 (comparable to the B-21) for the cost of a single SSN with 40 tubes firing JASSMs. But 3 H-20 could deliver 324 SDB-2 which only cost $65 Million. So it's a lot easier to saturate the defences with more H-20s combined with SDB-2. Aircraft are soft targets, so SDB-2 are perfectly adequate for this. And given that both JASSMs and SDBs can be engaged by air defences, it's better for SDBs to absorb these hits than JASSMs.

Plus the H-20s could conduct a sortie every day against Guam, whereas a submarine might be able to do this twice a week due to transit times and reloading.

But there are targets beyond the range of H-20s like Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Panama Canal, etc.
In these scenarios, land-attack missiles from submarines would be very useful.

---

My gut tells me that for strikes against Guam, land-based missiles work out better than submarine-launched missiles for Day 1.

Theoretically a single DF-26 could carry enough tungsten ball-bearing cluster munitions to ensure every single large aircraft on the ground is hit. Yes, Guam will have about 15-20 minutes warning time. But that is not enough time to get most of the large aircraft off the ground.

Then you just need a few more missiles throughout the day to ensure Guam can't conduct any proper air sorties and for the majority of large aircraft based at Guam to be destroyed.
 

Blitzo

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For Guam, I previously did a rough model for the [H-20] versus [SSN with 40 VLS tubes]

If we're talking about a first-strike, then yes, the 12 SSNs with 40 VLS tubes closeby would be useful.
So 480 JASSM type missiles launched from submarines at Guam would cost a minimum of of $0.8 Million each.

But a campaign would require multiple strikes over weeks and months, so an H-20 would have an advantage in being able to launch many more SDB-2 or JDAM at a much lower cost.

My guestimate was that you could have 3 H-20 (comparable to the B-21) for the cost of a single SSN with 40 tubes firing JASSMs. But 3 H-20 could deliver 324 SDB-2 which only cost $65 Million. So it's a lot easier to saturate the defences with more H-20s combined with SDB-2. Aircraft are soft targets, so SDB-2 are perfectly adequate for this. And given that both JASSMs and SDBs can be engaged by air defences, it's better for SDBs to absorb these hits than JASSMs.

Plus the H-20s could conduct a sortie every day against Guam, whereas a submarine might be able to do this twice a week due to transit times and reloading.

But there are targets beyond the range of H-20s like Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Panama Canal, etc.
In these scenarios, land-attack missiles from submarines would be very useful.

The ability for H-20 with SDB type weapons to conduct re attack against Guam and other second island chain targets, is of course not something that my description of SSNs are intended to perform.

However, I believe a number of competitive SSNs with enhanced VLS capacity is the only way to achieve the mission I described in previous posts "near-permanent/round the clock deployment of a large number of munitions in relatively close range to second island chain region (including and beyond Guam), from a variety of axes of attack relative to potential targets."



My gut tells me that for strikes against Guam, land-based missiles work out better than submarine-launched missiles for Day 1.

Theoretically a single DF-26 could carry enough tungsten ball-bearing cluster munitions to ensure every single large aircraft on the ground is hit. Yes, Guam will have about 15-20 minutes warning time. But that is not enough time to get most of the large aircraft off the ground.

Then you just need a few more missiles throughout the day to ensure Guam can't conduct any proper air sorties and for the majority of large aircraft based at Guam to be destroyed.

The reason why warning time is important, is not primarily due to the ability of Guam to get its aircraft off the ground.

Rather, the reason why warning time is important, is that it allows the missiles and/or aircraft that are launched from land to be tracked for 3000-4000km from their launch sites to Guam, and enable rings of US air and missile defenses between the first island chain, up to and including Guam, to be able to have longer opportunities to discriminate and track targets enabling a higher chance of successful interception, as well as more opportunities to intercept them as well.

Being able to launch weapons closer to your target not only reduces the time that the opfor is able to track the missiles that you've launched (thus reducing chances of a successful interception), but also reduces the opportunities to intercept them as well.


Think about Guam's defenses as a multilayered onion that has to be peeled through to get to the core.

The outermost layer, in the 1st island chain, are US assets in the first island chain. Land based BMD radar and BMD batteries, land based fighters with AEW&C, and even naval ships with BMD capability.
The middle layer is between the 1st and 2nd island chain, composed of carriers, naval ships with BMD, and perhaps small islands with forward deployed smaller BMD radars and BMD batteries.
The final layer is in the 2nd island chain, including Guam and smaller islands that have their own land based comprehensive BMD and land based airbases with fighters and AEW&C, as well as escorting naval ships with BMD, perhaps carriers as well.

All of those layers will seek to track PLA land based missile and aircraft attacks launched towards Guam, as well as seek to shoot them down and thin them down as much as possible before they reach Guam. In other words, PLA attacks from land will have to go through three layers of defense, because at the commencement of hostilities, those land based weapons are naturally not forward deployed close to Guam.

Now, for SSNs with VLS, if they are routinely deployed close to Guam in the 2nd island chain, they are able to bypass basically the outermost layer and middle layer of defenses, straight to the final layer of defenses -- or perhaps even get within the final layer of defenses! That is in addition to the fact that they can attack from other directions where the outermost and middle layers of defenses are either weak or absolutely nonexistent by virtue of the geography of the middle pacific.
That is why the importance of having routine forward deployment close to potential targets is important.


As I wrote before, yes the PLA can try to conduct offensive strikes against the outermost and middle layers of defense that the US has, to weaken them to enable a strike with greater chances of success against Guam. And I expect the PLA to do so.
But that will require time and materiel, and even then I believe the likelihood of success will remain greatly enhanced when a large fraction of the first strike is delivered by a number of SSN-Gs that are already prepositioned and operational close to the target.
 
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