US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Why when you can just send in GJ-11s and bomb the marine force on an island once they are discovered?

The correct response is a picture of a PLA military intelligence officer with a caption that says "oh, so my job is a joke to you?".

I said that people don't understand operations and logistics but I should have added that they also have absolutely no idea about how military intelligence works. It's like that joke: There are two types of people in the world: those who can extrapolate from data.

Let my try to explain the nature of the problem. I don't know what you know or can do so I'll try juggling as an analogy, as if it is not clear to you already, you can easily watch some videos to try and understand the problems involved with that.

Can you juggle one ball? That's easy. Even I can do that. Two balls? You'll get there with some practice. How about three? Three balls is where "juggling" is recognized as a distinct skill. But you can learn it. How about four? Or five? With enough practice you'll get there.

How about: juggling a randomly changing number of balls?

You juggle three and suddenly while the balls are in the air they become six balls, then four, then twelve, then one... How do you think that would work for you?

How about: juggling a randomly changing number of balls while blindfolded and having to rely on another person telling you how many balls are in the air at any given moment?

Are you still there with me? Good. That's called "fog of war". Welcome to military intelligence and let me tell you how things get even harder from here.

The saying "military intelligence is an oxymoron" was coined by a moron. <ba dum tss>

------------

Information domain is the worst domain because information warfare is a scale-free problem. It's dealing with infinities. There's never a point where you reach the end of it and you can have all the information for analysis. And in war you are also limited by time available for analysis and synthesis. You need both because analysis provides the picture of the situation but synthesis develops the optimal response. Synthesis is more difficult than analysis because it has to deal with potential responses from the opponent. Do they know that we know that they know that we know? It's like chess and predicting moves. So you can only hope to be better than your opponent and be good enough to achieve your objective which is outside of information domain and thus scale-specific - the number of enemy personnel, the ability for maneuver etc etc.

When people look at FD30 (correction: it's Force Design 2030, not Battle Force - that was USN fleet plan) they think in terms what a reformed Marine unit can do. What they should be thinking about is what can the enemy know about the reformed Marine unit's capabilities at any given time.

The best analogy here is modern fencing. Extremely complex technically and very bland to an ordinary observer and so quick that even the fighters don't know if they won or not. Not helpful, so I will use kick-boxing.

It doesn't matter that the enemy can knock you out with a straight right followed by a left hook if you know how and when the two punches will be used. You can evade the hits by dodging, you can evade them through footwork putting you out of range, you can evade them by exhausting your opponent's energy. Alternatively you can adopt a defensive posture and just endure the hit and perhaps force the opponent to change strategy thinking that it's not effective.

So when people talk about USMC reform they're really saying "Marines used to do right-left KO and now they're supposed to do flying kicks? Flying kicks only work in movies." But that's not the point. A right-left combo only works from a specific position while a flying kick can come at any angle and distance and the battlefield is not a well-lit arena but a dark street. And there are no judges, no points, no rules.

------------

I made this table when FD30 was announced - look at the structure change and think not in terms of type of attack but in terms of being able to predict your opponent's move. Force Design 2030 is not about being more lethal. It is about surviving and being able to deliver blows against an opponent who has an advantage in the theater.

USMC reductions.jpg

Tanks are direct combat weapons, require extensive support and are not strategically mobile.

Cannons (M777) are mobile but have limited range and firepower and require logistics for operation. You can place a missile launcher at a greater range which expands the search area geometrically. Circle with radius 1 has area of 3,14. Circle with radius 4 has area of 12,56. Missile launchers can shoot and scoot, M777 have to deliver at least three rounds for the same effect. Missiles can have complex trajectory. Artillery rounds have simple ballistic trajectory. Etc.

Helicopter squadrons are both cut and reduced in size to 10 aircraft because helicopters limited range and payload so they're vulnerable to detection.

Fighter squadrons are only cut in size to better adjust to new mode of dispersed operations and to build a reserve pool of aircraft.

All of that also means that there are fewer people in every tactical unit meaning fewer people are necessary for every mission. Fewer people means less resources expended across all actions - combat, maneuver, transport, sustainment etc. And that means lower logistical footprint. Tracking enemy logistics is one of the most basic ways to detect enemy combat units and assess their disposition, strength, preparation etc.

Force Design 2030 is an admission that PLA has the upper hand in WestPac precisely because it's primary focus is on avoiding detection on strategic, operational and even tactical levels.

This is ROGUE Fires concept:

JLTV ROGUE 1.jpg
JLTV ROGUE 2.jpg

It's almost disposable. Mass approx half of JLTV (~4-6t) because armor is not necessary. Can launch NSM, GMLRS, other munitions, drones.

And that's not even touching on the problem of effectiveness of airstrikes against a prepared ground force. Air power doesn't win wars. That's American propaganda. You can look up my thread on Desert Storm for numbers. Ironically DS is used as best evidence for air power when it is best evidence against it.

GJ-11 is unlikely to do sufficient damage to a prepared Marine unit that it can't continue its mission. The best way to use such asset is to target logistics which is why FD30 does it's best to reduce exposure. If FD30 is applied properly sending GJ-11 on strike missions against individual Marine teams will be a waste of resources. As part of a combined operation against ships transporting Marines - yes. The way you suggest it can be done - no.

Don't apply the logic of neo-colonial warfare to full-spectrum peer warfare. US Marines will never be ISIS no matter how outgunned they may be in WestPac.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
The correct response is a picture of a PLA military intelligence officer with a caption that says "oh, so my job is a joke to you?".

I said that people don't understand operations and logistics but I should have added that they also have absolutely no idea about how military intelligence works. It's like that joke: There are two types of people in the world: those who can extrapolate from data.

When people look at FD30 (correction: it's Force Design 2030, not Battle Force - that was USN fleet plan) they think in terms what a reformed Marine unit can do. What they should be thinking about is what can the enemy know about the reformed Marine unit's capabilities at any given time.

And that's not even touching on the problem of effectiveness of airstrikes against a prepared ground force. Air power doesn't win wars. That's American propaganda. You can look up my thread on Desert Storm for numbers. Ironically DS is used as best evidence for air power when it is best evidence against it.

GJ-11 is unlikely to do sufficient damage to a prepared Marine unit that it can't continue its mission. The best way to use such asset is to target logistics which is why FD30 does it's best to reduce exposure. If FD30 is applied properly sending GJ-11 on strike missions against individual Marine teams will be a waste of resources. As part of a combined operation against ships transporting Marines - yes. The way you suggest it can be done - no.

Don't apply the logic of neo-colonial warfare to full-spectrum peer warfare. US Marines will never be ISIS no matter how outgunned they may be in WestPac.
Thanks for your explanation. So in your opinion PLA should emulate the American strategy and send its Marines after American Marines?

How about building hundreds of thousands of Shahed style piston cruise missiles to completely destroy fuel depots and support infrastructure in Japan and South Korea?
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Thanks for your explanation. So in your opinion PLA should emulate the American strategy and send its Marines after American Marines?

Yes, but no.

There are three aspects of warfare - strategy, operations and tactics - each defined by two fundamental questions.

Strategy:
1. Who is my enemy and who is my ally?
2. When do I fight and when do I keep peace?

Operations:
3. How do I prevent being forced to give battle at the wrong time and place?
4. How do I force my enemy to battle in a time and place of my choosing?

Tactics:
5. What do I do when I begin to lose the battle?
6. What do I do to win the battle?

The reasoning should be conducted sequentially from 1 to 6. You are asking 6 after 2 which is erroneous thinking. For optimal results 3, 4 and 5 have to be considered first.

The best form of victory is defeating enemy without fighting at all. This again follows 1 to 6. So if you can defeat your opponent's strategy you don't need to worry about operations. If you can defeat your opponent's operations you don't have to worry about tactics. Changing strategy is easy and cheap. Changing tactics that follow from strategy is hard and expensive. People confuse the two too often and think strategy is the problem.

Therefore if USMC and USN prepare for war in the Pacific (and 1, 2 are not variables) the best course of action is to take initiative and shift power to another theater and force them to fight a scenario that they are not prepared to fight. So if USMC is transforming itself to be an asymmetric enabling force China could for example push the US to use USMC as stabilizing force in the Arctic following breakup and partition of Russian Federation. This way the entire process of transformation backfires because USMC has shed numbers and assets necessary for that type of operation and will be at disadvantage coming from the sea while China will be coming from inland.

Why I suggest PLAN marines should change:

It has to do with them becoming a proper marine force than responding to what USMC does. Any form of assertive foreign policy in the region will sooner or later require force projection whether there is a war or not. I don't like the concept of parallel armies because that's something that emerged from legal constraints in the US and this is why I would make both PLAN marines and select PLAGF units more "marine" and integrated under joint ops. Give marines the edge but never expect them to be a land force. For that an airborne unit of PLAGF trained in jungle and mountain warfare is better. There's no reason why "marines" have to be a separate branch.

France has navy marine units (Fusiliers Marins) which number 1800 and army marine/expeditionary units (Troupes de marine) which number 17 000. Fusiliers Marins establish beachheads and are first line and then Troupes de marine follow. American system is unique to America for historical reasons and should not be replicated.

I also think that the density of marine traffic in WestPac littorals makes it viable for PLAN marines to train as boarding units. Quite literally fighting ship-to-ship and considering the "marine militia" can provide that type of battlefield I think it is a very relevant direction.

Why such move would be better for countering FD30 USMC:


Force Design makes marine units very adept at dodging attacks. They can slip by a massed attack and evade a direct strike. What they can't do is fight while someone is constantly disrupting their maneuver. It's more go than chess. You don't go after them directly as much as post your forces in places that will restrict what they can do - specifically making it more difficult to evade detection. It's also about distribution of decision-making and scale. If a Marine missile unit launches a missile it's better if a PLAN marine unit on a nearby island counters them rather than wait for PLAAF sending a GJ-11. If a GJ-11 is indeed sent it's better to have information fed from nearby positions. Better yet if nearby unit constraints USMC maneuver so that GJ-11 can strike it.

I don't think that such a force needs to engage US Marines directly. They will have an advantage against detection but if detected they will be more vulnerable compared to their previous structure. So perhaps just PLAN MF presence will provide sufficient deterrence against aggressive operations?

In the end I don't have all the data to engage in meaningful speculation. I can only attempt to correct the course of thinking when I see people going in a direction that I know is wrong. Ultimately only PLA knows what it wants to do and we don't. Ignoring FD30 altogether is also a viable solution if in the end it doesn't disrupt PLA strategy and operations.

How about building hundreds of thousands of Shahed style piston cruise missiles to completely destroy fuel depots and support infrastructure in Japan and South Korea?

First of all you forget the rule of war: don't do anyting that Russia does. That's obviously a joke except not really.

Russia's choice to employ Iranian drones en masse was largely a desperation measure aimed at achieving psychological effect and it was nowhere near as effective as Russian propaganda claims. Such drones can be used to saturate air defenses if used in numbers much greater than what Russia did in Ukraine but they will not have any other effect.

Piston engine is too inefficient to carry a sufficiently large warhead at a sufficiently long distance. They are not difficult to shoot down. Ukraine shoots down the overwhelming majority of them.

I don't know why China allegedly bought those thousands of drones from Iran but it doesn't have to do with PLA at all. It can be intended for North Korea. It can be intended for Pakistan. For some of the Pacific islands. It makes much more sense to use such large amount of munitions as proliferation threat because of how easy to operate they are for irregular formations like insurgencies in the Philippines or Indonesia or wherever.

Secondly what would that do to USMC deployment in the Philippines or Indonesia?

Let's forget about a continent named Australia for a moment.

US is logistically constrained by space and time necessary to cross from CONUS to theater but that constraint is not that different whether their approach is across the Pacific or Atlantic-Indian oceans. Pacific is more straightforward but it's entirely at sea. Atlantic/Indian allows for staging on land. At some point in PLAN development - and I expect it sooner than later - there will be a moment where USN will no longer enjoy an advantage at open sea that is as decisive as it is presently and people tend to forget just how hostile open sea is to human presence.

USN has "command of the seas" not because they do what they want but because they get to beat any opponent at sea. The literal claim is beyond hubris and comes from Royal Navy. Think of two drowning men who fight each other. The better swimmer will win but that means nothing in terms of his overall survival at sea. So at some point USN will prefer to fight closer to shore.

Japan and Korea are relevant because of economic factors which only matter at the beginning of armed conflict. Neither is Europe so they have no layers of escalation that separate Russia from European core. China vs Japan/Korea/Taiwan is western front in WW1. It will either be a bloody of 1914-1918 or swift collapses of 1940 and 1944. I think the war there is likely to be decided before it starts.

Everywhere else in WestPac is a different story.

In general I strongly recommend against armchair generalship. We don't know enough to make sense of what we know so there are plenty of directions that seem plausible even though they are very very wrong. This is why I prefer to focus on what is and what was rather than what could be.

Treat all above as somewhat informed speculation. I hope I answered your question sufficiently. It's already OT so let's end it here. Further questions -> PM. Take care.
 

MwRYum

Major
With the PLAN Marines still geared towards the final resolution of the Taiwan problem, countering USMC FD30 will require some other way to come to be.

Since USMC will still depends on the "squids" to get them to where the fight is, disruption / destruction of USN/USAF logistics in the WestPac/IndoPac theater will be in order. It will not stay "small scale" and "conventional" for long.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Marine Corps Requirements Call for 9 Light Amphibious Ships per Regiment​

Related artist renderings of LAM/LSM for the US Marine Corps:
7695e2e2ly1hbccuyb90wj22ji0u0adz.jpg
7695e2e2ly1hbccuy4ee9j21hc0u0tb2.jpg
7695e2e2ly1hbccuyamptj21hc0u0dma.jpg
7695e2e2ly1hbcde3qn0jj20ol0jndhw.jpg
7695e2e2ly1hbcd6bu9j5j21hc0u0q6g.jpg

Question:
1. Will the Type 22 missile boats and 056/056A corvettes be capable of countering these?
2. Does the PLAN have these kinds of boats for the Marine Corps, and doctrines to emulate and counter the US Marine Corps' FD30?
 
Last edited:

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Related artist renderings of LAM/LSM for the US Marine Corps:
[...]
Question:
1. Will the Type 22 missile boats and 056/056A corvettes be capable of countering these?
2. Does the PLAN have these kinds of boats for the Marine Corps, and doctrines to emulate and counter the US Marine Corps' FD30?

If those are officially approved preliminary design concepts then Light Amphibious Ship is an LST (Landing Ship Tank) or LSM (Landing Ship Medium) which is an amphibious ship but not an amphibious assault ship.

While performing amphibious assault is possible from this ship it is not its primary tactical role and it is not optimized for that purpose.

This type of vessel will serve an auxiliary role providing sea transport to unprepared landing sites. They are cheap slow small transport ships that don't need port infrastructure to unload cargo which is necessary for deploying forces to small uninhabited islands or parts of inhabited territory far from infrastructure. LAS is the naval equivalent of a logistical trucks, not an armored personnel carrier (that would be LPD) let alone an infantry fighting vehicle (LHD/LHA). They will not deliver Marine units to defended areas and they will not operate in waters controlled by enemy forces.

To answer your questions:

(1) LAS will not operate in waters that Type 22 or Type 056/A will operate in as these are defensive coastal vessels. Any more aggressive or offensive use of such asset would be an exception rather than the rule.

(2) Yes, PLAN has a number of LST/LSM type amphibious ships - 074 (800t) and 072III/A (4000t)

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
640px-072A.jpg


Those type of vessels are the standard amphibious ships used commonly around the world. USMC was unique in that it retired all LST/LSM ships long ago in favor of large LPD/LHD ships which was consequence of shift in doctrine where USMC would become expeditionary army capable of amphibious operations rather than a marine force. US Army maintains it's own fleet of amphibious vessels as well and those are LST designs in 4000t range:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

602px-US_Naval_Ship_Pollux_%28T-AKR-290%29_anchored_in_the_harbor_off_the_Port_of_Pusan%2C_Republic_of_Korea_-_19_Oct._1998.jpg


I expected that LAS would be designed as such because the main problem that USMC has currently is lack of small vessels that could transport company-sized unit or equivalent logistical payload between areas and potentially could be permanently assigned to a Littoral Regiment in the same manner that land vehicles are assigned to a unit. If a Littoral Regimens has a designated area of operations and is forward-deployed in theater the LAS would be directed there as well.

This choice of design is a potential indication that the use of Littoral Regiments may be more restrained than I initially imagined - focused more on area denial in an already-controlled area. For example - for aggressive amphibious operations Soviet navy developed Zubr-class heavy LCAC. At the time those vessels were fast enough to get to the landing zone, deploy and withdraw - 55 knots (100km/h) with range of 300nm/560km. That was very good for Baltic or Black sea theaters. They could carry a mechanized company or infantry battalion which was enough for capturing beachheads in advance positions. Objective-optimized design determines which operations are possible and which are not. So far FD30 is all about falling on the back foot and trying to keep PLAN at a safe distance. Which is correct thinking considering the force that both sides can bring to theater.

LAS will also enhance readiness. This video mentions an apparent mismatch of readiness rates - 46% for USN and 80% for PLAN.


I don't know if that is correct but definitely a smaller simpler vessel will be easier to maintain in ready state.

To do so we require no less than 31 Amphibious Warfare Ships and 35 Medium Landing Ships.

I assume this refers to 31 LHA/LHD/LPD and 35 LAW. However if as this video states LAW will be deployed around 2029 then it is too little too late. Those ships should already be entering service. USN keeps operating as if it still has uncontested control of the seas in WestPac theater but that is no longer true since PLAN has 3 LHDs, 8 LPDs and 25 LSTs focused locally while USN operates globally. If PLAN manages to break out of 1IC then it will have an advantage in sustaining operations thanks to those small amphibious ships.
 

Sinnavuuty

Senior Member
Registered Member
USTRANSCOM.jpg
Two hundred million rounds of ammunition: the US released data on military transport to Europe and Ukraine in 2022

During the year, the United States made more than 7,500 transfers of cargo and military personnel to Europe, including Ukraine. The data was released by the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

The States made almost a thousand flights, sent almost 150 trains and about 6,500 trucks with military supplies. In just one year, from the USA to Europe arrived:

▪️Over £360 million worth of military equipment.

▪️More than 200 million spins.

▪️Over 14,000 light weapons.

▪️More than 1.15 million artillery shells and 282 artillery systems.

▪️More than 111 thousand projectiles and piercing systems.

▪️Almost three thousand missiles for air defense systems and about 1500 different air defense systems.

▪️Forty-seven radars.

▪️Sixteen thousand employees.

▪️Fifteen helicopters.

▪️Thirty boats.

▪️More than two and a half thousand trucks.
 
Top