BLUEJACKET
Banned Idiot
Re: How Do You Sink A Carrier?
So, How do you like my arsenal aircraft concept as it realtes to attacking CSG?
Interesting articles-
So, How do you like my arsenal aircraft concept as it realtes to attacking CSG?
Interesting articles-
Dragon's teeth - Chinese missiles raise their game
By Robert Hewson
China now builds and supplies missiles that can be used in combat from the beach, across the coastal/littoral environment, and out to extended-range engagements far over the horizon. This has largely been achieved through an evolutionary process of staged improvement.
At the same time, China has shown that it can embrace entirely new concepts to serve the essential operational requirements of the People's Liberation Army, the navy and naval air force, and the air force.
The potential use of tactical ballistic missiles against targets at sea is the best example of this and the intent that drives the process is clear: China has spent a great deal of time analysing how best to neutralise US naval forces in the Pacific - in particular the carrier strike groups.
C-602
The C-602 stands apart from the rest of China's anti-ship missiles because it is such a radical departure in terms of range and accuracy. It is effectively a cruise missile, repackaged for the maritime attack role. Its basic design is clearly scalable and the C-602's performance today is probably at the lower end of this configuration's theoretical capabilities. It has been offered on the export market since 2005.
At first sight the C-602 export designation would suggest a linkage to the much older C-601 missile (YJ-6/YJ-61 family), a 1960s-era Chinese design based on the Soviet SS-N-2 'Styx'. However, the turbojet-powered C-602 is a completely new, very modern design with a maximum range of 280 km.
Going ballistic
Most of what China has accomplished in the development of its anti-ship missile -capabilities parallels that of Europe, the US and elsewhere. But one element of China's ship-killing strategy stands out as a remarkable application of technology, and an unprecedented threat.
In Chinese terms, this is a Shashaojian - the assassin's mace - a 'silver bullet' weapon that would, literally, drop from the clear blue sky.
A 2004 report by the US Office of Naval Intelligence made it plain that China was developing the capability to use its DF-21 tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) against targets at sea. The DF-21 carries a single warhead of about 500/600 kg over a distance of 1,500 km to 2,000 km, or more.
Designed as a nuclear delivery system, the DF-21 can also be fitted with a conventional payload. If made to work, such a weapon would be a 'carrier killer' without equal
Gathering Anti-Carrier Forces
Thanks largely to the PLA’s access to foreign technology, it will be able to gather the most serious threat to U.S. Navy carrier battle groups assembled since the Cold War. By gathering this imposing force the PLA hopes to deter U.S. naval intervention in support of Taiwan in the event of a PLA attack, or to quickly sink a U.S. carrier in hopes of precipitating a rapid U.S. withdrawal.[240] But at a minimum, this gathering force will make it far more difficult for the U.S. Navy to intimidate the PLA as it did in 1996, which serves to undermine deterrence on the Taiwan Strait. As illustrated in the box below, by this author’s estimates by 2010 the PLA could gather an imposing strike force: about 45 submarines and over 400 fighter-bombers capable of naval strike missions. These are conservative estimates; the PLA is capable of acquiring additional KILO and SONG submarines and a reported impending second Sukhoi co-production contract could significantly increase the number of multi-role fighters available for naval strike missions.
Potential PLA Anti-Carrier Forces by 2010*
Submarines
12 or more Russian KILO; 8 w/ CLUB anti-ship missile
10 or more SONG w/ Russian torpedoes
3 Type 093 SSNs; possibly with CLUB, Russian torpedoes
(... According to the Department of Defense the PLA Navy launched the first of its second generation nuclear attack submarine in 2002. In 1987 the Office of Naval Intelligence estimated that three would be complete by 2010. Known as the Type 093-class, the Pentagon noted that it “will compare to the technology of the Russian VICTOR III SSN and will carry wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, as well as cruise missiles.”[165] This assessment conforms with several previous reports of Russian assistance to the PLA’s SSN development program and the comparison to the Russian VICTOR III. If this is the baseline for the Type 093’s performance, then it would constitute a considerable achievement for the PLA.
The VICTOR III was designed to hunt older U.S. nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), possessing a considerable sonar capability and a level of quieting that approached that of early U.S. LOS ANGELES class SSNs. The VICTOR III also is equipped with the unique Russian 650mm torpedo tubes, and if the Type 093 follows suit, it too could carry Russia’s class of very large torpedoes designed to sink aircraft carriers. It is likely, however, that the PLA would insist on technology from Russia that would improve on the VICTOR III level of performance for the Type 093. This could mean the latter could dive deeper than the 600 meter depth for the VICTOR III and be even quieter. ..)
20 or so older MING
Modern Ships defending submarine areas
2+ No. 170 air defense destroyers
2+ No. 168 air defense destroyers
4 Sovremenniy destroyers
8+ Type 054 stealth frigates
Strike Aircraft
40+ Su-30MKK2; w/ Kh-31A anti-ship missile
70 or so Su-30MKK upgraded to MKK2 standard; w/ Kh-31A
50+ JH-7A; with Kh-31 and indigenous anti-ship missile
300+ J-11/Su-27SK w/ Kh-31A
*In most cases numbers are author estimates
To be sure the PLA will face significant challenges in creating in implementing new doctrine, tactics and in marrying its new strike platforms with new space, airborne and ship sensors in order to mount effective coordinated strikes against the U.S. Navy. That said, the PLA appear to be investing in solutions to all these challenges. Literature from China examining the weaknesses of U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups at least indicates that this challenge for the PLA is receiving some degree of attention. Necessary space-borne sensors, like radar satellites, and airborne sensors like AWACS are being procured. Whether the PLA will soon begin to exercise this capability, in the hopes of deterring leaders in Taipei and Washington, while also revealing methods and weaknesses, remains to be seen. But the fact that the pieces of this potential capability are gathering quickly, even if not assembled into a whole, places real pressure on Washington’s strategic position in Asia.
First, by 2005 and after U.S. Navy forces in Asia will much harder pressed to defend higher numbers of PLA Navy submarines armed with new Russian long range anti-ship missiles and heavy torpedoes. This threat is growing at a time when the U.S. Navy is reducing its anti-submarine assets needed to protect its fleet. By 2005 the Navy plans to retire one-third of its Lockheed-Martin P-3C ORION anti-submarine warfare aircraft, a reduction from the current 227 to 150.[241] This reduction, due to age/fatigue and expense-related issues will only further stress this over-committed fleet. This comes on top of the 1999 ending of the anti-submarine mission for carrier-based Lockheed-Martin S-3 VIKING aircraft, with the intention that land-based P-3s would make up the difference.[242] Slower P-3s, however, require air escort, which detracts from fighters needed to defend against PLA Su-30s and JH-7s. But P-3s are now sorely needed to extend the anti-submarine cordon of a carrier battle group, which is now limited to shorter-range Sikorsky SH-60 helicopters on carriers and escort vessels. The 220km range of PLA sub-launched anti-ship missiles like the CLUB-S greatly increases the chance that PLAN KILOs can penetrate these defenses. For any Taiwan contingency that could happen around 2005 or after, the U.S. would have to take away P-3s committed to other regions, a time consuming process that could cost the U.S. ships and lives.
The U.S. Navy also relies on its fleet of nuclear attack submarines to perform anti-submarine missions. It is often said by naval officers that the best anti-submarine weapon is another submarine. However, the PLAN’s increasing submarine numbers will place greater strain on the ability of the U.S. Navy to respond sufficiently to a surge PLA deployments around Taiwan. The U.S. fleet now has about 54 SSNs, a number that the top U.S. Navy submarine commander has stated, in 2002 and 2003, is inadequate to fulfill missions in support of recent U.S. military deployments and global commitments.[243] This would especially be the case if the PLA succeeded in deploying over 40 nuclear and conventional submarines to support an attack on Taiwan. Home-porting two or three SSNs in Guam adds to the U.S. ability to rapidly reach the Taiwan area, but they may soon be overwhelmed by PLAN submarines.
Second, the rapidly increasing number of PLA Air Force and Navy Air Force multi-role fighters capable of naval strike missions places great stress on U.S. Navy carrier air wings. The U.S. carrier air wing consists of about 46 fighter and attack capable aircraft: 10 F-14 fighters [already retired] and 36 F/A-18C/D fighter-bombers. Soon the carrier wing will be centered on two new fighters: the Boeing F/A-18E/F SUPER HORNET and the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter. The F/A-18E/F’s first Pacific Fleet deployment will be to the 7th Fleet carrier Kitty Hawk, to replace the Grumman F-14 fighter. For some time U.S. carrier wings will use older F/A-18C multi-role fighters. The F-35C will not join the fleet until early in the next decade. As noted above, the Su-27/J-11/Su-30 family, save for stealth capabilities, may be too competitive for comfort in terms of counter-air capabilities with the U.S. F/A-18C/E/F and F-35C. So even before a consideration of the numbers of fighters the U.S. Navy may bring to a confrontation, the U.S. aircraft to carry the fight will not have a decisive level of superiority over the PLA’s Sukhoi fighters.
If the PLA were able to achieve enough surprise in an attack on Taiwan, the U.S. may not be able to respond with any more than the one carrier assigned to the 7th Fleet in Japan. Even with expected air support from U.S. Air Force F-15C fighters based in Okinawa, the PLA’s fleet of 300-400 Sukhoi fighters alone would handily overwhelm U.S. fighters and their AWACS and tanker support. Add another carrier and you only increase the U.S. numbers by 46 more combat aircraft. A go-for-broke 7th Fleet deployment, assuming it escaped PLA Special Forces attacks to keep it in port, might be able to close on Taiwan only with support from the Japanese Self Defense Air Forces. But Japan is only just beginning to purchase the AWACS and tankers that might conceivably support distant air support missions, and there is no assurance that Japanese leaders would commit their air forces against the PLA.
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That's how America keeps beating everybody. They're always thinking (and building) ahead.
