054/A FFG Thread II

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Actually what the Chinese Navy orbat would look like in 2020 and beyond is relevant to what the current order of battle should look like.

For example, if the Chinese Navy wants to have a larger order of battle in 2020, that means they will choose a different way of adjusting their current/past order of battle to meet the future requirements, versus say if they wanted to have a similar sized order of battle or a smaller sized order of battle by that time instead.


In the case of the old 051s and 053 variants remaining in service, we need to first ask ourselves what the Chinese Navy of 2020 and beyond is wanting to look like. I think the consensus is that the Chinese Navy's orbat will definitely expand, so we'll work with that assumption for trying to examine keeping 051s and 053s in service.

Expanding an order of battle -- i.e.: the number of ships -- will involve having more sailors (yes, newer ships do mean there needs less sailors to run the same sized ship as older ships, but let's also remember that newer ships are much bigger than older ships, like 052D or even 055 versus an 051, or 054A vs an early variant 053). Those sailors need to be educated and trained.
What the old 051s and 053 variants provide, IMO, are ships that help to retain the size of the current order of battle (in terms of ships) while also providing a steady and growing pool of trained and relatively experienced personnel, who once the time comes right, can transition to newer frigates and destroyers with a degree of experience in the navy and in seamanship. And of course, 051s and 053s also provide a lower end general patrol capability for China's peripheries.

Conversely, retiring the old 051s and 053 variants would make sense, if their operating costs were very high, and/or if the Chinese Navy was not interested in expanding much in the future. In that case, retiring these obsolete ships and transferring the personnel to the few last new frigates and destroyers coming off the production line would make sense.

But as it is, I doubt the 051s and 053 variants have operating costs which are that high, all the while they provide a useful general patrol capability, and more importantly they provide ships for personnel to operate on and develop experience on (even if their capabilities, technology and doctrine are obviously multiple generations behind the leading ships the Chinese Navy have these days).


So when you bring up the PLA's force reduction of 300k troops -- mostly from the ground force/army -- sort of has its logic work in reverse for the Navy, because the Navy is not looking to shrink its order of battle or its personnel, but rather to increase it.
There is not much more you can learn from an obsolescent ship other than basic seamanship skills. 051s and 053s share literally no systems in common with any of the modern ships in the PLAN. There is also something to be said about wasting your career on a dead-end ship learning things that won't translate into anything useful in your future, and possibly even hampering your adaptation to a new ship because of what you've become accustomed to, when the transfer inevitably comes. You point out that these ships' "capability, technology and doctrine are obviously multiple generations behind the leading ships" but yet wave this off like it doesn't mean anything. So what "experience" are you referring to besides basic seamanship skills?
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
There is not much more you can learn from an obsolescent ship other than basic seamanship skills. 051s and 053s share literally no systems in common with any of the modern ships in the PLAN. There is also something to be said about wasting your career on a dead-end ship learning things that won't translate into anything useful in your future, and possibly even hampering your adaptation to a new ship because of what you've become accustomed to, when the transfer inevitably comes. You point out that these ships' "capability, technology and doctrine are obviously multiple generations behind the leading ships" but yet wave this off like it doesn't mean anything. So what "experience" are you referring to besides basic seamanship skills?

Basic seamanship skills, I think as a few recent events have demonstrated, are not to be underestimated.

As for other learning opportunities, I think the process of being aboard an operational warship, learning to receive and give commands, and conducting exercises, even aboard obsolete warships, I believe will produce sailors and officers who are more ready to effectively operate as part of a crew of a more advanced modern warship, compared to sailors and officers who have had zero experience as part of the crew of an operational warship before.

There is an argument to be made that perhaps fresh officer graduates and enlisted sailors might be more able to transition effectively to the demands of an advanced modern warship compared to officers and sailors who have had a few years experience on an 051 or 053, as the latter group would likely require re-training to get acquaint them with the capabilities and their jobs on a modern warship. But OTOH, the fresh officer graduates and enlisted sailors would also be green to their new taskings in an actual operational warship itself.


However, I want to add that my reasoning for why the Navy has yet to retire 051s and 053s is not reliant on that single reason.

Rather, it is a combination of a number of potential factors, including:
-the aforementioned role of 051s and 053s providing a means of providing experience for some sailors and officers before moving onto more advanced warships
-the role of 051s and 053s in retaining "positions" in the current expanding order of battle so as to allow a smoother transition to an overall larger order of battle of "all-modern" warships in the near future.
-the ability of 051s and 053s to still retain a degree of operational usefulness, in low intensity missions near China's periphery, namely general patrol duties
-and finally, the issue of cost. The above factors would all not be worth it if the operational running costs of 051s and 053s were immensely high.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
Rather, it is a combination of a number of potential factors, including:
-the aforementioned role of 051s and 053s providing a means of providing experience for some sailors and officers before moving onto more advanced warships
-the role of 051s and 053s in retaining "positions" in the current expanding order of battle so as to allow a smoother transition to an overall larger order of battle of "all-modern" warships in the near future.
-the ability of 051s and 053s to still retain a degree of operational usefulness, in low intensity missions near China's periphery, namely general patrol duties
-and finally, the issue of cost. The above factors would all not be worth it if the operational running costs of 051s and 053s were immensely high.
There is probably some truth to a few of these propositions which is why the 051s and 053s are still around, but certainly none of these reasons are compelling enough for them to stay past the end of this decade.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
There is probably some truth to a few of these propositions which is why the 051s and 053s are still around, but certainly none of these reasons are compelling enough for them to stay past the end of this decade.

I expect most of them to be retired by 2020. A few stragglers may persist to the early 2020s but I think the vast majority will be gone by 2020.

To clarify, I was not suggesting that 051s and 053s should continue to remain in service beyond 2020, but rather to explain why they have been retained over the last few years despite an increase in other modern warships for the Navy, and to explain why they might still be around for a couple years more before exiting for good. Basically, I was replying to Franklin's statement of "I feel that the PLAN should have decommissioned 4 or 5 of the Luda and Jianghu ships by now"
 

philbob

New Member
Agreed as a American this ship is the most fearsome unit of the PLAN. Quantity is a quality of its own and it out strips the US Navy LCS. I shudder to think what would happen if they decided to produce 10 a year.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Chinese flotilla cross the Tsushima strait for exercise with Russian navy. Tsushima is the site of Russo-Japan naval battle

4 military vessels of the Chinese navy, including a submarine rescue vessel, entered the Sea of Japan since 15 September.

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I'm a big fun of Naval Artillery so I pick this one:
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Chinese naval guided-missile frigate Daqing (Hull 576) fires its main gun during the maritime phase of the second stage of the China-Russia Joint Sea - 2017 military exercise in Peter the Great Bay of the Japan Sea near Vladivostok on Sept. 23, 2017. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Liu Huadi)
from an interesting collection
Maritime phase snapshots of Joint Sea - 2017 military exercise
2017-09-25
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google translation of
Mise à flot de la 28e frégate Type 054A
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26 septembre 2017

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Moins de six mois après le précédent bâtiment de même classe, le chantier naval Huangpu du groupe naval chinois CSSC a de nouveau mis à l’eau, vendredi dernier, une frégate de Type 054A.

Il s’agit du 14e Type 054A construit dans ce chantier naval, situé près de la ville de Guangzhou au sud de la Chine, et le 28e de série. Le début de la production en masse de cette classe de frégate multi-rôle chinoise remonte à il y a 12 ans, et depuis les nouveaux bâtiments sont lancés au rythme d’un tous les cinq mois en moyenne.

A noter que cette nouvelle frégate est également la 3e du modèle à avoir été mise à l’eau en 2017.

Le Type 054A mesure 140 mètres de long, 16 mètres de tirant-bau, 31 mètres de haut et déplace à 4 000 tonnes pleine charge. Le navire dispose d’une autonomie supérieure à 4 000 miles nautiques, à une vitesse de croisière de 18 nœuds.

C’est, pour le moment, la meilleure plateforme de lutte anti-sous-marine de la marine chinoise, qui est doté d’une suite complète dédiée incluant un sonar de coque, un sonar remorqué à profondeur variable, un système de lutte acoustique et de communication sous-marin, ainsi que des torpilles, de l’ASROC Yu-8 et des roquettes anti-sous-marines.

Le coût relativement faible de son exploitation opérationnelle, sa polyvalence et aussi son niveau de confort, très appréciés dans l’ensemble par la marine chinoise et les équipages, font que le Type 054A est devenu un vecteur important dans la composition des forces navales chinoises de premier rang, et que le nombre de bâtiments construit soit revu plusieurs fois à la hausse, passant de 24 prévus initialement à au moins 28 aujourd’hui.

On ignore pour le moment le numéro de coque qui sera affecté à ce 28e Type 054A, mais sachant que tous les numéros 5xx, dédiés jusqu’à présent aux corvettes et aux frégates, sont déjà tous utilisés, il n’est pas exclus que ce navire recevra un numéro de coque 500 ou commençant par 6xx.

Le bâtiment devrait rejoindre la marine chinoise d’ici fin Octobre 2018 selon notre estimation.

En parallèle du lancement de cette frégate Type 054A, le chantier naval Huangpu a également mis à flot un remorqueur haute mer militaire de 110 mètres de long et déplaçant 6 000 tonnes pleine charge.

Il s’agit du 3e bâtiment de classe dont le premier a déjà été admis au service actif par la flotte du Nord au 20 Juillet cette année.
:
"Less than six months after the previous vessel of the same class, the Huangpu Shipyard of the Chinese naval group CSSC again launched last Friday a Type 054A frigate.

This is the 14th Type 054A built in this shipyard, located near the city of Guangzhou in southern China, and the 28th in series. The start of mass production of this multi-role Chinese frigate class dates back 12 years, and since the new buildings are launched at the rate of one every five months on average.

Note that this new frigate is also the 3rd of the model to have been launched in 2017.

The Type 054A is 140 meters long, 16 meters high, 31 meters high and moves to 4,000 tonnes full load. The ship has a range of over 4,000 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 18 knots.

For the time being, it is the best anti-submarine anti-submarine platform for the Chinese Navy, which has a complete dedicated suite including a hull sonar, a variable depth towed sonar, a sound control system and submarine communications, as well as torpedoes, ASROC Yu-8 and anti-submarine rockets.

The relatively low cost of operational operation, versatility and comfort, which are generally appreciated by the Chinese Navy and crews, make Type 054A an important vector in the composition of China's naval forces. and that the number of buildings built is revised several times upwards, from 24 originally planned to at least 28 today.

The hull number that will be assigned to this 28th Type 054A is not yet known, but knowing that all the 5xx numbers, so far dedicated to corvettes and frigates, are already used, it is not excluded that this ship will receive a shell number 500 or starting with 6xx.

The building is expected to join the Chinese Navy by the end of October 2018 according to our estimate.

In parallel to the launch of this Type 054A frigate, the Huangpu shipyard also floated a 110-meter-long military offshore tug and moved 6,000 tons full load.

This is the third class building, the first of which has already been admitted to active service by the Northern Fleet on July 20 this year."
 
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