PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
- Thread starter SEAD
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^ Phillipines infrastructure is already in motion and allows stockpiling.
Okinawa has major US infrastructure, so "realistically" depends on US intentions and commitment. And Taiwan does have CMs and BMs. They cant be ignored.
Your original point about no real estate existing is simply false.
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The article didn‘t say what kind of weapons are allow to be stockpiled in the Philippines.
Taiwan‘s weapons are crap
How many missiles can be fired from Ryukyu islands before the counterattack from China?
If Philippines and Japan allow the Americans to launch attack from their soil, they become participants of the war against China. They are open for retaliations, including nuclear ones. Are they willing to die for Americans?
What do you think the prudent assumption should be, for PLA strategic planners and force development/procurement point of view?
The prudent thing for China to do would be to solve its 1.4% problem.
On this issue specifically, I think @vincent's last sentence indicates the solution the US getting cute and thinking it can out-PLARF the PLARF. China's missile defenses, and more importantly its missile early warning systems, should be prioritized going forward given how the US is going to copy the PLA. Launch on warning works just as well for conventional missiles as it does for nuclear ones; China should make clear to the US and its allies that if it detects any large-scale missile attack, it will respond by mauling US forward deployed forces with its own conventional missiles and erasing US allies with nuclear attacks.
My point is that there is no reason to not honour the threat.
Trying to come up with ways to consider how an opfor's system of systems might be less effective or less viable than they plan, is called hoping the opposition makes an unforced error.
No high capability military in the world should base their strategic planning for hoping for an unforced error.
If anything, the prudent thing to do should be to assume the opposition's plan will be more effective than the opposition plans, and then tailor your own requirements and capabilities accordingly.
the key words as always, is cover and dispersion. Here's a partial picture of China's major military bases and MIC production capabilities.
As you see Chinese bases and MIC is spread across the entire country spanning 3000+ km north/south east/west.
Even with no effective early warning it is still very difficult to coordinate the destruction of all or even most of these targets simultaneously. Remember, if they are not struck simultaneously, the destruction of the first bases serves as an alert for the other bases.
You may also note that these bases are in heavily forested and mountainous areas, except the missile silos and early warning radars, which are near the Mongolian and Russian borders and still unreachable by anything but strategic missiles.
And this is assuming they can ignore tactical targets like naval ships, SAM sites, subs, etc.
A counterinvasion of China or permanent suppression of Chinese MIC is essentially impossible, since there's no way to reach the MIC and bases deep inside China with tactical air. the only way to suppress Chinese MIC is either by invading or continuous carpet bombing. invading is impossible and there no way to put bombers there because PLAAF tactical air can intercept them. Even stealth bombers, even if undetected going in, will be on a 1 way trip as J-16s with IRST and IR guided missiles hunt them down on their way out.
As you see Chinese bases and MIC is spread across the entire country spanning 3000+ km north/south east/west.
Even with no effective early warning it is still very difficult to coordinate the destruction of all or even most of these targets simultaneously. Remember, if they are not struck simultaneously, the destruction of the first bases serves as an alert for the other bases.
You may also note that these bases are in heavily forested and mountainous areas, except the missile silos and early warning radars, which are near the Mongolian and Russian borders and still unreachable by anything but strategic missiles.
And this is assuming they can ignore tactical targets like naval ships, SAM sites, subs, etc.
A counterinvasion of China or permanent suppression of Chinese MIC is essentially impossible, since there's no way to reach the MIC and bases deep inside China with tactical air. the only way to suppress Chinese MIC is either by invading or continuous carpet bombing. invading is impossible and there no way to put bombers there because PLAAF tactical air can intercept them. Even stealth bombers, even if undetected going in, will be on a 1 way trip as J-16s with IRST and IR guided missiles hunt them down on their way out.
I agree completely.
On the specific subject of China's adversaries trying their hand at A2/AD, I think a combination of vastly expanding the PLARF's own arsenal and placing it in a heightened state such that it's impossible to surprise or attrite, as well as expanding the scope of nuclear coercion, is the key to success both operationally and politically. In my response to Patchwork I mentioned that US allies have mutual defense pacts with it, not mutual suicide pacts. This enhanced Chinese missile posture is to remind them that going to Hell with the US isn't something they want to do.
In these discussions of systems, postures, moves, and countermoves we often ignore the political angle. I make it a point to try to incorporate that angle into these analyses.
I expect the Chinese leaders to warn any countries that may host US troops and weapons, and is willing to allow the American to launch attack against China that China will de-industrialized said countries. What that means destroying their power generation stations, mining their ports, and destroying critical infrastructures.
If US-China war gets escalated to nuclear exchanges, China will make sure she will spare a few for those countries that participated in the attack against her.
On the other hand, I expect the Chinese government to give economic incentives to her friends and neutral parties to reject American weapons on their soil.
PLA should adopt a launch-on-warning even for conventional attacks during tense periods. I expect PLA to deploy tons of sensory nodes in the likely incoming attack vector so any massive launch from the US will be detected and verified in minutes. I expect hypersonic weapons from both sides will be launched against each other in lockstep and I expect China will win in the exchange because China can produce hypersonic weapons at much lower cost and can stockpile many more of them. China can launch slower speed weapons en masse afterward.
Your previous original post was that China would issue ultimatums if they saw weapons piling up in the western pacific. You are saying that you would expect China to try and deter and dissuade countries from hosting US weapons.
All reasonable.
However, that doesn't answer the question of what China would do if their efforts are ultimately unsuccessful at preventing the US from frontloading the western pacific with substantial weapons. Would China go to war to prevent it? Probably not.
The only solution therefore, is to carry out substantial procurement and strategic planning of its own, and that starts by respecting the adversary and the threat.