India incursion and Chinese standoff at Dolam, Bhutan

The main gun of Indian mountain division suffer failure after test. They also talking to S korea about buying K 9 self propelled Howitzer. But it too suffer from mishap follow the link in the article


The army’s new M777 ultra-light American howitzer was partly damaged when a 155mm artillery round misfired and exploded in the barrel during a drill early September.

The gun is one of the two howitzers that arrived in New Delhi in May as part of a $750-million contract signed with the US in November 2016. India has ordered 145 howitzers.

The gun was firing Indian ammunition in Rajasthan’s Pokhran ranges.

“During the firing on September 2, the projectile, which was fifth of the series, exited the barrel in multiple pieces,” an army officer said on Tuesday.

No one was injured.

He said an investigating team is assessing the damage to the gun. A detailed input from the gun’s manufacturer, BAE Systems, would follow.

“BAE Systems is aware of an irregularity recorded during routine field firing of the M777. We are working closely with the Indian Army and the US government to explore the incident,” a company spokesperson said.

The M777 order is the first contract for artillery guns in almost 30 years after the Bofors scandal unfolded in the late 1980s.

The two guns are part of the 25 ready-built weapons that will be supplied by the US over the next two years. The remaining 120 howitzers will be manufactured in the country under the government’s Make in India initiative, in collaboration with Mahindra Defence.

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The 155mm, 39-calibre howitzers are inducted to increase the army’s capabilities in high altitude. These will be deployed in the northern and eastern sectors.

The army’s new mountain strike corps, raised in West Bengal’s Panagarh, will be equipped with the new guns.

Built with titanium and aluminum alloys, the howitzers weigh 4,218kg, providing them superior tactical mobility. In contrast, 155mm towed howitzers weigh twice as much. The howitzers can be underslung from helicopters and swiftly deployed in high-altitude areas.

More than 1,090 M777s are in service globally. The howitzers have been used during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. India is the latest user of the guns used by the US, Australian and Canadian militaries for accurate artillery fire support

Korean mishap raises doubts over reliability of Indian Army’s future artillery gun
The death of two South Korean soldiers in a K-9 howitzer explosion three days ago has raised doubts about the performance of a Korea-origin artillery gun set to be built in India on the same platform.

The Korean media questioned the reliability of the self-propelled howitzer, a gun meant for firing shells on high trajectories, after the incident occurred during an artillery training session in Gangwon province on Friday. Five others were also injured in the explosion.

Private sector defence major Larsen & Toubro and South Korean firm Hanwha Techwin are in the process of executing a $720-million contract for supplying 100 K9 VAJRA-T guns to the Indian Army. The contract was signed on April 21, and the weaponry will be produced at Talegaon near Pune in Maharashtra. The guns are expected to be delivered in three years.

According to a korean parliamentary inquiry in 2016, there were more than 1,700 reports of K-9 artillery malfunctioning over the past five years,” the news report said.

Doklam: How India misjudged China’s intentions and it escalated into a major standoff

The India-China military standoff at Doklam was apparently based on Indian misperception of Chinese intentions.

An alternative narration of events leading to the military standoff suggests that the skirmish might have been blown out of proportion and was completely unnecessary. And even though eventually the standoff was resolved through diplomatic negotiations, India was not a net gainer at the end of it.

The Chinese army personnel are still present at a distance of 250 metres from the site of the confrontation. This is where they were before June 16. The Indian Army meanwhile has vacated the area that the Chinese wanted vacated.

According to sources in the security establishment, the standoff which was projected as a result of Chinese road construction activity in the Doklam area was anything but that. A Chinese motorable road apparently already exists in the area. It has been there since 2003 or 2005, according to different estimates.

The standoff, according to these sources, had its origins not in any road-construction activity in the disputed area between China and Bhutan but in the destruction of two Indian Army bunkers in the area.

There are apparently two dozen bunkers in that area. Known as Self-Help Bunkers (SBH), they are not occupied all the time. The Chinese have for long objected to two bunkers that they claim have been built in an area which is within their perception line of their border with Bhutan.

Although Bhutan claims the area, Indian Army units under the control of 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok in Sikkim, patrol it. This includes the area where the two disputed bunkers are located.

The Chinese periodically use bulldozers to destroy the two bunkers whenever they are unoccupied. The Indian Army units patrolling the area equally periodically reconstruct them. This is not considered unusual activity in a disputed border area. Since this is China’s border with Bhutan but is patrolled by the Indian Army, the issue is never raised to a higher pitch.

In November 2007 also the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) had moved into Bhutan's Doklam Plateau and demolished a hut close to some Indian bunkers. The hut was apparently a rest house used by the Indian Army. The Indian side kept the matter quiet as the bunkers were located in Bhutan but manned by Indian Army personnel. In July that year, the PLA had also written to the 17 Mountain Division Headquarters about two “illegal” Indian bunkers but they were at Batangla near the disputed tri-junction (where the borders of India, Bhutan and China meet) warning of “adverse consequences” if they were not removed. The matter was swept under the carpet as the two armies were to conduct joint exercises a month later in December 2007. In 2008 also the PLA had destroyed two bunkers in precisely the same area in Doklam where this June’s standoff took place.

Whenever new Indian Army unit are deployed in the area, the outgoing units apparently don’t inform the incoming unit that the breaking and reconstruction of these two bunkers in particular takes place routinely.

According to sources, this summer when a new army unit was deployed for patrolling the area they decided to spruce up the bunkers, including the two disputed ones. The PLA soldiers suddenly saw something new happening– the Indian soldiers were painting the two bunkers in question in regulation brownish-saffron army colour. The PLA soldiers could not comprehend the enthusiasm of the newly deployed Indian army unit and thought that something more permanent was being built.

Predictably, when the bunkers were unoccupied, the PLA brought out its bulldozers and demolished the bunkers. When the Indian patrol discovered this, not knowing the previous history of such demolitions and reconstructions, they informed their superior officers about the aggressiveness of the Chinese.

The message that Chinese bulldozers were in action in Doklam, according to sources, went all the way up to the Major General who is the General Officer Commanding of the 17 Mountain Division based at Gangtok. He in turn informed his bosses in Army Headquarters in Delhi.

Sources claim that the Chinese use of bulldozers was linked to possible road construction activities by the army authorities sitting in Gangtok. They presumed that the Chinese were extending the existing road from Doka La (Doka Pass) through the Doklam Plateau towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri near the Jampheri Ridge.

The senior army officers in Delhi also believed the road construction theory and instructed the local army unit to prevent any road construction and stay put. Bhutan was taken on board and a full-scale military standoff began. General Bipin Rawat in fact visited both the 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok and the 27 Mountain Division at Kalimpong to boost the morale of his forces and take stock of the ground situation.

The Chinese, meanwhile, could not fathom why India was over-reacting. The Chinese media went on the offensive; and on the Indian side, security experts exaggerated and overplayed the strategic threat to India from the Chinese road construction activity. A full-scale propaganda war over claims, counter-claims and charges and counter-charges began.

At the end of it, through a “near-simultaneous” withdrawal of forces to pre-June 16 positions, the standoff was resolved. Both sides claimed victory but the Chinese went back only 250 metres while to maintain peace India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed. The Chinese got what they wanted.

Although the military standoff is behind us, perhaps an assessment still needs to be made of the strategic cost-benefit analysis of the confrontation, the nature of information flow, the response and analysis systems within the Indian armed forces and the wisdom of the current crop of Indian Army commanders

Looks like a terrible lack of professionalism in the Indian army.

delft said:

Looks like a terrible lack of professionalism in the Indian army.

Click to expand...

And lack of judgment by both the Indian army and government.

Hence why not one country has backed them up or spoken against Chinese action in sending reinforcements.

Global Times article from the author of "Unrestricted Warfare" who is still on active duty

War must always be the last resort in disputes

By Qiao Liang Source: Global Times Published: 2017/9/12 20:53:39

The title of China's role in future world written by Wang Xiangsui, retired Air Force Senior Colonel and professor at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, says it all, that is the importance of China's strategic positioning in the future.

The reason why so many Chinese people paid attention to the China-India border standoff in the Doklam area is that they are unfamiliar with China's strategic positioning. If they had a clear understanding of China's strategic positioning, they would know that the settlement of the Doklam standoff was one of the best results possible. China and India are both neighbors and competitors, but not all competitors must be treated in the toughest way.

Many people would say that the road construction in China's territory was none of India's business. Is this belief right? It is reasonable to some extent because road construction in this area is not a matter of right and wrong, but we need to understand that it is not always right to do something right at any time. Only doing the right thing at the right time is correct.

So, with this principle in mind, one can understand that the Doklam confrontation was solved in the way it should have been. And the most important thing is that when you understand China's strategic positioning and you cannot bring the entire world under your domination, you are willing to leave well enough alone. Only in this way can one completely reach his goal, otherwise, haste makes waste or the result and your desired outcome may even be poles apart.

Many people think that China has a powerful national strength, including a strong military power, thus only war can demonstrate China's power. But resorting to war is irresponsible for the country and the country's future as war has always been the last resort to solve problems. Whenever there may be a way to solve a conflict without war, war should be avoided.

Some people may say that I am a soldier and what I said above reflects a lack of confidence in my country. It's true that I am a military scholar that study strategies. I'm not afraid of war, and I know what war is about. But for any country, the war is always an unfortunate thing. Yet each soldier wants to fight in the war once in his lifetime, which could honor his life.

This is the wish of all of us soldiers. We know that war is ominous. The country can maintain peace and it will be the best to avoid war.

Soldiers can realize their values better in the battlefield, so in this case, what choices should we make? When the country needs soldiers to fight in the battlefield, they will absolutely choose to join the war without hesitation. But in the country's current position, we should spare no efforts to avoid pushing the country into a war as peace is the best outcome.

The author is a Chinese military strategist Major-General of the People's Liberation Army.

Click to expand...

jfy1155 said:

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Doklam: How India misjudged China’s intentions and it escalated into a major standoff

The India-China military standoff at Doklam was apparently based on Indian misperception of Chinese intentions.

An alternative narration of events leading to the military standoff suggests that the skirmish might have been blown out of proportion and was completely unnecessary. And even though eventually the standoff was resolved through diplomatic negotiations, India was not a net gainer at the end of it.

The Chinese army personnel are still present at a distance of 250 metres from the site of the confrontation. This is where they were before June 16. The Indian Army meanwhile has vacated the area that the Chinese wanted vacated.

According to sources in the security establishment, the standoff which was projected as a result of Chinese road construction activity in the Doklam area was anything but that. A Chinese motorable road apparently already exists in the area. It has been there since 2003 or 2005, according to different estimates.

The standoff, according to these sources, had its origins not in any road-construction activity in the disputed area between China and Bhutan but in the destruction of two Indian Army bunkers in the area.

There are apparently two dozen bunkers in that area. Known as Self-Help Bunkers (SBH), they are not occupied all the time. The Chinese have for long objected to two bunkers that they claim have been built in an area which is within their perception line of their border with Bhutan.

Although Bhutan claims the area, Indian Army units under the control of 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok in Sikkim, patrol it. This includes the area where the two disputed bunkers are located.

The Chinese periodically use bulldozers to destroy the two bunkers whenever they are unoccupied. The Indian Army units patrolling the area equally periodically reconstruct them. This is not considered unusual activity in a disputed border area. Since this is China’s border with Bhutan but is patrolled by the Indian Army, the issue is never raised to a higher pitch.

In November 2007 also the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) had moved into Bhutan's Doklam Plateau and demolished a hut close to some Indian bunkers. The hut was apparently a rest house used by the Indian Army. The Indian side kept the matter quiet as the bunkers were located in Bhutan but manned by Indian Army personnel. In July that year, the PLA had also written to the 17 Mountain Division Headquarters about two “illegal” Indian bunkers but they were at Batangla near the disputed tri-junction (where the borders of India, Bhutan and China meet) warning of “adverse consequences” if they were not removed. The matter was swept under the carpet as the two armies were to conduct joint exercises a month later in December 2007. In 2008 also the PLA had destroyed two bunkers in precisely the same area in Doklam where this June’s standoff took place.

Whenever new Indian Army unit are deployed in the area, the outgoing units apparently don’t inform the incoming unit that the breaking and reconstruction of these two bunkers in particular takes place routinely.

According to sources, this summer when a new army unit was deployed for patrolling the area they decided to spruce up the bunkers, including the two disputed ones. The PLA soldiers suddenly saw something new happening– the Indian soldiers were painting the two bunkers in question in regulation brownish-saffron army colour. The PLA soldiers could not comprehend the enthusiasm of the newly deployed Indian army unit and thought that something more permanent was being built.

Predictably, when the bunkers were unoccupied, the PLA brought out its bulldozers and demolished the bunkers. When the Indian patrol discovered this, not knowing the previous history of such demolitions and reconstructions, they informed their superior officers about the aggressiveness of the Chinese.

The message that Chinese bulldozers were in action in Doklam, according to sources, went all the way up to the Major General who is the General Officer Commanding of the 17 Mountain Division based at Gangtok. He in turn informed his bosses in Army Headquarters in Delhi.

Sources claim that the Chinese use of bulldozers was linked to possible road construction activities by the army authorities sitting in Gangtok. They presumed that the Chinese were extending the existing road from Doka La (Doka Pass) through the Doklam Plateau towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri near the Jampheri Ridge.

The senior army officers in Delhi also believed the road construction theory and instructed the local army unit to prevent any road construction and stay put. Bhutan was taken on board and a full-scale military standoff began. General Bipin Rawat in fact visited both the 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok and the 27 Mountain Division at Kalimpong to boost the morale of his forces and take stock of the ground situation.

The Chinese, meanwhile, could not fathom why India was over-reacting. The Chinese media went on the offensive; and on the Indian side, security experts exaggerated and overplayed the strategic threat to India from the Chinese road construction activity. A full-scale propaganda war over claims, counter-claims and charges and counter-charges began.

At the end of it, through a “near-simultaneous” withdrawal of forces to pre-June 16 positions, the standoff was resolved. Both sides claimed victory but the Chinese went back only 250 metres while to maintain peace India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed. The Chinese got what they wanted.

Although the military standoff is behind us, perhaps an assessment still needs to be made of the strategic cost-benefit analysis of the confrontation, the nature of information flow, the response and analysis systems within the Indian armed forces and the wisdom of the current crop of Indian Army commanders

Click to expand...

Must have been an interesting "negotiation" in the final days.

Indian: We will withdraw all forces if you agree to stop building that road.
China: What road? That one that has been finished for over a decade? What is there left to build?
Indian: So that sounds like you'll stop building. Good enough for me. We'll both withdraw and you stop building the road.
China: We're not withdrawing anywhere and what road? The last one was done in 2003!
India: Everybody! Listen! China agreed to withdraw and stop the road-building! We WON!!
China:

LOLOL

Indian leaders are a funny bunch aren't they. If what's presented here is true, they must have some agenda behind doing this. Are they trying to distract their population from something else? Modi trying to find a PR win for future election, or someone else pulling the strings to distract China from what's happening to its east?

Now what is Indian going to do? preempt it by blocking the road again? First they irritate the Nepali by blocking the road in support of ethnic Indian Nepali. The Nepali reaction of course is to form tighter relation with China to bypass future blackmail. Hence come the railroad and highway from China to Nepal

New China-Nepal highway can be used by military, move likely to ‘irritate’ India
The 25-metre wide highway can be used by armoured vehicles and serve as a runway for military aircraft, say experts.
Updated: Sep 18, 2017 22:47 IS

A new strategic highway in Tibet will link the region to Nepal and can be used for military purposes, state media reported on Monday, adding the road can help open up South Asia to China .

Experts said the 25-metre wide highway can be used by armoured vehicles and serve as a runway for military aircraft if required.

India is likely to be “irritated” by the development, the state media reported.

“The Tibet highway between Xigaze airport and Xigaze city centre officially opened to the public on Friday, a short section linking the national highway to the Nepal border which experts said will enable China to forge a route into South Asia in both economic and defence terms,” the Global Times tabloid said in a report.

The 40.4-km highway will shorten the journey between the dual-use civil and military airport and Tibet's second-largest city from an hour to 30 minutes.

The highway is expected to be linked to the China-Nepal railway in future, experts said.

“As part of G318, the highway connects the border town of Zhangmu with Lhasa, the capital city of southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region. It can link with the future cross-border Sino-Nepali railway,” said Zhao Gancheng, director of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies.

The report added: “The Sino-Nepali railway was part of a deal struck by Nepal deputy Prime Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara when he visited China in early September. The railway includes two lines: one connecting three of Nepal's most important cities and two crossing the border between China and Nepal.”

Zhao said the railway line, which passes through the Chinese border town of Zhangmu and connects with routes in Nepal, will be the first rail link from China to enter South Asia.

Zhao told the newspaper: "Although the railway connection between China and Nepal is intended to boost regional development and not for military purposes, the move will still probably irritate India. India is always disgusted when neighbouring countries attempt to get closer to China.”

Mahara said earlier this month that Nepal is fully committed to pushing forward cooperation with China under the Belt and Road Initiative. He was in China for a six-day official visit earlier this month.

"We have already signed the memorandum of understanding on participating in the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China," Mahara told official Xinhua news agency.

According to Xinhua, the total “highway mileage” in Tibet touched 80,000 km in 2016, an increase of 19,000 km since 2011.

Here is run up on all the railway bordering India Before long China will sew up the west China with extensive railway network. this is economist article from 2014 ignore the dribble. they can't help themselves to bring Tibetan human right subject

Taming the west
The Communist Party deepens Tibet’s integration with the rest of the country

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WHEN it opened eight years ago, the railway from Golmud to Lhasa was one of the most ambitious rail ventures ever attempted. At a cost of $4 billion, tracks were built across 550km (340 miles) of permafrost, reaching an altitude of 5,000 metres (16,400 feet)—the highest railway in the world. This September, an extension of the line will open from Lhasa to Shigatse, the first part of a further plan to knit Tibet into the rest of China.

The line to Shigatse stretches 250km southwest of Lhasa and will reduce the five-hour road journey to two hours by rail. As well as allowing easier access for tourists to Tibet’s second city, it will make an area rich in natural resources more accessible. (The Chinese name for Tibet, Xizang, translates as “Western treasurehouse”.) In the autumn the construction is due to start on another extension, running 400km from Lhasa to Nyingtri, a county with large hydropower potential.

By 2020 the aim is to complete several other major rail routes connecting Tibet with its neighbouring provinces of Xinjiang, Sichuan and Yunnan (see map). One of them, a 1,900km railway from Lhasa to Chengdu, will cost more than $20 billion.

Two more railways from Shigatse to the Nepalese and Indian borders, at Nyalam and Dromo, are also planned, to the alarm of the Indian government, which last week announced plans to fortify 54 new border posts in Arunachal Pradesh, a north-eastern state that China invaded in 1962.

The party’s infrastructure drive is an important part of its policy of integrating the poorer west of the country with the richer east. In Xinjiang, in the far north-west, where many members of the ethnic Uighur minority chafe at rule from Beijing, building transport links is also seen as a way to increase national security. Lavish spending on infrastructure reflects the central government’s determination to use economic development to pacify restive western regions. The sheer scale of such initiatives, in Xinjiang and Tibet, has its costs. “The people pushing these policies can’t really see the ‘smaller’ issues of preserving culture and the environment,” says Robert Barnett, a professor of modern Tibetan studies at Columbia University. “It is like using a bulldozer to herd mice.”

Few outside China believe such policies are working, especially after unrest spread across the Tibetan plateau in 2008. Through religious control, the erosion of Tibetan language, intense surveillance and “patriotic education” policies the government has sought to suppress traditional beliefs and customs. More than 130 Tibetans have set fire to themselves in protest since 2009. It has become almost impossible for ordinary Tibetans to travel abroad from Tibet, and border security has been tightened. Before 2008 the number of Tibetans escaping into Nepal each year was as high as 3,000. Last year only 300 made it out.

Meanwhile the number of ethnic-Han Chinese coming to Tibet as tourists or workers continues to soar. Last year 7.5m passengers rode the railway from Golmud to Lhasa—more than double the population of Tibet itself. Improved access to previously remote parts will increase the volume of visitors, drawn by the promise of an unspoiled and spiritually rich land. But it is a land that is being transformed.

As the train descends towards Lhasa, the scenery outside the window changes. Across the grasslands appear the wide chimneys of a refinery and other signs of industrialisation. The industrial development of Tibet has lagged far behind China’s central and eastern provinces. Now the party has the technical know-how and financial reserves to build on Tibet’s difficult terrain. If all goes to plan the extraction of natural resources will generate economic growth. The party values Tibet’s mineral reserves at 600 billion yuan ($96 billion). One mine in Shethongmon county, near Shigatse, is expected to produce 116m pounds (53m kg) of copper, 190,000 ounces of gold and 2.4m ounces of silver annually. Mining could make up a third of the region’s GDP.

Trickle down

That would imply a dramatic restructuring of the economy, which for decades has been sustained by government subsidies and state-led investment. Last year the region’s GDP grew by nearly 13%. Chinese companies and workers wield advantages: Tibetans often lack the linguistic skill and the connections to get ahead. As a result, much revenue flows back east. However, some of the gains are now starting to trickle down to ordinary Tibetans. The annual income of even those in the poorest rural regions is rising. Roads and railways are making consumer goods more available. Certain social schemes, too, are aimed at making people’s lives more comfortable. The government says one mass relocation project, completed last year, has moved 2.3m people into houses. The problem was that many of them were farmers, who did not want to move.

As well as railways, there are now six airports on the Tibetan plateau. Four of them have opened or expanded since 2010 and there are plans for two more. New airports near the southern border have irked neighbours. One security adviser to India’s government noted Beijing’s “more assertive policy” on territorial issues.

Meanwhile incentive schemes and government grants continue to draw more Han migrant workers. The railway facilitates the flow. Mr Zhao, a portly 32-year-old builder from Lanzhou, first came to Tibet in 2006. He says at first, as a Han Chinese, he felt unwelcome in Lhasa. Local Tibetans would sometimes steal his company’s sand. One day Mr Zhao hopes to return to Lanzhou permanently. But for the moment, in Tibet, there are roads and railways to build.