PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

[Michaelsinodef]

I wonder if superweapon-type deterrence weapons akin to the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and FOBS would be viable in given China an even definitive edge in terms of her deterrence capabilities, in case of any hot conflict in the Western Pacific?

The key of those superweapons would serve to enhance China's capability of punching through US-&-Lackeys Co.'s defense networks against China's nuclear delivery weapons, so much so that the US-&-Lavkeys Co. would rather choose to stand down and avoid as much confrontation as possible, in fear of being blasted out of existence by China should they dare to intervene while unable to do anything to stop it.

I know all nuclear powers today are de-facto practicing MAD policy, but with Japan, South Korea and Guam already stationing US ABM systems so up close to China's doorstep, I felt that China is at a disadvantage here. Not much different from Russia regarding NATO, really.

Should China pursue such kinds of weaponry as well? Or is China already in the process of/already acquiring such weaponry?

The ABM systems in Japan/SK can mostly be taken out with hypersonics before they can take out any chinese nuclear missiles/rockets if it gets to that stage.

 

[escobar]

I wonder if superweapon-type deterrence weapons akin to the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and FOBS would be viable in given China an even definitive edge in terms of her deterrence capabilities, in case of any hot conflict in the Western Pacific?

The key of those superweapons would serve to enhance China's capability of punching through US-&-Lackeys Co.'s defense networks against China's nuclear delivery weapons, so much so that the US-&-Lavkeys Co. would rather choose to stand down and avoid as much confrontation as possible, in fear of being blasted out of existence by China should they dare to intervene while unable to do anything to stop it.

I know all nuclear powers today are de-facto practicing MAD policy, but with Japan, South Korea and Guam already stationing US ABM systems so up close to China's doorstep, I felt that China is at a disadvantage here. Not much different from Russia regarding NATO, really.

Should China pursue such kinds of weaponry as well? Or is China already in the process of/already acquiring such weaponry?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1413324216070381569

 

[Mohsin77]

It's unlikely that the US military will be able to pre-position anywhere near enough assets for a really effective first strike against China.

The problem is that "unlikely" doesn't equal impossible. The French also thought a German offensive through the Ardennes was "unlikely." I would rather assume both sides are capable of accumulating potent 1st strike options if they really want to. All of this has been covered earlier in the thread already.

And if China sees the US preparing to do this, will that prompt the Chinese military to strike first?

If China concludes that an attack is imminent, based on all its gathered intel, then probably yes... But of course, that's a very difficult strategic decision. Just look at the other times in history when such go/no-go decisions had to be made.

 

[AndrewS]

If China concludes that an attack is imminent, based on all its gathered intel, then probably yes... But of course, that's a very difficult strategic decision. Just look at the other times in history when such go/no-go decisions had to be made.

It's not just if China concludes that an attack is imminent.

If China concludes that a war with the US is inevitable, that could also trigger a pre-emptive strike.

That would be the result of the US demonstrating more "resolve" to defend Taiwan.

 

[clockwork]

The ABM systems in Japan/SK can mostly be taken out with hypersonics before they can take out any chinese nuclear missiles/rockets if it gets to that stage.

Good point, except if China has to launch them urgently (e.g. silos) to avoid a US counterforce strike. Then those ABMs would have to be taken out preemptively before the conflict.

 

[W20]

What is the Range of DF-100

If for example it was 2 thousand kilometers (!?) then DF-26 could approach the coast and its Range would be spectacular, even if the range of DF-100 was 1 thousand kilometers (?) it would have to be taken into account.

What do you think about this. And thank you very much for the very interesting thread.

 

[AndrewS]

With that said though, the PLA's joint C4ISTAR and sensor fusion is pretty amazing, so they'll have a lot less trouble generating, disseminating, and executing tasking orders than we will in a few ways.

That is a very interesting statement. If there anything that can be shared publicly?

Haha it seems you've finally joined the FIRES club. Welcome! I actually wrote a research paper entitled "Fighting Fires with Fires: A Counterintuitive Approach to Operating Untenably" where I made the argument that, for strategic situations that are as untenable as 7th Fleet's forward deployed forces are, as Japans is, as Taiwan's is, and as South Korea's is... it is the more militarily sound option to invest in not one ounce of defensive equipment, but to procure as much offensive fires generation capability as fiscally and logistically possible. Not only is the deterrent value fairly self-explanatory (It's a lot more daunting to invade a country that can and will shoot back if you want smoke), but the amount of damage done to the attacker is orders of magnitude greater in the event that the defender pivots nearly 100% of their military apparatus to procuring, manning, training with, and should the need arise - employing as many penetrating PGMs as can be done. Sadly, it's difficult to palate for many people, being told "no, we would not win, so we're not even going to try; we're just going to kill as many of them as we can before we lose."

Well, in a short duration operation that is true.
But remember that in a long campaign, the US can bring in additional assets and missiles from CONUS.

I disagree. There exists no reality in which the PRC benefits from signaling their genuine intent to invade. If they do intend to invade, it would be so overwhelmingly in their best interest to ensure the initial blows are as out of the blue as they can possibly be. After all, and I try to tell people this often - there is no reason whatsoever why amphibious, land, etc. forces would need to mass, train, and embark before the first shots are fired. The PLARF and PLAAF and PLAN already have a peacetime posture sufficient to near-completely de-fang Taiwan; and thus, a relatively small surge would make that even more the case. Once the first gifts are sent on their merry way from the PLARF to Tsai Ing Wen, and the first munitions begin impacting - would the rest of the more "visible" PLA begin mobilization in earnest. The people I work with, when they say something like, "well, we'd know! we'd have plenty of warning!" I'm forced to restrain nearly every fiber of my being from turning around and smacking them in the face. Would sure show them a thing or two about whether or not you'll actually see unpredictable things coming. Plus, they'd have earned it by actively putting the rest of us in more danger, and potentially getting real people, with families, and dreams, killed because of a hubris-laden underestimation of the PLA.

It's also the underestimation of Chinese resolve over Taiwan, which seems to happen every time you get new political or military leaders in the US.

From an ideological and belief point of view, remember that for the past 70 years, the school curriculum and media have been emphatic about Taiwan being part of China. That runs from the people in charge at the very top, and down to the very bottom.

From a political point of view, Taiwan represents a political challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese state, because it is an unfinished civil war.

From a military point of view, an independent Taiwan would inevitably host US military forces and be the lynchpin of military containment along the 1st Island Chain to the Pacific. It would also represent a threat with offensive missiles targeting the Mainland China. On the other hand, Chinese control of Taiwan ends these potential threats and allows the Chinese military to focus on projecting power (extending a defensive perimeter) into the Pacific and beyond.

From a Mearsheimer realist point of view, we can use the Monroe Doctrine as an example of how the US jealously guards its prerogatives in the Americas. When Cuba started hosting Soviet forces, the US threatened nuclear Armageddon. And when Imperial Germany suggested a military alliance with Mexico, the US declared war against Germany.

But there is a lot of flexibility as to how One-China is interpreted and the current political status quo actually suits China fine, because the longer-term economic and military balance keeps shifting towards China.

Well, I'd get a spanking were I to talk about specific USN operational COA plans, but remember - if CSG5 is pulled out far enough to not get hit, that also means it's far enough out not to hit you. That's called winning. The goal in a conflict isn't to just kill all the adversaries, it's to accomplish an objective. In the PLA's instance, it's to forcibly isolate and de-claw Taiwan while preventing the US from doing anything about it. If the US is going to pull out one of their only active CSGs (remember, there's a good portion of time where the Reagan is in drydock undergoing retrofits or repairs or any number of things. That means it might simply be unable to get out of dodge expediently enough. Ultimately I'm not a politics guy, so I won't comment on the ramifications of a Pacific "consolidation" (aka pull-out); but it'd be my personal choice from an operational standpoint at least.

The US pulling out its forward deployed forces would be viewed as abandonment by Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
If the US can't provide economic prosperity or military security, then what use is an alliance with the US?

 

[W20]

Taiwan is China more than California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, (Texas and Miami) are USA

Why don't we discuss whether the USA should return the lands it has invaded militarily?

 

[Mohsin77]

it is the more militarily sound option to invest in not one ounce of defensive equipment, but to procure as much offensive fires generation capability as fiscally and logistically possible.

Exactly! For some reason, this is a controversial idea here. Except for a few people like @Blitzo, many seem to think you can simply 'absorb' the enemy's 1st strike offensive fires and then casually retaliate.

Any IADS can be saturated, for much less the cost of the IADS. In fact, all evidence indicates IADS don't even work as advertised. And if you get enough CMs/BMs through, you can do a ton of catastrophic damage in the opening wave. Add to that the degradation of the kill chains which would be required for retaliation, it just makes more sense to focus on offense rather then relying on defense.

This general principle has always been true in strategy, but it is even more pronounced in the age of CMs.

 

[JamesRed]

Exactly! For some reason, this is a controversial idea here. Except for a few people like @Blitzo, many seem to think you can simply 'absorb' the enemy's 1st strike offensive fires and then casually retaliate.

Any IADS can be saturated, for much less the cost of the IADS. In fact, all evidence indicates IADS don't even work as advertised. And if you get enough CMs/BMs through, you can do a ton of catastrophic damage in the opening wave. Add to that the degradation of the kill chains which would be required for retaliation, it just makes more sense to focus on offense rather then relying on defense.

This general principle has always been true in strategy, but it is even more pronounced in the age of CMs.

The controversial part isn't whether IADS can be overwhelmed, it's whether you can get enough assets in place to overwhelm it. The Chinese will surely detect any large scale attack, and thus be positioned and prepared for it.