055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[kwaigonegin]

I see a lot of speculations, some outlandish claims but I also do see many smart assertions and good analysis.
This is my own 2c based on my own research, experience and talking to others in the government.
In the event of a major crises, in all honesty it would be quite near impossible for PRC to defend their SLOCs anywhere near or past the 2nd island chain. This is due to two primary factors.
1. Most countries in that region are allies with the US or at least 'closer' to the US than they do PRC.

2. Even with all the reclamation going on in the SCS, PLAN still lacks a serious naval or air base overseas far from their shores.

The 4 future CSGs is based on what many 'real' experts believe as well so I will have to take their word for it. To be safe let's just go with 3-5 CSG in the next 25 years.

Unless you're blind, there is NO DOUBT, PLAN is very very serious about the organic air component of their armed forces. After analyzing the Persian Gulf War and the many conflicts thereafter or even before it would be foolish for anyone let alone the movers and shakers to not concentrate on air power especially naval air power and theater air superiority

Back then China was limited by funds and technologies but those constraints are not as monumental these days.
I can totally see 4 CSG's in PLAN's future.

I also feel that we should not compare the 055 with the Tico's (until we know more) because while their armament load and disp. may be be somewhat similar they intent and probably operational capacity is different. Keep in mind also that the Zumwalts were originally slated to replace the Tico's but well but $$$ and it didn't happen at least not 1:1 basis. USN planners intended to have at least one DDG 1000 as escort. Now it will be the Burke Flt III playing Tico 'replacement'. I think it's more apt to compare the 055 to the Burke Flt IIIs if anything.

One other thing folks here need to know when looking at PLAN from a strategic standpoint. People may or may not agree with me however I firmly belief that PLAN will structure their forces somewhat similar to USN sans a few modifictions due to geographical and other political considerations that USN may not necessary face (overseas bases, close allies, etc)
Why you ASK?
First off USN is by far the biggest, the most experience and most combat proven and combat ready naval force currently. It would be simply foolish if PLAN do not at least emulate or learn from the USN.

Secondly and this is not often talk about here or anywhere! The USN are heavily influence by the Mahan principles or Mahanian principles and many of out doctrines are based on his teaching. We teach that as West Point, Naval War College etc. Hell there's even a big white building in Annapolis call Mahan Hall.

What has this got to do with PLAN?
Everything!
PLAN is a BIG fan of Mahan principle and to a certain extend Corbett as well. Heck Amdr. Zhang He in the 14th century was already doing some of the things that Mahan wrote about some 400 yrs later in terms of naval expansion through expeditions and force projection.
Do not think these type of things are lost to the modern admirals and planners of PLAN or PRC's armed Forces in general.

 

[Jeff Head]

In the event of a major crises, in all honesty it would be quite near impossible for PRC to defend their SLOCs anywhere near or past the 2nd island chain. This is due to two primary factors.

1. Most countries in that region are allies with the US or at least 'closer' to the US.
2. Even with the reclamation in the SCS, PLAN still lacks a serious base far from its shores.

Agreed.

The 4 future CSGs is based on what many 'real' experts believe as well so I will have to take their word for it. To be safe let's just go with 3-5 CSG in the next 25 years.

I can totally see 4 CSG's in PLAN's future.

Again...agreed.

I also feel that we should not compare the 055 with the Tico's (until we know more) because while their armament load and disp. may be be somewhat similar they intent and probably operational capacity is different.

Yes...cannot compare them in terms of their specific capabilities yet, however, in terms of their general fit within the fleet, there is little doubt that they are very similar in that regard and role.

Thus my comment that the Type 055 is the PLAN's Tico. They will be the principle AAW and defense escort ship for their capitol vessels.

Keep in mind also that the Zumwalts were originally slated to replace the Tico's but well but $$$ and it didn't happen at least not 1:1 basis. USN planners intended to have at least one DDG 1000 as escort. Now it will be the Burke Flt III playing Tico 'replacement'. I think it's more apt to compare the 055 to the Burke Flt IIIs if anything.

The Burke IIIs are not going to have the Cruiser C&C package that the Ticos have...at least not at this point...and they will start building them soon, like in the next couple of years.

The Ticos are the command defense escort for the US Navy for the forseeable future...perhaps into the 30s. I believe that the Type 55s will fill the same role for the PLAN.

Later, the US will either replace the Ticos with an upgraded Flight of Burke IIIs, or with something like what the CGX was supposed to be. BTW, the DDG 1000, which became the Zumwalt, was not intended to do this...that was going to be the CGX, which was originally planned to be on the same hull form. Now it is off the table...at least for the time being.

One other thing folks here need to know when looking at PLAN from a strategic standpoint. People may or may not agree with me however I firmly belief that PLAN will structure their forces somewhat similar to USN sans a few modifictions due to geographical and other political considerations that USN may not necessary face (overseas bases, close allies, etc)

I tend to agree with this...heck, they are already doing so.

But there will be some differences that will be uniquely Chinese.

Secondly and this is not often talk about here or anywhere! The USN are heavily influence by the Mahan principles or Mahanian principles and many of out doctrines are based on his teaching. We teach that as West Point, Naval War College etc. Hell there's even a big white building in Annapolis call Mahan Hall.

What has this got to do with PLAN?

Everything!

PLAN is a BIG fan of Mahan principle and to a certain extend Corbett as well. Heck Amdr. Zhang He in the 14th century was already doing some of the things that Mahan wrote about some 400 yrs later in terms of naval expansion through expeditions and force projection.
Do not think these type of things are lost to the modern admirals and planners of PLAN or PRC's armed Forces in general.

Absolutely...and I do believe it has been mentioned here on SD in the past...and linked to.

There have been numerous USNI articles and comments about this...and you are spot on, to date the Chinese Naval leadership have studied and attempted to implement Mahan principles all over the place.

 

[janjak desalin]

I know I'm jumping in late on the anticipated production runs and total numbers of Type 052Ds and 055s, but, I do so enjoy these types of discussions. Thus, based on my, albeit simplistic, geo-spatial analysis, I'm thinking these types would be deployed in a two-tiered strategic system.
First, and foremost, I'd expect a bastion defense type scheme extending in-depth A2/AD coverage out to ~800 km from the coastline in the open sea zones. In the east sea, this would encompass the Ryukyu Islands zone and, in the south sea, the Paracel Islands zone. To achieve this objective, I'd anticipate ~12 052Ds and ~6 055s each for the east and south seas and ~3 or 4 of each for the north sea. So, to simply achieve this, fundamentally defensive, objective, I'm anticipating ~27 052Ds and ~15 055s.
Secondarily, I'd expect the deployment of expeditionary forces in both the east and south seas to provide the offensive component within any strategy of power projection. I'd anticipate that these forces would comprise ~6 of each platform. So, adding these ~12 of each platform to the ~27 052Ds and 15 055s, gives me a total of 39 052Ds and 27 055s. And, notice, which I'm sure some will, that I haven't even considered units deployed with CBGs/CSGs, although, the expeditionary units could well fulfill this function.
Oh well, my 2 cents, or 1.76 euro cents!

 

[Brumby]

First, and foremost, I'd expect a bastion defense type scheme extending in-depth A2/AD coverage out to ~800 km from the coastline in the open sea zones. In the east sea, this would encompass the Ryukyu Islands zone and, in the south sea, the Paracel Islands zone. To achieve this objective, I'd anticipate ~12 052Ds and ~6 055s each for the east and south seas and ~3 or 4 of each for the north sea. So, to simply achieve this, fundamentally defensive, objective, I'm anticipating ~27 052Ds and ~15 055s.
Secondarily, I'd expect the deployment of expeditionary forces in both the east and south seas to provide the offensive component within any strategy of power projection. I'd anticipate that these forces would comprise ~6 of each platform. So, adding these ~12 of each platform to the ~27 052Ds and 15 055s, gives me a total of 39 052Ds and 27 055s. And, notice, which I'm sure some will, that I haven't even considered units deployed with CBGs/CSGs, although, the expeditionary units could well fulfill this function.
Oh well, my 2 cents, or 1.76 euro cents!

I am curious how you actually get to that number. A methodological approach would require matching capabilities to theatre requirements and establishing risk against campaign requirements. Currently we don't even know what the final form of the Type 055 and its capabilities.

 

[Jeff Head]

...gives me a total of 39 052Ds and 27 055s. And, notice, which I'm sure some will, that I haven't even considered units deployed with CBGs/CSGs, although, the expeditionary units could well fulfill this function.
Oh well, my 2 cents, or 1.76 euro cents!

Thanks for your thoughts.

I think you are far too high. They have no need for that many...and I do not believe the need will materialize in the foreseeable future.

As I said before, I can see:

06 Type 052Cs (this is already done)
18 Type 052Ds
12 Type 055s

When you couple th 36 very capable vessels with:

24 Type 054A FFGs
40 Type 056 Light Frigates

The PLAN becomes the second most powerful surface fleet in the world, and has the resource to meet what I believe will be its needs over the next 20+ years.

They do not need to match the US Navy in numbers. The US Navy has to maintain a very strong presence in every Ocean. The PLAN does not. The PLAN will be focused primarily in the Western Pacific, and in the SLOCs across to Africa and the Mid East.

Now, the numbers will vary somewhat...and as they age, new upgrades/variants, or new designs altogether will be created. But I believe they will maintain a force structure like this.

Of course (though this is not the thread for it) you have to remember at the same time that they are going probable maintain on the order of 48 SSKs, and probably end up with 12-18 SSNs.

Very powerful order of battle...and over the next ten years, all of it will be made up of modern, capable designs.

 

[lllchairmanlll]

Thanks for over rating my imagination. I can quote you 4 sources but I will not because I think your comment is somewhat petty given that we are talking about China watch.



I do not have problem with differing views nor in debating them provided it is substantive, but yours is not. I suggest you actually try to understand what I had posted and what you are attempting to convey before interjecting because words have meaning. I said the number was grounded on mission requirements and the minimum was one. Implicit in that, the number leaves the option of more than one. In contrast, you took the position of two which means implicitly it discounted one. Simple logic dictates one or more is easier to defend than at least two regardless of the force structure reasoning behind that number which we haven't even discussed. Btw, Wiki source says one or two for a US CBG.

Words have meanings, yes, but something like "Force structure planning is grounded on missions requirement and future scenario planning and where China wants to be eventually" is pretty much like saying PLAN builds 055 DDG because PLAN needs it. No need to point out this pile of words, I have faith that everybody already knew your "logic" here. And hey congratulation that you add some source to your post finally! Keep on doing that, we appreciate it!

"Currently we don't even know what the final form of the Type 055 and its capabilities." True, but are you referring to the category (Cruiser or DDG) and onborad subsystem (ie, X,L Band radar) ? Please be more specific next time. My guess is that type 055 is still a DDG (at least a report by Huanqiu.net referred 055 to a DDG) but with more diverse radar subsystem (X band radar is highly possible).

 

[Brumby]

Words have meanings, yes, but something like "Force structure planning is grounded on missions requirement and future scenario planning and where China wants to be eventually" is pretty much like saying PLAN builds 055 DDG because PLAN needs it. No need to point out this pile of words, I have faith that everybody already knew your "logic" here. And hey congratulation that you add some source to your post finally! Keep on doing that, we appreciate it!

You are using a lot of words but it is incomprehensible to me. Can you please be more direct and to the point.

"Currently we don't even know what the final form of the Type 055 and its capabilities." True, but are you referring to the category (Cruiser or DDG) and onborad subsystem (ie, X,L Band radar) ? Please be more specific next time. My guess is that type 055 is still a DDG (at least a report by Huanqiu.net referred 055 to a DDG) but with more diverse radar subsystem (X band radar is highly possible).

If type 055 is a DDG according to whatever that means for you, I think you still need to get to the point which still eludes me. Are you in the habit of expecting others to guess what you are trying to say?

 

[PanAsian]

As I said before, I can see:

06 Type 052Cs (this is already done)
18 Type 052Ds
12 Type 055s

When you couple th 36 very capable vessels with:

24 Type 054A FFGs
40 Type 056 Light Frigates

So Jeff do you not think there will be a 054B class of ships?

If the PLAN sees the 052D as obviating the need for a 054B class then I think there will be more 052D's, into the 30's. They would be replacing all the types from the transition/experimental years, the 051's and early 052's. Meanwhile the 053's will be replaced by 056's.

If there is a 054B class with 12 to 24 ships replacing all the 053's still in service then I think your number of 052D's and 056's are about right. But if not then I think the number of 056's, all variants, will be higher at least in the high 40's up to 60.

I think there will be fewer 055's than a dozen ships, or only as many on a 1:1 basis as there are CV/LHD/LPD's, so maybe 6 or 8.

 

[SpicySichuan]

So Jeff do you not think there will be a 054B class of ships?

If the PLAN sees the 052D as obviating the need for a 054B class then I think there will be more 052D's, into the 30's. They would be replacing all the types from the transition/experimental years, the 051's and early 052's. Meanwhile the 053's will be replaced by 056's.

If there is a 054B class with 12 to 24 ships replacing all the 053's still in service then I think your number of 052D's and 056's are about right. But if not then I think the number of 056's, all variants, will be higher at least in the high 40's up to 60.

I think there will be fewer 055's than a dozen ships, or only as many on a 1:1 basis as there are CV/LHD/LPD's, so maybe 6 or 8.

Don't forget that the type 052, 052B, 051B (Shenzhen), and 051C will most likely remain in service for the next 20-25 years. DDG 167 Shenzhen is undergoing massive modernization, possibly fitting out with VLS and AESA similar to that of 052D. Sorry for being off-topic!

 

[janjak desalin]

Let's not forget, also, that we're discussing the formation of battle fleets and not the arrangement of tableaux. Force planners, by necessity, must account for casualties/attrition in their assessments of procurement totals. Total procurement numbers comprise both essential strength and acceptable casualties. Depending upon the force, its mission, and the circumstantial context, acceptable casualty procurement might compose a significant proportion of a total.