00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread

[4Tran]

A high and increasing % of the air wings will be unmanned, which ameliorates the aircrew training problem considerably.

Does it really make that much of a difference? If we assume that PLAN carriers are supposed to have 4 fighter squadrons, how many would be replaced by UCAVs? I feel that they'd still want 3 manned squadrons. Aside from that, you'd want all of your specialty aircraft manned for the foreseeable future (aside from transports). So how much is really being saved?

Besides the number of maintainers will be unchanged; same the deck crew, and so on. Carriers require an awful lot of people to operate and there's no real way to avoid that.

The use case should be obvious.

Take a scenario where the US military decides to intervene because of Taiwan.

With 9 carriers, the Chinese Navy would likely be able to deploy more naval aviation in the Western Pacific than the US Navy.

For this scenario PLAAF aircraft already accomplishes this task. Besides there's no practical way for the USN to field more than 4 carriers in the Western Pacific.

 

[Mekconyov]

Does it really make that much of a difference? If we assume that PLAN carriers are supposed to have 4 fighter squadrons, how many would be replaced by UCAVs? I feel that they'd still want 3 manned squadrons. Aside from that, you'd want all of your specialty aircraft manned for the foreseeable future (aside from transports). So how much is really being saved?

Besides the number of maintainers will be unchanged; same the deck crew, and so on. Carriers require an awful lot of people to operate and there's no real way to avoid that.



For this scenario PLAAF aircraft already accomplishes this task. Besides there's no practical way for the USN to field more than 4 carriers in the Western Pacific.

Type04 CVN would be assembled, fitted with the operational subsystems, tested, evaluated, modified and then PLAN would start induction process. Whatever improvements would be needed those would be incorporated. Afterwards comes next aircraft carrier group and more aircraft carrier construction. For Taiwan there would be no war. Also Taiwan would not try to invade mainland China. China and Taiwan would resolve it without war, so would be with S/N Korea and Japan.

 

[AndrewS]

Does it really make that much of a difference? If we assume that PLAN carriers are supposed to have 4 fighter squadrons, how many would be replaced by UCAVs? I feel that they'd still want 3 manned squadrons. Aside from that, you'd want all of your specialty aircraft manned for the foreseeable future (aside from transports). So how much is really being saved?

Besides the number of maintainers will be unchanged; same the deck crew, and so on. Carriers require an awful lot of people to operate and there's no real way to avoid that.

For this scenario PLAAF aircraft already accomplishes this task. Besides there's no practical way for the USN to field more than 4 carriers in the Western Pacific.

We are looking at a situation where each manned fighter is accompanied by 2-4 high-end CCAs.

Note that some of those CCAs are single-engine sixth-gen unnamed air dominance fighters.

So future carrier airwings will be at most 20 manned fighters, maybe even just 10.

---

Also consider that given time, the US Navy could be expected to concentrate all its carriers in the Western Pacific.

So the Chinese Navy ideally has as many carriers as possible.

 

[GiantPanda]

I can see China having the capability of building that 9 carrier fleet, but constructing the air wings and training all the crews will be a significant challenge. What makes more skeptical though is that I just can't see a use case to justify all this expense. The US needs a lot of carriers because it wants to permanently station multiple carriers all over the world. This has a significant toll on the ships - making only about a third of them available at any time, and a significant toll on the crews. I have a hard time envisioning a world where the PLAN would want to have a carrier battlegroup in the Indian Ocean and another one in the Eastern Pacific at all times, so what would all these carriers be used for?

I think that there's only a use case for having about 6 carriers total. If we limit the STOBAR carriers to a purely training role, then that would bring up the total to 8, but that's going to be a fairly hard limit outside of a wartime scenario. Another thing to note is that the PLAN isn't in a hurry to build up to this number. Training the crews is going to take a long time anyways, and getting it right is a lot more important than getting them quickly.

The case is there. And it has nothing with basing a CBG in the Indian Ocean. China might have greater need of carriers than the US.

Because it could be existential for China not for power projection like the US.

China needs as many carrier groups in the China Seas and Western Pacific as possible because waters up to China's coast are still contested. And anything past the First Island Chain, means no air coverage unless there are carriers.

Having carrier groups at all times, especially during peace time, establish China's presence in its home waters and near abroad.

Six, nine or even twelve carrier groups are not too much for sovereignty and strategic depth.

 

[Blitzo]

The issue isn't whether the report writers are "exaggerating" Chinese aircraft carrier construction, nor is it relevant whether China has a need for 9 or more carriers or not (whether it's by 2035 or whenever).
The issue is whether the writers of the CMPR put much effort or thought into what they wrote in the first place, and what rights we have to discuss it as a viable prospect versus if it is just freewheeling speculation.

The reason why I strongly dislike everyone talking so much about the whole "9 carriers by 2035" notion from the CMPR, is that it gives the CMPR much more credibility than it deserves.

I would like everyone to recall that the CMPR is a public facing report with information compiled from public, non-classified sources.
That, combined with the questionable judgement of certain parts of the report (omitting key events and developments over the past year), and the questionable competency of the DoD/DoW under the current administration towards compiling these kinds of documents, means that really we should have no basis in making the "9 carriers by 2035" as if it is some sort of expectation.


Putting it another way -- the "9 carriers by 2035" notion shouldn't change our existing predictions/projections of PLAN carrier procurement, because past reports from the pentagon about Chinese procurement didn't affect our predictions and projections of PLAN carrier procurement either.

OTOH, if credible voices on the Chinese language grapevine explicitly made statements supporting the idea of 9 carriers by 2035 then that would be different.

 

[GiantPanda]

We are looking at a situation where each manned fighter is accompanied by 2-4 high-end CCAs.

Note that some of those CCAs are single-engine sixth-gen unnamed air dominance fighters.

So future carrier airwings will be at most 20 manned fighters, maybe even just 10.

---

Also consider that given time, the US Navy could be expected to concentrate all its carriers in the Western Pacific.

So the Chinese Navy ideally has as many carriers as possible.

The day that the PLAN has 12 carriers rotating patrols and providing air coverage for the surface fleet, Coast Guard and Maritime Militia as routine then it is fait accompli.

The ability for foreign intervention and the need for war in the Taiwan Strait drops to zero.

 

[Mekconyov]

The issue isn't whether the report writers are "exaggerating" Chinese aircraft carrier construction, nor is it relevant whether China has a need for 9 or more carriers or not (whether it's by 2035 or whenever).
The issue is whether the writers of the CMPR put much effort or thought into what they wrote in the first place, and what rights we have to discuss it as a viable prospect versus if it is just freewheeling speculation.

The reason why I strongly dislike everyone talking so much about the whole "9 carriers by 2035" notion from the CMPR, is that it gives the CMPR much more credibility than it deserves.

I would like everyone to recall that the CMPR is a public facing report with information compiled from public, non-classified sources.
That, combined with the questionable judgement of certain parts of the report (omitting key events and developments over the past year), and the questionable competency of the DoD/DoW under the current administration towards compiling these kinds of documents, means that really we should have no basis in making the "9 carriers by 2035" as if it is some sort of expectation.


Putting it another way -- the "9 carriers by 2035" notion shouldn't change our existing predictions/projections of PLAN carrier procurement, because past reports from the pentagon about Chinese procurement didn't affect our predictions and projections of PLAN carrier procurement either.

OTOH, if credible voices on the Chinese language grapevine explicitly made statements supporting the idea of 9 carriers by 2035 then that would be different.

Aircraft carriers take much longer to design, more longer to build and quite a significant time to test. Initial induction takes at least a year or more. Initial operational status needs more time then it leads to fully operational. By 2030 CV16 would retire and by 2035 CV-17 would relegate to training only if they are converted to CATOBAR with EMC. CV-18 would carry burden of training mostly then. At most we can expect 4 aircraft carrier being built by 2035. May be 1 more under construction, that is reasonable. But China is not in desperate situation so expect less. That is benign reality.

 

[4Tran]

We are looking at a situation where each manned fighter is accompanied by 2-4 high-end CCAs.

Note that some of those CCAs are single-engine sixth-gen unnamed air dominance fighters.

So future carrier airwings will be at most 20 manned fighters, maybe even just 10.

---

That's going to be something that's way in the future though. For the time being, manned fighters are much valuable than UCAVs. The main reason to go for the latter is because they're less expensive so they're a useful way to make up larger numbers. The equation for carriers is a bit difference because the most important variable is the limited storage space and sortie rates. Unless you can squeeze a lot more UCAVs into the same amount of space, or they can offer much higher sortie rates, you're generally going to want to have more manned fighters. As such, carriers with mostly unmanned fighters probably won't exist for another 20 years.

Also, this only counts for the fighter squadrons. All of the other aircraft, the EW planes, the AWACS planes, the S&R helicopters, and the ASW helicopters are all going to need be manned for the forseeable future. And even these only represent a small portion of the crew required to man carriers. It's just not something that can be rushed, and China simply isn't in a hurry to do so.

Also consider that given time, the US Navy could be expected to concentrate all its carriers in the Western Pacific.



So the Chinese Navy ideally has as many carriers as possible.

The USN simply can't move all 11 carriers to the Western Pacific. At any one time, only 3-4 are operational, with the others either in refit or in long term repair. The ones in refit can theoretically be rushed into service, but it'll take months before they're operational, so it's not going to happen until long after the start of hostilities. The US is unable to fight a long war so they'll probably never see action.

The case is there. And it has nothing with basing a CBG in the Indian Ocean. China might have greater need of carriers than the US.

Because it could be existential for China not for power projection like the US.

China needs as many carrier groups in the China Seas and Western Pacific as possible because waters up to China's coast are still contested. And anything past the First Island Chain, means no air coverage unless there are carriers.

Having carrier groups at all times, especially during peace time, establish China's presence in its home waters and near abroad.

Six, nine or even twelve carrier groups are not too much for sovereignty and strategic depth.

These waters aren't contested. There's no realistic scenario where the US is going to risk their CBGs in the China Seas, and they're likely to retreat behind the First Island Chain. Would having carriers be useful for China's strategy? Sure, but it's not that much of a difference maker.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Aircraft carriers take much longer to design, more longer to build and quite a significant time to test. Initial induction takes at least a year or more. Initial operational status needs more time then it leads to fully operational. By 2030 CV16 would retire and by 2035 CV-17 would relegate to training only if they are converted to CATOBAR with EMC. CV-18 would carry burden of training mostly then. At most we can expect 4 aircraft carrier being built by 2035. May be 1 more under construction, that is reasonable. But China is not in desperate situation so expect less. That is benign reality.

The CV-16 Liaoning just came out of its MLU only nearing 2 years ago. And according to the Guancha Gang, J-35 trial operations that hasn't yet been publicized have already been conducted by late-2024 if not early-2025 at the earliest. With the J-35, the Liaoning isn't going anywhere anytime soon.

The same goes for CV-17 Shandong. As of now, she isn;t equipped to operate J-35s, and it is expected that she will undergo MLU to enable this sometime in the coming years. Besides, the efforts of trying to convert Shandong to become CATOBAR-capable might as well go towards funding another brand new CATOBAR CV (or LHD/A).

And until China has at least 3 CATOBAR carriers in active service, none of the STOBAR twins will ever be relegated to training roles only, let alone retirement.

 

[lcloo]

Aircraft carriers take much longer to design, more longer to build and quite a significant time to test. Initial induction takes at least a year or more. Initial operational status needs more time then it leads to fully operational. By 2030 CV16 would retire and by 2035 CV-17 would relegate to training only if they are converted to CATOBAR with EMC. CV-18 would carry burden of training mostly then. At most we can expect 4 aircraft carrier being built by 2035. May be 1 more under construction, that is reasonable. But China is not in desperate situation so expect less. That is benign reality.

Where did you get the " By 2030 CV16 would retire and by 2035 CV-17 would relegate to training only if they are converted to CATOBAR with EMC. CV-18 would carry burden of training mostly then"?

Aircraft carrier normally has service life of 40-50 years. Which mean Liaoning will likely serve until 2050 or later. Note that we are talking about service life, not the "age" of the ship after it was launched.

And CV18 to be reallocated to training in leass than 5 years after its FOC? CV18 has not yet reach its IOC, and will likely achieve its FOC 4-5 years later after achieving IOC, which is after 2030.