South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

bluewater2012 said:

Duterte is native, what Spanish would call indio. They are anti-colonialist, ie anti-American.

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... one of the “injustices” that presumptive President-elect Rodrigo Duterte wants to correct during his administration is how Filipinos see the Bisaya hero Lapu-Lapu. Duterte told reporters in a press briefing that he will make Lapu-Lapu “a proper hero” for being the first to fight the Spanish forces who landed on the island of Cebu centuries ago.

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Last year I asked a ranking Pentagon planner what America would do about China’s ship-killer missiles, which reportedly can sink an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred miles from its coast. If China wants to deny the American navy access to the South China Sea, the official replied, we can do the same: persuade Japan to manufacture surface-to-ship missiles and station them in the Philippines.

It didn’t occur to Washington that the Philippines might not want to take on China. The country’s president-elect Rodrigo Duterte explained last year (as

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reported in the Wall Street Journal), “America would never die for us. If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened … America is afraid to go to war. We’re better off making friends with China.”

It isn’t only the Philippines who see the obvious. China

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of 40 countries for its position that territorial claims to the South China Sea should be resolved by direct negotiations between individual countries, rather than before a United Nations tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on Law of the Seas, as Washington wants. A joint statement by the foreign ministers of China, Russia and India after a meeting in Moscow last month supported China’s position.

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US, China closer on South China Sea issues than they appear
President Xi Jinping has termed the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) role as leading the "Great Rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation after a century of weakness and humiliation. But the outcome of the second phase of reforms, even if completely successful, will be slower growth, as the CCP has itself acknowledged. The "Great Rejuvenation" must therefore be as much, if not more, outwardly than internally directed. Externally, it is increasingly an essentially revanchist narrative. Herein lies the importance of the South China Sea (SCS) to China. Put simply, it is the least risky way of putting some shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which the CCP justifies its right to rule.

The United States defines its interests in the SCS in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation (FON). These are important interests but not of the same order as the CCP's primary interest, which is existential: the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the CCP. The US has made clear that the US-Japan alliance covers the Senkakus; it has been ambiguous about the US-Philippines alliance, and hence in effect made clear that it does not cover the disputed areas in the SCS. War in support of the principal US East Asian ally is credible, if unlikely. War over rocks, shoals and reefs would be absurd.

I doubt that China can be deterred from continuing its reclamation activities and deploying military assets on the artificial islands it is creating. But I doubt too that China can deter the US from operating in the SCS. Military assets that cannot be used are a weak deterrent. To use them to deny access must evoke a US response. This confronts the CCP with Hobson's choice: escalate and risk war or at least serious conflict which will jeopardise CCP rule; or respond weakly, which will expose the hollowness of the "Great Rejuvenation", which will also shake confidence in CCP rule. The CCP will not willingly place itself in such an invidious position.

China's bluster masks this dilemma. Beijing has carefully kept each action in the SCS below a threshold that must draw a response from even the most reluctant of US administrations. Miscalculations and accidents can of course happen. If an accident occurs, the highly nationalistic public opinion that the CCP both cultivates and fears could lead Beijing down a path it does not want to travel. But the probability of accidents can be minimised. China has of late taken a more positive attitude towards rules of engagement for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air. If we look past the chest-thumping by both sides, the probability of US-China competition in the SCS becoming ritualised is not to be discounted.

I think the process is already under way. In my view, there are less differences between the US and China on FON than immediately meets the eye. I think differences over what military activities are acceptable in another country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) reflect differences of capability rather than irreconcilable differences of concept.

China says that it has not and will never impede FON in the SCS. This is credible in so far as the merchant marine is concerned because China, too, is a trading nation. The US riposte is that there is a difference between FON granted by the leave and favour of a major power and FON as a right enshrined in international law. This is true. But the US is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and says it considers Unclos largely customary international law and abides by it on that basis. It does not take an extreme sceptic to consider this a gentler way of saying that the US too grants FON by its leave and favour, because of a particular calculation of American national interests and not an obligation it must fulfil irrespective of such calculations. Some American interpretations of FON have been questionable, for example, when it tried to assert the right to stop and search vessels on the high seas under the Proliferation Security Initiative after 9/11. One may have more trust in one major power's leave and favour than another's, but that is a matter of political choice and not international law.

There is at present a difference of interpretation between the US and China over what military activities are permissible under Unclos in another country's EEZ. But is this an irreconcilable difference of concept or does the apparent difference of concept reflect only a difference of capability? I am not so sure.

In 2014, China sent an uninvited surveillance vessel to the RIMPAC exercise that was being conducted off Hawaii. That same year, it conducted a major naval exercise in the eastern Indian Ocean between Christmas Island and Indonesia. Last year, the PLA Navy rather cheekily sent a flotilla through US territorial waters off Alaska while President Barack Obama was visiting that state. The PLA justified its actions in terms that could have been used by a spokesman for the Seventh Fleet. At present, the PLA Navy can only make such deployments sporadically. But its capabilities will develop and as capabilities converge so may concepts, and as concepts converge so may interests.

Over time, a more symmetrical naval equation must develop in the SCS. When this occurs, it is likely that some implicit or de facto agreement over the SCS will be reached between the US and China. When this occurs - and I believe it is more a question of when and how, not whether - countries like Cambodia and the Philippines which now define the extremities of the positions of Asean members on the SCS may well find themselves too far out on a limb for comfort. When big countries reach agreement, they generally try to make small countries pay the price.

Nothing I have said is intended to imply that the US presence in South-east Asia is unwelcome. But in South-east Asia the American porridge is always going to be too hot or too cold. It is extremely difficult to get the temperature just right to suit the tastes of all countries in a politically diverse region. Some countries will always fear abandonment while others will always fear entanglement. This is the reality that inevitably confronts an offshore balancer and its allies. It is one of the burdens of global power. But, of late, the US has itself unnecessarily added to its own burdens.

American intervention in Iraq, and later in Libya and Syria in support of the UK and France, left those countries irrevocably broken. But the US is now doing its best to walk away. When the "Arab Spring" broke out - a singularly inappropriate metaphor because after spring inevitably comes summer and Arab summers are notoriously hot - within the space of a mere week, the US shifted from treating President Hosni Mubarak as a valued and steadfast 30-year ally to unceremoniously dumping him. In South-east Asia, this evoked echoes of how the US had treated President Suharto, another 30-year ally. The US drew a "red line" in Syria which quickly faded entirely away as the Obama administration desperately grabbed at the threadbare line thrown to it by Russia. And all this at a time when China was constantly reminding Asean in ways subtle and not so subtle that it was a geographical fact, whereas the American presence in South-east Asia was only a geopolitical calculation.

In this respect, the metaphor of the "pivot" or "rebalance" was also inappropriate, connoting discontinuity. What "pivots" or "rebalances" one way could swing another. Instead, the stress should have been on the essential continuity of US policy in East Asia over the last 30 years or more, which has the additional advantage of being true. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) helps mitigate the possibility of a sharp swing in US policy, but is not a substitute for political consistency. The American system impels each new administration to stress differences even when there is none. Do not assume everyone in South-east Asia understands the eccentricities of the US system and will discount political rhetoric. But I do not think that what Mr Donald Trump and Mrs Hillary Clinton have said about the TPP can be entirely dismissed as campaign rhetoric. They were responding to a political mood that any new president cannot ignore, whatever his/her own inclinations.

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Let me concede that Asean has not dealt with the complexities of the SCS particularly well. Asean's basic and enduring purpose is to maintain a modicum of order and civility in relations among its members in a region where this is not to be taken for granted. On this score, Asean has not done badly. But Asean is divided on the SCS and will remain divided. We occasionally are able to come up with useful statements on the SCS. Still, statements are only just that: Statements do not change realities on the ground.

Asean constantly stresses its "centrality". But if Asean is "central", it is not because of our strategic weight but because our lack of strategic weight enables major powers to find Asean-led forums such as the Asean Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit occasionally useful, while remaining confident that Asean cannot frustrate their most vital designs. And if we look like doing something even minimally effective on the SCS, China will not hesitate to divide Asean, as it did in 2012 and again just a few weeks ago. I don't think China was behaving unusually. It was behaving as all big countries do on issues which they consider their core interest.

If I am right about how China defines its primary interest in the SCS, then it connects directly with the most vital of all its interests. For a hundred years, the legitimacy of all Chinese governments has been measured by its ability to defend China's borders and sovereignty. The artificial islands may be of limited military utility, but they serve a vital domestic purpose and additionally impresses the natives - that's us - with China's inescapable contiguity. Of late, China has even taken umbrage at references to the disputed areas as being in dispute because they have been Chinese territory since "ancient times", or so they claim.

What autonomy Asean currently enjoys on the SCS is due to the US presence, which is an irreplaceable element of the regional balance. But Asean does not define balance as being directed against one major power or another as during the Cold War. The small countries of South-east Asia conceive of "balance" as an omnidirectional state of equilibrium that will allow us to maintain the best possible relationship with all the major powers and avoid being forced into invidious choices. Avoiding invidious choices does not mean avoiding taking positions, lying low, saying nothing meaningful and hoping for the best. To duck on such a central issue as the SCS is to surrender autonomy. What it does mean is leaving open the maximum range of options when positions are taken.

Balance in this sense requires psychological as well as material equilibrium; it is a frame of mind. The US is an irreplaceable component to the material balance. But while the US and its allies can build capacity in those Asean countries that are deficient, warships, fighter aircraft and submarines are necessary but insufficient conditions to maintain such a frame of mind. And as I have argued, some US actions have even undermined psychological equilibrium in South-east Asia.

Internal developments in Asean members are crucial to maintaining psychological equilibrium. Here what happens on land is as important as what happens at sea. China's growing economic ties with South-east Asia and the many infrastructure projects planned or under way are binding south-west China and mainland South-east Asia into one economic space. This is to be welcomed on economic grounds but inevitably changes calculations of interest. It was a strategic mistake for the US and Japan to have stayed out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Japan is investing in South-east Asian infrastructure. But what Japan alone can do in mitigation is limited. If the US and Japan were in the AIIB, it would have had a greater effect. Fortunately, it is not an irreversible mistake. Asean countries are not alone in being psychologically vulnerable. It was not too long ago that a former Australian prime minister concluded, for broadly similar economic reasons, that Australia's alliance with the US had become a strategic liability.

If Singapore has been more resistant to this Chinese tactic, it is not because we are less venal than others or because of our superior wisdom, but from harsh necessity. We are the only ethnic Chinese- majority country in a region where the Chinese are typically a less-than-fully-welcome minority. We organise ourselves on the basis of multiracial meritocracy where typically countries in our region organise themselves on the basis of the dominance of one ethnic group or another. China nevertheless constantly refers to Singapore as a "Chinese country" that should therefore "understand" China better and hints at undefined but vast rewards if we should "explain" China to other Asean countries. We politely but firmly tell the Chinese that we are not a Chinese country. We understand all too well that when the Chinese seek our "understanding" they mean "obey" and by "explain", they mean use whatever influence we may have in Asean on their behalf. If we were ever foolish enough to accept their characterisation and do their bidding, the multiracial meritocratic compact on which independent Singapore rests would be at least severely strained, if not broken.

Singapore's success rests on this foundation of social cohesion. Once lost it will be very difficult if not well-nigh impossible to regain, particularly if the Government is regarded as complicit. But it would be equally foolish to alienate China which, even at a slower rate of growth, is going to be a major factor in our economic future. Maintaining a good relationship with China, while retaining the autonomy to pursue our own interests as we define them, is not a matter of choice; for us, it is a matter of survival.

We have so far managed this delicate balancing act. But Singapore is only 50 years old and not all our compatriots understand this reality and are not immune to Chinese seductions. This understanding must be, has been and, I have no doubt, will sooner or later again, have to be enforced by the exercise of the coercive powers that are the legitimate monopoly of the state. And exercised in a way that is entirely in accordance with our laws, but will probably be regarded by some of our partners, the US included, as arbitrary and in conflict with values that they hold dear. We have also deployed such powers against American attempts to influence our internal dynamics and again, I have no doubt, we will have to do so again in the future.

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By

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, CNN
Updated 1549 GMT (2349 HKT) May 22, 2016

Last year, a group of men from a Chinese-flagged vessel chased his boat, catching him and his sons, and threatening them.
"They raided our boat. First they took our fish, then the essential equipment. If they liked it, they took it. If they didn't, they threw it away," he said.
He estimated his boat has been targeted four or five times over the past decade.
Once his son was held for three days; he was badly injured after being beaten and tasered at the spine.
"He had to stay home for three months and could not go to work," Tan told CNN.
Vietnamese authorities believe Tan and hundreds of other fishermen like him have become targets because they operate in the Paracel Islands, disputed territory claimed by Vietnam, China and Taiwan.

They are caught in an international spat over territory in the South China Sea -- a clash that's frayed diplomatic relations within Asia, and sits high on the agenda as

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on Monday.

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to justify claiming territory that lies hundreds of miles to the south and east of its island province, Hainan.
Many others object to that -- with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei all offering competing claims.

Fisherman caught in the fray
Located off the east coast of Vietnam, the remote island of Ly Son is just 10 square kilometers (3.8 square miles) and wasn't connected to the national power grid until October 2014. It is home to around 1,000 fishermen who work in the Paracels, including Tan.

According to the local government, 200 Ly Son fishermen and 17 fishing boats reported being attacked by Chinese vessels in 2015.
China's foreign ministry says it has no knowledge of Vietnamese fisherman beating beaten or expelled from the area, which it claims as "indisputable" Chinese territory.
Since 1999, China has instituted a summer

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, saying it protects the sustainability of the industry. "China has the authority to administer its territorial waters because of our sovereignty," Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, said in response to a question from CNN. "As I understand it, China's maritime authorities have always enforced laws in a civilized manner."

'This area belongs to Vietnam'
Despite the risk, Pham Thi Huong, a senior official in Ly Son, said authorities encourage the fishermen to keep going to the Paracels, which she describes as a traditional and crucial source of income for the island. "By going out to the sea again, they confirm that this area belongs to Vietnam... That is undeniable," she said.

CNN wasn't allowed to speak to the Ly Son fishermen without a government minder present. But Vietnam's national government actively promotes the stories of the Ly Son fishermen and are keen to show them off as examples of China's aggression. Authorities support the fisherman with cash payments to replace lost fishing equipment and help pay for medical bills.

Because of their belief in Vietnam's ownership of the island, regular Vietnamese citizens also contribute money to the fishermen's cause, according to the President of Ly Son's Fisheries Association, Nguyen Quoc Trinh. "This is the force, the motivating force that makes our fishermen feel safe when we go out to the sea," he said.

Opportunity for United States
Political analysts say China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has threatened regional players and

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to build ties in countries like Vietnam.
Vietnam has also engaged in reclamation activities, but on a smaller scale.
The AMTI estimated Vietnam has created just over 120 acres, or half a square kilometer, of new land.

Before President Obama's visit, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel R. Russel, described Vietnam as "a partner in upholding the Law of the Sea and the rule of law in maritime space, in resolving peacefully the tensions and disputes in the South China Sea."

Vietnam, for its part, doesn't seem upset by the Freedom of Navigation operations.
In January, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Le Hai Binh, responded to one such operation by saying: "Vietnam respects the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."

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Last Monday, Duterte met Ziao Jianhua, China's ambassador to the Philippines, and openly asked that small fishermen be allowed to navigate the disputed reaches. He did not broach the subject of China's presence on Scarborough shoal.

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By Manolo B. Jara May 22, 2016

MANILA: China has stopped harassing Filipinos from using their traditional fishing ground in a disputed shoal in the South China Sea apparently due to a “paradigm shift” in the position taken by Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, the presumptive president, to resolve the issue, two officials confirmed on Saturday.

“The situation at the Scarborough Shoal has dramatically changed,” Professor Rommel Banlaoi, the head of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, told GMA News.

“Filipino fishermen,” Banlaloi added, “are no longer experiencing intense harassment particularly from the China coast guard,” particularly the use of water cannons to drive them away.

Asis Perez, the head of Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), confirmed Banlaoi’s statement in a separate interview, saying that Filipinos are now freely fishing at the shoal, their traditional fishing ground known in the Philippines as Panatag Shoal and Bajo de Masinloc.

“We haven’t heard of any complaints. That can be an indication that there are no more adverse consequences on Filipino fisherman,” Asis pointed out.

Banlaoi attributed the change to Duterte’s “paradigm shift” in his stand on the unresolved dispute between the Philippines and China over the disputed shoal that has reached the UN international arbitral court in The Hague, Netherlands.

In an earlier statement, Duterte said he might opt for a bilateral dialogue with China if there is no other prospect for the peaceful resolution of the dispute that also involves Philippine neighbours like Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei in the South China Sea. But Banlaoi said he believes Duterte would not withdraw the Philippine petition pending before the UN arbitral tribunal which Manila expects to hand down its ruling sometime in May.

China has repeatedly said it would not participate in the tribunal’s deliberations and warned it would not recognize nor comply with its ruling on the issue.

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confusion said:

The Vietnamese government officially back 1000 fishermen to fish in the Paracel Islands - unlike China, the US press doesn't refer to this as a hidden militia, but instead spins a story of poor Vietnamese fishermen being bullied by China.

Note: the fishermen spoke with CNN under the direction of Vietnamese government officials - what do you expect them to say?

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authorities encourage the fishermen to keep going to the Paracels

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Authorities support the fisherman with cash payments to replace lost fishing equipment and help pay for medical bills.

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MANILA (Reuters) - A Malaysian naval patrol detained three Philippine fishermen for encroaching in territorial waters in the disputed Spratlys this month, the Philippine military said on Tuesday (May 24), in what may be the first-such incident involving South-east Asian neighbours.

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On May 9, the Philippine vessel was about 29km south-west of Commodore Reef, one of nine Philippine-held territories in the South China Sea, when a Malaysian patrol boat intercepted it for encroaching in territorial waters.

When the vessel tried to flee, the patrol boat gave chase, and briefly detained the fishermen. Hours later they were turned over to Philippine troops stationed on Commodore Reef, a Philippine navy spokesman said.

"The Western Command is saddened by the incident involving our fellow Filipinos," Captain Cherryl Tindog said in a statement, adding that the fishermen received medical treatment."They are in stable condition, except for some bruises."

The statement gave no reason for the time elapsed since the event.

The fishermen complained of having been punched and kicked during questioning by the Malaysian Navy after being apprehended, Capt Tindog added. "We were treated like criminals," Mr Nelson Plamiano, one of the fishermen, told broadcaster GMA 7.

The Malaysian Navy did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Philippine military directed questions on diplomacy and policy issues to the Philippine Foreign Ministry, which did not respond to queries from Reuters.

Malaysia and the Philippines have overlapping exclusive economic zones in the disputed South China Sea, which is believed to have rich deposits of oil and gas and is almost entirely claimed by China.

But Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also claim the sea, through which about US$5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year.

Political analysts say the incident was the first reported to involve the Malaysian navy and Philippine fishermen since a 2012 escalation of tension in the South China Sea, when China harrassed Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen in the Spratlys.

Malaysia's handling of the Philippine fishermen was a violation of an informal code of conduct signed in Cambodia in 2002, said Mr Jay Batongbacal, an expert in maritime law from the University of the Philippines.

"Our Department of Foreign Affairs should talk to Malaysia about this incident, because hitting our fishermen was not part of any agreement," he added.

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confusion said:

Following this request from Duterte,


China is now allowing Filipino fishermen to fish at Scarborough:

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Three Vietnamese ships looking for shelter from high winds at the Philippines’ Scarborough Shoal on Tuesday were denied access by Chinese vessels, Vietnam’s search and rescue committee said Wednesday.

According to a release from the Office of the National Search and Rescue Committee (SAR), three Vietnamese vessels sent requests around noon on Tuesday for shelter at the Scarborough Shoal due to force-seven winds at sea.

The ships had set off from the central Vietnamese province of Quang Nam carrying 134 fishermen and were at coordinates 15o00’N 117o44’E near the Scarborough Shoal at the time the requests were sent, according to SAR.

Scarborough Shoal is located 220 kilometers from the Filipino Luzon Island and 650 kilometers away from China’s Hainan, well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

In April 2012, Philippine and Chinese ships had a major standoff and Beijing has since occupied the shoal.

After receiving distress calls from the fishing boats, Vietnam’s SAR requested the Consular Office under the foreign ministry to ask Filipino authorities to allow the Vietnamese ships safe entry into the shoal.

The fishing ships, however, were reportedly fenced off from approaching the Scarborough Shoal by four Chinese vessels, and were still at sea at 2:00 pm on Wednesday, according to SAR.

SAR said they were working closely with the Border Defense Force and Vietnam Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Center to maintain communication with the Vietnamese ships and guide them to safety on the Philippines’ Luzon Island.

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12:01 AM ET
Photographer Chiara Goia and TIME's Hannah Beech sailed the South China Sea

Chiara Goia for TIME
The "Wonder Boy" a 36-foot bamboo outrigger boat, on which TIME's East Asia bureau chief Hannah Beech and photographer Chiara Goia, made their voyage to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, May 10, 2016.


The Wonder Boy, a 36-foot bamboo outrigger boat, was lost. Using GPS coordinates provided by the Philippine navy, we had sailed to somewhere in the middle of the South China Sea—or the West Philippine Sea, as locals call it. But our destination was nowhere to be found. Instead, all we could see around us were varying shades of blue: cobalt waves, turquoise sky and an azure confluence of both at the horizon.

The South China Sea may be one of the most strategic and contested waterways on Earth, a watery frontline between two superpowers, as this week’s TIME magazine story

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. But the sea’s empty expanse belies its geopolitical significance. On a four-day sail through the contested Spratlys, which are claimed in part or in whole by six governments, we passed just a handful of other boats. Only an occasional dolphin or flying fish broke the waves.

Photographer Chiara Goia and I were traveling on the Wonder Boy with a four-man crew from the Philippine island of Palawan. Our boat had no radio, no maps and no satellite navigation system—merely a handheld GPS device and some coordinates for Philippine military outposts. The journey began with a broken motor: a couple miles offshore, we stalled for an afternoon while the crew jury-rigged the fanbelt with some plastic bits ripped by teeth and machete. A day later, through choppy seas, we arrived at our first destination: Flat Island, also known as Patag, where seven sunburned soldiers guard a sandbar on behalf of the Philippines.

Knowing that the detachment only receives supplies every two months, we had arrived with goodies: Philippine brandy, cigarettes and lad mags. The men were grateful but Chiara was not. She wanted them to look up from the pin-ups and return to their routine so she could document life on this spit of sand. At our next stop—Nanshan, a slightly larger Spratly island referred to locally as Lawak—we made sure to distribute the gifts at the end of our stay, so as not to disturb normal schedules.

Hannah and Chiara on the “Wonder Boy”.
Besides, Nanshan was blessed with a satellite link that, when it worked, allowed the soldiers to watch the NBA playoffs and Philippines league games. Outside their barracks, the men had fashioned a basketball hoop from a decapitated palm tree. Other amusement came from watching seabirds swoop in to nest on an island whose brackish water could sustain a bit of animal life. But on our visit to Nanshan, a heatwave had littered the ground with dead fledglings. High temperatures notwithstanding, hoops were a better bet.

Our last destination was to be the Sierra Madre, a World War II-era American warship that the Philippine navy had deliberately run aground on Second Thomas Shoal to serve as a makeshift military outpost. Chinese coast guard vessels—like the ones that had just glided past Flat Island—occasionally tried to stop resupplies from reaching the rusting warship. Our failure to reach Second Thomas Shoal, however, was courtesy of a map-reading snafu at the Philippine naval operations center.

Eventually, as dusk fell, we came across a tuna-fishing trawler that pointed us in the direction of another ship that had a map. Again we set sail but the next day discovered that circumnavigating a treacherous shoal would add days to our journey. We had enough drinking water, and the crew caught yellow-fin tuna and snapper to sustain us. But gas was running low. I was tired of sleeping on a sack of rice, Chiara cradling a watermelon. So the Wonder Boy turned east, back toward Palawan. When we finally reached shore, our crew—Jerry and Noynoy, Ray and Babu—were welcomed by children and the smell of dinner, freshly cooked, that for generations has beckoned fishermen home.

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