India incursion and Chinese standoff at Dolam, Bhutan

Discussion in 'World Armed Forces' started by Hendrik_2000, Aug 5, 2017.

Thread Status:
Not open for further replies.
  1. Hendrik_2000
    Offline

    Hendrik_2000 Brigadier

    Joined:
    Dec 20, 2006
    Messages:
    7,698
    Likes Received:
    26,763
    Here is an interesting article about disposition of forces lining up against each other . He think that if any conflagration broke out. It should be in September when the weather is clear
    It a long article by Indian blogger in Indian defense review. It is a long article Here is some excerpt
    It also give Indian troop disposition. China has better infrastructure of road, railway, warehouse, communication etc. In a long protracted war it is logistic that is the deciding factor. He also said China has been training for fighting in winter condition. Interesting
    Duel In The Himalayas: How India And China Square Off
    By
    Saurav Jha
    http://www.delhidefencereview.com/2017/07/26/duel-in-the-himalayas-how-india-and-china-square-off/
    -
    July 26, 2017

    FacebookTwitterGoogle+LinkedInWhatsAppRedditPinterestFlipboardEmailCopy LinkShare

    The prolonged standoff at Dolam, Bhutan between India and China has removed the facade of perpetual stability along their mutual frontier that certain quarters have sought to portray based on their unshakeable belief in the efficacy of various confidence building measures the two sides have put in place over the past few decades. However, the fact is, that ‘despite not a shot being fired’ for a long time across the 4057 kilometre (km) long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China, the Chinese have assiduously sought to change the territorial status-quo, one road construction unit at a time. But that strategy is something that the Indian Army (IA) is not willing to countenance anymore. Indeed, the IA is no longer willing to let China do so even in Bhutan, keeping aside the strategic military significance of Dolam for the moment.


    For years, India had deliberately kept its frontier with China devoid of much access infrastructure due to a premise that the absence of such connectivity would lead to attacking forces getting bogged down, thereby giving time to the Indian military to regroup and respond to an invasion. Even now, the Indian strategy in a few sectors seeks to let Chinese forces concentrate within the narrow confines of a valley before focusing an assault from the flanks. However, this outlook of basically conceding some territory up-front during an enemy advance began changing by the early 1990s, when Beijing started building a massive rail and road network of its own in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) that created a situation whereby the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) can attempt both creeping encroachment as well as salami-slice tactics along the LAC between India and China.

    As such, the LAC is divided into three segments: the Western Sector, from the Karakoram Pass to Demchok in Eastern Ladakh, the Middle Sector, from Demchok till the Indian border with Nepal and the Eastern Sector, from Sikkim up to India’s border with Myanmar. In some places, particularly lacking in connectivity, the Chinese could even build some rudimentary infrastructure of their own even during peacetime, as evidenced by the discovery of Chinese helipads inside Indian territory in the past. In fact, an official Indian report from 2010 mentioned the possibility that India may have lost a small parcel of land to Chinese encroachment in Eastern Ladakh.


    The Chinese could also create a favourable balance of forces (for themselves) along certain points on the LAC and then even sustain gains by extending their own border infrastructure very short distances into Indian territory, relatively quickly. In at least two places in Ladakh, Chinese border roads extend till points that lie within what India perceives to be territory controlled by it. Typically, the Chinese ‘road head’ is either right up to the LAC or is just a few hundred metres short of it while the Indian ‘road head’ could be anywhere between a several hundred metres to several kms short of the LAC, although this is changing now. In any case, the Chinese have built motorable tactical roads from their Western and Eastern highways in TAR till all 31 passes (eleven in the Western Sector, five in Middle Sector and 15 in the Eastern Sector) that are of military significance along the LAC. In addition to this various border ‘laterals’ of low classification also exist just south of subsidiary axes to the main tactical roads that may be used for an advance.


    With India now pushing back against Chinese encroachment both at the LAC as well as what it considers to be its sphere of influence in South Asia, tensions are on the rise. Three years ago, what was supposed to be a new beginning for India-China relations, with President Xi Jinping becoming the first major head of State to visit India after Modi assumed office, turned sour as Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh, even as the visit was underway. Since then, India’s ties with China have been characterized by dissonance, with China opposing India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier’ Group (NSG), Indian worries about trade imbalances, Chinese hostility towards the Dalai Lama’s travels to Arunachal Pradesh and finally India’s decision to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), made in no small part due to BRI’s flagship project being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which impinges on India’s sovereignty. Throughout this period, the LAC has seen numerous Chinese transgressions in certain sectors as well as airspace violations.
     
    #1 Hendrik_2000, Aug 5, 2017
    Last edited: Aug 5, 2017
    PanAsian and Equation like this.
  2. Hendrik_2000
    Offline

    Hendrik_2000 Brigadier

    Joined:
    Dec 20, 2006
    Messages:
    7,698
    Likes Received:
    26,763
    (cont)
    With CPEC, China has essentially inserted itself into the Kashmir dispute in a major way. The wariness of the Indian political class about the peculiar bilateral ethos of Sino-Pak relations which predicates itself on countering New Delhi has now crystallized into fears about the possibility of a collusive two-front threat from India’s two biggest neighbours. India’s polity has therefore accepted the Indian Military’s need to be prepared for a two-front conflict and there seems to be consensus across party lines on the need to build-up the necessary wherewithal to be able to hold-off a Chinese attack while being engaged in a short punitive war against Pakistan or conversely to hold off a Pakistani attack as Indian forces move to contain a Chinese offensive across the LAC in a quid pro quo scenario.

    The backbone of being able to wage a serious two-front campaign (apart from C4ISR and firepower to ensure maximum attrition of enemy formations) is infrastructure. The focus in recent times has been on building infrastructure that makes it easier for the Indian military to access even rather remote mountainous frontiers, such the easternmost parts of Arunachal Pradesh (AP), where in places such as Kibithu in Anjaw district the Chinese have been ‘asserting’ themselves. Indeed, Kibithu, is believed to be one of the likely targets for a Chinese attack in the event of hostilities. Other targets of value for the Chinese would of course be Tawang in Western AP where the Sixth Dalai Lama was born, Chaglagam in AP’s Lohit district, the Depsang Plains and Chumar in Ladakh (where PLAGF troops intruded during Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit) and possibly Barahoti in Uttarkhand’s Chamoli district.


    Chinese Capability in Tibet

    In all, the PLAGF used to have four combined arms group armies (GAs) in the PLA’s erstwhile Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Region’s (MR’s) that were of relevance to India. These were the 13th & 14th of Chengdu MR and the 21st & 47th of Lanzhou MR. Post re-organization, the total area of responsibility (AOR) under the former Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs has been merged into the newly created Western ‘Battle Zone’ or Theater Command (TC), which now controls the 76th and 77th ‘Combined Corps-Level’ GAs that have been created by enlarging the 21st and 13th GAs respectively. The 76th and 77th will likely absorb elements of the 47th which has now been decommissioned, with the 14thhaving been earlier assigned to PLA’s Southern TC and is being decommissioned as well.

    These new ‘Combined Corps-level’ GAs are not merely integrated arms units of PLAGF but are also supposed to progressively include inter-service elements from the PLA Air force (PLAAF) and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) in furtherance of integrated joint operations (IJOs) that are supposed to be a key facilitator of China’s doctrine of ‘winning local wars under conditions of informationization’ as enunciated in the 2015 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy (CMS). These new GAs are also expected to further the PLAGF’s move away from a division-based structure to one based on ‘modular combined arms brigades’ to apparently enhance mobility, and flexibility with high lethality. In addition to the 76th and 77th, Xinjiang Military Division (MD) and Tibet Military Division (MD), that are part of the Western TC have some additional 8 infantry divisions/brigades and 2 special operations brigades at their disposal.

    Be that as it may, Indian military sources believe that the 77th, which as the 13th was designated as a ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ (RRF) and the 76th which was termed an ‘offensive mobile force’ as the 21st could concentrate the equivalent of up to 7 division sized formations in TAR within a week’s time with one RR division being inducted into Lhasa in as little 24-36 hours. Nevertheless, most of the deployed forces from lower altitudes will take at least two weeks to get acclimatized and this must be added to the time taken for simply mobilizing a certain quantum of forces from outside TAR. As an aside, traditionally the Indian establishment keeps a watch on Chinese military movements across the Tsangpo. Significant movement across the Tsangpo, is regarded by the Indian side to be suggestive of serious military intent by the PLAGF. If a conflict were to at all take place this year, it is most likely to be during late-September or Early October when the skies clear up.

    For sustaining whatever forces it inducts into Tibet, the PLAGF, apart from the specialized storage facilities it has built there, can also leverage various ‘civilian’ logistic nodes that have ‘dual-use’ billeting and warehousing complexes complete with loading ramps and traffic loops as well as hard standings. Such nodes exist in the vicinity of places like Hetian, Garr, Xigaze, Lhasa, Nagqu, Nyingchi (only 30 kms from the LAC with Arunachal Pradesh) and Chayu. The multi-functional logistics centre at Nagqu which facilitates freight movement, storage, packaging, processing, distribution and information transaction with a throughput capacity of over 2.2 million tonnes is of particular significance. The Nagqu centre probably also hosts facilities for military command & control (C2) and surveillance.
     
    #2 Hendrik_2000, Aug 5, 2017
    Last edited: Aug 5, 2017
    delft, PanAsian, perfume and 2 others like this.
  3. SinoSoldier
    Online

    SinoSoldier Colonel

    Joined:
    Dec 27, 2009
    Messages:
    4,167
    Likes Received:
    7,015
    Which begs a long-awaited question: have China's leaders fully assessed the long-term ramifications and risks of a Sino-Indian conflict? Have any members here, for that matter, done so with the utmost impartiality to India's military capabilities and future Sino-Indian bilateral relations?
     
    PanAsian likes this.
  4. sanblvd
    Offline

    sanblvd Junior Member
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Nov 20, 2014
    Messages:
    349
    Likes Received:
    802
    You know, that's similar to what I said in the very beginning in the India China border trend before it got locked, basically I said if you want to know whatever China goes to war or not, here are the few steps.

    1. China starting massive media campaign to isolate India, in doing this India can either withdraw or India will be further isolated further. Because the first war is the war of public opinion.

    2. Once India is isolated, China will have far more options, expect to see massive deployments into Tibet, and of course #1 will still be happening. Then fighting may commence.

    I also said I have a feeling that India's action in sending troops into China might be the action of a regional commander and Modi might not even know about it, I say this because this situation only break out into news 2 weeks after it happened, and India government was not coordinated in its response, nor was any Western nation said anything, and still to today no Western nation is taking India's position, this only shows India's initial decision may very well unplanned

    However India is stuck because their media is string things up, so Modi who have a strong man imagine,cannot back down anymore. But If you look at India's official government they actually are keeping it a bit low, and a few weeks back they propose that both side withdraw together, that only means Indian top leaderships knows if this keep goes on it won't end well for them.

    And of course, India is not getting any support from West whatsoever and if this keep goes on, it might even jeopardize West goal to build up an "Democratic" "Responsible" and "Rule following" India's as a counter weight to China. Because if India has demonstrated that they are not at all "responsible" or "rule following", then it be a bit hypocritical for West to support them. I'm sure they still will get support, but won't be with the excuse of supporting a rightful power to counter a evil power anymore. It be like US giving weapons to Syrian rebels, but everyone know those rebels are basically terrorist. I think this long term implication is more important than anything else.
     
    bluewater2012 likes this.
  5. sanblvd
    Offline

    sanblvd Junior Member
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Nov 20, 2014
    Messages:
    349
    Likes Received:
    802
    No they won't

    US sees how it is, and they are NOT giving support to India whatsoever, nor are Japan, EU and Australia. So no support from West

    Take a look at Russia, there is no chance in hell Russia will get on India's side, I'm sure Russia want China and India to fight each other to weaken each other, so China will be tied down and have less ambition in Siberia.

    But Russia will NEVER openly support India, if they did that, that means Russia will openly piss off China who's 3 province bordering Russia far east with 110 million while Russia's entire far east with less than 6 million. Its really really not in Russia interest to have a hostile China next door. Putin is not Modi, they won't make such stupid decisions,.

    India is on its own this time, if they want a fight, it be one on one.
     
    Hendrik_2000 and perfume like this.
  6. taxiya
    Offline

    taxiya Major
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Dec 24, 2006
    Messages:
    3,723
    Likes Received:
    8,201
    Firstly, we know long term is a relative term as time is endless. It's not possible for anyone to cover the endless time, but comparably long enough or longer than others is possible.

    On the question about China's leadership, I can say they usually think and plan in at least doubled time scale and more. Xi is following a long term strategy that was set out by the collective leadership of Deng Xiaoping almost four decades ago. Specifically regarding India, that principle of how to (not exact action plan) was set by Mao in the late 1950s.

    I myself can not say anything for certain, but I am inclined to see the current struggling between Indian and China in a similar light to the Sino-Soviet struggle which at its worst went to a border war just like 1962 Sino-India, but today's Sino-Russo relation is quite ok, or Sino-American fight in Korea in the 50s. They all tell one thing, it can be rough to the point of shooting each other, China won't blink if that happens, but nothing ever went out of control (twice for China in the last 50 years), that is where my confidence of China's leadership's long term thinking rests on.
     
    Equation and manqiangrexue like this.
  7. Zool
    Offline

    Zool Junior Member

    Joined:
    Aug 17, 2009
    Messages:
    475
    Likes Received:
    968
    It is possible the Indian incursion was the result of the local Indian Commander taking initiative, without running it up the chain first, as sanblvd mentioned. It is a theory going around Indian forums at the moment.

    But the Indian Government and Media have dug in and too much time has passed to play this card now in any believable way. They could still use it as a means to try and save face in a unilateral withdrawal, but it would raise a lot of eyebrows since this scenario has not been remotely close to the position and commentary coming out of Delhi.

    This does seem more likely to be an opportunity India seized as means of responding to the perceived challenge it faces, economically and geopolitically, with the OBOR program and China's continued strong GDP growth.

    India presents itself as coming in at the behest of tiny Bhutan, who is defenseless and facing an aggressive China trying to land-grab via development of a road. Changing facts on the ground; this plays well internationally in the context of past island building in the SCS, particularly with Western powers.

    Delhi knows China has publicly valued its peaceful boarder with India and that China has also said it will never again suffer a loss of territory and sovereignty. So China is put into a position of either resorting to force to recover and hold its side of the boarder vis-a-vis Bhutan, or cede the ground.

    If China uses force, India would likely use the action as pretext to economically damage China through sanctions. India would certainly attempt to leverage the US, Japan and others in Europe to deal a blow. The OBOR venture would probably no longer be viable.
    Beyond this, I doubt India would put up much of a fight. I think they would instead play the victim for economic gain, rather than fight back in any meaningful way or expand the conflict along the greater boarder, expecting that China will also probably be conservative and keep hostilities isolated to the specific Doklam area.

    Were China to do nothing over the long term, India and others would use this to damage Chinese prestige and resolve, both internally among the citizenry and abroad geopolitically. That in addition to the physical loss of territory and whatever strategic value it holds.

    China right now seems to be making its case internationally and legally, to mitigate the damage economically and geopolitically, if it does resort to force. It is being methodical and putting forward the image that it is not rushing to war and is giving India the time and opportunity to pull back from perceived Chinese territory, which is a bilateral matter between China & Bhutan. As Kashmir is for India & Pakistan. This seems to me the right approach.

    If it looks like India intends to stay for the long haul, my suggestion for China would be to set aside some classic tactical wisdom and inject a degree of PR into the strategy:

    Prep secretly for a rapid deployment and then publicly announce the day before, that you will be sending in troops - refer to them as Chinese Citizenry - tomorrow to deport armed, uninvited Indian Forces, from Chinese land. Wish them well on their travels through Bhutan, which they also trespassed, before illegally crossing into China, and request they not commit such aggression again.

    The front line should be composed of a mass of unarmed Chinese Forces in riot gear, backed up by well armed PLA and fire support, and multiple cameras should be there to document any Indian resistance or God forbid, gunfire...

    Honestly though, I can't help but think how reminiscent this Chinese response is to the infamous 'Forward Policy' of India under Nehru in the 60's. If you study the Indian probing of the boarder then, and the Chinese warnings leading up to the 1962 War, it is eerily similar.
     
    Equation, Yodello, flyzies and 5 others like this.
  8. sanblvd
    Offline

    sanblvd Junior Member
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Nov 20, 2014
    Messages:
    349
    Likes Received:
    802
    What lip service? as far as I know literally 0 country on earth has officially taken India's side on this, give me your source? Do you have a link or something?

    Last time in 1962 China's position was far worse, China was officially a enemy with US as US don't even recognize China as the official government.

    And it was also in the beginning stages of Sino USSR split so it was also not on a good term with Russia.

    This time, Russia officially have a very good relationship with China and it needs to keep it that way, and US today is the largest trading nation with China. Very different situation than in 1962.
     
  9. taxiya
    Offline

    taxiya Major
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Dec 24, 2006
    Messages:
    3,723
    Likes Received:
    8,201
    Are you typing this post in a Sauna? You seems to be very heated up.
     
  10. taxiya
    Offline

    taxiya Major
    Registered Member

    Joined:
    Dec 24, 2006
    Messages:
    3,723
    Likes Received:
    8,201
    Now I see where your heat come from, and it seems it gets your nerve.

    No, I am not seriously comparing you to him at this moment, but I am suspicious of that because I do not know you. I would not have suspect you if you did not demonstrate the over average enthusiastic patriotism. So there is the possibility.

    I can only become serious about it (true or false) when in time I have read enough posts of yours on different subjects. So far I only have ONE subject/event, too early for me to say. You are welcome to prove me wrong in suspecting.
     
    Equation likes this.
Loading...
Thread Status:
Not open for further replies.

Share This Page