whether the next carrier is nuclear or not reminds me the argument of "steam is ready, EM is later, better to build a steam first". Some also suggested that CV-17 was an inserted extra to meet the need of having more CVs, but we did not see CV-16 and 17 runs around far out to project power.
I am trying to say that all the "urgency and small step arguments" did not really play out as argued for.
In China's near neighbourhood there is no need for CVs, long range cruise missiles and AshBMs are more cost-effective options than CBGs. China only need CVs outside 1st island chain and Indian ocean and beyond.
I think CV-17 was inserted to meet the need for having more CVs, and we are seeing the benefit of it. With both CV-16 and 17 in service, compared to only having CV-16 alone, I am sure it has helped to greatly accelerate their ability to develop cadres of pilots, flight deck crew, and accelerate proficiency in carrier operations.
In the near future, if there emerged a crisis or military operation where a carrier was necessary for the PLA, having two carriers should mean a much more competent way of conducting it by all the people involved.
In the medium and longer term future, if things are at peace, and the PLAN does continue to build carriers (I expect CVNs), having CV-16 and 17 both in service by the late 2010s and early 2020s means that they are able to build up a faster corps of pilots, deck crew, and personnel that can fill up the ranks of new carriers as they're built in a more effective manner.
Personally, I never believed that the "CV-17 ordered to have more CVs in the short term" meant that we would expect them to do power projection missions or deployments more frequently. Instead, I always interpreted it as
As for the China's "immediate near neighbourhood" -- if the PLA was only interested in fighting a war within the 1st island chain within 300-400km of its coast, then I would agree that carriers are hardly vital.
However, if they are interested in having the capability to fight a comprehensive conflict of air-naval-missile elements, with both fires and maneuver forces, then carriers are essential, and are the maneuver forces in the equation.
The question of power plant is related to but also distinct from the question of numbers and urgency. If PLAN views the carrier program as a glorified research program akin to the destroyer projects pursued from the late 80s to mid-2000s, then nuclear makes sense as the next step. If PLAN views carriers as a major component of its response to the credible prospect of major conflict in the medium-term, then I think nuclear makes less sense. In theory, PLAN could choose to produce nuclear-powered carriers at a high cadence, but of course this would come at the greatest cost and greatest implications for other programs. Given the heavy demands that greatly expanded nuclear submarine construction is going to place on PLAN's budget going forward, I do not see "having one's cake and eating it too" to be a realistic prospect, unless defence spending is increased as a proportion of GDP.
As others have mentioned, this is dependent as much on how much defense spending they have, the cost of nuclear propulsion (and carriers and the rest of the battlegroup), and the timing/maturity of nuclear propulsion.
But I want to add, that I think your comparison with the destroyer program in the way you portrayed it is inaccurate.
Because the PLAN's destroyer projects between late 80s and mid 2000s was never a "glorified research program" (and I know you don't mean it in a negative manner, but I'm just using your own words here). IMO, a "research program" very much seems to imply that such a program would not result in a mass producible, comprehensive warfighting product and capability.
However, as we all know and you are intimately familiar with, the PLAN's destroyer projects from the late 80s to mid 2000s ultimately resulted in the mass production of 052Ds and 055s, at rapid pace and at that point in an unprecedented manner.
For the 055 especially, as it was a clean sheet hull design, using a new type of propulsion system for the PLAN (COGAG with combined connector gear), a number of new sensor systems and a new generation of combat management system as well, and it entered mass production between two shipyards before the first hull was even in the water.
Personally I do think the PLAN's destroyer development from the 80s to the late 2010s is a good model on which we can hang other elements of other PLAN platform development and procurement programs. The question is for PLAN carriers (namely CV-16, CV-17 and now CV-18), whether they are at the equivalent of PLAN destroyer-related-industry-maturity of the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, or 2010s?
If they do move onto a 004 CVN now that 003 is in the water, will we be waiting 7-8 years for steel to cut, and only at one shipyard with a second 004 hull only beginning construction after the first hull has been launched+fitted out+entered service..... or may we be only waiting some 3-4 years for steel to cut, and perhaps at Dalian and Jiangnan simultaneously, and where both shipyards will have successive hull modules ready to be laid down the moment that a new hull is launched? Or perhaps something in between?
I ask it as a rhetorical question, because anything between the two seems plausible to me now.
As for carriers overall -- IMO, with the launch of 003 and no new carriers on the verge of steel cutting, and indications that the next carrier will be a 004 CVN, I have a feeling that any discussion about future CV or CVN procurement comes with the recognition that the PLAN won't be expecting any additional carriers to enter service prior to the late 2020s at the earliest, by design -- i.e.: we probably won't see any carriers apart from CV-18 Fujian, enter service before 2027.
Within five years IMO is "short term". 5-10 years I think can be reasonably described as medium term.
The question IMO is then two pronged:
- In the "short term" what are some projects that the PLAN may feel would be able to kick in more subsantially and perhaps in a faster manner in this period, outside of carriers? (Personally I think nuclear submarines)
- After 2027 (and going into the early, mid and late 2030s), what will PLAN carrier commissioning rates look like -- which of course is directly tied to, "when will we see steel cut on the next carrier"?
Both are rhetorical questions, but I think the medium term (5-10 years into the future mark) is very much an unknown. But I do think from 2027 to 2032 period, that nuclear powered carriers could play a very valuable and potentially key/decisive role of a high end conflict for the PLAN.
