There's an interesting exchange between
@Lethe and
@Blitzo in the
Fujian thread that I wanted to respond to, but I don't think my response is appropriate to that thread because it veers far from the
Fujian and into the PLA's strategic direction over the next decade. Therefore, I've decided to post it in this thread.
I want to distinguish between two objectives or imperatives facing China: The first is the need to deter the US from launching a war against China given the deteriorating geopolitical environment; the second is the need for China to develop sufficient force projection capability to decisively win a high-intensity war against the US no matter how broad the geographical scope of such a war. We might consider these two conditions to be the minimal and maximal expressions, respectively, of China's military ambitions. I argue that China will pursue the latter maximalist ambition over the long term, but my arguments and evidence for that position are tangential to this discussion so I'll just take it as axiomatic.
The question I want to consider here is the role played by aircraft carriers (both conventional and nuclear) in the two scenarios. To my mind, carriers play a much more important role in the latter scenario over the former, and nuclear carriers a much more important role there than conventional ones. While it's certainly true that vast carrier fleets deter conflict, the investment required in time and resources would crowd out other much more efficient means. Worse, I can think of no better way to entice aggression from the United States than it becoming generally accepted that China was out to build such carrier fleets in its present state of incomplete and inadequate deterrence.
Much more important than building another
Fujian-type carrier is to address the two most critical vulnerabilities that afflict China: its inadequate nuclear deterrent and the SSN asymmetry with the US. The most crucially important naval system for China to develop and field in vast quantities as soon as humanly possible is the Type 09-V SSN. Better still, this submarine is relevant to both deterring war and winning a high-intensity war in the Pacific - it has a starring role in both scenarios. Developing this system is the best use of the PLAN's resources at the present time, but even that takes a backseat to the much more pressing problem of expanding and strengthening China's nuclear deterrent. Although a taboo discussion here, it must be appreciated that absolute nuclear deterrence is the foundation on which everything else is built.
Does this preclude any other carriers from being built until China's conventional and nuclear deterrents are complete? Not entirely. But I would argue that developing another conventional carrier would be useful in the near and medium term only through its secondary effects - developing expertise in naval construction of this kind of ship, and raising a cadre sailors, officers, airmen, etc. around the ship. How useful that is depends on how well one thinks
Liaoning,
Shandong, and
Fujian are doing that job and what the marginal utility of adding a fourth carrier would be. The direct military utility is limited and if I were making the decision, I would rather have whatever number of Type 09-Vs that money could purchase. I'm also confident that by the time China's deterrence is where it needs to be and it has made some strategic room for itself, nuclear propulsion and other technologies will have matured to the point where conventional carriers are no longer considered satisfactory.
