00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
USS Yorktown (CV-5)?

CV-5 Yorktown was commissioned in 1937, not during WW2.

In fact, what I'm referring to are Allied fleet carriers that were commissioned post-December 1941. They were no longer bounded by the naval treaties, meaning that they can have larger displacements and designed to be have better protections and be more survivable.
 
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ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
Should still count USS Yorktown (CV-5) as the only US fleet carrier lost?

There were also the CV-8 Hornet and CV-2 Lexington, all of which (including Yorktown) were lost in 1942. After that, no Allied fleet carriers were ever lost to the enemy. Though there have been a few which suffered serious damages (CV-17 Bunker Hill and CV-13 Franklin for instance), yet they were able to limp back to base, which further reinforces my point.

Having said that, if you look at Battle of Midway and subsequent battles, the US was simply able to track down every single majour IJN capital ship. The US clearly had superior coding/decoding capabilities, intel gathering, and simply better and more numerous carrier-based aircrafts.

Yes, but those are beyond what I've explained. I'm mainly discussing about the ships themselves.

Either way, I hope I've already made my case (and we're risking the derailment of this thread).
 
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dingyibvs

Senior Member
Most would be spent on shipbuilding. This would be even more significant for a small carrier because it would need most of the same electronics a bigger carrier would need. The cost of propulsion doesn't decrease much with size too. Look at surface combatants to see how much a small warship costs. DDGs have the highest cost of any ship type relative to their weight. Because, as said, the cost of electronics and propulsion scale slower than the vessel displacement. This is true for the hull too, just to a less significant level. But it still is significant enough that civilian shipping is opting for the largest vessels possible.

The said facilities wouldn't be far smaller. The USS Ford already has a single operating room and just two emergency beds. There aren't many opportunities to scale down most things without losing the capability altogether.

Yes, it would need to act in groups or need a bigger carrier to back it up. It would also need the same escorts a large carrier would. These are all extra reasons to not to build it.

I would think that by far the most expensive electronics component would be the AESA radar, no?

Another, simpler addition to the explanations by @BoraTas and @ENTED64 in response to @dingyibvs:

All the costs and performance effectiveness considerations aside - Bar some rare, exceptional circumstances, larger warships are always going to be comparably better at sustaining wartime damages of similar magnitudes + Be able to make it out alive than smaller warships. This isn't just true for aircraft carriers, but applies for all surface warships.

Just take a look at WW2, which is when the latest large-caled naval battles were fought to date.

Speaking of the navies of the Allied Powers - While there have been some escort carriers (which mostly displace about the 10000-ton ranges at full load) that were lost to enemy actions, there have been no full-fledged fleet carriers (which displace at least 25000 tons at full load) commissioned after the start of the Pacific War that were lost to enemy action.

This is because larger fleet carriers have greater reserve buoyancies than smaller escort carriers (which is directly related to their larger hull volumes), meaning that they can actually take in more seawater before losing enough buoyancy and sink than their smaller counterparts. Their larger sizes also meant that damages caused by enemy munitions are always effecting smaller portions/regions of the larger warship (of which damage control teams can better isolate and control the damages) than smaller warships, where hits by the same munitions would result in damages to larger portions/regions of the smaller warship.

Other equally important factors include compartmentalization (e.g. watertight bulkheads and doors), distributed systems that are crucial for the basic operations of the ship (e.g. steering), and built-in redundancies are always going to be implemented to a greater degree in larger warships than in smaller warships too are fundamental towards ensuring their higher chances of survival.

This holds true during WW2 (and the same for WW1 as well for surface combatants), and is still very much holding true today. Moreover, compared to the unguided dumb bombs and rockets back then, current and future warships today are facing guided subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic missiles with pin-point accuracies today and going forward.

Therefore, the suggestion of "building smaller carriers that field only single-digit fighters for better attrition sustainment and distributed warfare" makes no sense. Building multiple such carriers just to have them easily sunk by only one or couple enemy hits is not smart - That's called needlessly sending men to die and material to be lost for no attainable gain, plus unnecessarily wasting finite money and resources which would otherwise be spent for better and more effective options.
That's a bit of a cart in front of the horse analysis, isn't it? A platform designed to be expendable and is used in such a way suffered more losses than one that's designed to be less expendable and is used accordingly, that's what you want and expected to happen. A foot soldier is much more likely to die than a general, not because the general is so much smarter/stronger/etc. and has so much better survival skills, but because a foot soldier is placed in more dangerous situations more often, sometimes with the goal of possibly dying so the general wouldn't. Surely a smaller ship is less survivable than a big one, but they're also much more easily replaceable as many more shipyards can build smaller ships and less training should be required to operate one.

The analysis would also need to be more in depth. Suppose you have a flotilla with a mega carrier and a super carrier vs. one with a mega carrier and 10 mini carriers. How much more money/lives would be lost for say 3 mini-carriers to be sunk vs. 1 super carrier to be disabled by a survivable strike? More importantly, how much fighting capability would you lose to have lost that one super carrier vs. having lost 3 mini carriers from your strike group? You would need to quantify at least these things to be able to properly weigh the pros and cons.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
That's a bit of a cart in front of the horse analysis, isn't it? A platform designed to be expendable and is used in such a way suffered more losses than one that's designed to be less expendable and is used accordingly, that's what you want and expected to happen. A foot soldier is much more likely to die than a general, not because the general is so much smarter/stronger/etc. and has so much better survival skills, but because a foot soldier is placed in more dangerous situations more often, sometimes with the goal of possibly dying so the general wouldn't. Surely a smaller ship is less survivable than a big one, but they're also much more easily replaceable as many more shipyards can build smaller ships and less training should be required to operate one.

The analysis would also need to be more in depth. Suppose you have a flotilla with a mega carrier and a super carrier vs. one with a mega carrier and 10 mini carriers. How much more money/lives would be lost for say 3 mini-carriers to be sunk vs. 1 super carrier to be disabled by a survivable strike? More importantly, how much fighting capability would you lose to have lost that one super carrier vs. having lost 3 mini carriers from your strike group? You would need to quantify at least these things to be able to properly weigh the pros and cons.

Your claim that a tiny fleet of "mega-carriers" supported by numerous "mini-carriers" being superior to traditional supercarriers is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of naval warfare.

Your argument fails by thinking that expendability = efficiency. But naval warfare isn’t about throwing cheap ships into battle like infantry in a trench (as you seem to imply). Even the "mini-carriers" require trained crews, aircraft, fuel, munitions, and escorts to operate each and every one of them - All of which consumes precious time, effort, material and money, especially when they are getting procured in large numbers. This means that their loss still represents a significant drain on the finite manpower and resources available to the navy at any given time.

You cannot just equate and scale ships up or down like infantry, because they are NOT the same.

There's also the angle of actual combat effectiveness. A single large-sized carrier/supercarrier is capable of fielding 70+ aircraft, generate 100+ sorties per day (for missions at above 500 kilometers from home carrier), and provide organic AEW&C, EW and aerial refueling (buddy-tanking) capabilities for the allied fleet. 10 such "mini-carriers" might collectively carry a similar number of jets, but have you ever thought of the complexity and challenges of planning and coordinating such massive fleets of warplanes which are spread across multiple ship and distances? This is the same whether the warplanes are for CAP, interception, strike or reconnaissance missions.

Like, have you ever done coordination roles in events of substantial scales before? It's anything but easy and straightforward.



Plus, to add on to @BoraTas -
There are fixed costs and requirements to operate aircraft from a carrier, and those fixed costs mean that the navy should get as much carrier capabilities as they can reasonably get in order to maximize the value for the fixed costs. This is the same calculus that results in most cargo or cruise ships being practically mammoth-sized today, with their resent constrains only due to the sizes of shipyards, port facilities and canals.

Every aircraft carrier needs X amount of propulsion system crews, X amount of aircraft maintenance crews, X amount of strike planners, X amount of hangar and flight decks handlers, etc etc. The size of these crews don't scale nearly as high with a higher number of aircraft. On the other hand, the so-called "mini-carriers" are the worst of both worlds - It carries very few aircraft, but still needs this same amount of crew and equipment to maintain that handful of aircrafts deployed onboard, let alone the fact that such smaller carriers needs to cramp all those people in small hulls. Hence, your "distributed mini-carrier fleet" don't work as magical as you think it might.



In fact, let me stress this one - Distributed warfare only works when each unit is effective by itself and be able to contribute well to the overall effort - Of which your so-called "mini-carriers" certainly aren’t. They are absolutely going to succumb to anti-ship missiles way easier than large-sized carriers and supercarriers, while simultaneously failing to deliver the concentrated firepower needed to both conduct and win battles at sea.

Last-but-not-least - If anything, the USN did come up with ideas and proposals of going back to smaller carriers during the height of the Cold War, which is similar to the so-called "mini-carriers". They are the Sea Control Ship and VSTOL Support Ship, with full-load displacements of ~10000 tons for the former and 20000+ tons for the latter. So how about go figure out why they neither of them made it into the shipyard drydocks?

TL; DR - Your idea is not 1 + 1 > 2, but 1 + 1 < 1.5.
 
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TK3600

Major
Registered Member
It usually stems from American realizing their carrier is not the automatic winning wunderwaffe. But instead of coming up with a better strategy, they tunnel vision on changing a perfectly good weapon. All this time they could find another way to win and have the carrier do a more supportive role as it always should have been.
 

dingyibvs

Senior Member
Your claim that a tiny fleet of "mega-carriers" supported by numerous "mini-carriers" being superior to traditional supercarriers is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of naval warfare.

Your argument fails by thinking that expendability = efficiency. But naval warfare isn’t about throwing cheap ships into battle like infantry in a trench (as you seem to imply). Even the "mini-carriers" require trained crews, aircraft, fuel, munitions, and escorts to operate each and every one of them - All of which consumes precious time, effort, material and money, especially when they are getting procured in large numbers. This means that their loss still represents a significant drain on the finite manpower and resources available to the navy at any given time.

You cannot just equate and scale ships up or down like infantry, because they are NOT the same.

There's also the angle of actual combat effectiveness. A single large-sized carrier/supercarrier is capable of fielding 70+ aircraft, generate 100+ sorties per day (for missions at above 500 kilometers from home carrier), and provide organic AEW&C, EW and aerial refueling (buddy-tanking) capabilities for the allied fleet. 10 such "mini-carriers" might collectively carry a similar number of jets, but have you ever thought of the complexity and challenges of planning and coordinating such massive fleets of warplanes which are spread across multiple ship and distances? This is the same whether the warplanes are for CAP, interception, strike or reconnaissance missions.

Like, have you ever done coordination roles in events of substantial scales before? It's anything but easy and straightforward.



Plus, to add on to @BoraTas -
There are fixed costs and requirements to operate aircraft from a carrier, and those fixed costs mean that the navy should get as much carrier capabilities as they can reasonably get in order to maximize the value for the fixed costs. This is the same calculus that results in most cargo or cruise ships being practically mammoth-sized today, with their resent constrains only due to the sizes of shipyards, port facilities and canals.

Every aircraft carrier needs X amount of propulsion system crews, X amount of aircraft maintenance crews, X amount of strike planners, X amount of hangar and flight decks handlers, etc etc. The size of these crews don't scale nearly as high with a higher number of aircraft. On the other hand, the so-called "mini-carriers" are the worst of both worlds - It carries very few aircraft, but still needs this same amount of crew and equipment to maintain that handful of aircrafts deployed onboard, let alone the fact that such smaller carriers needs to cramp all those people in small hulls. Hence, your "distributed mini-carrier fleet" don't work as magical as you think it might.



In fact, let me stress this one - Distributed warfare only works when each unit is effective by itself and be able to contribute well to the overall effort - Of which your so-called "mini-carriers" certainly aren’t. They are absolutely going to succumb to anti-ship missiles way easier than large-sized carriers and supercarriers, while simultaneously failing to deliver the concentrated firepower needed to both conduct and win battles at sea.

Last-but-not-least - If anything, the USN did come up with ideas and proposals of going back to smaller carriers during the height of the Cold War, which is similar to the so-called "mini-carriers". They are the Sea Control Ship and VSTOL Support Ship, with full-load displacements of ~10000 tons for the former and 20000+ tons for the latter. So how about go figure out why they neither of them made it into the shipyard drydocks?

TL; DR - Your idea is not 1 + 1 > 2, but 1 + 1 < 1.5.

I agree that there are numerous challenges to my suggestions, but perhaps more effort should be made to address those challenges rather than sticking to conventional wisdom. For example, coordination can perhaps be streamlined by AI, scalability can perhaps be solved by automation, perhaps construction can be more aligned with commercial standards than military standards, it may even be barely manned or fully unmanned mini-carriers carrying CCAs.

Scalability is actually a key potential advantage of such a platform and design should be done to maximize it. Say if war breaks out in the medium term and half of each fleet's carriers are destroyed in major battles, how quickly can they be replenished? It would take quite a few years even for a great shipbuilding nation like China. A few dozen 10,000 ton mini-carriers that are basically 055 hulls with a flight deck attached? That can probably be done within a year. If research and planning was done ahead of the time like I suggest right now, these things can be pumped out like dumplings by a countless number of shipyards in a countless number of drydocks in China.

What IMO has been understated is where bottlenecks may be in a fully industrialized 21st century naval battle. It won't be the "fixed costs" you mentioned like maintenance crews, deck crews, etc. It won't even be the cost of fiat currencies in a war-time economy. It'll be the ridiculous time it takes to construct the capital ships because of the infrastructure it requires to build them.

To your point re: distributed warfare, your point is well taken. I agree that my suggested doctrine will need further refinement, and that surrounding mega carriers with mini carriers isn't exactly a good example of distributed warfare. The optimal doctrine will certainly need to be built up, but a doctrinal shift IMO needs to happen to take advantage of advancements of modern technology. Simply building bigger, better carriers smacks of building bigger, heavier armored battleships with bigger guns pre-WW2. This isn't unlike ground forces around the world so focused on better armored tanks with bigger guns pre-Ukraine. Modern advancements in AI, unmanned systems, telecommunications, modular construction methods, etc. all need to be exploited to the maximum to result in a revolution in naval doctrine, and mini carriers is just one such platform which possibly can fit into a new doctrine.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
I agree that there are numerous challenges to my suggestions, but perhaps more effort should be made to address those challenges rather than sticking to conventional wisdom.
coordination can perhaps be streamlined by AI,
scalability can perhaps be solved by automation,
perhaps construction can be more aligned with commercial standards than military standards,
it may even be barely manned or fully unmanned mini-carriers carrying CCAs.
A few dozen 10,000 ton mini-carriers that are basically 055 hulls with a flight deck attached? That can probably be done within a year.
If research and planning was done ahead of the time like I suggest right now, these things can be pumped out like dumplings by a countless number of shipyards in a countless number of drydocks in China.
What IMO has been understated is where bottlenecks may be in a fully industrialized 21st century naval battle. It won't be the "fixed costs" you mentioned like maintenance crews, deck crews, etc. It won't even be the cost of fiat currencies in a war-time economy. It'll be the ridiculous time it takes to construct the capital ships because of the infrastructure it requires to build them.
Modern advancements in AI, unmanned systems, telecommunications, modular construction methods, etc. all need to be exploited to the maximum to result in a revolution in naval doctrine, and mini carriers is just one such platform which possibly can fit into a new doctrine.

I call these results of the TechBro Syndrome. Nuff said.
 
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