Signs of their mass production... Units being equipped with them... Etc. Like what we saw literally in this thread with the DF-17 being fielded en masse.
China can easily release videos of TEL fleets like NK/Russia does.
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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China can easily release videos of TEL fleets like NK/Russia does.
escobar
Brigadier
Just buy maxar imagery to track tel production...
That was already done in 2019 when 16x DF-41 TELs were on parade. Somehow that was taken to mean that only 16x TELs existed by the MSM. So it still deniable. The silos are undeniable.
SinoSoldier
Colonel
I strongly suspect that China's hesitance to massively expand its nuclear arsenal is closely tied to its pursuit of a credible delivery platform. Even though China has a large land mass, the most effective means of deterrence remains that of SLBMs and SSBNs. Nuclear warheads are expensive to maintain and refurbish, and China may not be willing to incur that cost before their sea-based deterrent is developed and good to go.
While SSBNs and SLBMs are technically the most survivable form of second strike deterrence, for the PLA, the survivability and weight placed on SSBNs depends not only on the capability of SSBNs and SLBMs themselves but also the regional geography and disposition of outside military forces forward deployed in the region.
Which is to say -- SSBNs and SLBMs once mature and competitive will be a major component of the PLA's nuclear deterrent, but even then, it is likely that a major land based deterrence will be as significant or perhaps even more significant than the underwater sea based deterrent.
Which takes us to the last few years of the silos under construction that number to nearly 300 identified... unless one thinks that they are decoy silos or intended to be a shellgame (and not to be fully occupied by missiles in the short to medium term future), those 300 silos cannot be ignored as part of the calculations of what the PLA's actual nuclear deterrence expansion may or may not currently be.
It is very confusing that MSM deliberately overestimated the number of warhead DF-41 can carry meanwhile underestimating the entire nuclear stockpile.
“They are very likely playing shell game, only 1 in 10 is true missile, others are all decoys."
"China will likely double its warhead stockpile by the end of decade."
"Silos are just sitting ducks, B-21 and ABM can easily knock them out."
SinoSoldier
Colonel
I have no doubt that the PLARF land-based ICBMs will continue to be an integral part of China's nuclear deterrence, but one cannot deny that sea-based deterrence is, pound-for-pound, the most sought-after and capable arm of the nuclear triad, especially when US satellites are almost certainly keeping close watch on all suspected Chinese missile sites.
The 300 silos may signal an increase to their land-based platforms but that in an of itself isn't any indication that China has shifted its priority from SSBNs to land-based ICBMs. The shell game theory is interesting, because if it turns out to be true, this could actually signal a reduction in their land-based ICBM arsenal.
Sea based deterrence has its role, and is most ideal if you have:
- A competitive and capable SSBN and SLBM capability
- A comprehensive degree of peacetime sea control and naval dominance in your regional periphery to allow your SSBNs to operate and deploy relatively safely without threat of consistent close in monitoring and detection
For the PLA, the first one is a matter of time, money and industry.
But the second is much more difficult and a longer term process dependent on geopolitcking, and is not guaranteed.
So yes, I absolutely agree that SSBN+SLBMs will play a major role in China's nuclear deterrence going forwards once they have a competitive and capable SSBN and SLBM, but the "pound for pound value" may actually be significantly less for China than it is for the US due to the second factor of regional presence of adversary forces.
As for the silos -- my point is that with the existence of those 300 silos, we can no longer speak of "China's hesitance to expand its nuclear arsenal" as if it is definitively confirmed that China is not currently expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Right now, the question we should be asking is what the status of those 300 silos will be, if/when they will be fitted with ICBMs, how extensively they will be equipped, and what sort of missiles and MiRV status they may have.
In short -- existence of those 300 silos means we are obliged to ask "is China expanding its nuclear arsenal" rather than "why is China not expanding its nuclear arsenal".
That’s a kind of political claim, I have to repeat it again.
That means “we can endure the hurt and destroy the whole China nuclear arsenal, while we plan to take the advantage and defeat China at any cost” (international) and “don’t worry Americans, you are safe even in a war with China, and when you finally find that’s a lie, you will have no choice other than blaming China”(domestic)
Basically, they are cheating Americans.
If you read the under water battle history in Cold War, you may find for most of the time, most Russian SSBNs are caught and followed by a US SSN before they can arrive their patrol area, while US SSNs have the ability to destroy those Russian SSBNs in one minute after the sound of SSBN opening launch tubes. That’s also why USN maintains a 60 SSN fleet and plans to expand it to 72 in case of future Chinese SSBN.
The relative(compared with US) capability/capacity of Chinese under water fleet is much weaker than CCCP while its geographic condition is much worse. Russia has Sea Okhotsk but SCS is only better than nothing. It must be crazy for PLA to deploy more than 1/3 of their warheads in SSBNs.
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